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Abstract 
The thesis is motivated by contrasting catching-up performances of the Korean 
heavy electrical industry (HEI) across nuclear power and gas turbine, which have serious 
ramifications for energy policy as well as catching-up studies. When the opposite 
performance of Japanese counterparts across the two technologies is compared to the 
Korean case, the existing catching-up literature based on firm capabilities and sectoral 
approaches does not offer direct answers. Also, while most of government energy policies 
are focused on research and development (R&D) efforts, they pay little attention to a wide 
set of institutions, which might constrain and incentivise a specific technology catching-
up. 
The idiosyncratic catching-up experiences and potential mismatch between 
catching-up policies and the institutional factors of the Korean HEI urge comparative and 
institutional perspectives for a generalisable claim. Therefore, the thesis adopts a partial 
comparative case study between the Korean HEI and the ‘earlier’ latecomer, namely 
Japanese HEI, as a reference case with mostly secondary evidences based on a broad 
version of national system of innovation system (NSI) approach (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 
1988; Lundvall et al., 2002). The adopted NSI framework assumes a potential dichotomy 
of cross-technology and cross-nation performance attributes to contrasting institutional 
set-ups. It focusses on two salient institutions of the electricity supply industry (ESI), 
including business and environmental regulations, and their impact on the catching-up 
performances across the two technologies. 
It finds historically evolved ESI-HEI relationships based on the specific 
institutional set of ESI substantially influenced the dichotomy of cross-nation and cross-
technology catching-up performances, regardless of R&D expenditures and relative 
technological capabilities of HEI firms. The result supplements the NSI literature by 
linking the variation of a set of institutions with catching-up performance variations. It 
also offers strategic implications to catching-up countries, such as the potential necessity 
for institutional reforms of the ESI in pursuing energy technology catching-up policies. 
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Technical Notes and Disambiguation 
 
BOF: Although Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF) is only part of Integrated Steel Mill, 
which also has a blast furnace (BF), BOF is used as a synonym for Integrated Steel Mill in 
the thesis in order to emphasise its different characteristics from that of electric arc furnace 
(EAF) that depends entirely on electricity for its thermal energy. 
KEPCO: Both the Korean Electricity Power Co. and the Kansai Electricity Power 
Co. of Japan use the same abbreviation, KEPCO. In order to avoid confusion, the thesis 
deliberately uses KEPCO for the Korean utility while terms Japanese utilities “Kansai 
Power” or “Tokyo Power”. 
MHI: Although thermal power plant divisions, excluding nuclear power, of 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Hitachi were merged to Mitsubishi Hitachi Power 
System (MHPS) in 2014, the thesis uses the term MHI instead of MHPS in order to avoid 
confusion and maintain consistency. Also, Mitsubishi’s relative capability compared to 
that of Hitachi is pronounced in CCGT technologies. 
NIS and NSI: National Innovation System and National System of Innovation are 
often interchangeably used in the literature. This thesis also uses both interchaneably, 
according to the background references. 
OEM: Often original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) are recognised as licensed 
manufacturers of catching-up countries in a few sectors such as electronics and 
semiconductors. However, the thesis uses the term for a literal original manufacturer, 
namely licensor rather than licensee, as widely used in the global HEI. 
TOU: Electricity supply industries in numerous countries apply Time-of-Use 
(TOU) prices which impose different prices for electricity at different times of the day in 
xix 
 
order to reduce peak load demand and shift the demand to off-peak period. This pricing 
scheme reduces the generation of peak load power technologies, such as pumped hydro 
and gas turbine, while increase generation of baseload power technologies, typically 
nuclear and coal power. The price scheme differentiates the peak-load price and the off-
peak price reflecting the level of demand on the electricity network and marginal cost of 
power generation. Electricity supply industry in a few countries, such as Korea, 
differentiate the prices further than the differential of marginal cost of power generation 
between off-peak and peak-load periods. 
  
1 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 Research Problem 
1.1.1. Two Low-carbon Technologies in the face of Climate Change 
As concerns about climate change grow and mitigation policies are urged upon 
international organisations and governments, the role of low-carbon technologies is 
becoming increasingly important in the global power plant market. Nuclear power and 
gas turbines, alongside renewable energy, represent low-carbon commercial electric 
power technologies in the world. In particular, the two technologies are the most practical 
large-scale options as direct substitutes for the existing ‘dirty’ coal power, which still 
covers the largest share of the existing global electric power supply capacity. 
Interestingly, the two technologies contain contrasting economic and 
technological characteristics while competing directly in liberalised electricity markets, 
such as those of the UK and the US. Nuclear power requires upfront heavy capital 
investment with cheap fuel costs, whereas gas turbines require much less capital with 
relatively expensive fuel costs. Accordingly, the former needs government interventions, 
including special subsidies or public financing through public utilities, while the latter 
only needs project financing from private investors in liberalised energy markets. With 
the liberalisation trend of energy markets and a couple of major nuclear accidents, nuclear 
power’s global market share has diminished, while that of gas turbines has grown since 
the 1980s. 
In a catching-up economy context, the two energy technologies have more 
complex ramifications. In terms of domestic energy security, catching-up economies are 
2 
 
under pressure to supply both cheap and low-carbon energy to their rapidly growing, 
energy-intensive manufacturing industries. In terms of technology development, on the 
other hand, catching-up countries tend to induce the demand for upstream suppliers 
through the indigenisation process of the two energy technologies, to enhance 
technological competence of overall manufacturing industries. Eventually, the latecomers 
aim to enter the global market of energy technologies once they localise the technologies. 
1.1.2. Korea’s Nuclear Catching-up Success in Question 
Korea’s relatively recent nuclear export contract with the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) in 2009 surprised the global nuclear community, given that the global nuclear 
market has been dominated by only a few Western reactor original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs), such as Westinghouse and AREVA, for the past half a century. 
Even Japan, the ‘earlier latecomer’ that had localised commercial nuclear reactors two 
decades earlier than Korea, could not export complete reactors, having exported only 
reactor-related component units of equipment. The Korean government and nuclear 
engineering community appraise Korea’s nuclear export case as a catching-up success 
story, based on the country’s science and technology policy or ‘national innovation 
system’. 
Stimulated by the Korean nuclear export case, Japanese reactor suppliers, utilities, 
and the government established an export consortium, and vigorously sought to export 
cases right after the Korea-UAE contract. Despite a disruption with the Fukushima 
nuclear accident in 2011, the Japanese consortium has continued to put the effort of 
nuclear export through the 2010s. It started from nuclear export agreements with Vietnam 
and India, but the agreements were eventually abandoned in the mid-2010s. Japanese 
reactor vendors, including Mitsubishi, Toshiba and Hitachi, attempted separately to 
export their reactors to Turkey and the UK, but two of them already abandoned the export 
project due to own financial problems and cost increase, respectively. Hitachi also spent 
several years for a negotiation with the UK government over financial support of its Wylfa 
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nuclear project. In this sense, Korea’s nuclear export case apparently ignited global 
nuclear export competition in the past decade. 
In effect, the competition is not limited by the two countries. Major developing 
economies such as China also aim to enter the global nuclear export market, while they 
are currently building large-capacity of nuclear reactors for their own electricity supply 
purpose and putting effort into indigenising reactor technologies. China’s recent 
commitment to sharing the financial burden of the troubled ‘Hinkley Point C’ reactor 
construction project in the UK in exchange for guaranteeing China’s direct involvement 
in the UK’s uncertain future reactor projects indicates their aspiration to enter the global 
nuclear market. Considering that numerous catching-up economies are showing a 
propensity to follow Korea’s industrial and technological development policies, the 
Korean nuclear story is worth examining. 
It is questionable whether the Korean nuclear catching-up success could be a kind 
of ‘model’ for energy technology catching-up to other latecomer countries in two respects. 
First, the success of the Korean heavy electrical industry (HEI) is limited with regard to 
nuclear power, which has been diminishing in the global power plant market, while the 
Korean HEI has not caught-up with emerging technologies, such as combined-cycle gas 
turbine (CCGT) technology. Second, the Japanese HEI flourished in the domestic and 
global CCGT market from the mid-1980s, whereas it could not export nuclear reactors for 
more than three decades, even after it had localised commercial nuclear reactor 
technologies in the mid-1970s. The dichotomous performances of the two technologies 
across the two countries in the changing global power plant market raise the necessity for 
an in-depth analysis, rather than simplistic appraisals of a specific technology success 
story. 
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 Aim of the Research 
The research aims to shed light on the unquestioned dichotomous catching-up 
performances of nuclear power and gas turbines across Korea and Japan. The main 
purpose of the research is, therefore, finding the reasons for the dichotomous catching-up 
performances, and the political as well as theoretical implications. The research aims to 
answer the following tentative question: 
Why is the Korean heavy electrical industry (HEI) unable to make a 
shift from its successful catch-up of nuclear technology to that of a globally 
emerging technology, namely gas turbines, while its Japanese counterpart, an 
‘earlier’ latecomer, could do so? 
The research has two sub-goals. First, it investigates the policy ramifications of the 
dichotomy. For instance, was there cross-nation or cross-technology differences in 
catching-up policies? Or, is the result attributable to their specific capabilities? The second 
research purpose relates to a theoretical aspect. For instance, to what extent can existing 
innovation system theories address the puzzling catching-up performances of the two 
competing technologies across the two countries? It is an important issue for catching-up 
studies, based on the innovation system theories, considering a well-known fact that both 
governments of Japan and Korea have been explicitly supporting catching-up of nuclear 
technology for several decades. Did the efficiency of their catching-up policies or other 
factors such as institutional structures make the difference? 
 Research Approach 
1.3.1. Unit of Analysis 
Considering the puzzling catching-up performances across the two technologies, 
the unit of analysis is crucial in improving the quality of the answers to the question. First, 
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it may be possible to find analyses of the HEI firms’ technological capabilities through 
firm-level approaches. The cross-nation and cross-technology dichotomy, despite the 
cross-national differential of firm capabilities in terms of technological scope and depth, 
however, leads the thesis to look beyond firm-level factors. 
Second, sectoral-level approaches could be a little better than firm-level 
approaches, in so far as factors and conditions beyond firms could be analysed. However, 
the HEI is typically susceptible to heavy-handed government interventions and highly 
dependent on the user sector, notably the electricity supply industry (ESI). These 
characteristics led the research to look beyond sectoral-level factors. 
Third, national-level approaches might offer a better perspective in terms of the 
national policies and institutional set-up which shape the dichotomy. Amongst the 
national-level approaches, a narrow version approach focusses on the micro supporting 
system for effective coordination between high-technology or advanced science 
innovation actors, while a broad version approach pays attention to overall socioeconomic 
factors. The former version might be better suited to Western and advanced economy 
contexts, where socioeconomic institutions are generally well-established and enable 
researchers to focus on micro-networks between innovative actors. The research seeks 
explanations for the dichotomous performances from catching-up contexts which are 
quite different from those of Western economies and pursues the latter version in order 
to find differences in socioeconomic factors that can explain the dichotomy. 
1.3.2. Catching-up Policies and Institutions 
Amongst the various socioeconomic factors in a broad national approach, the 
thesis focusses on a few core industry policies and institutions which might promote and 
constrain specific technologies. Considering catching-up contexts, it regards catching-up 
policies and institutions as competing elements, rather than harmonised or well-
established combinations. 
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In particular, the institutional characteristics of the two catching-up technologies 
in Japan and Korea are hardly addressed in catching-up studies. Although innovation 
system approaches such as the national innovation system (NSI) and sectoral system of 
innovation (SSI) emphasise institutional factors in explaining catching-up performances, 
their concerns are often either too broad, such as national education systems, or too 
narrow, such as supporting systems of research networks between firms, universities, and 
public institutions. Considering that the HEI technologies are heavily affected by growing 
concerns over environmental impacts and energy prices in numerous nations, the thesis 
focusses on institutions that govern the two major issues and their impact on catching-up 
performance. 
1.3.3. Historical and Structural Analysis of Institutions 
In analysing the institutional impacts of the two technologies in each country case, 
the thesis adopts a historical approach, in order to find the roots of institutions and their 
degree of constraining effect on the performance of each technology. As catching-up 
studies based on the NSI approach often show, the historical approach offers significant 
advantages when formal or de jure rules often confuse researchers and lead them to take 
institutional factors for granted, or mistakenly consider that institutional factors are 
identical in a cross-national comparative analysis. 
For instance, historical events in the form of external or/and internal shocks to 
society can decisively shape institutional characteristics, which may be constraining the 
latecomers beyond nominal or codified rules in each case. Thus, the historical approach 
offers the research a greater chance to observe the core parts of relevant institutions in 
each local context. It leads to another advantage that the research could use for 
rearranging numerous and seemingly undifferentiated institutional factors in a 
hierarchical framework, given that the institutional factors are accumulated based on 
historical events and subsequent institutional changes. Through the structural perspective 
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on institutional factors, the thesis can observe and evaluate the competitiveness and limits 
of specific catching-up policies in a more systemic way. 
 Outline of Chapters 
Chapter II: Literature Review and Research Framework compares and discusses 
several theoretical approaches, including political economy, firm capability, and the 
National System of Innovation and Sectoral System of Innovation approaches in analysing 
the specific characteristics of the catching-up HEI. It suggests a user-producer co-
evolution framework based on a broad version of the national innovation system 
approach, to capture richer explanations of catching-up performances from their inter-
sectoral relationships, with special attention to the impact of user-sector institutions. 
Chapter III: Method outlines the research design and defends a qualitative 
comparative case study approach against competing quantitative methods, such as Input-
Output Analysis, pointing out their limitations in capturing fine-grained inter-sectoral 
linkages. 
Chapter IV: The Case of Korea finds that a set of institutions of the two sectors 
have been crucial in shaping the country’s nuclear power success, while it discouraged 
gas turbines in the Korean case. By comparison and as a reference case, Chapter V: The 
Case of Japan finds that there has been the dichotomously opposite trend in the case of 
Japan. 
Chapter VI: Comparison of the Cases and Discussions discusses the contrasting 
catching-up performances of the Korean and Japanese HEIs. The Chapter argues that 
contrasting the institutional set of ESI, and following interactions between the ESI and the 
HEI, confirm the efficacy of the research questions. It also discusses the limits of the thesis 
in explaining the user-supplier relationship and suggests future studies. 
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Chapter VII. Conclusion answers the research questions, and summaries the 
contributions of the thesis to knowledge in terms of the theoretical and policy implications 
of the empirical findings, the limitations and the implications for future research. 
Appendix Chapter A. reviews the advanced nuclear and CCGT technology 
development programmes in the 1990s’ US and how the Japanese and Korean latecomers 
exploited the benefits of the programmes to arrive in the current position in the global 
market. Although the main case chapters focus on the domestic factors of the latecomers’ 
catching-up process before their commercial success, this Chapter provides the latest 
catching-up performances from the global perspective. 
Appendix Chapter B. briefly addresses the potential and limits of the latecomers’ 
aircraft engine capabilities in the global market context. It supplements the main 
argument of the case study by clarifying the possible ramifications of the aircraft engine 
capability to the CCGT catching-up performance. 
 Expected Contribution to Knowledge 
The research finds a gap in the existing SSI approach, which focusses on the cross-
national homogeneity of a sector or technology class and fills the gap through 
demonstrating how sectoral institutions of user explain the cross-national and cross-
technology variation. In this way, the original contribution of the thesis is expected to 
supplement the scope of the National System of Innovation literature by linking the cross-
national variation of the institutional sets with cross-technology catching-up variations. 
In empirical terms, the research will have strategic implications to catching-up 
countries, such as the potential necessity of institutional reforms across related sectors, 
and the recognition of the trade-off between different technologies in competition within 
a sector in pursuing specific energy technology catching-up policies. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review and Research Framework 
 Chapter Introduction 
As raised in the Introduction Chapter, the thesis questions the background reasons 
for the puzzling catching-up performances of the Korean HEI over nuclear power and gas 
turbine technologies. In searching for answers to the question, the Chapter reviews 
literature that can better address the question of how and why the catching-up ability has 
varied so much between nuclear technology and gas turbines within the same sector of 
the HEI. 
Section 2.2 reviews the empirical literature on HEI-specific cases, such as nuclear 
technology and gas turbines from global and catching-up points of view. The literature of 
HEI firms in advanced economies shows institutional changes in the electricity supply 
market induced substantial effects on the HEI firms’ technology performance. It also finds 
that most of the HEI literature lacks attention to catching-up cases, while a handful HEI 
catching-up literature lacks an integrated view, including inter-sectoral relationships, 
related institutions, and compatibility with global opportunities, other than sectoral 
policies, such as public R&D projects of the two technologies. 
 Subsequently, Section 2.3 reviews the literature on overall Korean catch-up 
experiences in other manufacturing industries in order to find the country-specific aspect 
of the HEI’s unbalanced catching-up performances. The literature commonly raises 
‘catching-up shift dilemma’ depicting the structural lock-in of the Korean manufacturing 
industries within specific technology and product categories and points out the lack of 
‘user-supplier’ or ‘producer-specialised supplier’ linkages as immediate reasons. 
Section 2.4 reviews the system of innovation literature, with special attention to 
the impact of the inter-sectoral relationship in explaining the dichotomous catching-up 
performances. It finds that a scope of the national innovation system literature is adequate 
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as a theoretical base for the thesis, in covering the overall impact of broad institutional 
factors and ‘user-producer’ linkages on the catching-up issues, rather than focusing on 
narrow science and technology development efforts. It finds strength and gaps in the firm 
capability literature, the institutional analysis literature and the literature of regulations 
and innovations in explaining the specific aspects of the HEI catching-up performances. 
Finally, Section 2.5 constructs a conceptual framework to capture the institutional 
effects of the user sector on catching-up performances and the user-supplier co-evolution. 
It employes the firm capability literature in the catching-up context, the institutional 
analysis literature and the literature of regulations and innovations in order to 
supplement the broad national innovation system approach. 
 Empirical Literature on the HEI 
2.2.1. The Literature on HEI Firms in Advanced Countries 
 
In this Section, the literature of the HEI in advanced economies is reviewed on 
technological stasis of incumbent HEI in the 1970s, and impact of institutional changes of 
the electric supply industry on the HEI in the 1980s and 90s and competition amongst 
advanced global HEI firms based on their technological capabilities. In addition, the 
literature on government’s explicit policy for technology innovation, such as public R&D, 
and their impact is also reviewed. 
‘Stasis’ of Steam Turbine and Emergence of CCGT in the 1970s 
Established technological, economic, institutional and social contexts surrounding 
the heavy electrical industry in the US and Europe began to change in the 1970s. HEI firms 
had enjoyed continuously growing fuel efficiency of power plants through adopting 
increasingly larger steam turbines and boilers in the case of coal power, steam turbines 
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and steam generators in the case of nuclear power, until the 1970s. Electricity supply 
industry (ESI) shared the benefit of the scale economy. In addition to the fuel efficiency, 
one large unit of a steam turbine, compared to several smaller units, would reduce 
accompanied management cost for the same electrical output (Hirsh, 1989; Rosenberg, 
1998). 
However, diminishing return on scale economy of steam turbines put both ESI 
and HEI in a difficult position from the 1970s. Although the maximum scale of steam 
turbines increased above 1,000MW, the large steam turbines’ thermal efficiency stagnated 
below 40% and caused additional maintenance costs mainly due to metallurgical 
problems (Hirsh, 1989, 1999; Islas, 1997, 1999; Castillo, 2012).1 Large steam turbine blades 
for coal and nuclear power were vulnerable to corrosion fatigue and stress corrosion 
cracking (SCC) and caused substantial costs for repair and maintenance as well as 
unexpected longer construction lead time (Hirsh, 1989; Barrientos, 2002; Jonas & 
Machemer, 2008). Although there are numerous large steam turbines above 1,000 MW 
operating as of 2018 globally, it took several decades for the industry to mitigate the 
reliability issue effectively. The ‘scale-up’ issue, in effect, is commonly found in various 
manufacturing industry sectors and require considerable development efforts in 
metallurgical, mechanical and dimensional materials properties (Sahal, 1985). 
By comparison, gas turbine emerged from auxiliary technology for a niche market 
to a primary one in the form of a CCGT in the 1970s. CCGT technologies evolved from a 
small and single-cycle gas turbine for a niche market purpose, namely peak electricity 
demand, in the 1950s. From the low load-factor niche market, gas turbines gradually 
adapted to auxiliary part of combined cycle steam and gas turbines, to dominant part of 
the combined cycle in the contemporary electricity market (Islas, 1997, 1999). As the 
 
1 Also, as unit size of nuclear power increased, HEI firms and utilities experienced more complex 
process and much longer construction lead time with huge financial loss in the 1980s (see 
Hirsh, 1989 and Barrientos 2002 for details).  
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technology continuously improved, the fuel efficiency of CCGT started hovering around 
50% in the mid-1980s (Islas, 1997, 1999; Castillo, 2012). The technological evolution has 
been accelerated by virtuous circle between development of larger and more efficient 
CCGTs and a serial development of new natural gas fields, such as those in Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Brunei, Australia, the Netherlands, the North Sea and North America as well 
as the Middle East in the 1970s and 80s (Jeffs, 2008). 
Institutional Turbulence in the 1970s and 80s 
The technological shift from the ‘stasis’ of large steam turbines to rise of CCGT in 
the HEI sector was not a smooth and straightforward process. Global HEI faced 
unprecedented institutional changes in their user sector, namely ESI, in the 1970s’ US. The 
most substantial changes were the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970, Power Plant and 
Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA) of 1978, and the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act 
(PURPA) of 1978. The conflicting interests and prospects on future energy security and 
environmental issues generated institutional mismatch which hampered overall 
innovation efforts of HEI for a decade. 
Although the CAA of 1970 did not set stringent emission standards compared to 
other countries such as Japan or later Germany, public interventions during construction 
and operation processes of coal power plants increased after the legislation. Meanwhile, 
the Arab oil embargo in 1973 induced an opposite political action, namely the Energy 
Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 by the US Congress. The emergency 
act restricted oil and natural gas use for power generation and promoted coal and nuclear 
power, on the one hand, interrupted regulatory pressure of the CAA on coal power on 
the other. FUA of 1978 succeeded the main logic of the temporary act. The US government 
also legislated a regulatory change to promote energy efficiency of the US electricity 
market in 1978, namely PURPA. It guaranteed much smaller, non-utility owned, and 
alternative technologies, such as combined heat and power plants (CHP) and renewables, 
purchase by vertically integrated utilities at a fair price. The unintended consequence of 
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PURPA was an erosion of the monopoly status of incumbent electric utilities by 
independent power producers (Hirsh, 1989, 1999; Winskel, 2002). 
The series of conflicting legislations derailed a path of technology change of the 
American HEI for a decade. CCGT market was virtually shut down while only coal power 
capacity expanded with limited improvement in emission control technologies in the late 
1970s and 1980s (Unger & Herzog 1998; Winskel, 2002). Electric utilities avoided nuclear 
power despite government’s promotion due to enhanced safety regulation, lengthy 
construction lead time, and expensive retrofitting costs of reactors under construction 
after Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979 (Winskel, 2002; Berthélemy, 2012). The 
utilities cancelled 93 nuclear reactors under construction or planned between 1974 and 
1985, in effect (Willams &Larson, 1988). Depressed demand growth of the US electricity 
market also added pressure on the HEI firms. 
Their European counterparts experienced a similar institutional change. European 
Commission (EC)’s ‘Directive on the use of natural gas in power station’ in 1975 shut 
down CCGT market and put European OEMs, such as ASEA, Brown Boveri, and Siemens, 
in a difficult position. The restriction on natural gas for power generation continued more 
than a decade and was abolished in 1990. Although nuclear power was promoted as an 
alternative to oil and natural gas in the EC member countries, the nuclear market situation 
was not that much different from the US market. France and the UK could order a few 
more reactors even after the TMI accident, but they could not sustain new orders anymore 
afterwards, at least for two decades. 
In the UK, political and institutional response to the turbulent 1970s and 80s was 
more intense than that of US counterpart. The UK government’s Energy Act of 1975 
implemented the European directive restricting natural gas use for power generation. 
Incumbent state-owned energy monopolies, including Central Electricity Generation 
Board, British Gas Corporation, Atomic Energy Authority and the UK government, 
concerned for energy security and protecting domestic HEI firms. The alliance’s scheme 
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to the Arab oil embargo was to promote nuclear and coal power plants while the 
prohibited entrance of CCGT or CHP using natural gas into the British electricity market. 
The preference for nuclear power and coal over CCGT by the incumbents continued even 
during the privatisation process of electricity and gas industries in the 1980s (Winskel, 
2002; Castillo, 2012). 
Institutional ‘Fixing’ in the late 1980s and Effects 
The restrictions of natural gas use for power plants across the Atlantic were 
withdrawn in the late 1980s as the initial misinformation about natural gas reserves were 
cleared with a series of new natural gas field development around the globe. The FUA in 
the US and the European Directive were withdrawn in 1987 and 1990, respectively. Once 
the restrictions were cleared, the global OEMs rapidly returned to CCGT market in the 
late 1980s. The UK government also revoked the restriction on natural gas for power 
generation to promote competition in the electricity supply market in 1988 (Unger & 
Herzog, 1998; Winskel, 2002).2 
At the same time, environmental regulations were tightened across the Atlantic. 
European Commission’s Large Combustion Plants Directive of 1988, which required its 
member countries to reduce sulphur dioxide to a specific level with a specific control 
technology, such as flue gas desulphurisation equipment. Although the legislation was a 
decade late compared to its US counterpart, it was detrimental to coal power regarding 
capital cost and invited CCGTs in the European market. The US Environmental Protection 
Agency also enhanced emission regulations through CAA Amendment of 1990. Its 
emission standards of NOx and SOx on both of new and existing power plants were 
 
2 US emission standards were rather lax and slow in the 1970s, and the amendment of CAA in 
1977 only required existing coal power plants installation of scrubbers to reduce SOx emission. 
By comparison, its Japanese counterpart set up quite stringent emission standards on SOx and 
NOx emission from both existing and new coal power plants with the promotion of advanced 
control technologies from the early 1970s. See Popp (2006) and Section 5.2.5 for details.  
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tightened compared to its 1970 version, and State-level legislation set much stricter 
standards in the late 1990s (Winskel, 2002; Popp, 2006). 
Finally, liberalisation of the electricity and natural gas markets started with the 
Energy Policy Act (EPAct) of 1992 in the US. Succeeding PURPA of 1978, EPAct allowed 
competition in the power generation segment of the market. The competition was 
extended to existing utilities’ power generation assets, creating a considerable risk that 
utilities will not be able to recover costs through electric rate (Stuntz, 1995). Liberalisation 
of gas supply industry as well as ESI in the UK prohibited British Gas’s discrimination 
against power producers and guaranteed the independent energy suppliers’ access to 
newly developed gas reserves in 1989 (Winskel, 2002). The high capital cost, long 
construction lead time, and additional equipment for emission control of coal power or 
safety margin of nuclear power, were more than offset by their cheap fuel cost in the 
competitive electricity market. Technological improvement of CCGT in terms of efficiency 
and emission control, by comparison, made CCGT the primary beneficiary of the 
liberalisation. It was the technological characteristics of CCGT, in effect, which reduced 
‘minimum efficient scale’ of power generation investment from 1,000MW to below 
350MW, removed the concept of “natural monopoly” in the power generation segment of 
the electricity market, and enabled competition in the market (Stein, 2000). 
In the overall perspective, the environmental and economic regulations of the ESI 
and CCGT technology co-evolved and fundamentally changed the landscape of power 
generation technologies in the developed economies in the 1980s. Although political 
preference for coal and nuclear power over natural gas in the US and the UK halted the 
co-evolutionary process for a decade, the temporary political events could not stop the 
overall force of the change. Nevertheless, the regulatory mismatch originated from the 
restriction on natural gas use for power generation substantially influenced the 
survivability of the HEI firms in respective countries. Regardless of political soundness or 
preference, the coherence of the regulatory framework of the ESI has been crucial to 
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survival and innovation of the HEI firms in the developed economies. Table 2.1 
summarises the institutional changes and their technological effects in the 1970s and 80s. 
 
Table 2.1 Regulatory Change of the ESI and Effects in the 1970s and 80s' US 
Emission 
Regulations 
Market 
Regulations 
Restriction on Natural 
Gas Use 
Technology Change 
CAA (1970): 
Preliminary 
Regulation 
on Utilities 
PURPA (1978): 
Entrance of Non-
Utility Producers 
↔ 
FUA (1978): 
Blocked a 
Virtuous Circle 
← 
Emergence of CCGT 
→ 
Closure of 
CCGT Market 
CAA (1990): 
Stringent 
Emission 
Standards 
EPAct (1992): 
Competition in 
the Electricity 
Supply Market 
FUA Withdrawn (1987): 
Virtuous Circle between 
Institutional Reforms & 
CCGT 
The revival of CCGT: 
‘Scale Flexibility’, Low-
NOx Technology, 
 Advance in Efficiency 
Note: CAA = Clean Air Act, PURPA = Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act, FUA = Power Plant and Industrial 
Fuel Use Act, EPAct = Energy Policy Act 
Survival Efforts of the American HEI Firms During the Turbulent Decade 
During the turbulent period, only a few HEI OEMs with enough technological 
scope and depth survived while others had to experience mergers or escaped the US 
market (Watson, 1997; Unger & Herzog, 1998; Winskel, 2002). In particular, competence 
in turbomachinery played as a criterion of the survivability of the global OEMs in nuclear 
power and CCGT markets (Thomas, 1988; Watson, 1997; Barrientos, 2002). While the 
global nuclear OEMs with the competence in steam turbine machines survived longer 
than other reactor vendors, the competence in gas turbines is recognised as a core 
capability of the winner in the global CCGT OEMs. Although two American nuclear 
OEMs, Combustion Engineering (CE) and Babcock & Wilcox (B&W), had dominated the 
US nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) market thanks to their competence in boiler 
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technologies until the 1970s, their lack of capability in turbine and generators forced them 
to exit the nuclear market in the late 1980s, for instance (Thomas, 2005; Barrentos, 2002).3 
In effect, CE and B&W outpaced Westinghouse and General Electric (GE) in 
manufacturing and managing the overall NSSS components regarding design, material 
choice and piping-work (Thomas, 1988). For instance, CE and B&W supplied 58 and 27 
reactor pressure vessels respectively out of 139 in total, commissioned from the 1950s to 
the 70s in the US nuclear market (Barrientos, 2002). Their lack of expertise in turbine 
generator, however, made them vulnerable to the depressed US nuclear market in the 
1980s while Westinghouse and GE managed to survive with continued steam turbine 
orders from fossil power projects. CE and B&W were merged by ASEA Brown Boveri 
(ABB), and Framatome, respectively, in 1989 (Thomas, 2005).4 
By comparison, gas turbine divisions of OEMs experienced a different path from 
their nuclear counterparts. General Electric could maintain gas turbine human resources 
by temporarily transferring them to its jet engine division, whereas Westinghouse did not 
have such capacity and moved to Japanese gas turbine market and maintained its business 
with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) under a licence contract during the difficult 
decade. European OEMs had a more difficult decade, and mergers were inevitable choices. 
ASEA and Brown Boveri became ABB in 1987, and GEC and Alsthom became GEC-
Alsthom in 1989 (Watson, 1997; Unger & Herzog, 1998; Castillo, 2012). 
The turbulent period squeezed the weaker OEMs and opened a window of 
opportunity for technology transfer to catching-up countries, such as Japan in the case of 
 
3 NSSS consists of a reactor, reactor coolant pumps, steam generators, a pressurizer and associated 
piping in a nuclear power plant. The steam, generated by the NSSS, is used to drive the turbine 
generator unit.  
4 Although the merger between B&W and Framatome was 50/50 merger initially, the merged firm 
was consolidated as Framatome Technologies a few years later. B&W’s NSSS business was 
squeezed to supply of a few sets of replacement steam generators in the 2000s for several old 
B&W design reactors, such as Oconee units and Three Mile Island unit 1. Its business remained 
only in a marginal market segment, such as maintenance and repair services (IAEA 2008).  
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CCGT and Korea in the case of nuclear power. Westinghouse’s gas turbine division 
completely shut down its manufacturing base in the US and transferred its CCGT 
technology to MHI in the late 1970s, as abovementioned. CE transferred its NSSS 
technology to KEPCO-Korea Heavy Industries & Construction (KHIC) alliance in the 
1980s (see Section 4.3.2 for CE’s nuclear technology transfer to Korea and Section 5.3.3 for 
Westinghouse’s CCGT technology transfer to Japan). 
2.2.2. The Literature on HEI in Catching-Up Context 
Amongst the rare contributions to the HEI catching-up literature, Cook and Surrey 
(1989) comprehensively articulate the overall features of energy technology development 
and strategies in catching-up countries. They re-define the meaning of R&D in energy 
technologies as a part of other industrial activities, such as an adaptation of designs, 
information gathering, or operating practices, rather than a ‘source of innovation’. They 
warn, subsequently, that R&D itself will not build up capabilities without such active 
demand from the industry, and that establishing of large R&D institutes could exhaust 
the scarce supply of scientists and engineers, who might be more productive elsewhere. 
Cook and Surrey (1989) rationalise such suggestions based on the specific nature 
of the energy technology progress, which mostly originates from other sectors, even in 
developed economies, and the importance of clusters of complementary innovation 
amongst various sectors. It is a crucial point as far as commercial nuclear and gas turbine 
technology originates from military technologies, such as the Navy’s nuclear propulsion 
system, and the air-fighter jet engine. They identify that energy technology innovation 
and catching-up is a ‘state-of-the-art’ appreciation of technologies which originate from 
advanced countries or other sectors, rather than development based on the ‘go-it-alone’ 
approach through R&Ds. 
After articulating the origin, characteristics, and pre-requisites of progress in 
energy technologies, Cook and Surrey (1989) emphasise that ‘efficiency of technology 
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transfer’ for catching-up countries in the energy sector depends on the closeness and 
stability of the relationship between licensee and licensor rather than indigenous 
innovation or governments’ restrictive regulation on technology transfer terms. They also 
emphasise the role of energy suppliers, such as electric utilities, in coordinating the 
gradual involvement of the domestic equipment industry in new construction projects, 
and subsequently improving the technical capability of the industry. In addition, 
catching-up nations need to have overall strategic planning which integrates the 
development policies of new industries to use the energy, such as aluminium or steel 
industries (Cook & Surrey, 1989: 436). 
In sum, they offer an insight into inter-sectoral aspects of energy technology 
catching-up, including energy suppliers’ roles in managing the capability-building of the 
domestic energy equipment industry, integrated planning of energy plants considering 
new energy user industries, and complementary innovation of upstream suppliers. 
Although their warnings and suggestions are closer to ‘rule of thumb’ rather than a 
theoretical argument, the insights based on decades’ experience of energy industries could 
not be dismissed. The next subsections review nuclear and gas turbine catching-up case 
studies. 
Gas Turbine Catching-up Case Literature 
As with the nuclear catching-up literature, there are only a few studies on the gas 
turbine catching-up case, due to the rarity of such cases in the global market where a small 
number of gas turbine OEMs dominate (Watson, 1997; Kimura & Kajiki, 2008). Kimura 
and Kajiki (2008) emphasise the role of national R&D programmes through a case study 
of a sub-project of the “Moonlight Project” (1978–1988) as a main component of a 
successful gas turbine catching-up performance in Japan. They find that the “High 
Efficiency Gas Turbine Project” not only offered chances to develop Japanese HEI firms’ 
technological capabilities in different component areas but also offered a technological 
base to improve their relative status in relationship with foreign gas turbine licensors. 
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Government’s leadership was also crucial in arranging and supporting the cooperative 
R&D programmes for rapid catch-up and encouraging firms to join in such programmes 
in the case study. 
However, the literature does not address the relative efficacy of the project in 
relation to the broader gas turbine catching-up process in Japan. The literature, in effect, 
finds that a leading participant of the project, namely MHI, could have achieved crucial 
component technologies of the gas turbine, such as ceramic shell moulds, even without 
the project. Also, public institutes which hosted the project lacked proper infrastructure 
and had to depend on the leading participant, notably MHI. Although the R&D project 
seems to shorten the technology catching-up process of MHI, the case study lacks an 
analysis of the institutional conditions which enabled the commercial success of gas 
turbines in Japan in the first place (Kimura & Kajiki, 2008). 
Regarding the success of the overall Japanese cooperative R&D performances, 
Porter (1990) points out that Western governments misunderstand the real value of public 
R&D programmes, sponsored by MITI, as a driver of Japanese success in industrial 
catching-up. He suggests the actual role of the R&D programmes is to signal the 
importance of emerging technology areas to participants and to stimulate participating 
firms’ own private R&D initiatives. In effect, Japanese firms participate in the programmes 
mostly for defensive purposes, such as to maintain a healthy relationship with MITI 
and/or to manage the potential risks of competitors benefiting from the programmes. 
Besides the public R&D projects, other studies suggest that institutional factors, 
such as regulatory differences between advanced countries and the catching-up countries, 
contributed to the MHI’s gas turbine catching-up success (Watson, 1997; Unger & Herzog, 
1998). The literature points out that the temporary ban on the use of natural gas for power 
generation in the US and Western Europe from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s was an 
important factor in the technology transfer from one of the US gas turbine OEMs, namely 
Westinghouse, to a Japanese latecomer, namely MHI. In addition, Watson (1997) implies 
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stringent emission standards in Japan also contributed to MHI’s successful catching-up of 
the technology. 
Although the precise roles of the institutions relative to the other factors are not 
differentiated in the overall empirical literature, there have been implications of 
institutional effects, such as environmental or business regulations on ESI, rather than 
direct policies, such as public R&D initiatives. Special attention to the effect of the 
distinctive institutions beyond the specific catching-up policies would represent 
important contributions to the empirical HEI literature. 
Nuclear Catching-Up Literature 
Although a few countries, including France, Germany and Japan, caught up with 
American commercial nuclear power technologies, mostly pressurised water reactors 
(PWRs), in the 1970s and 80s, since then there has been only one commercial nuclear 
power catching up: Korea. For instance, France’s Framatome, Germany’s Siemens and 
Japan’s MHI indigenised PWR technologies under Westinghouse licence. Siemens and 
Framatome became independent from the Westinghouse after terminations of the licence 
agreements in 1969 and 1982, respectively, and exported reactors under their brand 
names. For instance, Siemens delivered Borssele-1 and Goesgen to the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, respectively, through its subsidiary, Kraftwerk Union, in the 1970s, and 
Framatome delivered Koeberg unit 1&2 and Ulchin 1&2 to South Africa and Korea, 
respectively, in the 1980s (Thomas, 1988; Inside NRC Statistics Monthly, 2018). Although 
MHI also localised its PWR technology from the Westinghouse licence in the 1970s and 
terminated the license agreement with Westinghouse in 1991, it could never export its 
reactor (see Section 5.3.2). Since then, a reactor technology indigenisation and export case 
by a catching-up country has not been found other than the Korean case. Thus, it is not 
surprising that there is limited literature on nuclear power catching-up cases in recent 
decades. 
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A handful of literature (Park 1992; Sung & Hong 1999; Choi et al. 2009) commonly 
suggests strong government commitment, development of human resources, the rapid 
growth of heavy industries, and technology transfer from foreign firms as main drivers of 
the Korean nuclear power catch-up in the 1990s. The literature tends to explain the Korean 
nuclear power technology catch-up as an accumulated result of nuclear policies and R&D 
programmes in a linear relationship. It claims, in an undifferentiated way, oversea nuclear 
education and establishment of an “Atomic Energy Department” in the 1950s, a 
“Machinery Indigenisation Policy” in 1976, a “Master Plan for Technology Indigenisation 
of Nuclear Power Plants” in the mid-1980s, and public R&Ds in the 1990s as “success 
factors” (Park, 1992; Sung & Hong, 1999; Choi et al., 2009). 
However, such a linear type of explanation needs to be scrutinised. In effect, even 
the official review of the Korean government’s former Ministry of Energy and Resources 
(MER), which took charge of the nuclear indigenisation programme in the 1980s, denies 
the efficacy of the previous nuclear indigenisation policies in the country. It points out 
that “previous policies and programmes had been fragmented, unsystematic and lacking 
in proper evaluations” (MER, 1988: 335).5 The efficacy of such a linear logic becomes even 
weaker when Korea’s nuclear technology indigenisation history is compared to that of 
Japan. Although both started nuclear power programmes in the mid-1950s, it took four 
decades for Korea to localise commercial nuclear power technologies while Japan did so 
in two decades.6 Japan has formulated more than nine long-term programmes for nuclear 
science and engineering development through its Atomic Energy Commission since 1956 
while Korean started education programmes to train nuclear scientists and engineers 
 
5 It should be noted that previous nuclear indigenization programmes had been mostly dealt with 
by the Science and Technology Agency rather than the MPR. 
6  Japan’s MHI indigenised its PWR technologies to 95% level in terms of monetary value of 
equipment through the construction of Mihama unit 2 in 1975 while Korea’s KEPCO/KHIC did 
so through Yonggwang unit 3 in 1995. See Section 4.3.2 and 5.3.2 for details.  
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including sending about 240 students abroad during 1956-1964 and established overall 
institutional infrastructure of nuclear energy in 1958 (IEA, 2008; Sung & Hong, 2008). 
 In addition, the literature lacks unambiguous evidence about the linear 
relationship between the Korean government’s “strong policies” and the process of 
technology indigenisation. At least, the relative effectiveness of the nuclear policies and 
programmes should be evaluated in relation to the “window of opportunity”, such as 
technology transfer from a financially troubled American firm, namely CE, amidst the US 
nuclear market collapse in the 1980s (see Section 2.2.1). Although the government’s efforts 
to indigenise the technology could be defended as a capability building-up process which 
is a crucial internal factor for successful technology transfer, the four-decades-long 
government R&D policies and programmes only for capability-building are not easily 
justifiable. It should be noted that Japan localised the commercial nuclear technologies in 
two decades even without such a dramatic opportunity as the global nuclear market 
collapse. 
On the other hand, there are a handful of studies that analyse Japan’s nuclear 
power technology catching-up performance. The literature points out problems from the 
initial stage to catching-up performances in the Japanese nuclear case. The government’s 
early intervention in commercial nuclear catching-up resulted in poor technology choices, 
such as the Gas Cooled Reactor (GCR), and persistent attempts to develop public R&D 
programmes for “new reactors” also failed. Although Japanese HEI firms succeeded in 
indigenising and commercialising the light water reactors (LWRs) in the 1970s, by 
comparison, it is discounted as a result of the dissemination of American nuclear 
technologies rather than a victory of market over government intervention (Samuel, 1987; 
Kitschelt, 1991). This seems to accord with what Cook and Surrey (1989) suggest regarding 
energy technology catching-up: a stable relationship with licensors is more important 
than “go-it-alone” public energy R&D initiatives. 
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Furthermore, the literature ascribes Japan’s failure in the export market to the 
underperformance of its nuclear fleets, emphasising especially its low capacity factor 
compared to its European counterparts even after a decade of “start-up problems” 
(Thomas, 1982; Samuel, 1987; Kitschelt, 1991). Although Thomas (1982) implicates Japan’s 
relatively stringent safety culture as a background reason, more unambiguous and 
systematic analysis of the underperformance of Japanese nuclear fleets is needed. 
2.2.3. Research Gap in the HEI Catching-Up Literature 
Although a number of HEI studies have identified the nature of the technological 
and industrial evolution of global HEI firms, little analytic attention has been paid to the 
catching-up cases of HEI technologies (Thomas, 1988, 2005; Watson, 1997; Bergek et al., 
2005). The limited amount of HEI catching-up case literature lacks a systemic analysis of 
the technological catch-up process beyond the undifferentiated listing of sectoral policies, 
such as public R&D programmes, with intermittent explanations of external and internal 
factors, including technology transfer from foreign licensors and growth of domestic 
heavy industries. 
However, a review of the literature confirms that such policies as public R&D 
programmes would not automatically lead participating firms to successful catching up, 
including commercialisation (Porter, 1990; Kitschelt, 1991). Also, technology transfer does 
not spontaneously occur insofar as advanced firms would not allow it given that it could 
create potential threats to their own market shares in the future (Cook & Surrey, 1989).7 
Although HEI’s interplay with related industrial sectors could be influential, including in 
terms of (sources of) demand and upstream supplier sectors, the issue is also insufficiently 
addressed in the literature. The fragmented claims on the “success factors” of catching-up 
 
7 Technology transfer could occur in special conditions, other than through a long-term 
relationship between licensor and licensees, such as where there is a global market collapse and 
the market becomes the “user’s market” for a long period. Nuclear power technology has been 
the case since the global market collapse in the 1980s. 
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need to be scrutinised and integrated in a systematic way (Park, 1992; Sung & Hong, 1999; 
Choi et al., 2009). 
Although technology transfer and inter-linkages between HEI and ESI are 
constrained and incentivised by sectoral institutions, the mechanisms are not sufficiently 
addressed in the literature. Although the effects of such institutions are partially discussed 
in the literature, such as in terms of the impact of gas fuel regulations in the US and 
Europe, the contribution of emissions standards (Watson, 1997; Unger & Herzog, 1998), 
or the impact of the nuclear safety culture in Japan (Thomas, 1982), they should be 
investigated in a more integrated and systematic manner. 
On the other hand, the literature lacks discussions about the complex relationship 
between the capabilities of catching-up firms and their catching-up performances in both 
technologies. Although Japanese HEI has better technological capabilities than its Korean 
counterpart in terms of technological breadth, depth and history, it was not successful at 
exporting nuclear power for more than three decades after it localised commercial 
reactors. By comparison, it took two more decades for the Korean HEI to indigenise the 
technology, but it entered the export market only fifteen years after the indigenisation. By 
contrast, Japan’s CCGT post-catching-up performance has been far better than for its 
nuclear power counterpart, whereas Korea is still some way off fully indigenising its 
commercial gas turbine technology, despite its success in nuclear power. 
Overall, the research gap seems to originate from the limited number of studies on 
the HEI catching-up issue. There is a possibility that some of the research gap is already 
addressed in other catching-up studies based on various sector cases other than HEI. 
Whether it directly covers the HEI or not, it may be helpful to understand some common 
features of Korean catching-up issues when analysing the complex HEI catching-up issue. 
As such, Section 2.3 reviews other empirical literature on Korea’s overall catching-up 
performance. 
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Table 2.2 Dichotomy of Cross-National and Cross-Technology Catching-Up 
 Japan Korea 
Nuclear 
Power 
Failed in the export market for three 
decades after indigenisation (1975) 
Succeeded in export (2009) relatively 
soon after indigenisation (1996) 
CCGT Succeeded both in indigenisation 
and export market (1980s~) 
Failed in indigenisation despite repeated 
catching-up efforts (1990s~) 
The preceding review and the identification of the research gap lead to a 
refinement of the original research question: 
Research Question 1: Why did Japanese and Korean HEIs show 
dichotomously contrasting catching-up performances across their nuclear 
power and gas turbine industries over the past three decades? 
 
 Empirical Literature on the “Catching-up Shift Dilemma” 
2.3.1. Political Economy Approaches in the Early Literature 
 “Getting the prices relatively wrong” (Amsden, 1989: 139) symbolises the state’s 
efficient interventions in Korea’s catching-up performances across the heavy and chemical 
industries (HCI) in the 1970s and 80s. “Reciprocal subsidy” between the Korean state and 
Chaebol firms8, preferential loans, and tax credits to Chaebols in exchange for improved 
export performances, have characterised the dynamics of Korean development in the 
literature. In this reciprocal relationship, the Korean state’s dominance over the market is 
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emphasised, for example in terms of its disciplined leadership in choosing competent 
Chaebols and punishing weak performers. 
The term Chaebols indicates typical Korean large conglomerates, owned and 
controlled by family members of entrepreneurs who founded the groups mostly in the 
1950s and 60s. The concept is intertwined with a Korean version of the Developmental 
State. The Korea government used to target certain industry sectors for export promotion 
or some “strategic” purposes and incentivise the growth of the sectors by directly linking 
the provision of subsidised credit at below-market interest rates and export performance. 
Although the term of “strategic” is not well established in an academic language, it has 
been used as a synonym of ‘export-oriented’ in Korean industrial policies (Kim et al., 2004). 
The main beneficiary sectors of the subsidised credit have been changed from light 
industries in the 1960s, HCI in the 1970s, and some consumer goods and real estate sectors 
in the 1980s. 
However, the approach also has a weak point in addressing failed sectors under 
the HCI policy, and the implications of such failures. While a few Chaebols had been 
successful in diversifying from globally matured low-end technologies to emerging ones 
in several sectors, the Korean HEI not only failed under the HCI policies of the 1970s, but 
also continued to suffer even after nationalisation in the changing global and domestic 
markets in the 1980s (Rhee, 1994). 
The early analysis of the Korean HEI is followed by debates between industry 
policy and free-market approaches (Auty, 1995; Stern et al., 1995; Chang, 1993, 2000). The 
free-market literature points out the inconsistency of the state in exerting its authority and 
limited market reform during the HEI restructuring process in the 1970s and 1980s (Auty, 
1995; Stern et al., 1995). In response to the critiques, the political economy literature 
defends the Korean state’s way of managing industrial adjustment as a driving force of 
the Korean economic and technological “miracle”. Following the thread of Amsden’s 
claim, Chang (1993, 2000) defends even the monopolisation and nationalisation of the HEI 
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during the domestic and global recession of 1980 as evidence of the Korean state’s unique 
competence in calming conglomerates’ rent-seeking behaviour. He emphasises that the 
Korean state was not only good at promoting infant industries but also impartial in 
restructuring those industries according to their performance. 
However, the defence focusses on a political event of nationalisation rather than 
the broader and in many ways unsuccessful process. It ignores the significant implications 
of the government’s initial grant of monopoly status to a novice Chaebol in the HEI sector, 
and its overinvestment, such as in the world’s largest heavy forging and casting facilities. 
It also neglects the relative lack of success even after the nationalisation of the industry, 
evidenced in the repeated bankruptcies and bailouts of the nationalised firm in the 1980s 
(KHIC, 1995, Rhee, 1994; Auty, 1995).9 
On the other hand, free-market-oriented literature seems to exaggerate the 
overcapacity issues of power plants and the low capacity factor of manufacturing facilities 
of Korea Heavy Industries & Construction (KHIC), Korea’s previous state-owned HEI 
firm, in the early 1980s (Auty, 1995; Stern et al., 1995). In effect, the overcapacity or low-
capacity factor was ubiquitous in Korea’s heavy industries in the 1970s and 1980s, even in 
dramatically successful sectors such as shipbuilding. The difference is that the successful 
Chaebol in the shipbuilding sector diversified from already matured but low-value ships 
to higher-value ship products (Amsden & Kim, 1986). Thus, overcapacity per se does not 
reflect the inferiority of the Korean state in dealing with industrial policy. 
What both sides miss is the technological implication of the nationalisation that 
inhibited Korean HEI from responding to the dramatically changing global and domestic 
 
9 It should be noted that the energy and industry ministries had consistently opposed Park 
Chung-hee government’s monopolisation policy throughout the 1970s (Rhee, 1994; KHIC, 1995). 
The ministry-level approach seems to be understandable given that awarding a monopoly 
status to the least-experienced firm in heavy industries and locking out other experienced 
Chaebols from the HEI sector would not have been logical. 
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power plant markets in the 1980s and 1990s.10 The nationalisation, instead of market-exit, 
could be a critical juncture on a path-dependent process by locking the industry into a 
specific technology capability, such as heavy forging, from which the industry had to 
escape. Considering the technological rigidity of the HEI firm, the nationalisation rather 
than the market-exit reduced potential of technological diversification of the country’s 
public sector, such as ESI. It might be the typical case that a single event could generate 
increasing returns and irreversibility which locks a system into an inferior technology 
(Arthur, 1988; David, 1985). 
When this deficiency in the debates on the role of the state and market began to be 
recognised, critiques of the debate emerged in the literature. Dervis and Petri (1987) 
regard the Korean economy’s resilience as the ‘secret’ of its success in the 1970s and 1980s, 
although its broad outward-oriented industrial strategy is well known and replicable by 
other catching-up countries. According to Dervis and Petri, the components of Korea’s 
resilience are prominent conglomerates’ effectiveness in shifting financial and 
technological resources into their most profitable applications and the orientation and 
capability of bureaucracy. They argue that the one-dimensional debate, intervention vs. 
neutrality, misses the point. Keeping the gap in the state-market debate in mind, the next 
Section reviews more recent strain of empirical literature on Korean catching-up cases. 
2.3.2. Empirical Literature of the “Korean Catching-up Shift 
Dilemma” 
Since the late 1990s, when Korea suffered a financial crisis, a new strain of Korean 
literature concerning catching-up ‘shift’ or ‘transition’ issues has emerged as the 
 
10 Although it was ESI case rather than HEI, existence of the state monopoly ESI in the 1970s’ UK, 
namely CEGB, seriously locked out development of emerging technologies, such as gas turbine 
and its up-scaling which was against CEGB’s preferred technologies, such as nuclear or coal 
(Watson, 1997). If a monopoly HEI firm is added to a monopoly ESI, such as 1980’s Korean 
case, it is not difficult to expect systemic and strong technological inertia.  
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latecomers faced the limits of their earlier catching-up success. This strain of literature 
focusses on weak aspects of Korean catching-up performances, including the lack of 
balance in industry structure between Chaebol and small firms (Ernst, 1998), the lack of 
domestic user-producer interaction (Kim, S., 1998; Lee and Lim, 2004), and the lack of 
product design capability (Hwang, 1998; Hobday et al., 2004). These commonly suggested 
weak aspects, however, are not easy to overcome, since they form a vicious circle. 
Although Korean manufacturers need to diversify into new technologies and 
products, they are unable to do so due to a lack of qualified domestic upstream suppliers. 
To nurture specialised suppliers, domestic users need to use the products from these 
suppliers. Domestic users, however, are reluctant to use the unproven domestic 
components and equipment due to quality control issues. Thus, the domestic specialists 
have neither the chance to experience user-supplier interaction nor a market to sell their 
products. These claims are briefly reviewed below. 
First, there is a firm-level capability approach in explaining the Korean catching-
up shift issues (Hwang, 1998; Hobday et al., 2004). Hobday et al. (2004) raise the issue of 
‘catching up in transition’ in various Korean firms which intend to move from catching-
up status to a leadership position. They suggest that Korean capital goods firms should 
increase their development capabilities for new products to transit from catching-up 
status to a leadership position. In this, the firms crucially need a complementary domestic 
industry partner, which they are not used to from their catching-up period. 
In explaining the necessity of a complementary industry partner for new product 
development, Hobday et al. (2004) introduce the concept of ‘producibility’ to ensure 
design for manufacture before the firm decides to continue with potential product design. 
It is the specialised suppliers who can ensure this ‘producibility’. In effect, this is similar 
to the ‘castability’ issue in developing a new gas turbine design in a case study of the co-
evolution between gas turbine OEMs and precision casters in the US (Rycroft and Kash, 
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1999). Catching-up capital goods firms need a more intense and direct relationship with 
the advanced specialised suppliers if they are to move into a leadership position. 
As a policy suggestion, Hobday et al. (2004) claim that Korean manufacturing 
firms need to establish co-development partnerships with advanced foreign specialist 
firms. For example, Samsung had such a relationship with a US-based specialist for core 
technology of CDMA mobile telephones while Hyundai Motors did so with the British 
engine specialist Ricardo for the development of its own engine (Y. Kim and Lee, 2001). 
Such relationships with foreign specialists, however, come with certain preconditions, 
such as that the Korean manufacturers and advanced specialists are not in potential 
competition with one another. Substantial changes in the global market could also affect 
potential relationships. It is questionable, therefore, whether such a partnership with 
advanced foreign specialists can be explained or realised in a firm-level strategy without 
a specific set of institutions at a sectoral, national or global level. 
Second, there is also a sectoral-level approach to a ‘catching-up shift dilemma’ 
issue of Korean industries. Although it is not directly concerned with the ‘catch-up shift’, 
the literature suggests machine tools as one of Korea’s weak industry sectors, suffering 
from a lack of user-supplier interaction (Lee & Lim, 2001; Y. Kim & Lee, 2008). The 
literature sees the machine tool industry as a specialised supplier industry, based on 
Pavitt’s taxonomy (1984), in which the tacit knowledge accumulated from the producer-
user interface is crucial. It is argued that the poor catch-up performance of the industry is 
attributable to traditional Korean industry policy, focusing on end products while relying 
on the imports of core parts and intermediate materials. 
Furthermore, the specificities of the knowledge base of the machine tool sector 
have also placed Korean latecomers in an awkward position. First, the equipment used in 
production processes is mostly made up of ‘general purpose’ technologies and the skills 
accumulated by the labourers are more important than the imported equipment itself. 
Second, technology licences are limited to a few specific models and cannot enhance the 
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design capability in the sector, but the sector needs capabilities to modify machine design 
to meet diverse demand. Third, formal education, study abroad and R&D cannot solve 
the problems, given that the required knowledge is tacit and only acquired during the 
product development process (Lim, 1997; Lee & Lim, 2001). 
In addition to the original bottleneck issue, the literature points to current 
obstacles to catching-up in the Korean machinery sector: i) domestic users’ mistrust of 
domestic machinery products, ii) advanced foreign firms’ intellectual property rights 
(IPR) lawsuits against domestic suppliers, iii) advanced foreign firms’ price dumping 
attacks. Therefore, the Korean machine tool sector suffers from a vicious circle between 
the necessity of user-supplier learning and the low quality of domestic supplier (Y. Kim 
& Lee 2008). 
In overcoming this barrier, Korean machine parts producers consider insufficient 
R&D funds as the most serious difficulty in the development process. The insufficiency of 
R&D funds does not only mean the size of the funds themselves but also that there are 
structural barriers, including the uncertain demand from local users and the involved 
risks in relation to the size of the firms (Y. Kim & Lee, 2008). The structural issue like 
unstable domestic demand of the machine tool industry is shared with the specialized 
suppliers abovementioned. 
Finally, there is the national innovation system (NSI) approach to the Korean 
‘catching-up shift’ issue. S. Kim (1998) ascribes the Korean semiconductor industry's 
successful catch-up and export performances of Dynamic Random-Access Memory 
(DRAM) in the 1990s to a conjuncture between state, Chaebol-governance and a 'window 
of opportunity' in the global market, rather than to the victory of either a free-market or a 
state-led target-specific industry policy. She adds a temporal window of opportunity for 
the Korean Chaebols in the global market, namely the US-Japan trade agreement from the 
late 1980s to the early 1990s, as one of the crucial explanatory variables, while appreciating 
the “reciprocal subsidies” concept of the earlier political economy literature. She argues 
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that the state policy, such as the cooperative DRAM R&D project, played only a 
supplementary role. She suggests that the Korean success in the specific segment of 
electronics is an idiosyncratic experience and argues for the necessary improvement of the 
unbalanced relationship between weak domestic user firms and Chaebol suppliers of 
electronics for the next step in catching-up success. 
The ‘catching-up shift dilemma’ of the Korean manufacturing industries in the 
literature commonly demonstrate that some limited but unconventional catching-up 
strategies, used to be effective and successful in the past, do not work anymore. The stories 
point out that overall institutional reforms, rather than a few target-specific catching-up 
policies, need to be considered to address the structural dilemma of the Korean 
latecomers. 
In sum, most of the empirical literature points to either a lack of domestic ‘user-
producer’ or ‘producer-specialised supplier’ interactions as the major obstacle to the 
catching-up shift of Korean manufacturing industries. This raises the question of whether 
the Korean HEI also shares the common user-producer claim. The research findings of the 
Korean catching-up dilemma issue in other Korean industry sectors leads to the second 
research question as below: 
Research Question 2: What are the specific weaknesses of inter-
sectoral linkages between the Korean HEI and ESI that might explain 
contrasting catching-up performance between nuclear and gas turbines, 
compared to their Japanese counterpart? 
In addition, there is a nuanced ambiguity as to whether the inter-sectoral 
relationships in the vicious circle are cause or effect. There is a gap in explaining how 
those interactions are shaped by the relevant institutions, which could be more decisive 
factors of a ‘lock-in’ trap in a long-term view. To investigate the research gap of the 
empirical literature, the theoretical literature in each aggregation level of analysis is 
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reviewed in the next Section, focusing on the inter-sectoral relationship and institutional 
factors. 
 Theoretical Literature Review 
2.4.1. Firm Capability Approaches and Gap 
Based on the various elements of the literature that emphasise resources and their 
implications for firm performance (Penrose, 1959, Stigler, 1961), Briger Wernerfelt (1984) 
has established the “resource-based view” framework in the field of strategic 
management. The resource-based view regards a bundle of valuable resources, both 
tangible and intangible, of firms in a highly imperfect market as the basis of the 
competitive advantage of a firm (Wernerfelt, 1984: 172). It argues that firms build their 
strategic distinctiveness on resources that are valuable, rare, and less imitable (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991). In this way, the distinctiveness of first-mover firms works as a 
“resource position barrier” to newcomers (Wernerfelt, 1984). In short, the main account of 
the resource-based literature focusses on the sustainability of already achieved 
competitive advantages rather than on the creation of advantages by followers or 
catching-up firms (Barney, 1991, 1995). 
On the other hand, the ‘dynamic capability’ approach, another strain of firm-level 
capability approaches, also focusses more on firms’ competitive survival than on the 
acquisition of sustainable competitive advantage (Teece & Pisano, 1994). Thus, it is in a 
more distant area from catching-up contexts. Indeed, the firm-level capability approach 
assumes that firms are in a developed country context with a modern and sophisticated 
NSI. In a developing economy context, firms usually not only lack necessary technologies, 
which should be transferred from foreign countries but also operate within 
underdeveloped markets and innovation system, such as weak public research institutes 
(Hobday, 2005). Even when the catching-up firms are in a ‘transition mode’, that is, 
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between catching up and a leadership position, they still suffer from a lack of sufficient 
complementary assets, such as upstream suppliers, or a lack of sufficient domestic user-
producer interaction as seen in the empirical literature (see Section 2.3.2). 
Recognising the gap of the firm capability approach or the resource-based view in 
addressing technology constraints of catching-up firms, Mathews (2002, 2006) suggests a 
‘resource leverage’ framework, a reversed version of the approaches. In order to overcome 
such barriers, latecomer firms would strategically exercise linking with advanced 
technology sources, leveraging of technological opportunities from the linking, and 
learning from iterations of the linking and the resource leveraging. The latecomers would 
initially target available resources, which have the least rare, most imitable and 
transferable characteristics, from advanced foreign technology sources. From this 
foothold of linking, the latecomers would be able to bargain with the advanced firms for 
knowledge resources, such as technical know-how through subcontracts of 
manufacturing. Through numerous iterations of the linking and leveraging, latecomer 
firms learn how to expand and deepen initially acquired capabilities and turn them into 
internal competence development. The processes reduce the gap between the latecomer 
and advanced foreign firms and let the former eventually arrive at leader’s position, such 
as successful semiconductor producers in Korea and Taiwan (Mathews, 2002, 2006). 
In explaining the learning process of latecomer firms, he borrows conceptual 
categories from the organisation and management literature, namely absorptive 
capacities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and combinative capabilities (Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
Absorptive capacity is re-defined as latecomer firms’ ability to absorb the leveraged 
resources, including product and process technologies and tacit and explicit knowledge. 
The capacity can be generated through iteration of rather simple mass production, and 
eventually can be utilised in conceiving and executing major investments in plant and 
equipment, and in appreciating a new business area and executing an entry strategy. In 
this perspective, he specifies the role of R&D expenditures of the latecomers as a means 
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of acquiring a greater capacity for appreciating and exploiting technological and market 
“shocks”, chances in other words, rather than a simple means of generating new products 
(Mathews, 2002). 
The combinative capability is defined as an organisational capacity to generate 
new applications for existing knowledge. It is “the intersection of the capability of the firm 
to exploit its knowledge and the unexplored potential of the technology” (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992:391). Although latecomer firms are not expected to generate ‘new 
knowledge’, they are capable to combinate a variety of seemingly fragmented technology 
sources into a competitive production or process technology (Mathews, 2002). 
While Mathews’ alternative approach to the mainstream resource-based view 
enables an analysis of latecomer firms’ catching-up process in technology constraints, it 
still lacks explanations of non-firm and crucial factors for the catching-up performances. 
The shortcomings of technology and market sophistication in catching-up economies 
cannot be solved just by the latecomer firms and need to be facilitated by national 
institutions, such as public technology transfer agencies during FDI licensing processes. 
In this concern, Mathews supplements his approach with the term “institutional 
resources” and acknowledges the necessity of national-level interventions. “Latecomer 
firms can be effective in overcoming their disadvantages and exploiting their potential 
advantages only if the country in which they are located builds a set of supporting institutions 
that guide, shape and channel the linkage and leverage processes (Mathews, 2006: 324, italics 
added)”. 
However, Mathews’ supplementing term “institutional resources” is still too 
narrow to capture potentially more influential but broader institutional factors to the 
latecomer’s catching-up performances. The empirical literature reveals that institutional 
changes of the ESI, including those in economic and environmental regulations, are 
crucial to the innovation of the HEI technologies in developed economies, and the changes 
are driven by parliamentary or legal decision makings beyond narrow supporting policies 
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and incentive systems of energy ministries. The efficacy of narrow supporting institutions 
would be even weaker in the countries in catching-up transition, such as Korea, where 
technology transfer from foreign countries is not readily available anymore due to 
international competition. The firm capability or resource-based view, thereby, could be 
used only for a partial analysis of the latecomer HEI firms within a broader analytical 
framework in the thesis. 
2.4.2. The Sectoral System of Innovation Approach and Gap 
Based on the Schumpeterian classification, Malerba and Orsenigo (1996: 451) 
suggest that “the patterns of innovative activities differ systematically across 
technological classes but are remarkably similar across countries for each technological 
class”. Inspired by various system approaches, Malerba (2002) suggests another kind of 
system approach, namely the sectoral system of innovation (SSI). In the sectoral system 
concept, he defines a sector as a set of activities that are unified by linked product groups 
for a given or emerging demand and that share certain common knowledge. 
In its latest version, the literature suggests ‘building blocks’ of SSI consist of i) 
regimes of knowledge and technologies, ii) actors and networks and the coordination 
amongst them, and iii) the institutions (Malerba & Nelson, 2008). These elements are 
assumed to interact to generate variety, subject to selection and co-evolution. The SSI 
approach reveals that there are certain differences in catching-up patterns and paces in 
different sectors, even within one country. 
While the SSI approach emphasises the sectoral differences by knowledge base 
and networks of key actors in explaining sectoral variation, it also suggests that there is 
co-evolution between national institutions and specific sectors (Malerba & Nelson, 2008). 
Often, the characteristics of national institutions favour particular sectors rather than 
others. Thus, the sectors that fit the national institutions better may grow and prosper, 
whereas other sectors that do not match the institutions may be constrained in 
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development and innovation. The attention to the fitness of sectoral specificities with the 
characteristics of national institutions is an improvement in Porter (1990)’s account that 
nations succeed in inter-connected industries rather than in all industries or haphazardly 
scattered industries. 
Despite its contributions to innovation system studies, the approach has three 
weaknesses. First, it has a gap in explaining the cross-nation and cross-technology 
variations of a sector. It assumes that each sector is more or less homogenous and thereby 
succeeds or fails as a whole and that the patterns of innovative activities are similar across 
countries for each technological class. Although they address different technological 
trajectories for the same sector across countries (Malerba & Nelson, 2008: 13-14), it 
considers a variety of business positions of local subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations, such as a regional marketing centre, R&D centre, or service centre, rather 
than a variety of technological performances within the same sector. 
A second weakness of the approach is in its downscaling setting of sector 
boundaries regarding cross-technology variation. The literature suggests that different 
innovation subsystems related to different product groups may coexist within a broad 
sectoral system (Malerba, 2005). The technologies in the same sector are not mutually 
irrelevant co-existing entities, however. They often compete with one another under the 
same or similar set of sectoral institutions, as can be seen in the case of nuclear power and 
gas turbines in the empirical literature review. Then, the downsizing sectoral boundaries 
would miss the critical hinge of analysis. 
Third, the SSI approach has a gap in explaining inter-sectoral relationships. SSI 
includes a large number of heterogeneous sectoral elements, including firms, upstream 
suppliers, users, universities and public laboratories, financial organisations, 
governments, and actors’ networks (Malerba & Nelson, 2008). It is related to the 
assumption that knowledge and technology, and interdependencies and 
complementarities from the input (supply) and demand sectors define the ‘real 
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boundaries’ of a sectoral system (Malerba, 1999: 5-6). Although the claim offers insights 
into the clustering effect between supplier and user sectors over certain technology, it also 
has its own gap. 
In effect, the distinctive networks of firms, upstream suppliers, and users are inter-
sectoral relationships rather than networks of actors in a single sector. This is a serious gap 
in that upstream suppliers and users also have their own sectoral elements, such as 
sectoral institutions, and often the institutions of upstream and user sectors have serious 
influences on technological performances, as we have seen from the empirical literature 
on HEI. 
In effect, the SSI approach to the inter-sectoral linkage issue is inspired by 
development economics’ main theme, namely the impact of inter-sectoral linkages on 
industrial competitiveness. In his pioneering work of development economics, 
Hirschman (1958) conceptualised ‘backward linkage’ and ‘forward linkage’ as basic 
components of these linkages. Backward linkage effects mean derived demand and can 
be translated as the provision of input from other industries for a given activity. Forward 
linkage effects mean output utilisation; in other words, the outputs from a given activity 
will induce attempts to use this output as inputs in some new activities of other industries 
(Hirschman, 1958: 100). His contribution to inter-sectoral co-evolution and national 
development served as the foundation for the SSI approach. His theory could be 
abstracted as a combination of Leontief’s Input-Output Analysis and Schumpeter’s theory 
of innovation and entrepreneurship (Lundvall et al., 2002). 
However, considering the methodological dominance of Input-Output Analysis 
with the limited measurability of inter-sectoral interactions and sectoral performance only 
on an aggregate level, the approach could miss fine-grained aspects of inter-sectoral co-
evolution and innovation, and lead to the misjudgement of crucial components of national 
development (Lundvall et al., 2002) (see also Section 3.5.2). Such an approach misses the 
critical role of the user-producer interactions in the innovation process and could naively 
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lead to emphasis on upstream sectors as a strategy of developing economies. In contrast, 
Lundvall et al. (2002) show the opposite case in Nordic countries, where competitive 
machinery sectors were a result of strong user sectors and a long-term innovative 
interaction. 
This Section has discussed the findings of SSI on the co-evolutionary aspect 
between specific sectors and national institutions, and the gap in explaining cross-nation, 
cross-technology variation, boundary setting of sectors, and inter-sectoral relationships. 
The findings and gap lead attention to the NSI approach. 
2.4.3. National System of Innovation and Gap 
The literature of NSI reveals the pitfalls of mainstream economics, which explains 
economic growth as an autonomous mechanism independent of institutional background 
and does not recognise the relevance of innovation in this growth. It is defined as the 
network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions 
initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new technologies (Freeman, 1987:1). It points out the 
importance of central government leadership, inter-firm and inter-organisational 
technology exchange and cooperation, and social and educational innovation. It is 
distinctive from the previous mainstream views that focused on the competence of 
components and actors themselves in a nation. Instead, it shifts the attention to networks 
and interactions of components and actors. Furthermore, it demystifies a linear type of 
innovation idea, which is that basic R&D results in innovation, subsequent 
commercialisation, and economic growth in an orderly way. 
The NSI literature considers complementarities among subsystems or components 
of the system are a prerequisite in achieving high performance of innovation. 
Disproportionate progress of the subsystems may lead to mismatch, lack of synchronicity 
or harmonious integration of them. Thereby, identifying of the mismatch and re-
integrating the unfitted subsystems, such as science, technology, economy, politics and 
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culture, of society would be the primary purpose of innovation policies in the view of NSI 
(Freeman, 1995). For instance, Freeman (1995) attributes stagnation of the British economy 
in the late 19th Century and 20th Century to loss of congruence between the five sub-
systems of British society. The progress of new science-based technologies and specialised 
management in large corporations fitted ill with some of the old British political and social 
institutions. 
Since Freeman (1987)’s pioneering work on NSI concepts, there has been a 
nuanced bifurcation in the literature based on the definition and boundary of institutions, 
which is a crucial part of NSI (Edquist & Hommen, 2006). In particular, a group of the NSI 
literature, mainly based on innovation cases in the US, focusses on narrow coordination 
systems between firms, science-oriented universities, and public R&D centres. The main 
analytic subjects of this narrowly focused approach are micro supporting systems of the 
innovative networks such as rearrangements of IPR regulations and financial incentives 
for venture capitals (Nelson 1993, 2008, Mowery and Oxley, 1995). 
Inevitably, the narrow version of NSI has a propensity to focus on the developed 
economy context, where the production of knowledge and new technology are 
pronounced based on a well-established NSI. In the developed economy context, it is not 
only possible but also efficient to ‘analyse the details of the specific subsystem without 
worrying too much about the rest of the innovation system’ (Lundvall et al., 2002: 226). 
Thus, the narrow version NSI literature often concentrates on firms and technology, 
reducing the analysis of the (national) institutions to a ‘left-over category’ (Groenewegen 
& van der Steen, 2003). The narrowly defined institutions, however, do not match the poor 
components, such as weak public R&D institutes, and networking capabilities of NSI in 
developing economy contexts (Lundvall 1988, 2007; Lundvall et al., 2002). 
As an alternative, Lundvall and colleagues suggest a broad version of NSI and 
shift the attention to a broader set of institutions that shape competence building in 
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developing or small economies. The approach accounts for four conceptual building 
blocks as a theoretical base of the NSI. They include i) economy as a system, ii) the home 
market effect, iii) the microeconomic approach to innovation as an interactive process, and 
iv) the role of institutions in shaping innovative activities (Lundvall et al., 2002: 216-217). 
Implications of the four concepts need to be discussed for application to this 
research. First, the approach considers the national economy consists of industry sectors 
with backward and forward linkages rather than random co-existence of various 
industries. This implies the necessity of understanding of existing economic structure in 
innovation studies. Second, the ‘home market effect’ implies the importance of national 
context which offers the local demand and subsequently induces technological 
specialisation. Third, the interactive process implies co-operation between heterogeneous 
agents including user firms, supplier firms, public institutes, and universities as a crucial 
factor of innovative performance of firms. Fourth, the institutions are considered as formal 
and informal institutions that form the contexts in which the inter-active learnings take 
place (Lundvall, 2002). In addition, they emphasise a historical analysis of the role of the 
state, the creation and evolution of institutions under which user-producers’ learning by 
interaction evolves, international specialisation, and the co-evolution of major sectors 
(Lundvall, 1998, Lundvall et al., 2002). 
A few crucial points derived from the empirical literature could be accounted for 
by this approach. ESI-HEI relationship based on specific institutions, such as electricity 
market regulations and environmental regulations, have been crucial to HEI’s survival 
and performances in the empirical literature. Also, the home market concept could be 
useful in understanding specific coevolution patterns of the latecomer HEI firms and 
relevant actors, including ESI. The economic structure concept is also important in 
understanding the demand conditions of the Korean and Japanese HEI. In this sense, the 
broad version of NSI and its user-producer concept in relation to institutional and 
historical perspectives could be used as a theoretical base of the thesis. 
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Furthermore, the broad NSI’s user-producer framework based on the concept of 
‘quality of demand’ is highly relevant to this thesis. In the user-producer approach, the 
institutions of ESI can shape the quality of demand regarding HEI’s catching-up 
performances, including environmental and economic performance. Although most 
frequently analysed institutional factors in the NSI literature are concentrated on the 
education system, industrial relations, and labour market dynamics, Lundvall et al. (2002) 
suggest broad applications of the NSI concepts, such as energy and environmental policies. 
The conceptual framework of the NSI, thereby, is chosen as the main theoretical approach 
of this thesis. 
However, the NSI lacks a detail theoretical analysis of how the innovation systems 
function and how they evolve. The theoretical limit makes it challenging to compare 
empirical cases of countries in a more systemic fashion (Fagerberg, 2003; Witt, 2003; Balzat 
& Hanusch, 2003; Groenewegen & van der Steen, 2006). Although the conceptual 
frameworks of NSI are widely shared by policymakers in various countries, they still need 
better systemic NSI benchmarks, taking systematically into account the variety of 
“national idiosyncrasies” (Moreau, 2004; Groenewegen & van der Steen, 2006). In this 
regard, this thesis adds supplementing theoretical perspectives to the NSI approach. The 
next Section discusses the supplementing literature to the NSI approach for this thesis. 
2.4.4. Supplementing Analytical Approaches to the NSI Approach 
 
This Section devises three supplementing approaches to the broad version of NSI. 
First, firm-level capability approach could be partially utilised for comparing and 
analysing the latecomer HEI firms in Korea and Japan in a broad NSI context. Section 2.4.1 
already discussed the useful points and limits of the firm-capability approach in this 
regard. Second, institutional factors need to be analysed more systematically in order to 
understand the historical background and hierarchical relationships of core regulations 
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on ESI in the two catching-up countries. Third, core regulations on ESI need to be analysed 
in order to understand how they function in catching-up of technologies in overall 
national systems of innovation. 
Hierarchical Analysis of Institutional Factors and NSI 
In addressing the research questions, there is still a nuanced gap in the analytical 
concept of institutions. Although the concepts of ‘match’ and ‘mismatch’ between 
institutions and policies are already reflected in the NSI approach (Freeman, 1987; 
Lundvall, 1988; OECD, 1997b), overall relationships of the institutions and policies are not 
systematically addressed. For instance, which will be more influential or enduring among 
the relevant institutions and policies on the occasion of mismatch? Where should 
policymakers focus on the occasion of mismatch? Should governments consider all the 
types of institutions in equal weight? 
In this regard, the hierarchical framework for institutional analysis (Williamson, 
2000) based on a historical perspective is added to the NSI approach. Although the 
framework was devised for economic policy discussions rather than innovation studies, 
the institutional and historical perspectives can account for the ambiguous aspect of the 
NSI. Based on the concepts of ‘humanely devised constraints’ and ‘endurance’ of 
institutions (North, 1990), and in answering Kenneth Arrow’s open question, “why 
economic institutions emerged the way they did and not otherwise? (Arrows, 1987:734)”, 
Williamson (2000) elaborates an institutional framework for social analysis. The four-level 
scheme classifies institutional elements by their hierarchical positions in the chain of 
constraints accompanied by relative endurance including social embeddedness (Level 1), 
institutional environment (Level 2), institutional governance (Level 3), and resource 
allocation and employment (Level 4). In this chain of constraints, a higher level imposes 
constraints on the level immediately below (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3 Economics of Institutions 
Level of Institutions Frequency 
(years) 
Purpose 
L1. Societal Embeddedness 
(informal, customs, traditions, norms) 
102 to 103 Spontaneous 
L2. Institutional Environment: 
Property (polity, judiciary, bureaucracy) 
10 to 102 Get the institutional 
environment right 
L3. Governance: 
Contract (aligning governance structure with transaction) 
 1 to 10 Get the governance 
structure right 
L4. Resource Allocation & Employment 
(prices and quantities) 
Continuous Get the marginal 
conditions right 
Source: Williamson 2000: 597 
According to the scheme, Level 2 and 3 are emphasised as analytical themes while 
the ‘social embeddedness’ (Level 1) is implied as an entity beyond ‘deliberate choice’ of 
society. Institutional environment (rules of the game) is shaped by political, judicial, and 
bureaucratic decision-making, and endure more than a decade if they are not abruptly 
changed by occasional ‘massive discontents’ such as occupation after WWII or military 
coup. Although a rare window of opportunity to effect broad reforms is opened at this 
level, such moments are considered exceptional (Williamson 2000). Due to accompanied 
costs and complex processes in defining and enforcing the rules of the game at this level, 
more detailed institutional arrangements for transactions are defined by ‘governance 
structure’ at Level 3. The possible re-organisation of transactions among governance 
structures can be re-examined periodically and more frequently within a decade. 
Resource allocation and employment are routinely dealt with at Level 4. Williamson 
(2000) suggests that transaction cost economics’ role belongs to Level 3 while neo-classical 
economics’ role belongs to Level 4. 
Although the four-level analysis framework is devised to address economic policy 
issues, the hierarchical concepts based on historical perspective could be applied, in 
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conjunction with the NSI approach, to address the research questions. It enables this thesis 
to systematically address critical institutions of ESI in terms of historical background and 
the relative degree of constraining effects of different institutions on catching-up 
performances. Borrowing the analytical scheme of Williamson (2000), this thesis adopts 
the bottom three out of the four levels. It elaborates a framework which regards relevant 
institutions of the ESI as decisive factors of ‘quality of demand’ in a catch-up context. The 
framework follows a sequence of i) elaborating crucial institutional factors in a historical 
perspective, ii) finding measurable core institutions of electricity suppliers as decisive 
factors of ‘quality of demand’, iii) analysing differentiated impacts on cross-technology or 
cross-nation catching-up variations. 
From a historical perspective, the framework considers major historical, external 
and domestic events and subsequent institutional changes as origins of the deeply 
entrenched ‘institutional environment’ of the ESI in the cases. A few major events in 
economic and environmental dimensions may directly define ownership of ESI and the 
legal status of environmental and safety regulations, respectively. At the level of 
‘Governance’, state control or the autonomy of the ESI’s business transactions, including 
pricing scheme and fuel contracts, and environmental and safety standards and criteria 
are defined. At the level of ‘Routinised Operation’, routinised business transactions of ESI, 
such as pricing practices, and routinised regulatory practices on the environmental and 
safety issues of ESI are observed. At this level, observations are focused on the degree of 
autonomy or control by the state in routinised business transactions, and the degree of 
regulatory practices in terms of enforcement of sanctions on the occasion of violations. 
Finally, the framework interrelates the catching-up performances of technologies to the 
economic and environmental institutions of the ESI. Although the constraining effects of 
institutions are proportional to the hierarchical chains, the directly measurable 
components in the case study are at the level of resource allocation and employment 
(Table 2.4). 
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Table 2.4 Historical and Hierarchical Analysis of Core Institutions of ESI 
 Economic Dimension  Environmental Dimension 
Institutional 
Environment 
(property rights) 
- Ownership of ESI 
(private/national) 
- Legal change 
  (often with new agency)  
Governance 
(contracts) 
- Control or autonomy of 
  business transactions 
- Emission & safety regulations 
  (standards, criteria) 
Routinised 
Operation 
- Electricity pricing practices 
- Fuel contracts & transactions 
- Regulatory practices 
(sanctions or exemptions on violations) 
Source: Adaptation from Williamson 2000: 597 
 
The Literature of Regulations and Innovation 
As observed in the empirical literature on HEI in advanced economies, economic 
and environmental regulations on ESI profoundly affected HEI firms’ innovation 
activities and their survivability in the 1970s and 80s. The aspect is directly related to 
technology transfer from the affected advanced HEI firms to the latecomers in Japan and 
Korea. Therefore, it is rational to look at the corresponding economic and environmental 
regulations and their functions in the catching-up process in the latecomer countries. In 
analysing the effects of the economic and environmental regulations on the catching-up 
performances in the two countries, this thesis needs to supplement the overall NSI 
approach with the literature on regulations and innovation. 
Porter and van der Linde (1995) famously claim that although a stringent 
environmental regulation may hinder national industries initially, it will induce 
technology innovations and enhance their global competitiveness with increased export 
potentials over foreign firms, which will be constrained by the same regulations in 
respective nations later. A large body of empirical literature testing the hypothesis find a 
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mostly positive impact of environmental regulations on innovation, at least, from a long-
term perspective. 
For instance, Popp (2006) finds that US firms increased innovative activities 
regarding sulphur dioxide scrubbers of coal power plants in response to the US Clean Air 
Act of 1990, but they did not respond to environmental regulations of foreign countries. 
Berthélemy (2012) finds that stringent safety nuclear regulation in terms of average outage 
for inspection alongside new construction of nuclear reactors and public R&D 
expenditure induced innovation of nuclear technologies in twelve OECD countries 
between 1974 and 2008. He, however, finds that reactor outages by regulatory decisions 
in the case of non-compliance to safety standards hamper innovative activities. 
Beyond the effects of environmental regulations, there is a large amount of 
literature that cover the effects of other regulations on innovation. Stewart (2010) and 
Blind (2012) find that economic regulations have detrimental effects on innovation in 
general while social regulations induce compliance innovations at large from a broad 
cross-industry literature review and a quantitative assessment. From the empirical 
bifurcation, they draw an insight that the former is concerned with resource allocations 
rather than innovation while the latter is more likely to require compliance innovation to 
correct negative externalities. According to their definitions, economic regulations include 
price control, market entry conditions and the regulation of contract terms while social 
regulations include environmental controls, health and safety regulations (Table 2.5).11 
 
 
11 These are generally compatible with OECD’s taxonomy of regulations which include economic, 
social and institutional regulations (1997). 
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Table 2.5 Effects of Regulations on Innovations in the Literature 
 Negative Effects Positive Effects Empirical Results of 
Net Effects 
Economic 
Regulations 
(market entry, 
price) 
- Prohibit entry of 
  potential innovators 
- Reduce innovation 
  activities 
- Positive for protection 
  of infant industries 
- Flexible price schemes 
  increase productivity 
- Stifle innovations in 
  general 
- Positive in case of 
  deregulation 
Social 
Regulations 
(e.g. safety, 
environment) 
- Create compliance 
  costs 
- Reduce R&D 
 spending on other areas 
- Incentives for new 
environmental tech. 
e.g. create barriers to 
non-innovators’ entry 
- Ambivalent in the 
  short run 
- Positive in the long 
  run 
Source: Adapted from Stewart (2010), Blind (2012) 
Despite the efforts in finding causality between individual regulations and 
innovation effects, a systemic approach which analyses combined effects of the focal 
regulation with other regulations and policies is seldom found in the literature. A handful 
of literature pays attention to a narrow range of innovation instruments directly 
complementing the focal environmental regulations, such as public R&D (Walz et al., 
2008; Ambec et al., 2011). Environmental regulations and their complementing policies, 
however, do not operate in a vacuum condition. For instance, electric utilities and HEI 
firms are heavily influenced by economic regulations with completely different intents, 
including price controls, market-entry regulations or sometimes fuel regulations, other 
than environmental regulations (see Section 2.2.1). 
In this regard, Borrás & Edquist (2014) point out a potential fallacy of analysis of 
the effect of individual regulations on innovation. They articulate three reasons why it is 
difficult to find a direct causality between individual regulations and innovation effects. 
First, numerous complex factors, including wider socio-economic and technical factors, 
may intervene in diverse ways. Second, there could be a considerable time lag between a 
change of regulation and its eventual effects on innovation. Third, environmental 
regulations operate in complex interactions with other regulations and policies rather 
than operate in isolation. They argue that it is more realistic to pay attention to the effect 
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of regulatory frameworks, rather than the effect of individual regulations, on innovation. 
Thereby, there is a gap in the literature in capturing the combined effects of core 
regulations on catching-up performances of the HEI. The gap in the empirical literature 
and the findings in the review of theoretical literature lead to the third research question: 
Research Question 3: To what extent, can a specific set of user sector’s 
institutions explain the contrasting catching-up performances of the Korean 
HEI, as compared to the experiences of the Japanese? 
 
2.5 Chapter Conclusion 
The empirical literature of HEI firms in advanced economies shows that 
regulatory changes of their user sector, namely ESI, heavily affected the HEI firms’ 
innovation activities and survivability. The regulatory changes and subsequent firms’ 
survival efforts directly resulted in technology transfer from the firms to the two 
latecomer countries, namely Japan and Korea. In this regard, the corresponding 
regulations in the two latecomer countries might be important but the literature of 
catching-up HEI firms lacks the systematic analysis on effects of the regulatory 
asymmetry between the advanced economies and the latecomer countries. 
In supplementing limits of HEI catching-up literature, the literature review on 
Korea’s ‘catching-up shift dilemma’ in major manufacturing sectors shows lack of user-
producer or producer-specialised supplier interactions as a main cause of the dilemma. 
The literature on the dilemma based on firm-capability approach lacks systemic analysis 
beyond firm capability given that users’ aversion of domestic products or unavailability 
of technology transfer from advanced foreign firms is the problems beyond the focal 
firms’ capability. 
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The theoretical literature review shows that the broad version of NSI would be 
suitable to analyse the cross-nation, cross-technology variation of the HEI latecomers in a 
specific catching-up economy context. In order to supplement its weak theoretical 
frameworks in investigating how the innovation systems function and how they evolve 
over time and in comparing national idiosyncrasies, it needs additional perspectives 
including the firm-level capability approach (Mathews, 2002, 2006), the hierarchical 
analysis of institutions (Williamson, 2000), and the regulatory framework perspective on 
innovation (Borrás & Edquist, 2014). 
The supplementary perspectives contribute analytical concepts to explaining the 
cases, but individually they do not account for the overarching story. The firm capability 
approach helps to analyse catching-up firms’ ‘combinative capability’ in limited resource 
conditions but has limits in analysing institutional factors in the catching-up context. The 
hierarchical analysis of institutions helps to analyse how and why core regulations on ESI 
evolved and to compare the national idiosyncrasies in a comparative manner but do not 
explain their relationship with catching-up performances. The regulatory framework 
perspective can explain the combining effects of core regulations on catching-up 
performances but lacks a perspective on the historical evolution of the regulations and 
affected firms’ performance. 
Thereby, the thesis will use the broad version of NSI as the main theoretical 
framework to integrate the analytical strength of the three supplementary perspectives 
while complements their limits (Table 2.6). By employing the broad NSI approach with 
consideration of firm capabilities, institutional evolution, and regulatory effects, it is 
possible to investigate comparatively the coevolution of the HEI and ESI sectors in Korea 
and Japan. The thesis aims to suggest an interpretive history of institutional, economic 
and technological development in the context of catching-up NSI through this combined 
framework. 
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Table 2.6 Analytical Framework based on the Broad NSI Perspective 
 Capability of 
Latecomer HEI Firms 
Core Regulations on 
User Sector (ESI) 
Institutional Evolution 
N
ar
ro
w
 N
S
I Linking & Leveraging 
- Absorptive Capability 
- Combinative Capability 
Supporting Institutions 
- Public R&Ds 
- Facilitations of Technology 
Transfer 
Institutions are Left-over 
Parts in Undifferentiated 
Contexts 
B
ro
ad
 N
S
I Latecomers’ Adaptation to 
Domestic Regulations and 
Global Market Changes 
Combined Effects of 
Environmental & Economic 
Regulations on Catching-up 
Historical Evolution of 
Environmental & 
Economic Regulations 
 
At the beginning of Chapter 2, the tentative empirical question was raised: “Why 
has the Korean HEI been unable to make the shift from its successful catch-up of nuclear 
technology to that of a globally emerging technology, namely the gas turbine, while its 
Japanese counterpart, an earlier latecomer, could do so?” The review of the empirical and 
theoretical literature reveals that the Japanese catching-up of nuclear power was 
unsatisfactory with its export performances despite its early technological indigenisation 
of commercial reactors.12 In this regard, the two countries’ HEIs show dichotomously 
contrasting catching-up performances across the two technologies in terms of export. 
Thereby, the tentative question needs to be revised and elaborated further. The three 
research questions derived from the literature review are revisited here. 
Research Question 1: Why did Japanese and Korean HEIs show contrasting 
catching-up performances between nuclear power and gas turbines in the past three 
decades? 
 
12 It should be noted that Japanese nuclear reactor vendors have sought to export their reactors 
with enthusiastic government support in the 2010s even after Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Accident in 2011 (see Section 5.3.2 for details).  
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Research Question 2: What are the specific characteristics of inter-sectoral 
linkages between the HEI and ESI that might explain the cross-nation, cross-technology 
variation in catching-up of nuclear and gas turbine across Korea and Japan? 
Research Question 3: To what extent, can a specific set of user sector’s institutions 
explain contrasting catching-up performances of the Korean HEI, as compared to the 
experiences of the Japanese? 
In addressing the above research questions, the analytical framework based on the 
broad version of NSI suggests a series of assumptions. The framework assumes that a 
regulatory set of a user sector (ESI) influences the catching-up ecosystem of HEI and 
systemically favours one technology over another through a specific chain of demands. 
The set of core regulations on ESI evolve through historic economic and social events 
within a given national context rather than randomly change over time. The technological 
performances in terms of operation and new construction based on the chain of demand 
offer domestic conditions for technology transfer from foreign licensors, change the rate 
of learning by repetition of construction projects, and build a track record for the 
technology in the global market (Table 2.7). 
Table 2.7 Assumptions of User Sector’s Institutions and Catching-Up 
A Set of Institutions 
of ESI 
Distinctive Inter-Sectoral 
Relationship 
Catching-Up 
Performances 
influences user-
supplier relationship 
to a specific mode 
systemically favour specific 
technology over another through 
a specific chain of demand 
construction, operation, 
indigenisation, export  
 
Although this thesis does not intend to establish a general theory on HEI firms’ 
catching-up performance, it needs to suggest a theoretical proposition as a foundation for 
the research design. The research assumes that the cross-national variation of key 
institutions of ESI shaped the cross-national and cross-technology dichotomy of catching-
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up, regardless of public R&D efforts. In this regard, the following research proposition is 
suggested below: 
Research Proposition: Contrasting institutional sets of ESI between 
Japan and Korea have shaped the dichotomously contrasting catching-up 
performances of nuclear power and gas turbine technologies across the two 
countries, regardless of relative firm capability, sectoral arrangement, and 
public R&Ds in the HEI sector. 
However, plausible rival explanations may arise from other theories or 
conjectures. To validate the credibility of the research design, the research must address 
these rival approaches before the selection of the research method. First, the cross-
technology and cross-nation variation in catching-up performance could be attributable 
to differences in the technological capabilities of the Korean and Japanese HEI firms. 
Second, the cross-technology and cross-nation variation in catching-up performance 
could be argued to be mere coincidence, based on the SSI approach, which considers 
different technology classes as different sectors. Finally, the cross-technology and cross-
nation variation in catching-up performance could be argued as a result of different R&D 
efforts, including the size of public expenditure and frequency of R&D projects, as a 
practical rival proposition. These three rival explanations can be formulated as rival 
propositions: 
Rival Proposition 1: The cross-technology and cross-nation variation 
in catching-up performances is a result of different firm capabilities, including 
specialised supplier’s capabilities. 
Rival Proposition 2: The cross-technology and cross-nation variation 
in catching-up performances is a mere coincidence, given that the two 
technologies are different, and each has an independent sub-sector. 
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Rival Proposition 3: The cross-technology and cross-nation contrast in 
catching-up performance is a result of different R&D efforts, including the size 
of public expenditure and frequency of R&D projects. 
In addressing the three rival propositions, the research will i) thoroughly gather 
and analyse the relevant data regarding the impact of capabilities of HEI firm and 
supporting industries, sectoral contexts including institutions and policies, and R&D 
efforts, and ii) demonstrate cross-national and cross-technology dichotomous catching-up 
performances which might verify the firm capability, sectoral system, practical 
approaches’ claims throughout the comparative case study. The three rival propositions 
are addressed in the discussion and conclusion chapters. 
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Chapter 3. Research Method 
 Chapter Introduction 
This Chapter develops a method based on the framework introduced in Chapter 
2, describing the broad NSI framework in which the investigation of firm capabilities, 
institutional evolution, and regulation effects on catching-up will be conducted. This 
Chapter establishes a method to observe and measure i) the pattern and extent of the set 
of key institutions and ii) their impact on user-supplier interactions, which eventually 
enables iii) a catching-up of a specific HEI technology compared with other technology, 
for instance, nuclear power compared with the gas turbine. 
In order to focus on the discussion, this Chapter centres on impact of inter-sectoral 
institutions regarding new construction and operation performances of the two 
technologies, given that the performances i) can be indicated by ‘track-record’ in each 
export market, ii) increase technological capability through learning by repetition of new 
build projects, and iii) offer adequate domestic market conditions for foreign advanced 
licensors to transfer technology. 
As this Chapter explains, this research applies a qualitative comparative case 
study based on Korean and Japanese cases to highlight institutional impacts on user-
supplier relationships regarding specific technology catching-up performance patterns. 
The Japanese case, however, is used as a reference case rather than a part of a full-blown 
case study considering the asymmetric nature of the two cases. In other words, the 
Japanese latecomers have superior technical capabilities in both technologies in terms of 
a few decades’ earlier technology localisation histories. Thereby, a few crucial periods of 
the catching-up process will be highlighted while the early localisation history will be only 
briefly reviewed. Thus, the research on the Japanese case mainly takes the form of 
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extensive desk research on previous case studies, technology reviews, local literature, 
archival records, statistics and interviews with a few key informants. 
This measurement of the pattern and degree of an institutional set of a user sector 
and their impacts on the catching-up performance of the two technologies depends 
mainly on a qualitative comparative case study with supplementary descriptive statistics. 
 Methodological Review and Discussion 
3.2.1. Quantitative Methods 
Input-Output Analysis and Its Limitations 
One of the typical methods for dealing with a specific industry’s backward and 
forward linkage effects is Input-Output Analysis (I-O Analysis). Based on an ‘inter-
industry relation table’, a given input is enumerated in the column of an industry, and its 
outputs are enumerated in its corresponding row. This format shows how influential and 
dependent each industry is a relation to all others in a nation, both as a customer of the 
nation’s outputs and as a supplier of its inputs. 
The most appealing contribution of input-output matrices concerns the impacts of 
economic activities on sectoral distribution and trade. For instance, ‘leakages’ due to 
imports from other countries may prove to be important for policy-making. Similarly, the 
impact of sectoral demand may prove to be important, particularly if it is considered that 
some sectors must be stimulated to accelerate the overall national growth rate. However, 
the efficacy of this approach lies in the broadness of the research scope (i.e. aggregation 
level) and the availability of an appropriate dataset. Its dataset is based on national 
standard industrial classification, which covers only large-scale industrial sectors. 
However, economic output statistics are not always disaggregated enough to 
reveal the technological aspects of inter-sectoral trade, such as the extents of shifts from 
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lower to higher-value products (Williams & Larson, 1987). For example, the United 
Nation’s International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) or national standard 
industrial classifications do not distinguish specialty products from commodity products, 
even in its finest classification units, namely four-digit classes. Thereby, Input-Output 
Analysis (I-O analysis) based on such statistics cannot capture inter-sectoral relationship 
beyond the broad aggregation level of the dataset. Its broadness of aggregation level itself 
makes it difficult to discern specific technologies from such a broad technology group. It 
has fundamental limits on distinguishing each detail in an industry sector, as well as the 
relevant technologies and products of the HEI and ESI. 
For example, in the Japanese Input-Output Table, the ‘Engines’ sector (Column 
Code 3011-03, Row Code 3011-031) broadly defines ‘the production activities for internal 
combustion engines’ listed under Industry Number 2613 and ‘Miscellaneous Engines and 
Turbines’ listed under Industry Number 2619 of the Standard Industrial Classification for 
Japan (JSIC). Thereby, the sector includes various heterogeneous technologies, including 
‘atomic power reactors, water wheels, windmill engines, compressed air engines, parts, 
fixtures and accessories for general purpose internal combustion engines’, as well as 
general purpose gasoline engines, kerosene engines, and diesel engines (Chapter VI. 
Concept, Definition and Scope by Sector, 2005 I-O tables of Japan). 
Another example of basic sector classification of the Japanese Input-Output Table 
is ‘Electric power facilities construction’ (Row Code 4132-021). This basic sector is broadly 
defined as ‘Electric business activities…. and facility construction work activities… 
relating to power generation, transmission and distribution.’ Also, facilities replacement 
and repair work are included in this sector (2005 I-O tables of Japan). Thus, it is also 
impossible to capture technology-specific construction activities, such as nuclear power 
or gas turbines, from the input-output tables of Japan. 
Similarly, in Korean input-output tables, sectoral categories face the same 
problems. For instance, at its basic industry level—which is the most disaggregated 
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industry grouping level in Korean Standard Industry Classification (KSIC)—the ESI is 
divided into nuclear power, fossil-fuel power, hydropower, and other power. Thus, it is 
impossible to directly compare the linkage effects of nuclear power to those of gas turbines 
with I-O analysis. Furthermore, the ‘construction of power plants’, which is the closest to 
the HEI sector, is not distinguished from the broad category of the construction industry. 
Even in its basic industry level categories, there is only an electrical construction category, 
which does not distinguish power plants from transmission and distribution network 
equipment. Thus, it is virtually impossible to distinguish and compare individual power 
generation technologies in terms of HEI performance. 
Because the Input-Output Table does not provide detailed groups of technologies 
and products, it is difficult to compare the catch-up performance of the two technology 
cases with this tool. Although, in theory, one can decompose the basic level sector and re-
group it into more fine-grained levels to investigate nuclear power and gas turbine’s inter-
sectoral linkages, this approach requires a large-scale research project to cover a large 
amount of elementary data and proprietary information, which firms are unlikely to 
disclose. In this regard, I-O analysis cannot be used as a method to investigate inter-
sectoral linkages between the two sectors of concern in this thesis. The excerpt below 
emphasises the problem: 
…one could implement an input-output model with thousands of 
sectors or a world model with all of the approximately two hundred countries 
represented as potential trade partners. While the advantages of additional 
detail and disaggregation are evident, it should be recognised that there are 
also drawbacks. … Clearly the availability of adequate data becomes much 
more problematic. (Duchin & Steenge, 2007:29) 
Thereby, one cannot expect the I-O analysis to capture the detailed interactions 
between the two sectors, namely HEI and ESI, surrounding nuclear power and gas turbine 
catching-up performances. 
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Regression Analysis and Its Limitations 
In measuring the effects of users’ institutions on different technologies’ catch-up 
performances, a multiple regression analysis can be considered. In a similar vein, a 
regression analysis needs a detailed and fine-grained time-series data set, which shows 
the catching-up or innovation performances of the HEI in relation to the other two sectors. 
The availability of such a data set, however, is limited to rather a small batch and large 
technology products of the HEI sector, namely nuclear power and gas turbine. Although 
such detailed data set in the ESI sector is available in the form of time-series data such as 
electricity price and power generation, regression analysis has limits in explaining the 
relationship between ESI and the HEI’s catching-up performances due to the limited data 
of HEI. 
3.2.2. Qualitative Methods: Comparative Case Study 
Amongst several qualitative methods, including phenomenological research, 
grounded theory research, ethnographic research and case study research, case study 
research offers more utility in analysing the two sectors’ interactions surrounding the 
catching-up process of the two energy technologies, while others are limited in their 
capacity to capture these interactions. A comparative case study contrasting technological 
catch-up performances between the two countries could increase explanatory power. 
Multiple case studies have a replication logic which is analogous to that used in 
multiple experiments (Yin, 2009): ‘The logic of multiple case studies is based on a careful 
choice of cases so that it either i) predicts similar results which imply “a literal replication” 
or ii) predicts contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons, which means “a theoretical 
replication”. Subsequently, the framework needs to state either the conditions under 
which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found or the conditions when it is not likely 
to be found.’ (Yin, 2009: 54). If two cases are selected based on their contrasting situations 
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and the subsequent findings support the hypothesised contrast, the results represent a 
robust step towards theoretical replication, which greatly strengthens the findings, as 
compared to those of single case studies (Eilbert & Lafronza, 2005; Yin, 2009). 
However, the full-scale comparative case study on two countries with embedded 
units, such as two sectors and each sectoral institution, and their impact on dichotomous 
catching-up performances across the two technologies, is not feasible in this PhD thesis. 
As such, this thesis chooses the Japanese case as its reference point and carries out the 
Japanese case study mainly based on secondary sources of information, such as industry 
journal, technology review, historical archives, local literature, statistics, and interviews 
with a few available key informants. 
Data Collection 
This study’s data collection depended mainly on in-depth interviews, archival 
records, technology reviews, industry journals, literature in local languages, sales records, 
published public expenditure and descriptive statistics during fieldwork. Following the 
main concepts of the abovementioned framework, the data collection focused on sectoral 
institutions and policies as well as technology indigenisation and the output of the two 
technologies, as described below. 
Technology Catching-Up Policies 
▪ HEI: Archival records, government reports, and technology R&D reports 
▪ BMI: Archival records, local literature, and technology R&D reports 
▪ ESI: Technical reports, electricity supply plans and electricity market 
statistics, and government policy reports 
Sectoral Regulations 
▪ ESI: Business and environmental regulations including emission 
standards, nuclear safety inspection standards, and electricity price and 
fuel cost statistics 
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▪ HEI: Archival records and government reports 
Data of Technology Catching-Up Performances 
▪ HEI: Domestic sales and export data, technology reports, corporate & trade 
journals, and technology review reports 
▪ ESI: Construction and operation statistics 
Participatory Observations 
In addition, participatory observation results from the author’s participation at 
industrial and governmental energy policy conferences are included. The author 
participated in a series of government energy policy conferences and workshops, 
including South Korea’s conference ‘The Second Basic Energy Demand and Supply Plan’ 
process and subsequent workshops between June and December 2013, namely, ‘Demand-
Management Expert Working Group’ for ‘The Seventh Basic Plan for Long-term 
Electricity Supply and Demand’s ’ meetings between March 2014 and April 2015, as a 
panel and working group member. Those conferences and workshops offered the author 
invaluable chances to directly observe public comments from director-level government 
officials, manager-level industry leaders, and university professors during and after 
official meetings. 
 Research Design 
3.3.1. Basic Concepts 
Technology Catching-Up of HEI 
This thesis defines technology catch-up of HEI by overall user-supplier 
interactions involved in construction, operation, indigenisation and modification of 
power generation technologies, in overcoming given constraints (or maximising given 
incentives), rather than specific R&D activities and technology indigenisation process. 
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This broad definition enables the research to include the innovative activities of 
latecomers in overcoming given institutional and technological constraints with their 
limited technological capabilities, as compared to their more advanced foreign 
counterparts. This conceptual perspective is consistent with the literature review. The 
broad version of NSI literature suggests a more realistic framework in a catching-up 
economy context, compared to the narrow version of NSI which assumes advanced 
networking capabilities between well-established NSI components. The empirical 
literature also points out a lack of user-producer relationship as a base of ‘learning by 
doing’, rather than narrowly focused research efforts, as the main cause of ‘Korean 
catching-up shift dilemma’. 
 
Heavy Electrical Industry and Supporting Industries 
As a central theme of the thesis, Japanese and Korean HEIs maintain both the 
business of nuclear power and gas turbines. Unlike Western HEI firms—which are 
specialised either in turbo-machinery, including steam turbine and gas turbines, or 
stationary structures, including boilers or steam generators—these two latecomer 
industries have attempted to catch up of both technological areas. As can be seen in Table 
3.3, the two HEI technologies can be divided into the Steam Generator (2513) and Engines 
& Turbine (2518) classes in the ISIC (Rev. 4). Most of public R&D for the catching-up of 
nuclear and gas turbine technologies are focused on the HEI, while specialised supporting 
industries are involved in such R&D as upstream technology suppliers. The HEI firms are 
constrained not only by their own sectoral institutions, such as trade and entry regulations 
but also by those of the ESI sector. 
Although the thesis is focused on inter-sectoral issues rather than firm-level ones, 
it is inevitable to narrow down the analysis unit into representative HEI firms in the two 
countries to observe detailed catching-up processes. While Doosan, including its 
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predecessor (KHIC), is selected in the case of the Korean HEI, MHI is selected among the 
three major HEI firms, including MHI, Toshiba, and Hitachi, in the case of Japanese HEI. 
Doosan and MHI developed PWRs under US firms’ licences, whereas the other two 
Japanese HEI firms developed boiling water reactor (BWR) technology under GE’s licence 
(Table 3.1 and 3.2). Given that PWRs have been developed in both countries while other 
reactors are either obsolete, such as CANDU reactors, or operate in a specific nation 
between two cases, such as BWRs in Japan, suppliers of PWRs are chosen as main subjects 
of analysis in the thesis. 13 
Furthermore, PWR is the dominant technology in the global nuclear market in 
terms of operating units and new construction projects whereas other reactors are limited 
in unit numbers and their construction orders have been virtually absent for the past 
decade or concentrated in a few countries. Among 416 operable nuclear reactors in the 
world as of 2018, PWR’s share is about half with 204 units across sixteen countries. By 
comparison, its competitors are limited to historically accumulated political ties between 
supplier and host countries. BWRs are concentrated in the US and Japan with 75 units in 
total, pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs), commonly known as CANDU, are 
concentrated in Canada and India with 50 units in total, and Russian PWRs (VVERs) are 
concentrated in Russia and Eastern Europe with 53 units in total (Inside NRC Statistics 
Monthly, 2018).14 
Among about 50 reactors under construction in the world as of 2018, 28 units are 
PWRs, originated from Westinghouse technology, 12 units are VVERs, and four units are 
PHWRs. Although two Advanced BWR(ABWR) units are recorded under construction 
status, namely Shimane-3 and Ohma in Japan, the prospect of the projects has hardly 
improved due to strengthened nuclear safety regulations and negative public acceptance 
 
13 Although Korea has four CANDU reactors, Korean ESI and HEI abandoned the technology. 
14 Most of remaining reactors are outmoded Former Soviet Union’s graphite reactors (RBMKs) 
and British gas cooled reactors. 
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since the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. Although Chugoku Power, a Japanese 
electricity supply firm, applied for verification of compliance with the new regulatory 
requirements of Shimane-3 in August 2018, there is no definite prospect that the reactor 
could start operation eventually (Schneider et al., 2018; Chugoku Electric Power Co., 2018). 
Prospect of BWR needs more explanation in that it has been the main competitor 
of PWR in the US and Japanese markets. While BWRs are technically less complicated 
than PWRs given that the former directly use steam from reactor coolant water to drive 
turbines and do not need steam generators for heat exchange, the technical simplicity 
causes extensive radioactive contamination of the whole plants (Thomas, 2005). It leads to 
concerns on higher radiation exposure of labours. For instance, BWRs’ average collective 
radiation dose per reactor has been 90% higher than that of PWRs in the US between 1974 
and 2016. Although the average collective radiation dose of both reactors has decreased 
in absolute terms, the relative dose rate of BWRs to that of PWRs has hardly improved 
during the same period (US NRC, 2017). The concern has been the main reason why BWR 
has not been seriously considered by electricity power utilities in the global market 
(MacKerron et al., 2006) (Table 3.1 and 3.2). 
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 Table 3.1 Selection of a Case Amongst Japanese Heavy Electrical Industry Firms 
  Nuclear 
 Licensors Westinghouse (PWR) 
1960–’91 
GE (BWR) 
Gas 
Turbine 
Westinghouse 1961–’87 Mitsubishi (MHI)  
GE 1964–present 
1982–present 
 Hitachi 
Toshiba 
Table 3.2 Selection of a Case Amongst Korean Heavy Electrical Industry Firms 
  Nuclear 
 Licensors CE/Westinghouse (PWR) AECL (CANDU) 
Gas 
Turbine 
GE (1990–2005) 
MHI (2005–present) 
KHIC (1980–’97) 
Doosan (1998–present) 
Westinghouse Hyundai Heavy Industry 
(1977–’80, 1994–’97) 
 
 
Electricity Supply Industry and Demand Conditions 
The ESI’s main activities can be broadly defined as the construction and operation 
of power generation facilities, procurement of fuels for power generation, and sales of 
electricity to users with differentiated pricing schemes. The associated business activities 
are heavily influenced by the mode of ownership (whether private or state-owned) and 
overall regulations from energy ministries. 
In turn, the ESI’s business activities influence its major user sectors including 
electricity-intensive basic metal industries (BMI). At the same time, the BMI characterise 
demand conditions of the ESI in terms of bulk base-load electricity consumers, which 
shapes base-load power plant projects. The BMIs supply large volumes of primary metal 
products, such as aluminium and steels, based on cheap and abundant electricity, and are 
important industries to the ESI as major base-load customers (Table 3.3). 
68 
 
Table 3.3 Sectors from International Standard Industrial Classification 
Division   Group Class Relevant Segments  
24. Basic Metals 241. Basic iron and 
steel 
2410. Basic iron and 
steel 
Re-melting of scrap 
ingots of iron or steels 
(EAF), Seamless tubes 
(specialty steels) 
BMI 
242. Basic precious 
& other non-ferrous 
metals 
2420. Basic 
precious & other 
non-ferrous metals 
Production of Aluminium 
243. Casting of 
metals 
2432. Casting of 
Non-Ferrous Metals 
Precious Metal Casting 
(Precision Casting) 
25. Fabricated 
Metal Products 
251. Structural 
metal products, 
tanks, reservoirs & 
steam generators 
2513. Steam 
Generators 
Steam Generators, 
Nuclear Reactors 
HEI 
28. Machinery & 
Equipment 
281. General 
Purpose Machinery 
2811. Engines & 
Turbines 
Turbines and Parts: Gas 
turbines 
35. Electricity, 
Gas, Steam & 
Air Conditioning  
351. Electric power 
generation, 
transmission & 
distribution 
3510. Electric power 
generation, 
transmission & 
distribution  
Operation of Power 
Generation Facilities, 
Sale of Electricity to 
Users 
ESI 
Source: Adapted from UN ISIC Rev.4 2008 
Note: The relevant industry segments are added by author on the right columns. 
 
Institutions of the Electricity Supply Industry 
The overall literature review draws attention to user sector institutions and their 
overall impact on the HEI catching-up performance through specific user-supplier 
relationships. Although there are conceptual overlaps between institutions, policies and 
regulations, the research considers all the three concepts as competing elements of 
institutional governance of the ESI, often established by different historical events or 
different government agencies in a national context. Some of the institutions could be 
intentionally set-up in relation to specific catching-up policies while others might be 
unintended and historical results beyond the authority of a specific government agency 
such as an energy ministry. Environmental regulations of ESI, for instance, do not belong 
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to the jurisdictions of energy ministries, but still heavily influence the ESI’s technology 
and fuel choices. This assumption offers a dynamic perspective of catching-up efforts in a 
complex context consisting of incentives and constraints compared to static and narrowly 
defined catching-up policy perspective. 
Also, the research assumes that sectoral institutions of the ESI shape ‘quality of 
demand’ for supplier’s catching-up performance based on the broad version of NSI 
literature. This means a specific set of ESI institutions might incentivise catching-up 
performance of a specific technology while constraining that of another. Also, the research 
assumes the degree of the incentivising effects or constraining effects on a specific 
technology catching-up performance is proportional to the degree of demanding quality 
set by the ESI’s institutions if other conditions are equal. 
From the empirical literature review, most frequently depicted institutional 
elements of ESI are economic and environmental regulations. Although no generally 
accepted definition of regulation can be applied to the very different regulatory systems 
in OECD countries (OECD 1997a: 6), the OECD addresses regulation as the diverse set of 
instruments by which governments set requirements for enterprises and citizens for 
economic development, environmental protection and social cohesion (Table 3.4). From 
this classification, economic regulations and environmental regulations of ESI will be 
further elaborated in Section 3.3.2. 
Table 3.4 OECD's Classification of Regulations 
 Economic 
Regulations 
Social Regulations Administrative 
Regulations 
Examples Pricing, competition, 
market entry/exit 
Health, safety, the 
environment, social cohesion  
Paperwork, 
administrative formalities 
Source: OECD 1997 a, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Report 
on Regulatory Reform Synthesis, Paris: OECD 
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Furthermore, the concept also complements the firm-capability approach. 
Although firm-capability approach captures catching-up firms’ effort to overcome 
technology barriers through linking and leveraging with foreign firms, the approach does 
not capture a specific context in which the latecomers interact with foreign firms. The 
context regarding regulatory frameworks can be divided into three points. They include 
i) asymmetry of (economic) regulations between advanced economies and catching-up 
countries, ii) different effects of (environmental) regulations for foreign firms and local 
firms, and iii) overall effects of regulatory frameworks on domestic catching-up eco-
systems including users, producers and upstream suppliers. The three points need some 
explanation. 
First, the regulatory asymmetry between advanced and catching-up countries can 
open a window of technology transfer from foreign firms to latecomers. Specific economic 
regulations, which stifle a specific technology in advanced countries, may induce firms to 
turn to latecomer countries, which do not regulate them in the same way and increase the 
potential of technology transfer to the latecomers. Second, the environmental regulations 
in catching-up countries may have different effects between local firms and foreign firms. 
The former may consider the regulations as a strategic issue for long-term growth at the 
home market while the latter regard the regulations as a temporary or secondary issue 
compared to those of their own home market, as can be seen in the case of US firms’ 
indifference to environmental regulations in foreign countries above. This perspective 
helps to capture a potentially active role of catching-up firms beyond a mere beneficiary 
of technology transfer from foreign firms. Finally, core regulations on ESI may shape 
overall catching-up eco-system of domestic users, suppliers and specialised suppliers and 
their interactions in response to the regulations may shape directions and degree of the 
catching-up performance. 
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3.3.2. Operational Definitions 
The proposition of the sectoral institutions of the user and the effects on catching-
up performances of HEI is articulated by operational variables in this Section. Among 
various institutions of ESI, institutions that affect the cost and environmental 
performances could be the key ‘quality of demand’ factors in inter-relationships with HEI. 
Thereby, business and environmental regulations are derived as key institutions. The two 
key institutional elements are narrowed down as below: 
▪ Business Regulations of ESI: Among the business regulations, a specific 
electricity pricing scheme, such as Time-of-Use (TOU) pricings, for industry 
customers, and gas fuel procurement contract, which decides relative gas fuel 
cost of ESI, will be measured. Both regulations of the ESI business play a crucial 
role in allocating energy cost to different customer sectors, and at the same time 
influence operation and new construction performances of nuclear and gas 
turbine. 
▪ Environmental Regulations of ESI: Regarding nuclear power, safety regulations 
and practices on steam generator tubes are selected. The steam generator issue 
is derived from American HEI’s experience as depicted in Section 2.2.1. Also, 
environmental regulations on gas turbines are narrowed down to NOx emission 
standards and regulatory practices. This issue is also derived from the 
experiences of the global gas turbine OEMs as depicted in Section 2.2.1. 
Regarding the institutional effect on the HEI’s catching-up performances of 
nuclear power and gas turbines, two types of operational variables, including quantitative 
and qualitative variables, are derived from the basic concepts as articulated in Section 
3.3.1. Given the research defines catching-up of HEI as user-supplier interactions involved 
in construction, operation, technology transfer, and technology modifications, operational 
and construction performances are considered as the direct effects of the sectoral 
institutions of the user. In addition, further effects of the sectoral institutions of user can 
be ‘learning by doing’ through repeated construction projects and technology 
modifications efforts in order to overcome environmental and safety regulations of ESI. 
While the direct effects are observed in quantitative data, the indirect effects need to be 
analysed in a qualitative way (Table 3.5). 
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The institutional set of ESI and catching-up effects of HEI in explaining cross-
nation and cross-technology dichotomy of catching-up performance will be compared to 
operationalised terms of the rival propositions in Section 7.3 in Chapter 7. 
Table 3.5 Variables for Cross-Nation Comparison of ESI Institutions & Effects 
Institutions of ESI Direct Effects 
(Descriptive Statistics) 
Indirect Effects 
(Qualitative Analysis) 
Gas 
Turbine  
Fuel 
Contracts 
Gas fuel price 
(operation, construction) 
Learning by doing (repeated 
construction) 
Emission 
regulations 
Operation and construction of 
GT 
Technology modification for 
emission control 
Nuclear 
Power 
Electricity 
pricing 
 Growth of base-load demand 
(new construction) 
Learning by doing (repeated 
construction) 
Safety 
regulations 
Operational performance of 
nuclear power 
Technology modification for safety 
improvement 
 
3.3.3. Operationalisation of Rival Concepts and Approaches 
In order to verify the three rival concepts and approaches will be operationalised 
as below. 
First, the firm capability approach might claim that different capabilities of HEI 
firms, including upstream suppliers, are the causes of the cross-technology and cross-
nation contrast of catching-up performances. In this regard, the technology scope that 
each of HEI firms will be analysed in terms of indigenisation of nuclear steam supply 
system (NSSS) in the case of nuclear power, and the level of development and 
commercialisation performance of gas turbines in the case of gas turbines. In addition, the 
research will also analyse supporting specialized metal firms’ capabilities in terms of their 
manufacturing capabilities in a few key component technologies, including steam 
generator tubes in the case of nuclear power, and turbine blades and vanes in the case of 
CCGT. 
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Second, the rival explanation of the SSI approach will argue that the two 
technologies are irrelevant to each other given that each of technology may have each 
one’s sectoral system. In this regard, the rival explanation of the SSI approach is 
operationalised through pattern matching of institutional impact on catching-up 
performances of each technology in terms of operation, construction, technology transfer, 
technology modification, and export. If random patterns in the impact of ESI’s business 
and environmental regulations on the performances are observed, the SSI’s explanation 
could be verified as genuine. However, if consistent patterns are observed, it implies that 
the two technologies are bounded by the same sectoral institutions and the rival claim will 
be rejected. 
Third, the practical rival explanation based on R&D efforts is operationalised in 
terms of size of major R&D expenditure, and duration and frequency of R&D 
programmes. The R&D expenditure and frequency will be compared to the catching-up 
performances of each technology. If consistent patterns between the R&D efforts concepts 
and catching-up performances are observed the rival claim will be verified as genuine. 
However, if the patterns are inconsistent, it will be rejected. 
In addition to these specified rival explanations, there might be unspecified factors 
which have random effects. While statistical models can render such unspecified rival 
hypotheses implausible to a certain degree, qualitative case researches cannot control such 
potential of random effects in a complete manner. The only way to minimise such 
potential is to address the most plausible rival hypothesis to the main one. The primary 
hypothesis, namely causality of a broad version of NSI, assumes a specific combination of 
environmental and economic regulations of ESI induce a successful catching-up of 
particular technology over another. The hypothesis can be supported by the expected 
opposite combination of environmental and economic regulations in the reference case, 
which shows the different catching-up performances concerning the relative success of 
CCGT and unsatisfactory nuclear power. 
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Finally, it is necessary to address an implicit hypothesis of the thesis. It assumes 
that both nations have the intent of developing every variety of modern energy 
technology and export markets for them. The assumption is based on the conspicuous 
export-driven industrial policies of both countries in overcoming the deficiency of natural 
resources and limits in the domestic market size. Although it is a contestable premise, it 
is essential to evaluate the potential performance of the energy technology catching-up in 
both nations. This underlying axiomatic assumption is necessary to support the argument 
throughout the thesis and will be addressed later in Chapter 6. 
3.3.4. Interview Protocol 
Interviews on the Korean Case 
Uniform formats of interview questions for interviews are difficult to define for 
such varied industry sectors, relevant actors and agencies as the firms of the HEI, ESI and 
BMI, environmental and business regulators, and government policymakers in this thesis. 
Equally, key informants who have comprehensive insights into both sectors, along with 
the relevant policies and institutions surrounding nuclear power and gas turbine 
technologies, are rare. Thus, the open interview format is inevitable for this study, with a 
particular concern with finding key informants per sector and institute. 
Although the open-ended interviews do not have a uniform format exhibited by 
other methods, such as survey methods, the openness itself can help reveal how the 
interviewees construct reality (i.e. understand states of affairs) regarding the theme of the 
research, even beyond the researchers’ specific questions (Yin, 2009). If the interviewees 
are key persons in the organisation or industry, the open-ended format can provide 
indispensable insights that researchers’ initial questions do not capture. 
Interviews with key persons in each sector were prioritised, such as a head 
engineer or general manager of firms and director-level government officials. More 
informants were sought for the ESI than for the others, given that the institutions of the 
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ESI heavily influence the other related sectors. Considering business regulations, 
including fuel pricing and electricity pricing practices, and environmental regulations, 
each relevant regulatory or government officials were interviewed. 
To validate the interviews’ credibility against interviewees’ specific bias, all the 
interview results are triangulated with other information sources including other 
interviewees, documents, statistics and literature. Only validated interview results are 
presented in the case chapters. The interviewee list is added in Appendix C. 
Interviews on the Japanese Case 
The comparative case study considers the Japanese case as a reference rather than 
a ‘full-blown’ study case. Thereby, the study on the Japanese case depends mainly on 
secondary information sources, while conducting interviews with a few key informants 
in Japan. To supplement the limited empirical investigation in the Japanese case, the 
author asked Korean interviewees the same questions about their Japanese counterparts 
during the interviews as often as possible. 
The interviews in Japan were conducted with a few key industry leaders and 
government officials in the nuclear catching-up case, as well as with the co-authors of a 
Japanese gas turbine catching-up report based on the ‘Moonlight Project’ (Kimura & 
Kajiki 2008) in the gas turbine case. The interviews with the author of the Japanese gas 
turbine catching-up report were conducted in three sessions, between 2010 and 2012, 
together with separate email discussions to gain insights into critical aspects beyond the 
contribution of the ‘Moonlight Project’ to the catching-up performances. The interviews 
and discussions with additional statistics led the Japanese case study to focus on the inter-
sectoral impact of institutions. Although the number of interviews is quite limited, they 
led authors to key issues not captured in the initial research plan and led them to 
reinterpret the relevant literature, documents and statistics from a new perspective, 
76 
 
particularly regarding institutional issues. All the interview lists in the two countries are 
presented in Appendix A. 
Choice of Interviewees 
In-depth interviews were conducted to capture the effects of ESI’s institutions on 
catching-up performance to answer the research questions and hypothetical assumptions. 
The rationale for choices of interviewee is described below. 
▪ Interviews with director-level energy and industry ministry officials in charge of 
electricity demand and supply planning and those in charge of nuclear and gas 
turbine technology R&D projects were conducted to understand the policy-
making background, which is not normally expressed in official documents. They, 
on the other hand, directly regulate ESI’s businesses from gas fuel for power 
generation to electricity prices for industrial customers. 
▪ Researchers from public R&D institutes were also interviewed since often the 
public R&D institutes have been hosts of nuclear power and gas turbine 
technology development projects. Interviews with senior researchers of the 
institutes were focused on examining main enablers and obstacles in explaining 
the successes and failures of the projects. 
▪ As the main actor, the HEI firms design and manufacture nuclear power and gas 
turbine systems and subsystems. Senior engineers or management personnel 
could directly answer the research questions. 
▪ As a user sector of HEI, the ESI covers managers and subsidiary R&D centre 
researchers, who were chosen to investigate their direct relationship with the 
nuclear power and gas turbine suppliers. In addition, pricing managers were also 
chosen to examine ESI’s relationship with BMI customers (Table 3.11). 
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Table 3.6 Overall Feature of Interviewees 
 Japan Korea 
 Nuclear Gas Turbine Nuclear Gas Turbine 
Government 
(Policy-Maker 
& Business 
Regulator) 
Vice chair of JAEC, 
Deputy director & officer 
(METI) 
One retired & two current directors (MOTIE) 
Public R&D 
Institute 
Retired 
senior 
researcher 
(CRIEPI) 
Author of 
Japanese GT 
catch-up report 
(CRIEPI) 
One retired & two 
senior researchers 
(KAERI) 
Two senior 
researchers (KIMM) 
Safety & 
Emission 
Regulator 
  Senior researcher, 
regulatory policy 
office (KINS) 
 
Officer of air quality 
division (ME) 
HEI Firm  Secondary 
information 
from Korean 
interviewees 
Principal engineer 
of steam generator 
& senior engineer 
(Doosan) 
Former director of 
KEPCO Nuclear 
Fuel (KNF) 
Head of gas turbine 
development, senior 
researcher & two 
senior engineers 
(Doosan) 
Material researcher 
(Doosan Central 
R&D Institute), 
Executive director of 
Research Centre 
(KLW), 
Former Senior 
Engineer (HHI) 
ESI Firm President of 
JAIF 
General 
manager of 
(FEPC) 
 Former quality 
control manager 
(KHNP) 
Manager of pricing 
office (KEPCO) 
Three senior 
researchers (KEPRI) 
Marketing manager 
(Private IPP) 
Export 
Consortium 
Chief Officer 
(JINED) 
 General Manager 
of Power Plant 
Service (Doosan) 
Senior Economic 
Analyst (KDB) 
University   Energy economist (Korea Polytechnic) 
Electric power economist (Konkuk Univ.) 
Electricity network engineer (Hongik Univ.) 
Note: See Abbreviations in List of Acronyms 
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Chapter 4. Korean Case 
 Chapter Introduction 
The Chapter shows how catching-up performances of nuclear power and gas 
turbine technologies progressed in contrasting ways, in conjunction with a specific set of 
ESI institutions. It shows selective match and mismatch between each of the technologies 
and the set of ESI institutions. In explaining the process of contrasting catching-up 
performances across the two technologies, it thus mobilises the co-evolving processes of 
the ESI and HEI sectors. 
A virtuous circle between the nuclear power of HEI and the commodity BMI, and 
a vicious circle between gas turbines and the specialised BMI are explained through the 
set of institutions which governs the ESI. It highlights to what extent the historically 
established institutional set of business and environmental regulations of the ESI shaped 
the divergent pathways of the two technologies in Korea. 
Section 4.2 analyses Korean ESI and its specific set of institutions based on a 
historical perspective. Section 4.3 describes the Korean HEI’s contrasting catching-up 
performances across nuclear power and gas turbine for the past three decades. It also 
describes supporting industries’ performances. Then, Section 4 analyses the effects of the 
ESI institutions on the interaction between the ESI and HEI, and contrasting catching-up 
performances between the two technologies. 
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 Electricity Supply Industry Sector: KEPCO 
4.2.1. Brief History of Korean ESI 
From the establishment of Hansung Electricity Ltd. for lighting service in Seoul in 
1898, early Korean electricity suppliers grew to 63 in 1934. As the Japanese military 
occupation increased its control over the electricity supply business, the number of 
suppliers reduced, and the structure was vertically integrated from the late 1930s. After 
the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, the Japanese occupiers merged private utilities, 
nationalising them into Chosun Jounup, ‘Chosun Electricity Business’ in Korean, for rapid 
mobilisation of cheap electricity supply to strategic heavy industries for warfare in 1943 
(Kim, I., 1998; Oh, 2011). 
Once WWII was over, the Korean electricity supply business was re-privatised by 
the American occupation regime in 1945. After the military coup of Park Chung-Hee in 
1961, however, three private electric utilities were merged and nationalised as a monopoly 
utility, namely the Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO). Although the military state 
justified the nationalisation as a necessary measure for rapid economic development, the 
nationalisation resembled the wartime measures applied by Japanese military occupiers 
during WWII.  
Thanks to the country’s rapid economic growth, KEPCO’s power generation 
capacity increased from a mere 367 MW in 1961 to about 71 giga-watt (GW) in 2013. It 
owns six power generation subsidiaries (GENCOs), an architecture and engineering firm 
(KOPEC), a maintenance and repair firm (KPS), a nuclear fuel supplier (KNF), amongst 
others, as of 2013. Although there are three independent power producers (IPPs) based 
on gas turbine combined cycles, small-scale co-generation service providers, and 
miscellaneous renewable energy providers, their share is rather small, accounting for 
13.2% in 2013 (KEPCO, 2014). On the demand side, industrial customers consume around 
52%, whereas commercial ones consumed about 21% of total electricity in 2013. The large 
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share of industry customers in electricity demand is markedly different from other OECD 
counterparts, which mostly range from about 20% to 40% (IEA, 2013). 
 
From Massive Reserve to Tight Supply in the 1980s and 1990s 
Massive investment in nuclear reactors in the 1970s worsened both the HEI and 
ESI sectors’ position to face the second oil shock in 1979, which caused a domestic and 
global recession. Thus, KEPCO had to implement a massive load-building programme to 
manage unbalanced electricity networks with depressed demand growth and the sudden 
input of large nuclear power capacity during the decade (Song, 1999). Accordingly, 
KEPCO arranged a special 40% discount to steelmakers in addition to a 60% discount on 
electric bills to the manufacturing industry sector, compared to a 40% discount on the 
commercial and residential sectors, on average, during the decade (Auty, 1995; Song, 
1999). 
As a result of massive load-building activity as well as the global economic 
recovery in the mid-1980s, KEPCO met a dramatic demand surge in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (KEPCO, 1991). It could not respond to the demand surge with nuclear and 
coal in such a brief period, however. Instead, it inevitably had to import massive capacity 
of CCGT (around 11 GW), which has a short construction lead time and flexible 
characteristics, mostly from GE and Siemens. In effect, in a global market view, it was a 
natural trend to introduce massive CCGT to respond to the recovery of the global 
economy and subsequent electric demand hike. For example, electric utilities in Japan, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and India installed systems with capacities similar to that of CCGT 
to cope with the demand surge in the same period (Watson, 1997). 
Nevertheless, the Korean government restricted natural gas for electricity 
generation by imposing a considerable share of the cost of the city gas business on the 
national ESI from the mid-1980s. Thus, KEPCO also had to restrict the operation of the 
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CCGT units only for peak-load purposes to save on the high cost of gas. Then, KEPCO 
had to pay additional costs for repair and replacement of crucial parts. In this way, a 
vicious circle between the institutionally high natural gas price, in addition to the ‘Asian 
premium’ of LNG price, and the peak-load mode operation of base-load-purpose CCGTs 
went on throughout the 1990s. 
Stalled Restructuring and Continuity of the State-owned ESI in the 2000s 
At the end of the 1990s, when the country experienced the financial crisis, the 
government’s policy exercise through KEPCO was challenged by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Following economic reform recommendations from the IMF, the 
Korean government launched a privatisation programme for KEPCO and KHIC at the 
end of 1990s. Thus, KEPCO’s electric power generation sector was divided into six 
subsidiary generation companies (GENCOs), which consist of one nuclear GENCO, 
namely Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP), and five fossil-fuel-based GENCOs in 
2001.15 However, resistance from labour unions changed the government policy under the 
Roh Moo-hyun administration, and the privatisation plan was officially ceased in 2005. As 
a result, KEPCO’s subsidiary GENCOs produce about 89% of electricity while a few 
private IPPs contribute the remaining 11% as of 2016 (KEPCO, 2017). 
4.2.2. Demand Conditions of ESI: Basic Metal Industries 
Aluminium Smelters in the 1970s and 1980s 
The aluminium smelter industry started operation from 1969 in Korea when the 
country’s aluminium demand started to grow. Korea Aluminium Company (KAC) 
constructed a smelting plant with a capacity of 15,000 tonnes in terms of annual 
production. The project was financed by a private loan from Japan as well as domestic 
credit. KAC’s plant met nearly the entire domestic aluminium demand in 1970. The 
 
15 KEPCO’s privatisation programme was withdrawn due to political resistance in 2005, but the 
six GENCOs are still divided from their parent firm, KEPCO.  
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country’s import of aluminium, however, began to rise rapidly as domestic demand 
increased further (Stern et al., 1995). 
Due to the global energy crisis in the early 1970s and the big gap between product 
prices and imported ones, KAC went into bankruptcy in 1972. Then, Korea Development 
Bank, a major shareholder of domestic credit, and Pechiney from France jointly took over 
the bankrupt firm and changed the name to Aluminium of Korea Co. (AKC) in 1972.16 
The joint firm expanded the production line by 2,500 tonnes to meet the growing domestic 
demand of aluminium in 1973. Nevertheless, Korea’s dependence on imports rose from 
21% to over 90% in the 1980s (Maeil Business Newspaper, 1973; Stern et al., 1995). 
Although the Korean government devised several supporting institutions to 
protect the domestic aluminium industry, there were fundamental problems surrounding 
the industry. First, the electricity price, which accounts for nearly 40% of the total cost of 
the global aluminium-smelting industry, was too high to compete with foreign 
aluminium smelters from energy-rich countries. Second, the London Metal Exchange 
began to trade aluminium ingot in 1978, and it became an international commodity, freely 
available at international market prices from that point (Uriu, 1996). Third, the smelting 
technology that AKC used, the Soderberg smelting process, became obsolete a few years 
later with the introduction of a new process technology that saves vast amounts of energy 
(Stern et al., 1995). 
Although KEPCO supplied electricity to the aluminium smelter at a subsidised 
electric rate, thanks to redundant nuclear capacity in Korea from the late 1970s to the 
1980s, the joint owner of the company, namely Pechiney, withdrew the business from 
 
16 It should be noted that Pechiney had built its own numerous hydroelectric power plants in 
France before the Second World War. Once all the power plants and electric price control were 
taken by EDF in 1946, controlling electricity prices became a priority for the French aluminium 
conglomerate. Then, it sought foreign interests in countries. For further reading, see Godelier 
and Roux (2005). 
83 
 
Korea, and the special electric rate was ceased in 1989. Even with electricity at half the 
price of the average industrial price, it was difficult for the smelter to compete with 
aluminium smelters from Canada or Nordic countries—where cheap hydroelectric power 
resources are abundant—in the global market. Indeed, the Korean electricity price for 
industry customers was three to four times that of those hydro-abundant, aluminium-
producing countries throughout the 1980s (Table 4.1). 
In effect, the co-owner, Pechiney, had already made a special electricity supply 
agreement with the Canadian government for a $1.5 billion aluminium-smelting factory 
in Becancour, Quebec, in 1980. It was at a price of less than 0.8 cents/kWh, which was less 
than half of the average Canadian electric rate for industry of 2 cents/kWh at that time 
(Michal, 1984), or one-fifth of the price of the special electricity rate for aluminium 
smelters in Korea, which was around 4 cents/kWh in 1980. Thus, it was a result of a rather 
naïve expectation of the potential of cheap nuclear power amongst decision-makers, who 
were ignorant of international aluminium market conditions at that time.17 
In this way, the temporary alliance between KEPCO and the aluminium smelter 
industry ended in the late 1980s. In effect, Korean ESI already started to suffer from 
massive increases in electricity demand as a result of repeated electricity rate discounts 
across all types of customer groups throughout the decade. Thus, it did not have any more 
room to further discount electricity rates for the aluminium industry in the late 1980s. 
Instead, it had another electricity-intensive metal industry, namely electric arc furnace 
(EAF) steel (Table 4.2); EAF became the most electric-intensive metal industry after the 
aluminium industry left Korea. 
 
17 Open comments of Professor Seungjin Kang from Korea Polytechnic University during a 
conference meeting for the 2nd Energy Demand & Supply Basic Plan on 21 June 2013. 
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Table 4.1 Electricity Price for Industry in Aluminium-Smelting Countries 
Unit  1978 1980 1985 1990 
US cents 
per kWh 
Norway 1.2 1.8 2.0 3.5 
Canada  1.5 2.0 2.6 3.6 
Sweden 2.9 4.0 2.8 5.0 
Korea 4.3 8.1 7.6 7.0 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) 2001 
Note: It shows average electricity prices for industry rather than specific prices for aluminium smelters based 
on special agreements between the smelters and power suppliers.  
Table 4.2 Electric-Intensity of Korean Metal Industries in the 1980s (kWh/tonne) 
 Aluminium EAF Steel Integrated Steel Mill 
1986 15,734 456 51 
1987 15,663 447 51 
Source: Kim 1989 
Note: Integrated steel mill consists of blast furnace (BF) and basic oxygen furnace (BOF). 
 
Electric Arc Furnace Steel Industry from the 1980s to the 2000s 
Once the aluminium industry left the Korean market in the 1980s, the iron and 
steel industry filled the gap in terms of KEPCO’s base-load demand. Although POSCO is 
the well-known Korean commodity steelmaker based on the basic oxygen furnace (BOF), 
the country has another type of commodity steelmaker, which depends on EAF 
technology. It is another electric-intensive heavy industry that entirely depends on 
electricity for the smelting and refining of scrap steels. While BOF steelmakers produce 
carbon steels for diverse markets from automobile to shipbuilding, EAF steelmakers 
produce somewhat limited and low-end steel products for construction and civil 
engineerings, such as steel bars for concrete reinforcement material and structural beams. 
There are seven EAF steelmakers, and three of them—Hyundai, Dongkuk, and Daehan—
dominate 80% of the EAF steel market in Korea as of 2010. 
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Korean EAF production capacity tripled and tied itself to that of BOF during the 
1990s. Its share in Korean crude steel production increased from less than 30% in the 1980s 
to above 40% in the late 1990s and 2000s. Its share outpaced that of the world average 
throughout the past three decades (World Steel Association, 1983–2010). It is an 
impressive performance, given that the country depends on imported scrap steel for EAF 
steel and imported fuels for power generation. It can be explained by its special 
relationship with the ESI (see Section 4.2.4 for further detail). 
In effect, Korea has been one of the biggest scrap steel importers in the world due 
to the rapid growth of its EAF steel production in the 1990s and 2000s. Its annual imports 
reached to more than five million tonnes, which took about one-third of total input scraps, 
in the mid-2000s (Hyundai Steel, 2009). While more than half of its domestic scrap steel 
consists of low-quality scraps that cannot be used for high-end steel products, it depends 
on imported scraps for high-quality scraps, including pig iron, mostly from Japan. 
Furthermore, the low-quality scraps consume more electricity per unit weight for 
purification. 
On the contrary, most Japanese EAF steelmakers securely procure high-quality 
“home-grown” scrap steel, namely pig iron, from their Keiretsu member BOF steelmakers, 
and they export even more than seven million tonnes of surplus scrap steel to Korea and 
China. In effect, the voluntary control of EAF steel production capacity came from a 
combination of the BOF-steelmaker-led strategy for the overall Japanese steel industry 
and its arm’s length relationship with the ESI (Uriu 1996) (see Section 5.2.4). 
The lack of strategic control over demand and supply of high-quality scrap steels 
and, subsequently, more electricity-intensive characteristics of Korean EAF made the 
industry desperately lobby the government to control the price of electricity. Although 
the cost of electricity accounted for around 5% of overall Korean EAF production costs in 
the past decade, it should not be underestimated, given that hiked prices of global scrap 
steels in the last half of the 2000s, thanks to the ‘Beijing Olympic Boom’, made the relative 
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share of electricity costs in the industry look much smaller than they were (Minter 2004, 
McCurry 2007). Kyungsik Kim from Hyundai Steel, the biggest Korean EAF steelmaker, 
explains additional reasons why the industry focusses on electricity prices rather than 
scrap steel. 
Although we try to save scrap steel input cost through every possible 
measure, including rationalisation of the domestic scrap steel market, there is 
an absolute limit in saving the cost since the scrap price is mainly decided by 
the international scrap steel market. Thus, electricity price is the only 
controllable input variable in improving the price competitiveness of our 
steels. 18 
The relative controllability of the domestic electricity price to the Korean EAF 
industry gives a clue as to why the industry increased its overall production capacity 
above the global average despite increasing scrap steel prices in such an energy-resource-
poor country. Compared to BOF firms, EAF firms are much more sensitive to electricity 
prices due to much higher electricity intensity per tonne of steel production. It is reported 
that the share of electricity costs in the production costs ranges between 5% and 10% in 
the EAF steelmakers’ case, whereas it only takes around 2–3% in the case of BOF firms in 
2012 (Kim.YJ. 2012). In this sense, the Korean EAF industry successfully adapted to 
electricity demand and supply conditions throughout the past three decades (Figure 4.1 
and Table 4.3). 
 
18 Open speech by Kyungsik Kim, Director of External Cooperation Department, Hyundai Steel, 
during the conference meeting on the 2nd Energy Demand and Supply Basic Plan hosted by the 
Federation of Korean Industries on 2 October 2013. 
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Figure 4.1 Korean EAF Steel Production and Share of National Crude Steel 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Steel Statistical Yearbook from 1983 to 2013, World Steel Association 
Table 4.3 Energy Consumption of Korean EAF and BOF Steels (1,000 TOE) 
Year EAF BOF (including Blast Furnace)  
Electricity (TWh) Fuels Coal Coke Electricity (TWh) Fuels Coal Coke 
2001 2,529 (29.4) - 653 868 (10.1) 637 13,730 
2002 2,630 (30.6) - 671 787 (9.1) 632 14,186 
2003 2,564 (29.8) - 654 760 (8.8) 648 14,536 
Source: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) 2004. 
Notes: 1. TOE stands for ‘tonne of oil equivalent’. 
2. Self-power generation in BOF steel electricity is excluded in the Table. 
Although Korean EAF steelmakers had enjoyed low electricity rates, a rolling 
blackout in 2011 changed such extreme pricing practices by KEPCO. After the incident, 
the government allowed KEPCO to continuously increase electricity rates for industry 
amongst various customers, resulting in intense public anger about KEPCO’s unfair 
discounting practices for industries. Faced with increasing electricity rates and market 
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penetration of imported EAF steel products from China, the Korean EAF steel industry is 
in crisis (Kim YJ, 2012). 
Furthermore, the construction market, which has induced crucial demand for 
construction steel beams and steel bars in the industry, has stagnated, too. In effect, the 
Korean EAF steel industry has been enjoying a continuous growth of construction orders 
over the past three decades. Construction orders peaked at 112.5 trillion won (about 102 
billion US dollars) in 2007, however, and they never returned to that level despite 
increased government expenditures on large infrastructure projects to boost the 
construction industry. Following the construction market trend in four years intervals, the 
EAF steel production trend also peaked at 26.4 million tonnes in 2007 (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2 Construction Market and EAF Steel Production in Korea 
Source: Author’s elaboration from the Korea Iron and Steel Association 2014 and the Bank of Korea 
Economic Statistical System 
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4.2.3. Institutions of ESI: KEPCO as a Multi-policy Tool of State 
With this historical background, KEPCO has been heavily regulated by the 
government since its establishment. The government imposed various energy policy 
agendas on KEPCO, including non-electricity energy issues. They vary from the 
incubation of the infant nuclear power industry, the indigenisation of reactor design and 
heavy electrical manufacturing technologies, to cross-subsidies to the household city gas 
sector and electricity-intensive heavy industries. 
First, the utility had to absorb several nuclear power plant supplier segments for 
an aggressive nuclear technology indigenisation programme in the early 1980s. It 
undertook one-third of KHIC stock in 1980 when KHIC went into bankruptcy and 
absorbed Korea Power Plant Design and Engineering Services (the nuclear architecture 
and engineering company) and Korea Nuclear Fuel Supply (predecessor of KNF) as 
subsidiaries in 1982. KEPCO, as a parent company of those nuclear plant suppliers, 
delegated a monopolised supply right to each subsidiary firm for efficient indigenisation 
of advanced nuclear power technology (Sung & Hong 1999). 
Second, the company has been forced to reduce natural gas prices for the 
household segment of the city gas sector through an obligatory natural gas purchase 
contract with Korea Gas, a state-owned wholesale natural gas supplier, since 1985. Third, 
it also has subsidised electricity prices for industry. A few electricity-intensive industries 
have been the main beneficiaries. Given that the cross-subsidies to electricity-intensive 
industries and the city gas sector are highly related to the catching-up performances of 
nuclear and gas turbines, they are analysed separately in the next Section. 
4.2.4. Tight Business Regulations 
The Electricity Business Act makes the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy 
(MOTIE) primarily responsible for the economic regulation of the electricity sector, 
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including supervision of final electricity rate changes. Furthermore, the Korea Electric 
Power Corporation Act states that the Minister of MOTIE ‘shall instruct and supervise the 
business of the corporation’, in effect giving the minister control over KEPCO’s budget 
and operating decisions. Based on these acts, in effect, the Korean government can 
exercise its authority over virtually all kinds of business activities of KEPCO (OECD, 
2000a). Amongst them, cross-subsidies through fuel contracts and pricing practices of 
Korean ESI are more tightly controlled by the government for societal and industrial 
policy goals. 
Carbon Monoxide Poisoning Issues and Cross-subsidy to City Gas 
Coal briquettes were widely used as the main fuels for domestic heating from the 
1950s to early 80s in Korea due to their cheap price compared to other available fuels, such 
as oil. The coal consumption in households generated massive carbon monoxide (CO) 
poisoning incidents, however, and the death toll had risen to more than 1,000 every year. 
About 60,000 nationwide CO poisoning deaths due to the coal briquette use between 1954 
and 1982 were reported by the Department of Preventive Medicine of Seoul National 
University (Kang 1983). Occasional announcements by the Korean government show that 
there were around 1,500 deaths annually due to the coal CO poisoning until the mid-1980s 
(Maeil Business News Editorial 1986, Figure 4.3). The black line graph in Figure 4.3 shows 
periodical statistics for the overall death rate reported by the Korean government—‘All 
Accidental Poisoning and Exposure to Noxious Substances’—and about half of the death 
rate comes from coal CO poisoning. 
Amidst growing public discontent about the CO poisoning issue, thanks to 
Japanese ESI’s development of Indonesian gas fields in the 1970s (see Section 5.3.3), 
KEPCO also made a natural gas import contract with the Indonesian government for 
power generation in 1983. The government set up a state-owned wholesale gas supplier, 
namely KOGAS, and transferred ownership of the gas import contract from KEPCO to 
KOGAS for rapid gasification of Korean household heating sector in the early 1980s. As 
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the market penetration of city gas rapidly increased, the CO poisoning death rate 
dramatically reduced after the mid-1980s. When the share of households that have access 
to the natural gas network reached about 65% in the early 2000s, the annual CO poisoning 
death cases dropped to less than ten. Most of the causes were liquefied petroleum gas or 
natural gas rather than coal briquettes (Lee & Lee 2006). 
Figure 4.3 Death by Carbon Monoxide Poisoning from Domestic Heating Coal 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Statistics Korea, “Deaths and Death Rates by Cause (Annual 1983~2014)” 
and Annual Statistics of Korean City Gas Association, 2017 
However, this achievement did not come without cost. For a rapid transition of 
the country’s domestic heating fuels from coal to expensive natural gas, the government 
imposed the cost burden of city gas business upon KEPCO through a compulsory LNG 
procurement contract with KOGAS at peak prices. In terms of supply cost, there is a big 
gap between the two sectors due to, for instance, differentials in pipeline pressure, 
seasonal demand fluctuations causing expensive gas tank storage costs, designated 
terminals, and additional distribution service. For instance, wholesale LNG supply costs 
for power generation were 53.7 won/m3, whereas the costs in the household sector 
amounted to 107.8 won/m3 in 2000 (APERC, 2001). 
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However, the government arrangement made the prices of the two sectors almost 
even. It heavily increased the cost of natural gas for electricity generation and made 
KEPCO avoid construction and operation of gas turbines unless there is an urgent supply 
crisis. The additional cost that KEPCO should pay due to the cross-subsidy arrangement 
is estimated to be around 10% of its total natural gas bills in 1997 (OECD, 2000b; Son & 
Roh, 2002). The additional cost burden, however, can increase further whenever 
government officials have a reason to do so. Thanks to this cross-subsidy, the gas turbine 
technology have been considered the most expensive power generation option for 
KEPCO, whereas household city gas customers enjoyed even cheaper gas prices than 
those of countries with indigenous natural gas reserves, such as the UK and the 
Netherlands (IEA, 2015) (Figure 4.4 and 4.6). 
If we look at the price change by each group of natural gas customers in Korea for 
the past quarter-century, the average price difference between power utilities and 
household customers is merely 5%. Even further, sometimes LNG prices for power 
generation increase above those for household city gas due to government intervention in 
the pricing of natural gas in Korea (Figure 4.4). Heebong Chae, Director General of the 
MOTIE explains the reason. 
When the natural gas import price skyrocketed in 2007 and 2008, our main 
concern was that household city gas customers would face a more acute 
economic burden than power generation companies would. That was the 
main reason we decided to pass more of the cost burden of total natural gas 
import to the power generation sector in 2008. 19 
 
19 Public comments of Heebong Chae, Director General for Energy Saving and Efficiency and 
former Deputy Director of Gas Industry of Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy: 
Participatory observation during a conference meeting for the 2nd National Energy Basic Plan 
on 14 June 2013. 
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Heebong Chae’s address sounds quite impressive in terms of the degree of 
government intervention in energy pricing practices as well as the sympathy for 
household customers. In terms of welfare policy, however, the Korean cross-subsidy to 
city gas households has been quite regressive for the past three decades. The household 
gas customers mostly locate in urban areas and belong to a middle-income group while 
‘off-gas’ households in rural areas, who should depend on kerosene for space heating, 
mostly belong to a low-income group but pay twice as much as the city gas households 
do to get the same amount of calorific value in Korea (IEA, 2016). The initial background 
of the cross-subsidy policy was a rapid fuel-switching of households heating energy from 
coal(briquette) to natural gas, but the cross-subsidy became a ‘norm’ even after the 
household gasification rate of Korea reached the world highest level. 
The cross-subsidy issue has been well addressed by international communities in 
terms of allocation efficiency and energy efficiency. Experiences of the energy subsidy 
policies in the OECD countries show that much of the subsidy goes to high-income 
households while it drains financial resources for the households in actual energy 
poverty. International agencies such as OECD, IEA and World Bank recommend energy 
price reform to those countries that subsidise energy prices and urge to reflect market 
price in the final customer price while supporting the households in energy poverty with 
direct subsidies, either monetary or energy voucher. 
In that it is still difficult to estimate the extent of cross-subsidy from the 
comparison between the power generation and city gas sectors in Korea, Figure 4.4 is 
juxtaposed to that of the UK, where private utilities supply electricity and gas markets 
without such cross-subsidies between customer groups. It shows that there is a big gap in 
relative prices between the two countries. While there is only a 27% difference between 
the two sectors in Korea, the UK shows a 131% difference during the 2000s. It clearly 
shows that Korean CCGTs need to take a huge cost burden for the cross-subsidy to 
domestic city gas (Figure 4.4). Furthermore, the nominal prices of Korean and UK 
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household city gas customers start to converge from the year 2008, and sometimes the 
Korean household group even pay less than their UK counterparts. It should be noted that 
the UK has its own natural gas fields and often exports natural gas. 
Figure 4.4 Natural Gas Price by Sectors in the UK and Korea 
Source: Author’s elaboration from IEA Energy Prices & Taxes 2016 4Q 
In effect, the cross-subsidy of gas prices from the power generation sector to the 
household city gas in Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey has been one of the major issues in 
international agencies, including International Energy Agency (IEA) and World Bank. The 
cross-subsidy not only distorts competition in the electricity markets but also weakens the 
incentives for the energy efficiency of buildings in the three countries. In terms of welfare 
policy, the cross-subsidies are regressive as the major portion of the subsidy goes to a 
high-income group while the subsidies exhaust public resources for the actual energy 
poverty group.20 The three countries are suggested to establish cost-reflecting pricing 
 
20 Although the cross-subsidies may accelerate gasification of households initially, they do 
not support off-gas grid households that mostly belong to a low income and rural area residential 
group. Unintentionally, the subsidy scheme concentrates resources of public energy suppliers to 
those who already have access to gas networks and discriminate the energy poor group. 
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mechanisms, to remove the cross-subsidies to facilitate competition in both gas and 
electricity markets. Regarding the energy poverty issue, they are recommended 
establishment of social safety through a direct subsidy mechanism rather than tariff to the 
households (IEA, 2007, 2012, 2016, 2017; Dilli & Nyman, 2015) (Figure 4.5 and Table 4.4). 
Considering the cross-subsidy was introduced for rapid penetration of natural gas 
for household heating, the policy goal has been achieved in terms of a penetration rate of 
city gas. The share of Korean retail customers connected to the city gas network reached 
83 per cent in 2017, which is the third-highest level in the world. Compared to the share 
of large OECD economies, including the US, Germany and Japan, which show around 50 
to 60 per cent, the result is more surprising. Although natural gas was introduced in Korea 
in 1983, quite late compared to other OECD countries, the penetration rate of retail city 
gas dramatically increased thanks to the substantial cross-subsidy from the ESI to the 
household sector for the past three decades (Figure 4.5 and 4.6, and Table 4.4 and 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5 Natural Gas Prices for Household and Power Generation (2013) 
Source: Author’s elaboration from International Energy Agency, Natural Gas Information 2016 4Q 
Table 4.4 Ratio of Household Gas Price to Power Sector Gas Price in OECD 
Source: Author’s elaboration from International Energy Agency 2016, Natural Gas Information 2016 4Q 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Portugal 3.0 2.2 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.5 2.62 
Poland 2.2 2.5 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.59 
UK 2.3 2.0 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.7 3.1 2.42 
US 1.8 1.5 2.5 2.1 2.3 3.0 2.3 2.1 3.6 2.35 
Canada 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.1 - - 2.15 
Mexico 2.0 1.1 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.86 
Slovakia 1.6 1.1 1.2 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.39 
Hungary 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.35 
Turkey 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.23 
Korea 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.23 
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Source: Author’s elaboration from International Energy Agency, Natural Gas Information 2016, 4Q 
 
Table 4.5 Share of Gas Retail Customers of Major OECD Countries 
 
Market 
Entry a 
% of Retail Customers 
Connected to City Gas 
No. of Retail City Gas 
Customers (1,000s)  
 1998 2017 2017 
Netherlands 1960s 97.0% a 98% b 7,152 f 
UK 1960s 81.9% a 86% c 23,714 c 
Korea 1983 d 49.0% d 83% d 17,177 d 
Italy 1960s 69.6% a 82% e 23,203 f 
Belgium 1960s 55.1% a 69% f, i 3,268 f 
US n/a 61% g 58% g 68,600 g 
Japan 1969 h n/a 56% h 30,246 h 
Germany 1960s 42.0% a 52% f, i 20,979 f 
France 1960s 41.0% a 39% f, i 11,268 f 
Source: Griffin 2000 a, Honoré 2017 b, BEIS (UK) 2017 c, Korea City Gas Association 2017 d, Baratto 2017 e, 
Capgemini 2018 f, US EIA RECS Data g, The Japan Gas Association 2018 h, Eurostat 2018 i 
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Figure 4.6 Natural Gas Prices for Households 
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Additional Cost Burden of CCGTs due to Seasonal Demand Shift of City Gas 
The household demand for natural gas in Korea plummets in the summer and 
skyrockets in the winter, and the seasonal differential reaches up to 15–20 times, whereas 
KOGAS should take contracted volumes of gas regularly from export countries, 
regardless of season, based on the “take-or-pay” principle. 21  This extreme seasonal 
difference of demand in the city gas sector causes an enormous amount of additional 
management costs, such as expensive LNG tank storage. In this sense, the government 
designated KEPCO as a main consumer of natural gas in the summer season. 
In managing the cost burden of the asymmetry between domestic seasonal 
fluctuation and gas import contracts, the Korean government arranged for KEPCO to play 
as a so-called seasonal ‘swing consumer’ of the country’s national natural gas supplier, 
KOGAS, since the mid-1980s when the country introduced the city gas business. The idea 
of a ‘swing consumer’ came as a solution to the unbalance between the considerable 
seasonal fluctuations of household natural gas demand—‘turndown ratio’, in other 
words—and rigidity of long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) import contracts, namely 
“take-or-pay” contract (Kim & Do, 2004; OECD, 2000b, 2004). 
Although KEPCO had to install a massive capacity of CCGTs in the early 1990s 
when a supply shortage occurred, KEPCO kept CCGTs only for peak-load purposes due 
to the ‘institutionally’ high natural gas prices in addition to the ‘Asian premium’. In effect, 
KEPCO had a better option than CCGTs to manage electricity demand during the summer 
peak days, namely the EAF steel industry. For instance, major electricity-intensive 
industries, such as EAF steel and cement makers, shift their major production schedules 
from daytime to night-time to ‘cream-skim’ cheap off-peak electricity. As a result of the 
 
21 A ‘take-or-pay’ contract between a natural gas field owner and buyer is a universal contract 
custom due to technical difficulties in controlling the output of natural gas fields. 
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mismatched policies and institutions across sectors, KEPCO’s subsidiary GENCOs 
operate CCGTs more in the winter than in the summer season. In this kind of price 
distortion, thereby, the ‘swing consumer policy’ was never realised (Figure 4.7). 
Figure 4.7 The "Swing Consumer Role" of KEPCO & Actual Gas Demand (2011) 
Source: Author’s elaboration from KOGAS Management Statistics 2012. 
Note: The figure for city gas includes households and industrial customers to show the total volume of city 
gas demand compared to that of CCGTs. Households’ seasonal differentials of demand are much larger 
than the figure shows, around 15–20 times, for instance. 
 
Overall Electricity Price Control for Industry Support 
KEPCO also had to keep subsidising industrial electricity customers through low 
electricity rates from the 1970s when the Park Chung-Hee administration launched a heavy 
industry policy. Its 50% discount off of electricity rates as a special contract with the 
Korean Aluminium Co. from 1976 to 1989, in addition to a discount to the overall 
manufacturing industry, shows a dramatic aspect of its support for energy-intensive 
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heavy industries in Korea (Auty 1991)22. Although the initial policy of heavy and chemical 
industries (HCIs) promoting was officially withdrawn in 1979, the Korean government’s 
extensive export-oriented economic growth policies with a focus on the HCIs led its 
energy policies to continue tight electricity price regulation even after the 1970s. 
One main objective of the Korean government’s energy policy was to ensure that 
the energy sector would provide low-cost energy supplies to encourage economic 
development. Keeping energy prices low was viewed as being essential to ensuring 
electricity-intensive HCIs’ competitiveness and to supporting social welfare so that all 
customers could have access to reasonably priced energy, regardless of the cost of supply. 
This policy, while apparently successful, as shown by unprecedented economic growth 
and improvement in social welfare, has also brought about undesirable effects. Facing 
strict price regulation, public firms in the energy sector were unable to generate sufficient 
funds to meet their future investment needs. Serious distortions in relative prices amongst 
various energy sources resulted in an inefficient allocation of resources. Low energy prices 
discouraged investment in technologies of energy conservation, thus hindering the 
government’s own efforts to improve energy efficiency (Chang Hyun-Joon, 2003). 
Based on the massive supply reserve margin of electric power generators in the 
1980s, KEPCO repeated price reductions throughout the decade. As a result, all types of 
Korean customers enjoyed cheaper electricity prices than did their OECD counterparts 
from the 1990s. Price discounts for industrial customers were pronounced amongst all the 
subgroups from the 1980s to the 2000s. From around 2000, electricity prices for industrial 
customers in Korea reached the cheapest level amongst OECD countries. Although the 
electricity price for the industry was once similar to that of Japan in 1980, it continuously 
decreased until it reached that of Canada, which has abundant and nearly ‘zero-cost’ 
hydropower resources in the early 2000s (Figure 4.8). 
 
22 Open comments of Professor Seungjin Kang from Korea Polytechnic University during a 
conference meeting for the 2nd Energy Demand & Supply Basic Plan on 21 June 2013. 
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The government’s tight regulation of the electricity pricing practices of KEPCO 
dramatically manifested itself from the mid-2000s when global oil prices, together with 
other fossil-fuel prices, hiked to a record level. Although it would be rational for electric 
utilities to reflect fuel price changes in electricity rates even if they are under regional or 
national public regulation, the Korean regulatory system did not allow such pricing 
practices, and the utility had to bare its huge deficit by itself. Even after it was bailed out 
by the government’s special subsidy for the first time in its history in 2008, it was forced 
to continue such price practices, irrelevant to fossil-fuel price changes (Figure 4.8 and 4.9). 
Figure 4.8 Electricity Prices for Industry Customers by Country 
 
Source: International Energy Agency 2006, 2013. 
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Figure 4.9 Deteriorating Cost-Recovery Rate of KEPCO’s Tariffs in the 2000s 
Source: Author’s elaboration from KEPCO 2013: 214. 
Meanwhile, industrial electricity customers did get incorrect price signals. In 
effect, the country’s five major steelmakers started to massively invest in new production 
lines from the year when KEPCO was bailed out. Their total investment in new iron and 
steel production facilities between 2008 and 2012 was about 36 trillion won, equivalent to 
32 billion US dollars (Song, 2013). As a result, the country had to face its first rolling 
blackout 23  since the late 1970s on September 15, 2011. Public discontent made the 
government replace the minister of energy ministry and related officials. Although 
KEPCO was to increase the electricity rate, somehow, after the rolling blackout, the 
government’s regulation still did not allow KEPCO to pass fuel cost fluctuations on to its 
customers. 
  
 
23 The local outages affected around 2.5 million customers. 
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In effect, thanks to the ‘Beijing Olympics construction boom’ in China, many 
Korean steel industries enjoyed an increased export performance until 2008. KEPCO had 
to face a huge deficit due to its continued low prices for industry and the outperforming 
capacity factor of steel industries; it also had to get a special subsidy from the government 
to offset part of the deficit in 2008.24 The average level of electricity prices for industry 
customers does not show the unique characteristics of the relationship between KEPCO 
and electricity-intensive industries in Korea, however. Thus, it needs to go deeper to see 
the pricing mechanism. 
Intense Practice of “Time-of-Use” Pricing Scheme 
KEPCO’s price scheme had been entirely based on the quantity of electricity 
consumed, regardless of the time of use in a day and season until 1976 (World Bank, 1985). 
Once nuclear power was introduced, however, KEPCO set up a “Time-of-use (TOU)” 
pricing scheme for large industrial customers. The TOU pricing mechanism itself is well 
known and has been widely practised by electricity utilities in numerous countries to 
reduce peak demand in the daytime and to increase the operation of cheap base-load 
power during night times. The basic principle of TOU pricing is to charge a higher rate 
during peak hours and discounted rates during off-peak hours, typically at night, 
encouraging customers to shift to off-peak hours with discounted prices. In effect, KEPCO 
has been offering unparalleled, disproportionate TOU prices since 1978 when its first 
commercial nuclear reactor, Kori-1, started commercial operation. 
Although KEPCO’s TOU pricing scheme is often praised as efficient (Hill, 1992), 
the extreme level of pricing has been questioned by economists and research communities 
regarding its extreme discount during night times from the 2000s (Lee et al., 2009). The 
criticisms are focused on the fact that the off-peak prices at night hours, typically from 11 
 
24 Open comments of Professor Seungjin Kang, Korea Polytechnic University during a conference 
meeting for the 2nd Energy Demand and Supply Basic Plan on 21 June 2013. 
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p.m. to 9 a.m., do not reflect actual production costs and cause equity issues between 
customer groups. 
In 2012, for instance, KEPCO bought electricity from power generation companies 
(GENCOs and IPPs) at around 82 Korean won(KRW)/kWh during off-peak hours, but the 
company sold electricity to large industry customers at about 62 KRW/kWh during the 
same hours. This brought a massive revenue loss (2.2 trillion Korean won, equivalent to 
about US$ 2 billion) to KEPCO in the same year (KEPCO, 2013; National Assembly Budget 
Office, 2013) (Table 4.6). Although most of the loss was apparently recovered by peak-
load prices charged to industry customers during the daytime, it causes a serious equity 
issue between cream skimmers of the pricing scheme, such as EAF steel and cement firms, 
and other industries that do not operate factories at night hours or that have to operate 
factories 24/7. 
Table 4.6 KEPCO's TOU Pricing for Large Industry Customers and Results (2012) 
 Off-Peak 
Hours 
Partial-Peak 
Hours 
Peak Hours 
Average Cost 
(KRW/kWh) 
81.8 103.2 108.4 
Average Price 61.8 103.7 154.8 
Price Gap -20 0.5 46.4 
Sold Electricity (GWh) 111,374 72,890 42,117 
Profit (Billion KRW) -2,233 35.3 1,954 
(Million US$ in 2012 price) -1,983 31 1,736 
Source: National Assembly Budget Office, 2013: 47. 
 
The problem of TOU pricing practice does not end here. The off-peak electricity 
price has been even lower than the nuclear power generation price in the 2000s. It shows 
the off-peak price was kept below the nuclear power price, which KEPCO pays to KHNP, 
from the early 2000s to late in the decade. Although relatively lower off-peak prices can 
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be justified to increase loads during off-peak hours and flatten overall daily load, a price 
level lower than the cheapest base-load power generation price cannot be easily justified 
(Figure 4.10). 
Figure 4.10 KEPCO’s Time-of-Use Pricing for Large Industry Customers 25 
Source: Author’s Elaboration from Korea Power Exchange’s Historical Monthly Power Generation Price 
(2001–2014) and KEPCO’s TOU Pricing Scheme Archives. 
Note: The figure shows the price scheme for the largest industry customer group, which consists of about 
350 customers and consumes about 45% of industrial electricity and about a quarter of total national 
electricity consumption. This pricing category is merged with that of a smaller industry customer group in 
2012. 
Professor Jongbae Park from Konkuk University, Seoul, explains the rare pricing 
practice and its potential impact on electricity supply planning: 
 
25 The reason why nuclear power generation price started to fluctuate from 2009 mainly comes 
from application of a ‘modification factor’ on electricity transaction between KEPCO and 
GENCOs, including KHNP, in order to decrease electricity prices in the face of global energy 
price increases from 2008 (Lee et al., 2013). Thus, the nuclear power generation price does not 
reflect real cost of nuclear power from 2009. 
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It would be difficult to find a similar case of such an extreme pricing scheme 
in other countries. The level of off-peak price lower than nuclear power 
generation price can be justified only in exceptional cases. For instance, it 
would be justifiable when nuclear power units operate in a ‘daily start and 
stop (DSS)’ mode due to low base-load demand during night hours given that 
nuclear power operation in a DSS mode would be extremely expensive. 
However, such a DSS mode operation of nuclear power never 
happened during the past three decades in Korea. I assume that the extreme 
pricing was the background of the chronic shortage of base-load power 
capacity in the Korean electricity market for the past 15 years. I participated 
in the planning processes of the Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity Supply 
and Demand as an expert panel member from its first to the fifth plan, 
consecutively. Each time, I repeatedly heard that ‘we are suffering a dire 
shortage of base-load power capacity’ from the Korea Power Exchange. 26,27,28 
Figure 4.11 and 4.12 show what the phrase ‘we are suffering a dire shortage of 
base-load power capacity’ means. The former shows a so-called ‘shifting peak’, meaning 
peak load simply shifted from daytime to night-time hours, thanks to the aggressive TOU 
pricing scheme. The night peak on 1 February was the annual peak of the Korean electrical 
system in the year 2005. It makes a 20 GW gap between the night peak and the total base-
load power capacity in operation. In this circumstance, electricity utilities need to either 
modify the pricing scheme to reduce the night peak or construct a large capacity of base-
load power plants. KEPCO hardly changed the pricing scheme until the early 2010s, and 
the gap continued to increase. 
 
26 Electricity Market and Power System Operator 
27 Telephone interview with Professor Jongbae Park of the Department of Electricity and 
Electronics, Konkuk University, Seoul, on 14 May 2015. 
28 ‘The Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity Supply and Demand’ or its previous version, ‘The 
Long-Term Electricity Demand & Supply Plan’, has been made every other year. 
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Figure 4.11 Impact of Aggressive TOU Pricing (1 Feb. 2005) 
Source: Author’s Elaboration from the Korea Power Exchange’s Monthly Statistics of the Electricity Market. 
Figure 4.12 Continued Aggressive TOU Pricing and Increasing Gap (2 Feb. 2012) 
Source: Author’s Elaboration from Korea Power Exchange’s Monthly Statistics of Electricity Market. 
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Instead, the new large units of nuclear and coal power were authorised during the 
electricity supply planning processes throughout the 2000s. There is no direct evidence 
that the Korean government and KEPCO intentionally kept the extreme pricing practices 
to justify new nuclear and coal power construction projects. Nevertheless, there are 
numerous pieces of evidence showing a correlation between utilities’ pricing schemes and 
nuclear power programmes in European countries in the past. Specific pricing schemes to 
encourage electricity demand at night hours and their implications for the nuclear power 
programme in the UK in the 1960s are shown as below: 
Such electrical storage heating was particularly successful in the UK as a 
complement to the nuclear power programme from the 1960s. The 
requirement for nuclear generators to operate continuously caused the then 
state-owned system operator to incentivise load shifting to provide a higher 
and stable night-time base-load. (Torriti et al., 2010: 11–12) 
Professor Younghwan Chun from Hongik University explained more specific 
implications of such pricing schemes to nuclear power rather than other base-load power 
technologies. 
Sustaining electrical demand at night hours is a critical issue to nuclear power. 
If you have low demand load at night, you may have to shut down nuclear 
reactors, rather than reducing their unit output, to keep the balance of the 
entire electrical system. Nuclear power cannot be operated in a load-following 
mode for a safety reason. Although France exceptionally boasts a ‘load-
following’ operation of nuclear plants, I doubt whether they actually can do 
it. When I requested EDF for details of such an operation several years ago, 
they refused to answer my inquiry. 
By comparison, almost all modern fossil power plants, including coal 
power, are equipped with the ‘governor’ system, which enables turbines to 
automatically respond to frequency changes of the electrical system and 
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restore a standard system frequency.29 For instance, most coal power plants in 
Korea have the ability to change their output by about 5% within a minute 
following frequency changes. Although it is slower than a gas turbine in 
responding to load changes, its governor system makes a big difference from 
nuclear.”30 
Indeed, the big gap between night peaks and base-load power capacity easily 
justified new nuclear and coal power projects against the other technology options in the 
energy planning processes. It should be noted that the construction plan of Shin-Kori 3 
and 4, the first APR1400 and the reference reactors of the Barakah nuclear project in the 
UAE, was also authorised in 2000 (MOTIE, 2000a). 
While optional price differential is not over two times greater between base-load 
and peak-load hours in most OECD countries, it is 3.4 times in the summer season in 
Korea as of 2013. As compared in Table 4.7, Public Gas and Electricity (PG&E), the biggest 
utility of California, practices the optional price programme with 1.9 times differential at 
most. Although the bigger differential would result in larger customer response and peak-
load reduction, KEPCO’s extreme pricing scheme causes not only equity issues between 
industrial customers but ‘wrong price signals’ and ‘shifting peak’ problems. Customers 
who do not operate their factories at night times and who should operate factories 24/7 
would pay KEPCO’s loss from the intensely discounted off-peak prices. In this way, the 
two types of industry customers cross-subsidise those who can cream-skim the cheap off-
peak prices, such as EAF steelmakers (Jung & Park, 2010). 
For instance, EAF steelmakers or the cement industry can flexibly change their 
production activities from ‘load-shedding’ to complete shutdowns during peak-load 
 
29 The frequency change means an unbalance between electricity supply and demand caused by 
demand changes or sudden outages of power plants. 
30 Interview with Professor Younghwan Chun, Electrical Engineering Department of Hongik 
University, Seoul, on 12 July 2017. 
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hours while operating their production facilities at full capacity during night hours. Most 
manufacturing industries, including BOF steelmakers, however, cannot follow the same 
path, in that they do not have such flexible characteristics in their production process. 
Instead, Korean BOF steelmakers, such as POSCO, operate their own self-power 
generation plants using by-product gas from their blast furnaces during peak hours. 
Table 4.7 International Comparison of TOU Electricity Prices (2013) 
 Peak & Off-Peak Hours Differential 
(Peak/Off-Peak) 
Load Factor 
(Average/Peak) Off-Peak Hours Peak Hours 
Korea 
(KEPCO) 
11 p.m.–9 a.m. 
11 a.m.–noon, 1–5 
p.m. 
3.4 times 77.1% 
US 
(PG&E) 
9:30 p.m. –8:30 
a.m. 
12 p.m.–6 p.m. 1.9 times 57.5% 
Source: Korea Electric Power 2013; California Public Utility Commission 2017 
Note: The presented TOU prices of both countries are applied during the summer season. 
Nevertheless, KEPCO kept the pricing practice with the justification of demand 
management of electricity under the supervision of the government, namely the MOTIE. 
The general manager of KEPCO’s pricing office explained this: 
The level of off-peak price for large industry customers is about 80% of 
average power generation cost during the off-peak hours. Although it does 
not accord with the cost-based pricing principle and there are numerous 
complaints from industry customers who operate production facilities 24 
hours a day, the pricing scheme serves as a policy tool such as demand-side 
management. Also, the economic loss due to the off-peak price could be 
recovered by peak pricing.  
The pricing scheme is a result of consultation between KEPCO and 
government rather than KEPCO’s own decision. The government seems to 
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consider that the economic loss due to the pricing scheme is somehow 
reasonable compared to the effect of demand-side management. 31 
Furthermore, the extreme pricing, which is even lower than the nuclear power 
generation price, sent an incorrect signal to numerous Korean electricity-intensive 
industries, mostly EAF steelmakers, to massively invest in new production facilities from 
the late 2000s. Often, they face overcapacity and end up with abrupt results, such as the 
bankruptcy of ‘Hanbo Steel’ in the late 1990s and the restructuring of eight EAF 
steelmakers in 2015. Regardless of the eventual economic results, the pricing scheme 
played as a ‘matchmaker’ between base-load power, namely nuclear and coal, and 
commodity metal industries for the past three decades in Korea. The rapid growth of the 
steel industry induced by the excessive TOU pricing, in return, gave rise to the persistent 
growth of base-load electric demand, which is a prerequisite for new nuclear power 
construction projects. 
EAF-centred Load Management Rebate Programmes 
In addition to the aggressive TOU pricing scheme, KEPCO has been practising 
special load control programmes that offer rebates to industrial customers who reduce 
usage during summer peak days. Even in this case, the main beneficiaries of the 
programme are from the same commodity BMI, namely EAF steelmakers. Whether the 
programme was intended to do so or not, EAF steels have been the biggest beneficiaries 
of the programme. 
When KEPCO offered a peak cut rebate programme in 1994, for instance, the 
biggest beneficiaries of the programme were three EAF firms and Pohang Steel (POSCO), 
the only BOF steel firm until the 2000s in Korea. The three EAF firms, whose crude steel 
 
31 Telephone interview with a general manager of the pricing office, Korea Electric Power Co., 
Naju, on 19 May 2015. The interviewee’s name is not presented here due to the interviewee’s 
request. 
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production capacities were much smaller than those of Pohang Steel, exploited the rebate 
programme much more than Pohang Steel did. In terms of contracted capacity, all three 
EAF firms performed load control of more than 50%, whereas Pohang Steel could reduce 
its demand load lower than 30% (Table 4.8). 
The programme and the EAF steel sector’s active involvement have increased 
further since then. For example, six of the ten largest participants in the load reduction 
rebate programme during the summer peak days in 2012 were also EAF steel firms. Only 
13 EAF steel firms amongst 3,111 participant firms of the programme took nearly half the 
amount (49%) of the total rebate, which was 287 billion won, equivalent to US$ 254 million 
dollars(KEPCO, 2013).32 It indicates both the scale of the Korean EAF steel industry in 
terms of electric consumption and its complementarity with the Korean electric supply 
industry (Tables 4.8 and 4.9). 
Table 4.8 Major Participants of Electric Load Control Rebate Programme in 1994 
Participants Industry Contracted 
Capacity 
Load 
Reduction 
Reduction 
/Contract 
Ratio (%) 
Rebate 
(Million Won) 
MW 
Kangwon EAF Steel 295.0 148.7 50% 471.8  
Pohang Steel 
(POSCO) 
BOF Steel 290.0 85.1 29% 268.0  
Dongkuk 
Steel 
EAF Steel 143.6 143.6 50% 168.0  
Hankuk Steel EAF Steel 72.0 41.4 58% 227.9  
Source: Ministry of Energy and Resources 1995 
Note: The figure is the result of a programme practised for 10 days in August 1994, and the rebate is 
converted into 2013 prices. 
 
32 It should be noted that the size of rebate programme in 2012 was the biggest case ever in terms 
of rebate size and the number of participant firms due to the tight electricity supply–demand 
situation in the year. Nevertheless, it highlights the close relationship between EAF steelmakers 
and KEPCO. 
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Table 4.9 Top 10 Participants of Electric Load Control Rebate Programme in 2012 
 
Participants Industry Load Reduction 
(MW) 
Rebate 
(Million Won) 
1 Hyundai Steel EAF + BOF 95,489  43,537  
2 Daehan Steel EAF Steel 42,153  18,778  
3 Koryo Zinc Zinc Smelter 38,703  17,148  
4 POSCO BOF Steel 29,993  13,163  
5 Hankuk Iron & Steel EAF Steel 25,793  11,829  
6 Dongkuk Steel EAF Steel 27,048  11,556  
7 Hankuk Beam Steel EAF Steel 23,605  10,908  
8 Youngpoong Smelting Zinc Smelter 24,625  10,336  
9 Ssangyong Cement Cement 20,515  8,957  
10 Hankuk Steel EAF Steel 19,686  8,824  
Source: KEPCO 2013, Report to Committee of Industry, Trade, and Resources, National Assembly of Korea 
during the 320th National Audit (25 October), Vol. II: 418. 
Note: The amount of load reduction by each firm is counted in accumulated terms during 45 days of the 
programme in the summer season. 
 
4.2.5. Lax Environmental Regulations 
Lax Emission Control Practices on Fossil Power Plants 
Although emission control regulations on the electricity market were established 
in 1978 under the Environmental Preservation Act, its emission standards and practices 
have been loose. First, its national standard of NOx on coal power plants was set at 500 
ppm and continued until 1987, looser than even the pre-1973 standard of Japan. Even after 
amendment in 1987, the standard remained 350 ppm, which is still weaker than Japan’s 
1973 standard, until 2004. It is only from 2005 that the country’s emission standards were 
strengthened to OECD members’ average standards (see Section 5.2.5) (Table 4.10). 
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Table 4.10 Korean NOx Emission Standards on New Power Plants33 
Fuels 
National Standards (ppm, % of O2) 
1978–’86 1987–’04 2005–’09 2010–’14 
Gas - 400 50 (13) 20 (15) 
Oil 250 (4) 250 (4) 250 (4) 50 (4) 
Coal 500 (6) 350 (6) 150 (6) 50 (6) 
Source: Author’s elaboration from the Enforcement Decree of Environmental Preservation Act (enacted in 
1978) and the Enforcement Decree of the Clean Air Conservation Act (enacted in 1991) 
Second, although the Korean emission control acts prohibit electricity suppliers 
from using coal fuels in its metropolitan areas, such as Seoul and Incheon, according to 
the regulation34, the electric utility has been repeatedly exempted from the regulation 
(Table 4.11). For instance, KEPCO and its subsidiaries have built six large coal power 
plants in Incheon since the late-1990s. Although the Clean Air Conservation Act also 
allows a few local governments the authority to negotiate with the utility, their opposition 
was not recognised in practice. The official from the Ministry of Environment explained 
the legal background of the repeated exemptions. 
If the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) requests permission 
of coal power plant construction project in the designated areas, the Ministry 
of Environment should settle with the MOTIE. Initially, it was agreed to 
permit four coal power plants in Incheon in the 1990s. However, the MOTIE 
requested another exemption for additional coal power plants again in the 
early 2000s. That is why we have six coal power plants in the area now.35 
 
33 The standards in the Table only apply to new power plants. 
34 Article 42. Enforcement Decree of the Clean Air Conservation Act (enacted in 1991). The 
regulation was elaborated to control the total volume of emissions beyond concentration level. 
35 Telephone interview with an officer of Climate and Air Quality Policy Division, Ministry of 
Environment, Sejong, on 8 June 2015. The name of the interviewee is not presented here due to 
a request of anonymity.  
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Table 4.11 Designated Areas under Mandatory Use of Clean Fuel 
 
Designated Areas Target Facilities 
1988 Seoul City Power Plants, Boilers 
1991 Incheon City and 13 Cities of Gyunggi Province  
Power Plants, Boilers, and 
Apartment Complexes 
1993 Busan City and Daegu City 
1998 12 Cities, including Ulsan, Gwangju, Daejon 
1999 6 Cities including Pohang, Gimhae, Gumi 
Source: Ministry of Environment 2004 
The loose emission standards and practices imply important ramifications for 
KEPCO and its subsidiaries. The Korean power producers have not been under pressure 
to replace their high sulphur and/or nitrogen content fuels with alternative ones, such as 
natural gas, under such loose standards and practices. The share of coal power has been 
always above 30%, and often even above 40%, in the Korean electricity market for the past 
three decades. By comparison, gas turbines could not exploit their environmental 
competitiveness under such loose regulation and practice, and the share has been less than 
20% during the same period.36 
Lax Nuclear Safety Regulations and Practices 
Although codified Korean nuclear safety regulations seem to benchmark those of 
the US, namely the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its regulatory guidelines, 
the regulatory practice has been loose in operation and in new reactor construction 
projects. The industry-friendly regulations of the Korean nuclear safety regulators 
allowed a higher capacity factor (CF) of nuclear fleets and the rapid construction of new 
nuclear power plants in Korea. This Section discusses this issue in detail, particularly 
focusing on the issue of steam generator tubes’ safety. 
 
36 The share of gas power temporarily increased to around 20% in 2013 due to a surge in 
electricity demand and an abrupt shutdown of several nuclear reactors. 
116 
 
One of loose safety regulatory practices regarding nuclear reactors in operation 
was the case of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident at Ulchin unit 4 in 2002 
and the following actions by Korean regulators (Figure 4.13). The SGTR accident was a 
rare and serious event in the global nuclear power history. However, the regulator 
allowed the operator to restart the reactor after only two months of repair work even 
without identification of the root cause of the event. The regulatory action was criticised 
as a “hasty and industry-friendly action” by foreign experts as well as by civil society and 
media in Korea. There was international criticism by industry journals, such as Nucleonics 
Week, on the regulatory decision, as shown below. 
Experts outside Korea questioned how Korean regulators have allowed 
Ulchin-4 to restart only 7.5 weeks after a ruptured tube had been detected. The 
unit was shut from April 5 to May 27, according to KHNP. In Japan, for 
example, a steam generator tube rupture at Mihama-2 in 1991 led to a long 
forced-outage during which a comprehensive examination of tubes was 
carried out and which did not end until the steam generators were replaced a 
year later. In that case as well, the results of investigations by Japan’s Nuclear 
Safety Commission were made publicly available (Hibbs, 2002: 1). 
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Figure 4.13 CE-type Steam Generator and the Ruptured Tube at Ulchin 4 
Source: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Photo Gallery on the left and Lee 2008 on the right. 
In addition, the material issue of steam generators, namely Alloy 600, was not 
seriously considered when the Korean nuclear industry, including the utility and 
manufacturer, imported nuclear power plants and built up the technological capability in 
the 1980s. Even in the 1990s, when the global nuclear industry shared the vulnerability of 
Alloy 600 to stress corrosion cracking (SCC) with all the PWR operators all over the world, 
KEPCO constructed six reactors of Korean standardised PWRs, namely OPR1000, with 
Alloy 600-based steam generators. 
Thanks to the rather loose inspection requirements and rapid periodic inspection 
practices, the Korean nuclear industry performed at the world’s highest capacity factor 
over the past quarter-century. Once the country’s nuclear fleet performed above 80% of 
the capacity factor in 1991, it never went down below 80% until 2012. Even then, it 
maintained above 90% on average throughout the 2000s. Its performance surpassed all 
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the countries with large nuclear reactor capacities, including Canada, France, Germany, 
the US, and Japan, between 1989 and 2010. Only that of the US has been close to the Korean 
capacity factor in the 2000s (Figure 4.14). 
Figure 4.14 Average Inspection Days and Capacity Factor of Korean Nuclear Fleets 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power, White Paper of Nuclear Power, each year 
from 1990 to 2013. 
Even further, KHNP, a nuclear subsidiary of KEPCO, launched a high capacity 
factor campaign, such as ‘One Cycle Trouble Free’, in 2009. At the same time, it also 
planned to launch the so-called ‘9402’ Campaign, which implies a 94% capacity factor and 
0.2 times of unplanned shutdown per reactor unit by 2014 (KHNP, 2009:16). The first two-
digit number indicates the capacity factor, and the second one represents the average 
shutdown frequency per reactor unit (Figure 4.15). 
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Figure 4.15 KHNP’s Ambitious Capacity Factor Maximisation Plan in 2009 
Source: KHNP 2009, Report to Standing Committee of Knowledge-Based Economy for the 284th 
Parliamentary Inspection of Government Administration, 13 October 2009: 16. 
However, the plan was not realised due to a manifestation of a massive steam 
generator tube cracking at Ulchin 3 and 4, the first Korean standard reactors, in 2011 and 
several years maintenance and steam generator replacement thereafter. The special task 
force team of Korea’s Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, a newly established 
independent regulator in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, found that the cracked 
tubes accounted for more than 50% of the total tubes, pointing out that the previous 
inspections overlooked the accumulating cracks (NSSC, 2011). 
Subsequently, the regulator disapproved the restart of the Ulchin 4 reactor. 
Following the regulatory guidelines, KHNP shut down the reactor for 2 years until new 
steam generators could be prepared. Eventually, it scheduled to replace the steam 
generators with new steam generators made of more corrosion-resistant material, namely 
Alloy 690, in August 2013. The earlier loose regulatory practices of nuclear power in the 
2000s made Korean ESI pay the cost, eventually. 
In addition, the steam generator tube scandal was followed by a series of certificate 
forgery scandals in 2012 and 2013. Two operating reactors were forced to shut down when 
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it was revealed that thousands of substandard parts had been supplied with fake 
warranties in 2012. Another revelation about fabricated certificates of control cables in 
2013 forced another two operating reactors to shut down and delayed the operation of the 
newly constructed Shin-Kori 3 and 4—reference reactors of the Barakah nuclear project in 
the UAE—until December 2016 (Choi, 2013; Park, J., 2013). 
Subsequently, the nuclear operator experienced a lower capacity factor than 80% 
for the first time since 1990. All the events in the early 2010s revealed that the previous 
practices of Korean safety regulators had been far looser than international standards. The 
strengthened regulatory overview in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident and the 
massive manifestation of the steam generator tube cracking indicates that the world-
record operational performance of the Korean nuclear fleets in the 2000s was related to 
the lax regulatory practices. 
The series of scandals not only shattered KHNP’s ambitious capacity factor 
maximisation plan but also delayed the operating licences of the first reactors, Barakah 1 
and 2, in the UAE. According to the nuclear export contract between Korea and the UAE, 
Shin-Kori 3 and 4 reactors should perform safe operations for several years from the end 
of 2013, given that the APR1400 reactors did not have any operational track record. 
Furthermore, candidate operators of Barakah reactors were supposed to train with Shin-
Kori 3 and 4 under KHNP’s supervision for the same period to get the operating licence. 
The safety regulator of the UAE, thereby, refused issuance of the operating licence in May 
2017, and the start-up of the first reactor has reportedly been delayed by a year without a 
specification of a date (Carvalho & Clercq 2017; World Nuclear News 2017). 
The delay of operations not only caused penalties (US$ 600,000 per day according 
to the contract’s ‘Liquidated Damages Clause’), but also increased KEPCO’s labour cost. 
The total labour at the Barakah construction site is reportedly about 21,000 (Choi 2017; 
Clercq 2017). A year-long delay of operations alone can cause more than $1 billion of cost 
overruns, aside from capital costs. KEPCO hardly experienced this kind of delay in 
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construction and operation schedules in the loose domestic regulatory environment 
before the Fukushima accident. The uncertainties under enhanced domestic safety 
regulations and foreign safety regulations will decide the fate of the UAE nuclear project. 
 Heavy Electrical Industry 
4.3.1. A Brief History of Korean Heavy Electrical Industry Policy 
Changwon Complex and Machinery Policy in the 1970s 
As we have seen from the Literature Review Chapter, the Korean HEI experienced 
daunting circumstances decades before its surprising nuclear export case in 2009. The 
sector’s experience has followed quite a different path from other comparable Korean 
machinery sectors, such as shipbuilding, where a typical Korean ‘Chaebol-governance’ 
style worked well. It went through such a difficult time not because the Korean 
government and Chaebols were indifferent, but ironically, because both sides were so 
enthusiastic about the sector. 
The Korean HEI started with a massive but hasty investment decision-making 
process on the HEI complex with the world largest heavy forging and casting machines 
under the military Park Chung-Hee state in the 1970s. As a part of the famous heavy and 
chemical industry policy, the so-called ‘HCI Push’, the Park government made an 
ambitious plan to construct a heavy machinery complex, including heavy electrical 
equipment production infrastructure, imitating Japanese Hitachi machinery complexes, 
in Changwon, a southeast region of Korea in the early 1970s (O, 2006). 
However, experienced Chaebol firms, including Hyundai, Samsung, and Daewoo, 
did not consider the ambitious plan feasible and were reluctant to join in the complex 
project (Rhee, 1994). Instead, a novice Chaebol firm in overall heavy machinery sectors, 
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namely Hyundai International Inco,37 joined in the ambitious plan as a main construction 
contractor as a reward for its compliance with the Park state. 
The heavy forging and casting facilities were initially designed by GE, Hyundai 
International Inc.’s (HII’s) OEM at that time, based on over-forecasting of future demand 
in the Asian power plant market. The scale was further increased by Park’s military 
ambition to compete with the massively mechanised North Korea. Hyundai International 
Inc. constructed an immense heavy forging-and-casting complex following the Park state’s 
guideline. The world largest complex was financially facilitated by a large but conditional 
loan offer from the World Bank, which guaranteed monopolisation of the Korean HEI. 
When they were planned in the mid-1970s, the heavy forging and casting 
machines were supposed to produce heavy equipment such as large steam turbine rotors, 
casings, reactor pressure vessels and steam generator shells. However, global and 
domestic electricity markets plummeted in the late 1970s and 80s due to the global energy 
crisis, and the facilities idled most of the time. Unsurprisingly, HII went into bankruptcy 
at the end of the 1970s. 
In parallel, the Korean government set up the Machinery Indigenisation Policy in 
1976 with intention to increase the local contents of plants and equipment and to reduce 
the portion of turn-key plants constructed by foreign firms. Following the policy, the state-
owned KEPCO and Bechtel made a technology transfer contract in the fourth and fifth 
nuclear construction projects. The contract included the transfer of architecture 
engineering from Bechtel and subsequent training of Korea Power Engineering Company 
(KOPEC) engineers to build architecture design capabilities. Following the Machinery 
 
37 Although Hyundai International Inco. (HII) was established by a younger brother, Chung 
Inyung, of the Hyundai Chaebol CEO, Chung Juyung, their business management were not at all 
shared and even hostile to each other. Chung Juyung did not recognize his younger brother’s 
management capacity in heavy machinery industries including the Changwon Complex project 
and HEI business (Rhee, 1994).  
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Indigenisation Policy, KEPCO increased the local content of equipment from the fourth 
and fifth nuclear project through procuring the components from local manufacturers, 
mainly from Hyundai Heavy Industries, a subsidiary of Hyundai Group, rather than HII 
(MER, 1988). 
Continued ‘Curse’ of Changwon Complex in the 1980s 
Right after the bankruptcy, the other three Chaebols, namely Hyundai, Daewoo and 
Samsung, competed fiercely to get access to the HEI market. Although the immediate 
disputes around the HEI were resolved by nationalisation of the bankrupted HII into 
KHIC in 1980, the initial massive investment on heavy forging and casting machines 
continued to frustrate the nationalised HEI firm and its major customer, KEPCO, for the 
next two decades (Rhee, 1994).38 
The Korean government had to arrange the Korean Development Bank (KDB) to 
take 42.3% of the KHIC stock, with KEPCO taking 38.2% and the Korea Exchange Bank 
taking 19.5%, to bail out the firm from bankruptcy in 1980. Additionally, the government 
aided the aggressive recovery of KHIC from chronic financial deficiency and management 
problems by appointing Nak-Jung Sung, a former president of KEPCO, as the president of 
KHIC in 1983. Thanks to this aggressive recovery programme, the KHIC sustained its 
autonomy from KEPCO in its overall management, while it still could take advantage of 
guaranteed monopoly status in its domestic market (KHIC, 1995). 
Nevertheless, the KHIC suffered chronic financial deficit throughout the 1980s due 
to the continuously shrinking domestic power plant market and an inability to export the 
global power plant market. Even after the merger, KHIC’s overall production capacity 
factor remained at only 30% in 1980, 35% in 1981 and even less than 10% in the mid-1980s 
(Auty, 1995: 210). It is not a surprising result in that the KHIC’s major asset, namely the 
 
38 For more detailed analysis on the saga of the Korean military state, the four Chaebols, and the 
World Bank in the late 1970s and the early 80s, see Rhee, 1994. 
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heavy forging and casting facilities, which took 40% of total capital assets, was needed for 
only a few weeks per production of equipment, such as reactor vessels, steam turbine 
rotors, and generator rotors, and used to be idle for most of weeks a year. Unghan Lee, a 
former quality control manager of Korean nuclear power plants, explains the 
technological difficulties that KHIC had to face in the 1980s. 
The curse of KHIC came from its gigantic size heavy forging and 
casting facilities. Initially, it was intended to supply GE complementary 
products of its local turbine business in Asia, such as heavy forging, but GE’s 
turbine business did not go well due to low demand for growth in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, the final size of the heavy forging facility was enlarged again by 
Park Chung-Hee government’s military ambition considering the competition 
with mechanised North Korea at that time. The 10,000 tonnes’ heavy press 
machine was the world largest class at that time. In fact, power plants consist 
of much more precision equipment and parts rather than a piece of a few 
heavy forging equipment. Unfortunately, KHIC did not have such a capacity 
to produce precision products.39 
The enormity of the 10,000 tonnes’ press together with a decade’s low demand for 
growth had KHIC facing financial crisis again and again. Although over-forecasting of 
electricity demand in the 1970s, followed by overcapacity of power generation in the 
1980s, can be observed in many industrialised countries (MacKerron 1992), the KHIC 
suffered more intense overcapacity problems. As Lee points in the interview, it was 
virtually impossible for KHIC to diversify its technology from heavy forging products to 
more sophisticated ones, such as gas turbines, due to state ownership and tight financial 
conditions. It was unimaginable for the state-owned firm to put its financial efforts into 
technology R&D, unlike the resilient Chaebols, such as Hyundai Heavy Industries, which 
 
39 Email Interview with Unghan Lee, a former deputy director of the Quality Control division at 
Yonggwang Nuclear Power unit 5 & 6, on 14 July 2012 
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were free to mobilise their cash in hiring foreign experts and training their employees on 
new technologies (Amsden & Kim 1986). 
Amidst its repeated financial crisis, including KHIC’s huge revenue loss from its 
desalination plant project in the UAE in the late 1980s, the Korean government decided to 
privatise KHIC in 1988. The only viable firms who could afford the offer and expressed 
intentions to buy KHIC were Hyundai and Samsung at that time. However, the 
privatisation process, based on a competitive bidding scheme, was miscarried by 
intentional abstention by Samsung on the day of bidding.40 Then, the KHIC was bailed out 
again by KEPCO and the Korea Development Bank, and its monopoly status was 
extended to the mid-1990s. A nationalistic view of politicians that such a strategic industry 
should be held by the public ownership also supported the monopoly status of KHIC 
(Korea National Assembly, 1996). 
Despite the miscarriage, Korean Chaebol firms prepared for entrance into the 
market again given that the temporal monopoly status of KHIC was supposed to end in 
1995. Also, the Agreement on Government Procurement in the Uruguay Round of GATT, 
the predecessor of WTO, pushed the Korean government to open its power plant 
manufacturing market by 1997. Four Chaebol firms and KHIC actively sought to arrange 
technology licensing relationships with advanced foreign firms. For instance, the HHI 
made a gas turbine licence contract with ABB in 1991,41 and Samsung Aerospace did so 
with GE and SDC Turbine, a small Russian engineering group, in 1992 and 1993, 
respectively. In addition, KHIC made a licence contract with GE in 1991 (Lee, 1994). 
 
40 Samsung allegedly perceived that it would not be able to win Hyundai in the competition bid 
due to a capability gap in the HEI sector and decided not to bid to call off the entire 
privatisation program. 
41 HHI maintained dual license relationships with foreign HEI firms. For instance, its license with 
Westinghouse was for steam turbine and nuclear power, and the other license with ABB was 
for gas turbine in the 1990s. 
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However, the Korean HEI sector was monopolised again, as the Asian Financial 
Crisis arrived in Korea in 1997. As the IMF got involved in the industrial restructuring of 
Korea for an economic recovery from the financial crisis, the Korean government had to 
go through restructuring of the HEI sector, including an amalgamation of all the private 
production capacity into KHIC and the privatisation of KHIC with a 10-year guarantee of 
monopoly status in 1998. In this way, the Chaebol firms were locked out from the HEI 
market again (KHIC, 2000). All the networks between foreign licensors and the Chaebol 
firms vanished and the mobilised human resources were reallocated to different divisions 
(Table 4.12). 
Table 4.12 Result of Korean HEI Restructuring in 1998 (MW/year) 
 
Before Restructuring 
After 
Restructuring 
 KHIC HHI SHI Total KHIC 
Production Capacity 5,800 3,450 1,000 9,250 5,800 
Employees 3,628 596 633 4,857 4,033 
Domestic Demand 2,500 MW/year 
Source: KHIC 2000 
Ironically, KHIC was sold to a complete novice firm, namely the Doosan Group, a 
resort development and liquor manufacturing firm at that time, in 2000. The 10-year 
monopoly status of the newly privatised HEI firm was guaranteed by the government. It 
locked out other Chaebols, such as Hyundai Heavy Industries, and let them completely give 
up the HEI business. Although the Park state and the resourceful Korean Chaebols were 
enthusiastic about the industry, they had never experienced the famous ‘Korean 
government-Chaebol dynamics’ in the HEI sector over the previous three decades.42 
 
42 Although Doosan is also recognized as a “Chaebol” firm, its fields were too narrow and 
irrelevant to heavy electrical industry such as resort development and liquor manufacturing, 
unlike typical Chaebols which are diversified in various manufacturing industries and have 
accumulated experiences over decades. 
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Instead, the private successor, Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction (Doosan), 
specialised its heavy forging equipment technologies through repetitive orders of nuclear 
power equipment from KEPCO and its subsidiary KHNP, beginning in the 2000s. In 
addition, Doosan could put its efforts towards technological diversification into the 
advanced steam turbine and gas turbines with much better financial conditions. It 
invested, for instance in the small gas turbine (5 MW) development programme with 
government sponsorship for technological capacity-building in the mid-2000s, following 
MHI’s MF111 (11 MW) development case in the 1980s. 
 
4.3.2. Nuclear Power Catching-Up Experiences 
Development of the First Korean Standard Reactor 
While Korean equipment and engineering suppliers increased their share of 
nuclear power construction projects in the early 1980s, they witnessed a collapse of the US 
nuclear market due to the effects of the Three Mile Island accident (1979) and stagnation 
in demand for electricity growth. Korea Electric Power Co. (KEPCO) and its subsidiaries 
requested that the Korean government set up nuclear reactor technology indigenisation 
programmes. Subsequently, the Ministry of Energy and Resources (MER) outlined 
guidelines for the indigenisation programme and requested the nuclear-related firms and 
institutes to submit each one’s implementation plan by the end of 1984. KEPCO organised 
a consortium for the programme, namely the Electric Power Group Cooperation Council, 
which included the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), KOPEC, KHIC, the 
Korea Nuclear Fuel Supply, and Hyundai Construction in the year (MER, 1988). 
Furthermore, the Korean consortium exploited aggressively its bargaining power 
in order to achieve its ambitious nuclear technology indigenisation plan. It demanded its 
foreign partners virtually full-scale technology transfer options even at the expense of a 
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longterm relationship. One of the leading engineers of the consortium at that time recalls 
the aggressive catching-up process:  
 
The Master Plan for the Technological Indigenisation of Nuclear 
Power Plants was set up in 1985. It enforced domestic firms as a prime 
contractor in nuclear power construction projects and defined the technology 
transfer list and technology indigenisation schedule, which targeted domestic 
firms’ contribution of up to 95% of overall nuclear power technologies by 
1995. Korea’s government requested foreign licensors through KEPCO to 
transfer the whole technology package of the nuclear steam supply system 
(NSSS) design and equipment in 1985 and the council set up a schedule for the 
indigenisation programme, which planned an increase of local content ratio 
from mere assembly to 95% in the 11th nuclear plant, namely Yonggwang unit 
3, by 1995. 
We initially requested a package deal combining the Yonggwang 
reactor 3&4 construction project with a reactor technology transfer option 
from our licensor, Westinghouse. They answered with a rather cheap 
construction price without a technology transfer option. Then, we contacted 
CE and got an answer with a more expensive reactor construction price than 
the Westinghouse proposal, with a technology transfer option. We chose CE 
as a new licensor, and Westinghouse seemed quite surprised at the sudden 
change of the licence relationship.43 
Indigenisation of 95% means that the Korean HEI firm lacks the technology of the 
reactor coolant pump (RCP), man-machine interface system (MMIS), and reactor core 
 
43 Interview with Byungoo Kim, Professor of Nuclear Engineering at Korea Advanced Institute of 
Science and Technology, Daejon, and a former senior researcher at Korea Atomic Energy 
Research Institute, on 23 March 2011 
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computer codes. Professor Byungoo Kim further explains the background reasons for this 
target of 95% rather than 100%: 
Those three components are the most expensive and difficult 
technologies amongst the nuclear power components. In addition, we did not 
have any demand for RCP and MMIS in power plants other than nuclear 
reactors. Furthermore, a dozen computer codes belong to US national 
laboratories, such as Argonne National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, rather than CE. We may need to localise them in the future. But 
you should keep in mind that we also need well-known foreign firms, such as 
Westinghouse, as a strategic partner in export projects to maximise utilisation 
of their networks in the global market. So, the dependence on the US firms for 
those technologies is not that much negative and even necessary for keeping 
the partnership. 44 
After the abrupt change of licensors, KEPCO and CE made a nuclear technology 
transfer agreement in 1987. The technology transfer based on the global market 
contingency is pronounced among various factors of Korea’s successful indigenisation of 
nuclear technology. Without a virtual collapse of the global nuclear market and the 
subsequent financial crisis of CE in the 1980s, it would not be possible for the Korean HEI 
to get a nearly full scope technology transfer from foreign suppliers. The Korean nuclear 
community, including KHIC, could exploit such a condition by creating a new reactor 
construction contract for the first time after the 1986 Chernobyl accident. In effect, even 
the official review of the Korean MER, which took charge of the nuclear indigenisation 
programme, denied the efficacy of the previous nuclear indigenisation policies, including 
 
44 Interview with Byungoo Kim, op. cit. 
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early education. It points out that ‘previous policies and programmes had been 
fragmented and unsystematic and lacked proper evaluations’ (MER, 1988: 335).45 
In addition to the global market condition, KEPCO’s financial assistance played a 
crucial role during the technology transfer process. Unghan Lee, a former quality control 
manager at several nuclear reactors of KEPCO, explains the contribution of KEPCO’s 
financial mobilisation for all aspects of the reactor technology transfer from the US donors 
to the Korean recipients. His explanation also hints at the extent to which the scope of 
technology transfer could reach as an option of a single commercial nuclear construction 
contract with a financially troubled nuclear vendor, namely CE: 
KEPCO had to subsidise all the technology transfer expenditure on 
behalf of KHIC, KAERI and KOPEC when Yonggwang unit 3&4, the reference 
reactors of Korean Standard Nuclear Reactors, were contracted in 1987. I 
clearly remember that KEPCO offered KHIC 25.5 billion won for reactor 
equipment, 9.8 billion won for turbine/generator, KAERI 28 billion won for 
reactor system design, and KOPEC 26 billion won for plant design. Putting 
the technology transfer expenditure into the contract was a violation of 
regulations on budget & account of KEPCO, in effect. But it was justified by 
government with the rationale that those suppliers would lower the costs of 
design and equipment in the future nuclear power projects, and KEPCO 
would be a major beneficiary. In this way, each of the participant firms could 
send around 200 engineers and staff members to the US for training under the 
supervision of CE, GE and S&L, respectively.46 
In this way, the total expenditure for the PWR indigenisation programme, 
including the actual project cost for Yonggwang reactor 3&4, was US$ 2.5 billion, in 2013 
 
45 It should be noted that most of previous Korean nuclear reactor indigenization programs were 
handled by Science and Technology Agency (STA) 
46 Email interview with Unghan Lee, op. cit.: p. 124 
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dollars. If the reactor construction cost is excluded, the net expenditure for technology 
transfer would be only US$ 0.82 billion, including training costs for Korean participants 
and the transfer commission for CE’s reactor design System 80. Furthermore, the 
technology transfer also brought the inclusion of CE’s new reactor design ‘System80+’ into 
the Korean Next Generation Reactor (KNGR, later the name was changed as APR1400), 
which made Korea’s first nuclear export (Table 4.13).47 
Table 4.13 Public Expenditure for Nuclear Indigenisation in 1986–’95 (in 2013 US$ Million) 
 
Firms Yonggwang 
3&4 Project 
Training & 
Commission 
Foreign 
Licensor 
Sub-
Total 
Design Transfer 
Commission 
KEPCO 
 
605.4 CE 605.4 
Plant Design KOPEC n.a. 63.6 S&L 63.6 
Reactor System & 
Equipment Design 
KAERI 134.5 68.5 CE 203.0 
Reactor Equipment KHIC 
(Predecessor 
of Doosan) 
457.4 62.4 CE 519.8 
Turbine Island 354.7 24.0 GE 378.7 
Balance of Plant 734 n.a. Mixed 734 
Sub-Total 
 
1,680.6 823.9 
 
2,504.5 
Source: Author’s elaboration from an email interview with Unghan Lee, op. cit.: p.124 
 
Development of APR1400 Reactor based on System80+ 
The Korean nuclear industry started to develop its next generation nuclear reactor 
(KNGR) in 1992. During this process, CE supported the KAERI through the inclusion of 
major ‘System80+’ design features into the KNGR design, such as two-loop systems, a 
reactor water storage tank, and a human-system interface. The architecture and 
 
47 When CE made a contract for the Yonggwang 3&4 project with KEPCO, CE applied US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission certification of its new reactor design System80+ in 1987 and received 
the certification in 1997. Although ‘System80+’ reactor was never built in the US market and the 
certification expired 2012, its major design features were applied to the Korean APR 1400 
design (see Section A2. in Appendix Chapter A). 
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engineering (A&E) division of KAERI minuscule into the KEPCO’s subsidiary A&E, 
namely KOPEC, while CE was merged by ABB, the Swedish/Swiss firm, during the 
technology transfer process. Although the technology transfer of ‘System80+’ to Korea 
was officially confirmed by the Technology Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between ABB-
CE and KEPCO in 1997, the main design features of the design were already transferred 
to Korea from the early 1990s.48 
In detail, the TCA between KEPCO and ABB-CE in 1997 consisted of a licence 
agreement (LA), support work agreement for KNGR development programme, and 
business cooperation in the global nuclear market. This 10-year broad agreement created 
a development path for Korean nuclear technologies (KAERI, 2003). In particular, the 
agreement offered KEPCO a blueprint and related data on a newly developed ‘System80+’ 
design by ABB-CE, a base for Korea’s APR1400 reactor design. The LA renewed the 
licence for transferred technologies and guaranteed permanent rights of the licence, while 
agreement on cooperation in technology development and global market business opened 
a window for Korea’s nuclear exports (Ahn & Han, 2000; KAERI, 2003; KHNP, 2013). 
The development process was completed in 2000 and the design was certified by 
the Korean safety regulator in 2002. The first APR1400 reactors were built at Shin-Kori 
site. Total public R&D expenditure for this programme was only 233 billion won, 
equivalent to US$274 million in 2013’s price (MOTIE, 2000b). Even KEPCO’s overall 
financial support for miscellaneous R&D programmes are added, the total R&D 
expenditure is minuscule. For instance, as a major source of nuclear R&D funding in 
Korea, KEPCO spent KRW265.5 billion, equivalent to US$ 313 million in 2013’s price, for 
189 nuclear R&D programmes between 1984 and 1998. 
 
48 Interview with Byungoo Kim, op. cit. 
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Table 4.14 Reactor Technology Transfer from CE Designs to Korean Designs 
American Design Korean Design Indigenisation Period Reference Reactor 
CE System 80 KHNP OPR 1000 1987–1997 Yonggwang 3&4 
CE System 80+ KHNP APR 1400 1992–1999 Shin-Kori 3&4 
Source: MOTIE 2000b; Interview with Byungoo Kim, op. cit.  
After the technology indigenisation programme and subsequent completion of the 
reference reactor (Yonggwang 3&4) and first Korean standardised reactor (Ulchin 3&4) 
construction projects, the KHIC won most of the contracts for main nuclear equipment, 
previously subcontracted to CE. Table 4.15 depicts the gradual progress of KHIC’s status 
from a subcontractor to a main contractor, to virtually a monopoly contractor in continued 
nuclear construction projects. Doosan, a successor of KHIC, also joined in the subsequent 
reactor construction projects as an NSSS equipment supplier from Ulchin 5&6 to APR1400 
reactors. Nevertheless, Doosan’s role has been limited in only NSSS equipment supplier 
rather than an independent reactor vendor due to the lack of capabilities in A&E. 
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Table 4.15 Main Equipment Supply of Pressurised Water Reactors in Korea 
Reactor Capacity 
(MW) 
NSSS 
Contractor 
Turbine/Generator 
Contractor 
Operation 
Kori 1 (Turn-key) 587 WH GEC 1978 
Kori 2 (Turn-key) 650 WH GEC 1983 
Kori 3&4 950x2 WH GEC 1985/’86 
Yonggwang 1&2 950x2 WH WH 1986/’87 
Ulchin 1&2 1,000x2 Framatome Alsthom 1988/’89 
Yonggwang 3&4 1,000x2 KHIC/CE KHIC/GE 1995/’96 
Ulchin 3&4 1,000x2 KHIC/CE KHIC/GE 1998/’99 
Yonggwang 5&6 1,000x2 KHIC KHIC 2002 
Ulchin 5&6 1,000x2 Doosan Doosan 2004/’05 
Shin-Kori 1&2 1,000x2 Doosan Doosan 2010/’11 
Shin-Wolsong 1&2 1,000x2 Doosan Doosan 2011/’12 
Shin-Kori 3&4 † 1,400x2 Doosan Doosan 2016/’18 
Source: Sung and Hong 1999; MOTIE 2015 
†Note: Actual operation of Shin-Kori 3&4 was delayed 3 years, respectively, due to the quality certification 
forgery scandal in 2013 (see p.119-120). 
 
Catching-up Policy Through Electricity Supply Planning 
Government nuclear technology catching-up policies were not limited to public 
R&D and technology transfer contracts. The MER’s intervention in the decision-making 
process of electricity supply planning also played a vital role in the 1980s and 90s. The 
technology transfer process materialised through the Yonggwang 3&4 project, and the 
transferred technology was standardised through the Ulchin 3&4 project in this period. 
Securing investment into the two projects in KEPCO’s energy supply plan was crucial to 
the technology catching-up process and should not be taken for granted given that 
socioeconomic conditions were unfavourable to nuclear power throughout the 1980s. 
Nuclear power, the most capital-intensive energy technology, incurred high 
capital costs to the Korean state, which still heavily depended on external borrowing, 
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whereas its competing technology, namely coal power, enjoyed low coal prices 
throughout the 1980s. In screening public investment projects, the Economic Planning 
Board’s (EPB’s) rates on capital cost, such as the opportunity cost of capital and discount 
rates, were applied as a unified guideline in the decade.49 The application of such rates on 
the electric power supply planning process would easily screen out nuclear power. The 
World Bank, as the biggest lender to Korea at that time, pointed out the Korean the Energy 
Ministry’s practices for nuclear power programmes and their negative implications in the 
1980s: 
 However, for some capital-intensive energy producing or energy 
using projects the opportunity cost criterion has not always been rigorously 
applied due to ‘strategic’ reasons. As the size and capital requirements of these 
projects is large, these exemptions have major macroeconomic consequences, 
crowding-out more productive investments, and increasing the cost of capital 
to other users. Projects in this category include the nuclear power programme, 
expansion of steel-making and oil stockpiling. While the magnitude of these 
investments and their long maturity might warrant a modest deviation from 
an opportunity cost based on current tight capital market conditions, the 
current evidence is that the deviation has been very substantial and thus very 
costly to the national economy (World Bank, 1985: 2, italics added). 
As World Bank stated, the MER decision-makers exempted or modified the 
application of such capital cost rate guidelines in power plant construction programmes 
in the 1980s. By modified application of the discount rate guidelines, deviating from the 
EPB guideline, the MER’s ‘strategic’ intervention was exercised during KEPCO’s 
electricity supply planning processes in the 1980s. There is a snapshot showing how they 
deviated from the guideline for nuclear power programmes. 
 
49 Economic Planning Board (EPB) was a powerful steering government organization for Korean 
state’s economic policy planning and management mostly during the 1970s and 1980s. 
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As the Table 4.16 shows, if MER had applied EPB’s guideline discount rate, 10% 
in the late-1980s, all the nuclear units would have been screened out, favouring coal power 
units in the electricity supply plan, which covered a period from 1990 to 2001. In order to 
secure the nuclear units for technology transfer and standardisation programmes, KEPCO 
applied a favourable discount rate of 8% and then slightly modified the final numbers 
under MER’s supervision. The final planned capacity for nuclear power, 4,700 MW, 
includes Yonggwang 3&4 (2,000 MW) and Ulchin 3&4 (2,000MW) together with a smaller 
CANDU reactor (700 MW) (Jhun, 1991). In this way, the government’s nuclear catching-
up policies have been reflected in the electricity supply plan and have played a crucial 
role in terms of ‘learning by doing’ through repeated construction projects. 
 
Table 4.16 WASP Results and Actual Electricity Supply Planning in 1988 
 
Discount Rate 10% Discount Rate 8% Adjusted Plans 
 
Unit Size 
(MW) 
Unit No. Unit Size 
(MW) 
Unit No. Sub-total 
(MW) 
Share 
Nuclear 0 0 1,000 10 4,700 32% 
Coal 500 27 500 8 8,800 60% 
Oil 500 3 500 2 1,155 8% 
Others 0 0 0 0 2,363 16% 
Total 
    
14,708 100% 
Source: Adapted from Jhun 1991: 238 
Note: WASP stands for Wien Automated System Planning Package. The software system was initially 
developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory to meet IAEA’s requests for the market survey for nuclear 
power in developing countries in the early 1970s (IAEA, 1986). With several updates, the software has been 
used for electric utilities’ power generation capacity expansion planning in various countries. 
 
137 
 
First Nuclear Export Case in 2009 
The Korean nuclear consortium’s award in the UAE’s international nuclear reactor 
bidding in 2009 was shocking news to the global nuclear power market. Considering the 
presence of global frontier nuclear OEMs in the bid, such as Westinghouse/Toshiba, 
AREVA and GE-Hitachi, it was a remarkable catching-up story. The construction project 
of four APR1400 reactor units will be completed by 2020. 
Although the overall contract was led by KEPCO, Doosan was the biggest 
beneficiary of the export contract. Doosan’s NSSS, including a steam generator and reactor 
vessel, has a major share of UAE nuclear projects in terms of economic values. Out of the 
total project price, US$ 18.6 billion, Doosan’s share is the biggest, about US$ 3.9 billion. 
Although Doosan used to export replacement steam generators on an occasional basis, 
mostly to the US market, the UAE project has the major share of the company’s entire 
NSSS export history. Other than Doosan, Samsung and Hyundai took a substantial share of 
the total project as civil engineering firms. Toshiba/Westinghouse also joined as a 
subcontractor of steam turbines and technical consulting for the project after it was 
screened out during the first round of bid. 
Unique aspects of the project were the presence of Toshiba/Westinghouse and 
Korea Power Engineering Company(KOPEC), the Korean A&E firm. Although 
Toshiba/Westinghouse was screened out during the first round of bid, it joined as a 
subcontractor of steam turbines and technical consulting for the project. It is related to 
special licence issues and will be analysed below. Another unusual aspect is that A&E  
contract was given to KOPEC, a subsidiary of KEPCO, rather than Doosan. It shows the 
weakness of the Korean HEI, given that all the global nuclear vendors have their own 
A&Es (Table 4.17). 
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Table 4.17 The Role and Share of Participants in the UAE Nuclear Project 
 Scope Contractors Price 
($Billion) 
Equipment & 
Architecture 
NSSS & steam turbine Doosan (with Toshiba 
as a subcontractor) 
3.9 
Architecture & engineering KOPEC n/a 
Technical assistance & royalties Westinghouse 1.3–2 
Construction EPC KEPCO & KHNP n/a 
Civil engineering Hyundai 3.1 
Samsung 2.5 
Training UAE staff KHNP n/a 
Initial 
Operation 
Nuclear fuel KNF 1 
Operation & maintenance KHNP & KPS 1.2 
Financing Project financing 50 
(failed at finding investors) 
KEPCO n/a 
Source: Berthélemy and Leveque 2011, Ex-Im Bank of the United States 2012 
The success factors of the surprising nuclear export by the Korean consortium 
became a global issue. The most frequently addressed factors are having the cheapest 
price, short construction lead time, and the world’s highest capacity factor (CF) of nuclear 
fleets (Berthélemy and Leveque, 2011; World Nuclear Association, 2011). In particular, 
price and operational performance need to be explained. 
First, regarding the price of the whole nuclear project, KEPCO played a major role 
as a leader of the Korean consortium for the bid. As a domestic monopoly user of Doosan’s 
reactor equipment and as a parent firm to KOPEC, it could effectively exercise its position 
to lower the price. In particular, KEPCO’s de facto monopoly status of all the domestic 
construction firms in the electricity business gave it irresistible power in cutting all the 
 
50 Although KEPCO spent more than five years for seeking funding from private investors, it 
failed to find them. Eventually, the financing problem was resolved by direct loans from UAE 
government and Korean Export-Import Bank in October 2016. 
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engineering and construction prices. It virtually ‘twisted the arms of all the participant 
firms to drastically cut all the prices up to nearly zero-margin level’.51 
Second, its world’s highest capacity factor, above 93% on average in the 2000s, 
reportedly impressed the UAE government. Right after the bid, both the UAE government 
officials and the KEPCO consortium acknowledged that the high capacity factor of Korean 
nuclear fleet was a high priority, along with the project cost and construction lead time 
(World Nuclear Association 2011; Berthélemy & Leveque 2011; Kane & Pomper 2013).52 
Efficacy of the Nuclear Export 
The efficacy of Korea’s first nuclear export could be evaluated based on 
dependence on a foreign OEM, its contract price and future market prospect. First, the 
discounted price, compared to competitors’ bids, other than the capacity factor of Korean 
reactors, was a major success factor of the UAE deal. Its aggressive approach to the bid 
raised criticisms, however. Its lowest price amongst international competitors, which was 
about US$ 18.6 billion—nearly half price of AREVA’s bidding53—would inevitably lead 
nearly to a zero-margin return.54 This lack of profit is more striking when one considers 
that the Korean consortium subcontracted expensive equipment and technology services 
to Toshiba/Westinghouse, equivalent to nearly 10% of the total construction project (US 
Ex-Im Bank, 2012). The expensiveness of the subcontract to Westinghouse/Toshiba comes 
from its licensing relationship. 
 
51 Interview with Chaeyoung Lim, senior nuclear engineering researcher of Korea Atomic Energy 
Research Institute, Daejon, on 21 May 2011 
52 See also Section 4.2.4 for background of the high capacity factor 
53 The Korean consortium’s bid was reported as US$16 billion lower than the AREVA’s bid 
(Arabian Business Newspaper 27 Dec 2009) 
54 Furthermore, global nuclear community warns that any delays of the construction project 
would lead to fatal results (Energy Economist 30 January 2012). Considering the financial 
package which the Korean consortium should deliver, estimated completion costs may be 
closer to US$ 40 billion (Nuclear Intelligence Weekly 20 April 2012, 11 May 2012). 
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In addition, the LA and TCA did not allow technology transfer of computer codes 
for the reactor core and core protection calculator (which belong to the US national nuclear 
laboratories and CE, respectively) to the third party without the permission of 
Westinghouse, which merged ABB-CE. Thus, it is impossible for the KEPCO–Doosan 
alliance to export the APR1400 reactor to potential host countries who request technology 
transfer as a condition, such as China (KAERI, 2003). The UAE nuclear deal that did not 
require a technology transfer was a rather exceptional case, and it may not be replicated 
in the future global nuclear market, at least in the catching-up economies. 
In this concern, the KEPCO–Doosan alliance has developed its own reactor design, 
namely the ‘APR+’ (KAERI, 2003). It also succeeded in putting the first APR+ reactor 
project, constructing two 1,500 MW reactors, in the country’s 7th Basic Plan for Long-term 
Electricity Supply and Demand in 2015 (MOTIE, 2015). As the new government 
announced a moratorium on all the new nuclear power projects in May 2017, however, 
the first APR+ project was also cancelled. Thus, it is difficult to expect the Korean HEI to 
be an independent nuclear supplier from Westinghouse in the global market in the 
foreseeable future. 
After the surprising export contract, the Korean government announced its 
ambitious nuclear reactor export plan in January 2010. The plan includes exporting 80 
nuclear reactors by 2030, which would represent 20% of the global nuclear market by the 
target year and US$ 400 billion in contracts (World Nuclear Association, 2010). It seemed 
that Korean HEI’s three-decade saga was repaid by the export success and prosperous 
future. Whether the future global nuclear reactor market would expand sufficiently 
enough to deliver the Korean government’s export target is doubtful, however. 
Furthermore, catching-up economies in Asia, such as China or India, may soon 
step up from being major nuclear reactor buyers to being suppliers, as they rapidly 
localise nuclear reactor technologies. In other words, the Korean HEI will have to face 
much fiercer competition in the future, with more suppliers from latecomers in a narrow 
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market. For instance, China was regarded by the Korean nuclear industry as a prosperous 
market in the 2000s but now it will be soon a competitor. 
China is virtually a closed market to the Korean nuclear industry, once 
the Chinese nuclear industry decided to standardise its reactors based on 
Westinghouse’s AP1000 and Areva’s EPR designs.55 
The problematic reason is not only matter of design but also main equipment, 
including reactor vessels, steam generators, pressurisers, coolant pumps and reactor 
internals, that why Koreans cannot directly penetrate the Chinese nuclear market. Instead, 
Chinese regional monopoly heavy forging and casting firm, namely China First Heavy 
Industries (CFHI), will do the same job as KHIC (Doosan’s predecessor) did in the Korean 
nuclear construction projects in the 1980s and 90s. Instead, Doosan is transferring know-
how of reactor pressure vessel forgings to CFHI as a part of Westinghouse’s AP1000 
project deal with China. In the beginning, some steam generator and pressure vessel 
forgings for the two Chinese AP1000 reactors were subcontracted to CFHI (World Nuclear 
Association 2015). It will be soon localised by CFHI, however, as new nuclear reactor 
projects continue. 
Although China constructed two units of Canadian CANDU and two units of 
Russian VVER in the early 2000s and started construction of two units of French EPR in 
the late 2000s, the country chose Westinghouse’s AP1000 as a base of its indigenous 
standard reactor in 2007. In the year, Chinese state-owned HEI firms, namely China 
National Nuclear Corporation and China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN), 
and Westinghouse signed a deal to construct four AP1000 units in exchange of technology 
transfer from Westinghouse to the Chinese firms (Freebairn & Hiruo, 2017). As the 
construction projects of AP1000 were delayed a few years and accompanied costs 
increased, the Chinese government arranged the Chinese HEI firms to develop an 
 
55 Interview with Chaeyoung Lim, op. cit. 
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alternative standard reactor, namely HPR1000. As a result, there are no more American, 
Canadian, Russian and French reactors in China’s new nuclear construction plan other 
than HPR1000 and CAP1400, a modified version of AP1000, as of 2019 (Thomas, 2017; 
South China Morning Post, 2019). 
 
4.3.3. Gas Turbine Catching-Up Experiences (1991–2014) 
As briefly discussed in the previous Section, several Korean Chaebols were 
preparing to enter the HEI sector in anticipation of the expiration of entry regulation in 
the early 1990s. The Chaebols put substantial efforts to efficiently catch up on gas turbine 
technology, one of the emerging power- generation technologies, after decade-long entry 
regulations. It should be noted that global gas turbine OEMs have not been eager to 
transfer their technology to the Korean industry, unlike in the case of nuclear technology. 
This reluctance is understandable in that the latter was diminishing and positioned in a 
buyer’s market whereas the former was emerging and positioned in a supplier’s market, 
where only a few suppliers dominate the market with numerous buyers in the world. 
Although HHI and Samsung showed the most active engagement, their strategies 
differed widely. While the former focused on arranging technology cooperation with 
advanced foreign firms through detailed conditions of a gas turbine licence contract, the 
latter focused on R&D projects other than technology licences.56 
Hyundai Heavy Industries was resourceful in maximising technology cooperation 
through a licence relationship. The firm dispatched several directors and managers to 
ABB’s headquarter and its subsidiaries in Zurich to arrange technology cooperation and 
subsequently invited three technical specialists to Seoul. Hyundai Heavy Industries was 
quite successful in arranging the detailed conditions of the licence, such as the automatic 
 
56 Licensed items for KHIC were quite limited in simple components such as casings of gas 
turbines. Thereby, details of the KHIC-GE license relationship are skipped here. 
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inclusion of newly developed or improved technologies and the limitless manufacturing 
of single-cycle gas turbines by HHI. 
Although open-cycle gas turbines are less efficient than CCGTs in a commercial 
sense, the licensing flexibility would offer HHI more chances to learn core technologies. 
The licence contract covered ABB’s Type 8 (46.9 MW), Type 1-EN (81.6 MW) and Type 13-
E (147.2 MW) gas turbines. Other firms, including KHIC and Samsung could not make 
such a flexible technology licence at all (Lee, 1994). 
By comparison, Samsung Aerospace made a gas turbine licence contract with GE, 
which is notorious for restricting technology transfer to its licensee in the global market. 
Due to its arm’s length relationship with GE, Samsung had to find a technology donor 
separately. After unsuccessful negotiations with American, European and Japanese gas 
turbine makers for technical cooperation, Samsung chose a small group of Russian gas 
turbine engineers as a technology partner in 1990. Samsung subsequently invited the 
group, namely SDC Turbine, to its public R&D programme as a technology partner (Kim 
et al., 1994). 
First Public R&D for 1.2 MW Gas Turbine (1991–1998) 
Samsung succeeded in getting government support for a small gas turbine 
(1.2 MW) R&D project, which started in 1991 and finished in 1998. The target of the public 
R&D project was a 1.2 MW emergency-purpose gas turbine and the company’s official 
expenditure was MUS$ 120. One of the main differences of the gas turbine R&D 
programme from that of nuclear power was that a user firm, namely KEPCO, did not join 
in the programme. Also, the emergency power plant market was neither developed nor 
encouraged in Korea in the 1990s. From the user side to a foreign technology donor, the 
programme scheme lacked crucial ingredients in the first place. Sooyong Kim from Doosan 
reviews limits of the programme further as below: 
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 Samsung Aerospace’s mindset was like, ‘Buy out all the best 
components and parts from all over the world and assemble them into a gas 
turbine machine.’ However, that does not work in a gas turbine development 
case and, of course, did not work. Not only integrators but also various 
suppliers, engineers and scientists should work together from the beginning 
for about a quarter-century to develop a gas turbine machine. It is a rather 
cooperative ‘building-up’ process than a simple ‘assembling’ of nice 
components and parts.57 
Figure 4.16 Limited Network for Small Gas Turbine Development Programme in the 1990s 
Rolls-Royce Modelling, 
ONERA specimen 
 Without technology transfer from 
foreign OEMs 
 Without the participation 
of electric utility(KEPCO) 
↓       
Public R&D institutes  Parts Suppliers  Vendor  Users 
KIMM, KIST 
(superalloy R&D) 
 KLW 
(blade casting) 
 Samsung 
Aerospace 
 Undesignated 
(emergency-purpose) 
Source: Interview with Sooyong Kim, op. cit. 
Note: ONERA stands for Office National d’Etudes et de Recherches Aérospatiales, a French national 
aerospace research centre. See Accronym List for others. 
Second Public R&D: Doosan’s Small Gas Turbine Programme (5 MW) (2005–
2011) 
Firm-level efforts have changed since the ownership change of KHIC in 1998. 
Doosan adopted diversified strategies in developing the technological capabilities of gas 
turbines. While it kept a licence relationship with MHI, a new licensor after GE left Doosan 
in 2005, it was developing in-house capability in small gas turbines with technological 
assistance from a jet-engine maker in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) region.58 
 
57 Interview with Sooyong Kim, Head of Gas Turbine Development, Doosan Heavy Industries & 
Construction, Daejon, on 16 March 2011 
58 The engine maker is not presented here due to Doosan’s own confidentiality issue; Ibid.  
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Doosan seems to have pursued a ‘two-track’ strategy as Samsung Aerospace did 
with GE and SDC Turbine in the 1990s. Although Doosan produced some basic parts of 
gas turbines, such as casings, and assembled complete gas turbines under MHI license, it 
pursued its own technology development path independently. The strategy seems 
inevitable in that MHI is not eager to transfer its core parts of gas turbine technology to 
its potential competitor. In effect, Doosan already experienced such licensor’s defensive 
approach under GE’s licence in the past three decades. 
Although we had a cooperative relationship with GE for three 
decades, GE completely shut out the technology transfer option and offered 
us only after-market service with the expensive commission. It happens in 
other countries too. For example, whenever GE Saudi suffers from technical 
problems with gas turbines, it should entirely depend on GE. In addition, GE 
had a negative experience in the steam turbine licence relationship with 
Doosan in the past. When we developed and commercialised steam turbines 
under the GE licence, our share outpaced GE in the Asian steam turbine 
market. That experience seems to have made GE cut off the gas turbine licence 
with us in 2005 to avoid a similar situation in the future.59 
Doosan, in the 2010s, seems to have a better position than Samsung Aerospace had 
in the 1990s in that it already has a licence relationship with MHI, as well as additional 
technology cooperation with a gas turbine maker in the FSU region. In effect, it already 
has done a larger gas turbine development project with a wider range of participants in 
the late 2000s. Doosan’s 5 MW Small Turbine Development Project produced four small 
gas turbines in total, from 2005 to 2011. It is reported that most of the components and 
parts are supplied by local manufacturers, except air compressors. Overall efficiency was 
 
59 Interview with Chunrok Kang, Chief Engineer of Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction, 
Changwon, on 14 March 2011 
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31%, and the emission target was NOx at 25 ppm. About 120 engineers and researchers, 
including 40 from Doosan, participated in the development project. Four universities, 
namely Seoul, Yonsei, Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST) and 
Postech, and parts suppliers, including Samjung Turbine and KEPCO Plant Service & 
Engineering (KPS), participated in the project. 60  It is estimated that a few high-
temperature components of gas turbines were localised by the project (Ahn, 2014) 
Third Public R&D for Large Gas Turbine (2013–2020) 
The Korean government and Doosan Heavy Industries launched the country’s 
third gas turbine technology indigenisation R&D programme in 2013. Initially, the project 
was planned to develop 100 MW (F-class), 37% energy efficiency gas turbines by 2020. 
Also, 70% of the components and parts are to be supplied, 100% designed by the local 
manufacturer. If a secondary cycle is added to the gas turbine, which means a CCGT, its 
total output would be around 200 MW (Ahn, 2014). 
However, there have been criticisms of the initial target during government 
feasibility study processes that even if the project successfully achieves its development 
goals, the technology gap between the Korean latecomer and global frontiers would be 
still around two decades. The criticisms pointed out the efficacy of the 100 MW target in 
the global context, where large gas turbines up to 250 MW were already commercialised. 
Facing the criticisms, the target was enlarged to 250 MW in 2014 (Ahn, 2014). Considering 
the capabilities of Korean HEI that only experienced development of 5MW scale gas 
turbine, the sudden upscaling of the development project target is also questionable. 
Whether the development target is 100MW or 250MW, the Korean HEI will need a close 
and reliable foreign partner. 
In effect, domestic gas turbine makers needed to have a foreign partner as a 
compulsory condition for the bidding eligibility to the public development programme. 
 
60 Interview with Sooyong Kim, op. cit. 
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In the beginning, the technology transfer agreement between Alstom and Samsung 
TechWin seemed imminent. The Samsung consortium gave up the bidding after Alstom 
eventually refused the technology transfer and sold its entire jet engine and small gas 
turbine business to Hanwha, another Korean conglomerate, in 2015, however. In the 
meantime, Alstom’s gas turbine division was sold to Ansaldo Energia, an Italian state-
owned gas turbine maker. In this time, Doosan tried to acquire Ansaldo, but the Italian 
government also refused the deal in 2013 (Korea EXIM Bank, 2014; Meritz Research, 2017). 
Finally, Doosan acquired an American gas turbine repair service firm, namely ACT 
Independent Turbo Services, and secured participation in the development project in July 
2017 (Combined Cycle Journal, 2018). The acquisition of the American specialist by the 
Korean latecomer is rather surprising, given that Doosan had to spend a substantial 
expenditure on the acquisition. The decision is reportedly related to the new Korean 
government, which has openly pledged a virtual moratorium on new nuclear power 
projects in Korea. 
The acquisition may be a rational choice given that it is almost impossible to have 
a gas turbine partner in the position of direct competition in the ever-competitive global 
market. Also, the repair service market is as big as the gas turbine market, considering the 
relatively short lifecycle of major gas turbine components. Doosan could develop its 
technology capabilities based on ‘learning by repairing’ process with its specialist partner. 
It is too early to tell whether Doosan could leap from its current capability to the 
development of such a large gas turbine within a few years, however. There may be more 
serious issues than a foreign partner in the Korean gas turbine market. 
 
Limit of Gas Turbine R&D Efforts and Insufficient Demand for Gas Turbines 
As the global gas turbine market grows and market dominance of oligopolistic 
OEMs is strengthened, the chances of technology transfer to the Korean latecomer are 
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diminishing. Most of the interviewees did not expect a dramatic result from the current 
public R&D programme for the indigenisation of gas turbines. Soo-Yong Kim from Doosan 
also expressed his scepticism on enthusiastic large gas turbine R&D projects in Korea. He 
emphasises that even Doosan’s small-scale gas turbine R&D investment a decade ago was 
a result of very hard decision-making, given the weak gas turbine demand in Korea: 
A large gas turbine R&D project itself does not necessarily help us 
improve technology capability. Gas turbine manufacturer’s own demand and 
conditions should be carefully considered in such a public R&D.61 
A few more interviewees also pointed out the demand condition of gas turbines 
in Korea. In particular, Sungho Lee from KEPRI gave unexpected answers to interview 
questions about the effectiveness of R&D and research networks between gas turbine 
actors in Korea: 
I do not think R&D size or coordination between gas turbine makers, 
public institutes, universities, etc. is the main cause of underperformance in 
gas turbine catching-up in Korea. Of course, we might have better R&D results 
if we had better material science institutes or expensive test-bed 
infrastructures for a demonstration of gas turbines. 
However, that is not my point. I think the real problem is that most of 
the Korean gas turbine stakeholders do not have sufficient incentives and 
demand for developing the gas turbine technologies to a critical stage. For 
instance, we reduced designated gas turbine researchers from 15 to three a 
decade ago. Gas turbines’ contribution to the Korean electricity market is still 
too small for us to invest in human resources and research funding. 
 
61 Interview with Sooyong Kim, op. cit. 
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Particularly, the price of natural gas is too high for gas turbines to compete 
with nuclear or coal power in the Korean market.62 
Haechan kim, a former engineer of the gas turbine division of Hyundai Heavy 
Industries (HHI) also suggests the problem of domestic market demand for gas turbines. 
Notably, HHI was once locked out of the Korean power plant market, from 1998 to 2009, 
due to the second restructuring of the Korean HEI and the temporary monopoly status of 
Doosan from 2000–2009. It did not return to the power plant market after the temporary 
moratorium was lifted, however.  Haechan kim points out weak domestic market demand 
for gas turbines in addition to a mismatch of technical specifications between domestic 
and the global market: 
In the 1990s, we aimed at the domestic gas turbine market. Now, we 
find that current and future domestic market for gas turbines would be too 
small. We also considered the export market as an alternative. But, there is a 
difference in electrical system frequency between domestic and export 
markets; say ours is 60Hz while major gas turbine markets are based on 50Hz. 
So, if we build up our gas turbine technology from 60Hz in the limited home 
market, we may not have a good prospect for the export market either. That 
is why we did not restart the gas turbine business even after the temporary 
monopoly status of Doosan finished.63 
Table 4.18 shows the power generation costs of the major three technologies in 
Korea, as of 2015. The high generation cost of CCGT comes mainly from high natural gas 
prices. The big gap between CCGT and the other two technologies limits its position in a 
 
62 Interview with Sungho Lee, Senior Researcher of Green Energy Laboratory, Korea Electric Power 
Research Institute, Daejon, on 16 January 2013. 
63 Interview with Haechan Kim, a former engineer of the gas turbine division of Hyundai Heavy 
Industries (HHI) and a general manager of Hyundai Electric, Changwon, on 15 March 2011.  
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specific market segment, such as peak-load power generation (see Section 4.2.4 for the 
background of natural gas price). 
Table 4.18 Economic Status of CCGT in the Korean Power Market (2015) 
 
Nuclear 
(1,400 MW) 
Coal 
(1,000 MW) 
CCGT 
(900 MW) 
Construction Cost (KRW 1,000/KW) 2,378 1,449 904 
Construction Lead Time (months) 75 58 27 
Power Generation Cost (KRW/kWh) 44.6 58.6 103.7 
Source: MOTIE/KPX 2015, Background Material for the 7th Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity Supply and 
Demand 
Note: Capacity factor (CF) of all power generation technologies is assumed 80%. 
4.3.4. Institutions of Korean Heavy Electrical Industry 
Virtual Monopoly Status of Doosan 
The repeated monopolisation of the HEI in 1980 and 1998, and the miscarriage of 
privatisation in 1989 locked out the Korean Chaebols from the HEI market. Although three 
famous Chaebols prepared to enter into the market, including investment on production 
equipment, contracting foreign licences, and inviting foreign specialists, they had to hand 
over their production assets to the state-owned KHIC or give up their market entrance to 
the privatised monopoly of Doosan. 
The repeated deprivations of foreign channels, human and physical assets for HEI 
technologies made the Chaebols completely give up the market, even after the temporary 
monopoly status of Doosan expired in 2010. Although Hyundai and Samsung still 
participate in power plant construction projects, they are concerned predominantly with 
construction engineering. Therefore, Doosan exercises de facto monopoly status in the 
Korean HEI market without worrying too much about its domestic competitors. 
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Heavy Dependence on the Korea Electric Power Company 
Doosan’s dependence on the KEPCO, the state-owned monopoly of the ESI, is two-
fold. First, KEPCO and its subsidiary firms have been major channels of power plants 
construction orders to Doosan. Although three IPPs entered into the Korean electricity 
market in the early 2000s, their market share remains tiny. Thus, KEPCO’s technology 
choice and subsequent construction orders have been decisive in developing and 
maintaining Doosan’s technological capabilities. 
Second, Doosan has depended on KEPCO for A&E since the privatisation and has 
focused on the design and manufacturing of subsystems and power plant equipment. The 
unconventional division of labour was arranged by government in the early 1980s in 
consideration of the limited capabilities of KHIC, Doosan’s predecessor. As an A&E 
subsidiary of KEPCO, the Korea Power Engineering Company (KOPEC) developed 
system designs of Korea’s standard reactors, including OPR1000 and APR1400, and coal 
power plants, while Doosan started to develop its own gas turbine design capabilities in 
the early 2000s. This arrangement offers a cost-down effect of Korean nuclear reactors, 
while it also shows inherent weaknesses in the Korean HEI as a rector vendor. 
Arm’s Length Relationship With Foreign Licensors 
The Korean HEI has maintained neither long-term nor close relationships with 
foreign licensors in both nuclear and gas turbine technologies. Although it succeeded in 
contracting of technology transfer of PWRs from CE in the mid-1980s, it was rather a result 
of ‘linking and leveraging’ that switched its licence partner from Westinghouse to the 
financially troubled American firm rather than a close relationship. After a series of 
amalgamations of CE by ABB in 1989, by British Nuclear Fuel Ltd. (BNFL-Westinghouse) 
in 1999, and by Toshiba-Westinghouse in 2006, the Korean HEI and KEPCO had to meet 
Westinghouse as a licensor again. Doosan maintained a rather limited licence relationship 
with Westinghouse in component equipment of NSSS (KAERI, 2003). 
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By comparison, arm’s length relationships with foreign gas turbine OEMs could 
be explained by foreign licensors’ choices. General Electric’s typical attitude in gas turbine 
technologies is to keep some distance from its licensees and prevent technology transfer 
all over the world.64 Once GE left Doosan after a dispute over the Asian steam turbine 
market, MHI (the Japanese gas turbine OEM) became a gas turbine licensor of Doosan in 
mid-2005. 
However, MHI also tends to keep its distance from Doosan regarding technology 
transfer issues. Instead, the two firms have agreed to have a rather gradual technology 
cooperation programme in proportion to gas turbine delivery performances in the Korean 
and the export market. For instance, the two firms would start the technology cooperation 
programme only after delivery of a certain number of gas turbines in Korean and foreign 
export markets.65 Whether the technology belongs to the diminishing market (nuclear) or 
the emerging market (gas turbine), a long-term and close licensing relationship does not 
seem to fit with the Korean HEI. 
 
4.3.5. Supporting Industries 
Precision Casters for Gas Turbine Development 
Precision casters comprise an important supporting industry to gas turbine maker, 
given that a new gas turbine design comes from a cooperative development process 
between precision casters and gas turbine makers. Although there were around 45 small 
and medium-sized precision casting firms, two-thirds of them hired less than 50 
employees in 1990s’ Korea, and actively involved firms numbered only 31. Of them, 90% 
 
64 Interview with Sooyong Kim, op. cit.  
65 Detail numbers are not presented here due to Doosan’s confidentiality issue; Interview with 
Chunrok Kang, op. cit. 
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were focused on specialty steel and steel casting products, irrelevant to gas turbines or jet-
engine blades and vanes. A few exceptional firms produced aluminium alloy and copper 
alloy casting products, but their quality was still far from that of gas turbine parts, which 
mostly depend on nickel-base superalloy casting products. With underdeveloped 
technological capabilities, they had to compete only with the low-end products market 
(Lee et al., 1993). 
While advanced economies’ jet-engine and industrial gas turbine manufacturers 
offer large demand for precision casting products, the Korean gas turbine market does not 
offer precision casters for such large domestic demand. It is not strange that Korean 
precision casters did not have commercial technological capabilities for such purposes 
until the 1990s. Instead, the Korean precision casters are reported to have focused on basic 
technological capabilities, including i) reducing lead time through making ‘fast pattern’ 
with appropriate price and quality, ii) systematic process simulation technology on 
casting process factors of solidification, iii) equipment design capability for improving 
process efficiency (Choi et al., 2011). Table 4.19 shows all the material which the 31 firms 
use for their precision casting business (Lee et al., 1993). 
Table 4.19 Major Products of Precision Casters in the 1990s’ Korea 
Product Metals No. of Firms % (No. of Firms/Total Response) 
Specialty Steel 
Cast Steel 
Cast Iron 
Aluminium-Base Alloy 
Cu-Base Alloy 
28 
22 
1 
9 
6 
90% 
71% 
3% 
29% 
19% 
Source: Lee et al. 1993  
Note: The Table shows a result of multiple choices by the casting firms in an industrial survey in 1992 
Nevertheless, a few Korean precision casters did catch up to the basic level of 
technology for modern gas turbine equipment. One of them was Korea Lost Wax (KLW), 
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a small firm that started with only 40 employees.66 Initially, it was established as a Korea-
Japanese joint firm in 1979, making engine parts for Japanese industrial sewing machines. 
Seafoong Chang, the founder of KLW and a former manager of a construction firm who 
was personally fascinated with Korean traditional casting technologies, started to learn 
rather simple precision parts technologies, such as valves, from the Japanese partner 
Hayashi Lost Wax and sent several employees to Japan for training.67 
Once it built its own production capability and performed at a lower error rate 
than its Japanese partner, it shifted its attention from sewing machines to larger and 
advanced markets. It introduced the first vacuum induction melting furnace (VIM) in 
Korea in 1988. The VIM is needed for high-end precision casting processes, mostly used 
for parts of jet engines and gas turbines. The ‘vacuum’ condition of the equipment offers 
a superior environment for removing impurities such as oxygen and nitrogen contents 
from the casting process, which air melting processes for commodity steel products, such 
as the EAF, cannot match. 
It was surprising news to other Korean casting companies since there 
was not such a high-end market in Korea at that time. There were rumours 
that KLW would go into bankruptcy due to the financial burden of the 
expensive VIM equipment. But the decision-making of our CEO proved an 
excellent choice later.68 
After the introduction of VIM, it established its own technology research centre in 
1989 and started to invest in in-house R&D with an annual research expenditure of about 
 
66 The firm’s unique name came from a typical precision cast technique, called ‘lost wax’, which 
shapes ceramic mould for various complex 3-dimension shape products. 
67 Interview with Byungmoon Chang, director of Korea Lost Wax Technology Research Center, 
Sihwa Industrial Complex, on 7 & 8 March 2011. 
68 Ibid. 
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10% of its revenues. It aimed at precision casting technology including, jet-engine parts 
for aeroplanes. After several years, the small firm surprised the Korean defence 
equipment market by winning a precision casting subcontract from Pratt & Whitney for 
the ‘Korean Fighter Jet Project’, which selected F-16 air fighters, over Daewoo Precision 
Engineering, a subsidiary of the prominent Daewoo Chaebol, in 1992. Its investment into 
new production equipment and in-house R&D had paid off.69 
When we attended the bidding process, we brought a sample of engine 
parts while Daewoo Precision Engineering brought with only a blueprint. I 
openly argued to the government examiners that even if there had been Kim 
Woojung, the CEO of Daewoo Chaebol at that time, in the bidding venue he 
would choose KLW rather than the Daewoo subsidiary firm.70 
In the following years, it acquired quality certification for the Turbine Air Seal on 
PW4000 engines from Pratt & Whitney (P&W), system approvals from Bell Helicopter and 
GE Aerospace, respectively. It took advantage of technical assistance from P&W until 
2001, as well. It also developed its technological capability in gas turbine blades and vanes 
from the manufacturing of foreign OEM products, such as aero-derivatives of GE, namely 
the LM2500, in the 1990s (Korean Institute of Metals and Materials, 1994). Thanks to the 
accumulated experiences with major jet-engine OEMs, it now supplies blades and vanes 
for various commercial aeroplanes of Airbus and Boeing. 
Regarding land-based gas turbines, it defeated another Chaebol firm, Samsung 
Aerospace (a predecessor of Samsung TecWin), in a competitive bid for KEPCO’s gas 
turbine blade repair contract in the early 2000s. It was a remarkable achievement, since 
the small firm, with only around 150 employees at that time, performed in the project with 
 
69 Interview with Byungmoon Chang, op. cit. 
70 From a TV interview of Hanvit Broadcasting (a Korean local cable channel) with Seafoong 
Chang, the CEO of KLW, aired on 30 June 2014 
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higher production quality than Samsung Aerospace.71 In effect, the repair market for gas 
turbine blades and vanes is sizeable. Subsidiary GENCOs of KEPCO and Korean private 
IPPs operated 124 gas turbines altogether, as of 2010. They paid KRW 160 to 180 billion 
annually, around US$140–160 million in 2013 price, for repair and replacement of gas 
turbines blades and vanes to foreign gas turbine suppliers in the early 2010s. The 
replacement cost is large for the operators, given that the cost is equivalent to the price of 
four gas turbine units (Ahn, 2014). 
As foreign OEM’s superalloy technologies for gas turbine blades and vanes were 
continuously improved with superior materials and higher turbine inlet temperature, the 
cost of repair and replacement of the components also rapidly increased. Thus, KLW’s 
involvement in the repair market is important for the overall catching-up strategy of the 
Korean gas turbine community, especially when domestic HEI, namely Doosan, and other 
precision casters could not meet the quality requirements (KEPRI, 2003). 
For instance, starting in the early 2000s, foreign gas turbine OEMs began to 
exercise predatory measures to lock out Korean precision casters from domestic gas 
turbine maintenance business, including repair and replacement of blades and vanes. 
Considering that one of the main catching-up strategies of KLW has been reverse 
engineering, it is not surprising that the firm is vulnerable to lawsuits on IPR 
infringement. Although the interviewee did not confirm whether there was an actual IPR 
lawsuit case against KLW, he mentioned there have been informal threats of a lawsuit 
from a foreign OEM.72 Also, the foreign OEMs started to apply long-term (typically more 
than five years) exclusive maintenance contracts at a discounted price with Korean gas 
turbine users, including IPP and KEPCO’s subsidiary GENCOs. At times, the Korean 
precision casters are faced with sudden upgrades of gas turbines blades and vanes by the 
 
71 Interview with Byungmoon Chang, op. cit. 
72 Ibid. 
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foreign OEMs after the Korean firms localise existing blades and vanes. Byungmoon Chang 
explains an example: 
In some years of the 2000s, we developed D, E and N class blades and 
vanes through a collaborative development programme with KEPCO and our 
products were installed in one of GENCOs’ CCGTs. After two years of 
commercial operation, however, the OEM suddenly upgraded the gas turbine 
with a different configuration set of D & E-class blades and vanes from 
existing 115 blades configuration to 85 blades. The OEM upgraded the gas 
turbine at a nearly zero-margin price. Instead, it shared the increased revenue 
from the improved fuel efficiency of the gas turbine with the GENCO in each 
year. Then, the D and E blade technologies we developed were 
instantaneously abandoned in the Korean market.73 
Although Korean precision casters tried to make a link with a new technology 
source from advanced countries in order to improve its technology base of precision 
casting, soon they realised there is a tremendous hurdle to do so. Two Korean precision 
casters, for instance, tried to negotiate a cooperative development of the technology with 
advanced foreign precision casters such as Howmet and the Precision Castparts 
Corporation (PCC) in the US in the mid-1990s. Both failed to do so, however, owing to 
unacceptably high-technology commission requests (Korea Institute of Machinery and 
Materials, 1998). The frustration of ‘technology donor searching’ efforts amongst Korean 
precision casters was not only a matter of technology commission but also a matter of 
strategic control of the US Department of Defence. Bumsoo Kim from the Korea Electric 
Power Research Institute (KEPRI) suggests the background reason: 
 
73 Names of the CCGT, the OEM, and the year of development are not presented here due to the 
firm’s confidentiality issue; Interview with Byungmoon Chang, op. cit. 
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The refusal of the cooperative development request should not be 
misunderstood as a mere problem of technology commission. In effect, those 
US precision casters are involved in jet-engine development programmes for 
the US Department of Defence. Most of their contracts with foreign firms are 
strictly regulated by the US government with a concern of technology transfer 
to foreign countries. It is highly probable that their refusal to the request has 
been already decided from the beginning.74 
Nevertheless, KLW developed precision casting technology for ‘501F class’ gas 
turbine’s blades and vanes through its in-house efforts along with a recent public R&D 
programme in 2013 (see Section 4.3.6). It was a crucial achievement in that KLW upgraded 
its precision casting technologies from outmoded equiaxed, or conventional casting (CC), 
to directionally solidified (DS). Although DS technology does not match with single 
crystal (SC) technology of the global frontier OEMs, such as GE, it implies KLW’s 
competitive capabilities given that one of the three global OEMs, namely MHI, still applies 
DS technology to its gas turbines from F-class to latest J-class versions (Figure 4.17). 
 
74 Interview with Bumsoo Kim, a senior researcher of Korea Electric Power Research Institute, 
Daejon, on 10 March 2011 
159 
 
Figure 4.17 Korea Lost Wax’s Directionally Solidified Blades 
Source: Courtesy of Korea Lost Wax 
However, its involvement in the domestic gas turbine market has been effectively 
locked-out by conservative domestic users, namely KEPCO’s GENCO subsidiaries. The 
public ownership of the GENCOs and tight business regulations prevent them from 
applying the not-yet-commercialised blades to their gas turbines. If the blades cause 
damage to GENCOs’ gas turbines, for instance, the tight business regulations, including 
public enterprise management evaluation system, would punish the managers of 
GENCOs. Thus, KLW inevitably gave up the domestic market and shifted to foreign niche 
markets, such as the Middle East region. Although it has already delivered several sets of 
blades and vanes to the Middle East region, the market size is quite limited. 75 
 
75 Interview with Byungmoon Chang, the director of KLW Technology Research Centre, Sihwa 
Industrial Complex, on 8 September 2017. Details of the importing countries and the power 
companies are not presented here due to KLW’s confidentiality issue. 
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Thereby, KLW does not get enough benefit from its ‘home market’ despite its 
relatively advanced capabilities, compared to its HEI partner and other precision casters 
in Korea. This situation originates from the limited role of gas turbines in the Korean 
electricity supply market. Given that the domestic price of natural gas fuel for gas turbines 
has been kept high by KOGAS, the state-owned monopoly wholesale natural gas firm, gas 
turbines have always been regarded as a peak-load technology. Daily start and stop (DSS) 
operations are known to dramatically reduce the life cycle of gas turbine equipment and 
increased the cost of gas turbine further. Thus, a vicious circle between high natural gas 
prices, unstable operation, additionally increased cost of gas turbine generation, and state-
ownership of GENCOs has limited the overall demand of gas turbine in Korean electricity 
market (see Section 4.3.4 for the background and Section 4.4.2 for the effect). In this regard, 
KLW’s efforts to catch-up advanced blade precision casting technologies have been 
effectively suppressed, and it could not enter the commercialisation stage of decent 
precision casting technologies in the domestic market. 
 
Specialty Steel Firms for Steam Generator Tubes Supply 
Since the Yonggwang 3&4 project was completed in 1995, the Korean monopoly 
HEI firm, KHIC, and later its successor Doosan, started manufacturing NSSSs, including a 
reactor pressure vessel, pressuriser, steam generator and main pipelines for nuclear 
power plants under the licence of ABB-CE (KAERI, 1994). 76 KHIC and its specialty steel 
suppliers, such as Sami, recognised the necessity of localisation of the steam generator 
tubes, which account for nearly 50% of the total steam generator price. While there have 
been a few stainless-steel seamless pipe and tube manufacturers, such as Sami, in Korea, 
 
76 Combustion Engineering went into near bankruptcy due to collapse of nuclear power plant 
market in the US and was sold out to ABB in 1989. 
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nuclear steam generator tubes made of superalloys need more complex process 
technologies, which cover 27 process stages. 77 
Only a few Korean firms including Sami, Kia Specialty Steel, and Seoul Steel 
produced specialty steels in the 1970s. Pohang Steel Co. (POSCO), the biggest Korean 
steelmaker based on BOF or an integrated mill, also started a specialty steel business in 
the late 1970s for products suitable for mass production. The four firms kept production 
and development activities until the late 1990s. At this time, only material products for 
nuclear equipment which Korean specialty steelmakers could supply were limited to 
forging products, plates and some pipes. They did not have the manufacturing 
technology, such as vacuum re-melting, for steam generator tubes, which have a 1 mm 
wall thickness and about a 10 mm diameter. The country has had to depend on imported 
Japanese seamless pipes and tubes. For example, 78% of the imported pipe and tube 
products in 1992 came from Japan (Sami Specialty Steel, 1995). 
In the meantime, Sami joined in a public R&D programme for steam generator 
tube indigenisation under supervision of KAERI from 1993. Although it succeeded in 
developing alloy 600 steam generator tubes for a test purpose in the mid-1990s, it could 
not commercialise the products. After the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s, the four 
were reduced to two, namely POSCO and Sea Vesteel. Except POSCO, the three Korean 
specialty firms were not well equipped with finance and technology enough to survive 
the crisis. Sami also went into bankruptcy due to its massive investment in new factories 
abroad when the country faced the crisis. After the bankruptcy, Sami became Changwon 
Specialty Steel as a subsidiary of POSCO. While it had certain capabilities in 
manufacturing seamless pipes in general, it could not commercialise high-value products, 
such as steam generator tubes. Seamless pipes are the pipes without any welding parts to 
reduce the chance of degradation. Although steam generator tubes can be categorised in 
 
77 Interview with Sunkyo Jung, former Director of Technology Development Department, KEPCO 
Nuclear Fuel, Daejon, on 23 January 2015. 
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the seamless pipe products, the tubes need additional characteristics to withstand high 
temperatures and highly corrosive environments, such as nuclear power coolant systems. 
Despite continued efforts to develop the tubes under government-sponsored R&D 
programmes, it could not commercialise it even in the 2000s. 
Although Doosan, successor of KHIC, has evolved as one of the global suppliers of 
pressure vessels and steam generators in major nuclear power markets such as China and 
the US, it should depend on foreign firms, such as Sandvik from Sweden, Sumitomo from 
Japan, and Valinox from France, for its steam generator tubes supply. All efforts by the 
specialty steel firm to localise manufacturing technologies of the tubes failed as of 2018. 
 After repeated failure to commercialise through government-sponsored R&D 
programmes, the development role was shifted in 2011 from KAERI to KEPCO’s 
subsidiary nuclear fuel supplier, KNF. It planned to commercialise the tube by 2017. The 
KNF was already familiar with similar types of products such as nuclear fuel rod 
claddings, made of zirconium alloy with thin walls. Since the firm already developed the 
claddings, which also needed to withstand high temperature and high corrosive 
environments, it expected that it could also develop steam generator tubes.78 
Nevertheless, it seems that it is still far from commercialisation success in that its 
initial foreign partner, Sumitomo Metal from Japan, scrapped a KNF-Sumitomo joint-
venture production plan when the Japanese firm decided to cease to expand its 
production capacity in 2012. Sumitomo Metal’s cancellation of the plan came from a 
discouraging market forecast that the global demand for steam generator tubes would 
stagnate after the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011.79 
 
78 Interview with Sunkyo Jung, op. cit. 
79 Ibid. 
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4.3.6. Public Programmes for the Supporting Industries 
Public R&D on Precision Casting for Gas Turbine Blades 
In contrast to the electric-intensive commodity metal industries, specialised metal 
industries in Korea have been suffering from weak institutions. Although there have been 
repeated development efforts from the early 1990s through to the end of the 2000s, public 
R&D programmes on the specialised metal technologies have failed to indigenise both the 
gas turbine blade precision casting and nuclear power’s steam generator tube quenching. 
It is the Korean Institute of Science & Technology (KIST) that started superalloy 
R&D in 1979, under a government grant without any gas turbine and superalloy industry 
in Korea. The development programme was carried out based on the computer aided 
design method developed by Japanese researchers. The KIST developed several cast 
superalloys for turbine blade applications through benchmarking of the Japanese 
analytical technique. However, the research efforts could go no further when there was 
not enough industrial demand for superalloys and government initiatives in Korea. 
After a decade, the Korean superalloy development programme restarted in 1992 
under the government-sponsored Highly Advanced National project. It was inter-twined 
with the Korea Fighter Project, which offered an ‘offset project’ to domestic precision 
casters such as KLW in the early 1990s, as explained in the Section 4.3.5. Through this 
opportunity, KLW could develop its production capability in gas turbine blade precision 
casting. In addition, KLW participated in a cooperative public R&D project for the 
development of 501F Class gas turbine blades and vanes in 2009, and reportedly 
developed blades and vanes for the demonstration purpose (KETEP, 2014; MKE, 2009). 
Nevertheless, the developed blade precision casting technology could not be 
commercialised in both of new gas turbine and gas turbine repair markets, owing to 
Doosan’s inferior capability in modern gas turbines and foreign OEMs’ new strategy in the 
repair market, respectively. 
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Although certain Korean precision casters and public research institutes continued 
to invest effort into localising gas turbine blades and vanes in the 2000s, such investment 
has hardly achieved fruitful results. One of the main reasons for the unsatisfactory results 
arises from the tendencies of global gas turbine OEMs, which still have their business 
merits in the gas turbine repair and parts replacement market as much as the new gas 
turbine market and use their certification for quality assurance as an obstacle to 
discourage latecomers from catching-up on parts technology and mass production. 
Unfortunately, most of the Korean public institutes and manufacturers have focused on 
the development of prototype blades and vanes, without the concept of certificates 
established by the global OEMs.80 The certification issue reminds that there is a substantial 
limitation in public R&Ds on the gas turbine blades without a close relationship between 
domestic HEI firm and foreign licensors. 
Public R&D Programmes on Steam Generator Tube Technologies 
Sami and KAERI launched a collaborative R&D project on alloy materials for 
steam generator tubes in 1993. Their research reports in 1994 and 2002 show successful 
results with prototype steam generator tubes based on outmoded alloy 600, and alloy 690 
materials, respectively. Neither prototype tube produced any fruitful results in terms of 
commercialisation, however, due to reliability and complex manufacturing process issues. 
In 2011, the leading role of the development project was shifted to the KNF. Since the 
nuclear fuel manufacturer succeeded in indigenisation nuclear fuel cladding and since the 
cladding has a small-diameter seamless pipe shape similar to steam generator tubes, the 
developers have the optimistic prospect of successful indigenisation by 2017 (KAERI, 
1994; KETEP, 2008; Park CH, 2013). 
 
80 Interview with Byungmoon Chang, op. cit.: p.159 
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 Sectoral Institutions of ESI and Catching-Up 
Performances 
4.4.1. Sectoral Institutions of ESI and Nuclear Power Catch-up 
The Korean case shows that the core institutions of the ESI have shaped the 
successful catch-up of nuclear power technologies. First, the state-owned monopoly status 
of KEPCO played a crucial role in the nuclear technology transfer process. Its abrupt 
change of the technology links from the incumbent licensor, namely Westinghouse, to 
financially troubled CE in achieving the technology transfer contract and the package deal 
of technology transfer from NSSS to A&E demonstrate a dramatic aspect of ‘linking and 
leveraging’ of the Korean nuclear latecomers. The swift financial mobilisation of KEPCO 
for supporting all the process of the technology transfer from reactor blueprints to the 
overseas training programmes of all the Korean subcontractors also shows the crucial role 
of the state-owned ESI firm. 
Second, the tight business regulations secured preconditions for ‘learning by 
repetition’ of constructing the same design reactor and the rapid indigenisation and 
standardisation of the transferred reactor technology. Energy ministry’s alteration of the 
long-term electricity supply plan deviating from the national guideline of public 
investment and its stiff regulations of electricity pricing for specific electricity-intensive 
industries, which induced constant growth of base-load demand, has established essential 
preconditions for continuous new reactor orders. The remarkable learning performance 
of the HEI firm (KHIC), public nuclear research institute (KAERI) and A&E subsidiary 
(KOPEC) during the short-term standardisation process cannot be explained only by the 
firms’ ‘absorptive capability’ without the tight business regulations on the ESI. 
Third, even after the rapid standardisation, tight business regulations enabled the 
first nuclear export case in 2009. The monopoly status of the ESI allowed the cheapest 
bidding in the international competition for the UAE nuclear project by ‘twisting arms’ of 
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all the Korean subcontractors to lower overall prices down to nearly zero margins. The 
Korean subcontractors had to follow KEPCO’s command and control in the project to 
guarantee participation in future projects at the monopolised home market. In this way, 
the tight business regulations on the ESI more than offset the weak capability of the 
Korean HEI firm in the whole nuclear catching-up process. 
 However, repeated failures in indigenisation of steam generator tubes show the 
weakest link of the ecosystem of the Korean nuclear latecomers. Although there have been 
repeated public R&D programmes for more than two decades, the specialised suppliers 
could not follow the nuclear catching-up trajectory. The steam generator tubes should 
withstand the most vulnerable area of PWRs, namely pressure boundary, in which highly 
corrosive conditions and the large pressure differential between primary and secondary 
coolant loops are pronounced. It reveals the limits of the role of firm-level capability in 
explaining Korea’s nuclear catching-up success. 
On the other hand, loose safety regulation and practices contributed to the world-
record operating performance of Korean nuclear fleets in the 2000s. The regulatory 
response to the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event and continued lax oversight 
of nuclear equipment transactions were shown as evidence. The operating performance 
became one of the primary track records in the UAE nuclear export case. It is difficult to 
expect, however, that the world-record operating performance would sustain facing 
strengthened regulatory practices, which are the aftermath of the Fukushima accident. 
Besides the weakness of Doosan, the KEPCO–Doosan alliance needs to solve a more 
serious issue to become an independent nuclear supplier in the global market. The 
technology of APR1400 reactors is not free from Westinghouse’s intellectual property of 
‘System80+’ design. The issue became self-evident in the UAE export case, in which the 
KEPCO consortium offered a subcontract of technology consulting with a huge 
commission to Toshiba/Westinghouse despite such tight price-cutting efforts for the 
bidding. To become a completely independent vendor from the Westinghouse 
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technology, the KEPCO–Doosan alliance developed its own reactor design, namely ‘APR+’ 
(see Section 4.3.2.).81 The Korean ESI-HEI alliance will need to secure another series of a 
new construction project to commercialise the new design in the Korean market under 
increasingly strict safety regulations, however. 
4.4.2. Sectoral Institutions of ESI and CCGT Catching-Up 
Although there have been continued catching-up efforts including repeated R&D 
programmes and technology transfer negotiations with foreign gas turbine OEMs by 
Korean HEI and its supporting industries, ESI’s institutions heavily constrained their 
efforts. The same tight business regulations and loose environmental regulations that 
offered favourable conditions to nuclear power have limited the CCGT catching-up 
efforts. The tight business regulations, including the gas fuel contracts of KEPCO, and the 
loose environmental standards and regulatory practice on coal power effectively limited 
overall demand of gas turbine in Korea in terms of new orders and operation. 
Furthermore, Korean CCGTs suffered from more maintenance problems since 
their role in the Korean electricity market was limited in the peak-load power source and 
thereby had to repeat ‘start-up and stop’ daily. This frequent repetition of start-up and 
stop severely degraded thermal parts and reduced the life cycle of CCGTs. Ironically, 
CCGTs’ superior technological aspects and superior load-following ability made the 
technology more expensive and unattractive in the Korean electricity supply market. 
It is quite different from other countries’ cases, where CCGTs are utilised as a base-
load, or intermediate-mode at least. Although it is CCGTs’ technological competitiveness 
that can meet peak load on short notice, too frequent involvement in responding to peak 
loads deteriorated its components much earlier than its designed life in Korea. For 
 
81 However, recent political events, such as the newly electred Korean government’s moratorium 
on all new nuclear projects in 2017, have made commercialisation of the new design impossible 
in the foreseeable future. 
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instance, several life-cycle analyses of gas turbines report that the lifecycles of gas turbine 
blades in the DSS mode are less than a quarter of those in a load-following mode, which 
is a typical operation mode of gas turbines in competitive electricity markets (Isaiah et al., 
2015, 2016). 
Table 4.20 Share of Start and Stop Mode by Technology in the 1990s Korea82 
Technology DSS WSS Low load 
Operation 
Total 
Nuclear Power83 None None None None 
Coal Power None 3% 9% 3% 
Heavy Oil Power 23% 31% 34% 28% 
CCGT 77% 26% 17% 43% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: KEPCO, 1992. 
Although there is a warranty of ‘equivalent operating hours’ by CCGT OEMs, gas 
turbine blades are reported to show much shorter lifetimes than the warranty duration 
when they are operated under peak-load mode or cycling mode. Sungho Lee from KEPRI 
interpreted the same phenomena below: 
Most of the CCGTs imported by KEPCO and its subsidiaries in the 1990s and 
2000s were designed for base-load or intermediate purposes by global OEMs. 
However, CCGTs in Korea have mainly operated in a peak-load mode. The 
‘daily start and stop or DSS’ mode caused gas turbine components, such as 
turbine blades, to deteriorate in less than half of their designed life cycle. To 
repair and replace the damaged blades and related parts over around 120 
CCGTs, the Korean operators should pay nearly the equivalent of 3 to 4 gas 
turbines to the foreign OEMs every year. This mismatch between technical 
 
82 DSS stands for daily start and stop, whereas WSS stands for weekly start-up and stop. 
83 Nuclear power’s case was added by the author for readers’ understanding. 
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specifications of imported CCGTs and operational modes of the Korean 
utility, in addition to high gas fuel price, alienated CCGTs from the Korean 
electricity market.84 
Thus, the economic life cycle of CCGTs in Korea is 20 years, whereas it is 40 years 
in other countries, such as the US and Japan (Cho, 2008; IEA, 1998). The mismatch between 
the imported base-load purpose CCGTs and DSS mode practice in the Korean market is 
confirmed by a Korean IPP. 
We had a dispute with a foreign OEM about our gas turbines over the 
responsibility of turbine blade replacement cost a few years ago. The supply 
contract guarantees that effective lifecycle of the first stage blades meets 25,000 
equivalent operating hours and is extended another 25,000 hours after 
inspection and repair processes. During the inspection, however, the blades 
were so severely damaged that we could not extend the lifecycle at all. 
Although the supplier should take the cost burden of replacement according 
to the contract, the OEM pointed out the frequent ‘daily start and stop’ 
operation practices of CCGTs in the Korean electricity market as an 
exceptional cause of the unusual early degradation. After a negotiated 
resolution of the dispute, we paid 50 per cent of the replacement cost.85 
The mismatch between CCGTs and the Korean electricity market does not end 
here. The premature degradation of gas turbine blades and subsequent disputes led to 
foreign OEMs to lock into the repair and replacement service market, in which Korean 
precision casters could learn foreign technologies and develop their own capabilities. The 
deputy director of the Korean IPP explains this new situation. 
 
84 Interview with Sungho Lee, op. cit. 
85 Interview with a deputy director of a Korean Independent Power Producer on 15 May 2015. 
Due to the firm’s confidentiality issues, name of the interviewee, the firm, and the OEM are not 
presented here. 
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After the dispute, both sides agreed to make a 10-years, long-term 
maintenance service contract from the next gas turbine import deal. The 
contract will require our firm to make a fixed payment during the contract 
term in exchange for unlimited liability in repairing and replacement services 
from the foreign OEM. This kind of contract gives the foreign OEM an 
exclusive right in the repair service market at the expense of domestic repair 
service providers. 86 
Although the long-term service contract between CCGT OEMs and users is not a 
Korean-specific way of transaction, the omnipresent premature degradation of gas 
turbine components in Korea made gas turbine users follow foreign OEMs’ guide. This 
makes the gap between foreign OEMs and domestic latecomers, including Doosan and 
precision casters, bigger. In this context, active in-house research efforts and better 
performances of the Korean precision caster, namely KLW, compared to its nuclear 
counterpart, such as Sami or POSCO specialty steel, the chances for the precision caster to 
accumulate technological capabilities have been limited. 
 
 Chapter Conclusion 
The Chapter shows that historically ingrained institutional factors of the Korean 
ESI have been shaping the context for success and failure of the two power generation 
technologies in Korea. On the one hand, the tight business regulations of the state-owned 
monopoly ESI have been pronounced in the successful catching-up process of Korean 
nuclear power despite the limited role of the HEI firm and its specialised suppliers. The 
regulations played a key role in ‘linking and leveraging’ for technology transfer, securing 
new construction projects for the rapid standardisation of the transferred reactor 
 
86 Interview with a deputy director of the Korean IPP, op. cit. 
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technologies, and controlling of bidding and overall project process for the first nuclear 
export case. 
However, the tight business regulations effectively limited overall demand for 
CCGT despite repeated public R&D programmes and relatively successful performances 
of the specialised supplier. Persistent cross-subsidy from the ESI to the city gas sector has 
increased the cost burden of CCGT and effectively discouraged public and private 
demand for CCGT technology development. 
On the other hand, the lax safety standards and regulatory practices effectively 
encouraged operational performances of nuclear power and offered the globally 
recognised track records. Catching-up efforts in steam generator tube technologies by 
supporting industry have been marginalised by KEPCO, and the efforts were left only a 
few public R&D programmes without KEPCO’s involvement. By comparison, the loose 
environmental regulations discouraged environmental competitiveness of gas turbine 
compared to its competitor such as coal power in the Korean electricity market. 
While technology catch-up policies including public R&D programmes do not 
exhibit consistency in explaining the contrasting catch-up experiences, focusing on effects 
of regulations on ESI seems to offer better explanations. As a result, the Korean user-
supplier co-evolution effectively strengthened operation, construction, and technology 
catch-up of nuclear power technology, whereas it weakened those of CCGTs. Thus, the 
sectoral institutions of user framework offer a better position than the strength of specific 
technology catch-up policies in explaining the successes and failures of catch-up across 
nuclear power and CCGT technologies. 
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Table 4.21 Institutional Scheme of Korean ESI and Technological Impacts 
 Business Issues Environmental Issues 
Institutional 
Environment 
(Property) 
- Nationalisation of ESI by Military 
Coup (1961) 
- Massive Poisoning Deaths due to 
Household Heating Coal (1960s–80s) 
Governance 
(Contract) 
- Tight Control of Business Activities 
(Fuel Contracts and Pricing) 
- Lax Emissions and Safety 
Regulations of ESI for Price Concerns 
Operational 
Practices 
- Cross-subsidy from CCGTs to City 
Gas 
- Aggressive TOU Pricing for 
Commodity BMIs 
- Rules often Exempted for Coal Power 
- Serious Nuclear Safety Issues are 
Repeatedly Dismissed 
Technological 
Impacts 
- CCGTs’ Increased Fuel Cost 
Caused Vicious Circle 
- Continued Growth of Base-load 
demand for New Nuclear Projects 
- CCGTs’ Role Limited by Coal under 
Lax Regulatory Practices 
- Operational Performance of Nuclear 
Enhanced by Lax Regulatory Practices 
Source: Adapted from Williamson 2000 
173 
 
Chapter 5. The Japanese Case 
 Introduction 
This Chapter clarifies critical reasons of how and why the Japanese HEI could shift 
from catching-up to nuclear power to gas turbines. It illustrates how user-producer co-
evolution of HEI and the ESI has been shaped in Japan, and focusses on how a set of 
institutions of the ESI, rather than explicit catch-up policies, such as public R&D and 
energy supply plans, have affected the user-producer co-evolution in favour of gas 
turbine technology, which is currently overtaking nuclear power. 
Section 5.2 analyses Japanese ESI and its business and environmental regulations 
based on a historical perspective. Section 5.3 describes Japanese HEI’s brief history and 
catching-up performances in nuclear power and gas turbine. Section 5.4 analyses effects 
of the ESI’s institutions on catching-up performances and the ESI-HEI relationship. 
 Electricity Supply Industry 
5.2.1. Structure of Japanese Electricity Supply Industry 
The Japanese electricity supply system has quite unique characteristics in terms of 
the regional division by electric frequency (50/60Hz), regional private monopoly utilities, 
designated wholesale utilities, and quite a big self-power generation capacity of 
manufacturing industries. The unique characteristics have co-evolved with sectoral 
institutions and have heavily influenced technological choices of the Japanese ESI 
regarding nuclear power and CCGTs. Although a detailed background and other aspects 
are analysed in later sections, they need to be briefly explained here. 
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The Japanese electricity system has been divided in two different geographic 
markets according to different electric frequencies, namely the Kansai area (the western 
region of Japan) where the standard of 60Hz is applied and the Kanto area (the eastern 
region) where 50Hz is applied. This regional division of electric frequency began in the 
early twentieth century, when Japan introduced Western electricity systems. In the early 
period, the Osaka area introduced the American system (60Hz) while the Tokyo area 
selected the German system (50Hz), and the division has remained the same for more than 
a century. Thus, all the electrical equipment, including power plants have had to be 
adapted to their regional frequencies. 
As of the mid-1990s, nine private utilities, including the major three of Tokyo, 
Kansai and Chubu Electric Power Co., were given a monopoly status to supply electricity 
to each one’s assigned region. After Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the number 
of the regional monopoly utitilities was increased to ten. Although the major share of 
wholesale electricity has been supplied by the regional monopolies (about 75%), other 
electricity suppliers supplement the rest of electricity, such as wholesale electric utilities, 
self- generation by heavy industries, and specified suppliers mostly owned by local 
governments. 
In addition, electric-intensive industries, such as steel, oil, chemical and 
petrochemicals, and paper and pulps also are involved in power generation activities for 
their own auto-generation or as a joint-venture with one of the regional monopolies. 
Therefore, they have also installed on-site power plants in their industrial complexes. 
Their capacity has been more than 10% of the country’s total power plant capacity for the 
last three decades of the twentieth century and reached 16.5% in 2008. These industrial 
users’ generation increased to 35% of their own electric demand and about 10% of the 
country’s total power supply in the mid-2000s (IEA, 2011). 
As of 2016, the Japanese electricity market is in the last stage of the liberalisation 
process, which means regional monopoly markets will disappear, and a competition 
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system across the regions will be introduced. While the wholesale market opened for IPPs 
after 1995, retail market liberalisation has been gradually introduced. For example, the 
retail market for large customers (2MW or more) was liberalised in 2000, and the retail 
market of commercial and industrial customers (50kW or more) was liberalised in 2005. 
Residential markets, which account for a 37% share of the Japanese electricity market, 
once confined to each region’s monopoly, was liberalised in April 2016.87 
Table 5.1 Structure of Japanese Electricity Supply Industry in the mid-1990s 
Categories Examples of Firms 
Share of 
Capacity 
Regional Monopoly Utilities 
Ten utilities with major three, namely Tokyo, Kansai 
and Chubu electric power companies 
75% 
Wholesale Electric Utilities 
J-Power (successor of EPDC, 67 thermal power 
plants), JAPCO (4 reactors) 
12% 
Self-Generation by 
Industries 
Steelmakers, oil refineries, chemicals, paper and 
pulps etc. 
10% 
Specified Suppliers Municipal councils 3% 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Sharon Beder, 1998 
5.2.2. A Brief History of Japanese Electricity Supply Industry 
Post-war Period: Realisation of Matsunaga Scheme of ESI 
On the verge of the World War II, during the Pacific War, the Japanese military 
government consolidated all the private utilities into the Japan Electric Power Generation 
and Transmission Company (Nippon Hassoden KK, hereafter Nippatsu) in order to rapidly 
mobilise the Japanese ESI for its war economy in 1939. Although a few influential leaders 
of the Japanese ESI, such as Yasuzaemon Matsunaga, resisted the nationalisation, they could 
not prevail over the wartime military state. Matsunaga, who managed various Japanese 
utilities during the inter-war period and was known as a determined liberalist, retired 
 
87 Interview with Osamu Kimura, Research Economist, Socioeconomic Research Center, Central 
Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, Tokyo, on 2 February 2011 
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from his management position in utilities after the nationalisation (Samuels, 1987; 
Kikkawa, 2006). 
However, as soon as the war ended, state control of the Japanese ESI was under 
the pressure of a re-organisation policy instituted by the Supreme Commander for Allied 
Power (SCAP). First, SCAP ordered the abolition of the National Mobilisation Law, which 
governed many of the controls and regulations on the Electric Power Industry Law during 
the war, in September 1945. Second, SCAP designated Nippatsu and the nine distribution 
firms as “excessively concentrated companies” under the “De-concentration Law”, 
enacted in December 1947. Third, in 1949, SCAP invited Matsunaga to be chair of the 
Electric Industry Reorganisation Council (Denki Jigyo Saihenseibi Shinjikai) under 
consideration of his clean wartime record and his consistent position against state control 
of the ESI (Samuels, 1987).88 
However, from the beginning, the reform process was not at all smooth. Japanese 
interest groups including steel industry leaders, Nippatsu officials, MITI bureaucrats, the 
labour union, the communist party and the Diet Cabinet, as well as the majority of the 
Council, led by Miki Takashi, the president of Nippon Steel, tried to maintain the status 
quo of the nationalised utility. Matsunaga, nevertheless, succeeded in dissolving Nippatsu 
into nine private regional monopolies, thus replacing state control of the electric industry 
with an independent regulator, namely the Public Utility Commission. The reform was 
realised with dedicated support from the SCAP including General Douglas MacArthur’s 
direct instruction to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in 1950 despite the Japanese 
government’s fierce resistance (Samuels, 1987; Kikkawa, 2006). 
 
88 Matsunaga proposed a historic blueprint of the Japanese electric supply industry in his 1928’s 
manifest, “‘Denryoku Tosei Shiken’ (My View of Electric Power Regulation)”. His suggestion can 
be summarized as i) Nine Regional Private Monopoly Utilities, ii) Vertical integration of 
generation, transmission and distribution businesses in each region, iii) Establishment of 
National Public Utility Commission. For details, see Samuels (1987) and Kikkawa (2006). 
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In addition, Matsunaga himself was designated as acting chair of the National 
Public Utility Commission in 1950 and contributed to the decision-making regarding 
electricity prices in the early 1950s. Between 1950 and 1953, heavy industries such as iron 
and steel and chemicals, which expanded their production capacity as a result of the 
Korean War economic boom, aggressively demanded that the government and the Public 
Utility Commission reduce allowed electricity tariffs. Fearing the revival of state control, 
however, Matsunaga proposed a 76% increase of the electric rate and the introduction of 
foreign capital in May 1951. Although SCAP approved only a 30% increase of electric rate, 
it also provided 6.2 billion yen in Counterpart Aid89 assistance to the nine private utilities 
in August 1951, thus endorsing Matsunaga’s proposal (Kikkawa, 2006; Samuels, 1987). 
In effect, the Yoshida government and the majority of the Diet started to prepare 
a bill to create a new national electric power development company with strong support 
from heavy industries that expected subsidised electricity. Matsunaga, however, again 
resisted the plan to nationalise the Japanese ESI. Under the post-war regime led by SCAP, 
Matsunaga finally realised his pre-war reformist scheme of a Japanese electricity supply 
industry against strong resistance from heavy industries and MITI bureaucrats who 
wanted to keep a national ESI and low electricity rate under state control. Although there 
have been external events, such as the two Oil Crises in the 1970s, his scheme 
fundamentally shaped the institutional backbone of Japanese ESI until today (Kikkawa, 
2006). 
Dodge Line: Financial Reform and Post-war Electric Power Development 
As explained above, in the early 1950s, Matsunaga, as the first and last acting chair 
of Japan’s Public Utility Commission, abruptly initiated a major increase of the electric 
rate twice despite strong resistance from large steel industries and MITI. How his actions 
 
89 US Aid Counterpart Fund Special Account was a representative aid method of the US 
government in rebuilding and reforming post-war European and Japanese economy under 
control of US government. 
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could be accepted and executed need further explanation. The unique institutional 
background of post-war Japan gives an explanation to some extent. 
Immediately after World War II, Japan suffered a steep inflation rate due to a 
serious shortage of commodities. By the end of the 1940s, after various efforts by the 
Japanese government, the inflation rate fluctuated around 300%. Having faced the Cold 
War Era, including the confrontation with the FSU, the US Truman administration sent 
Joseph Dodge, President of Detroit Bank, as a Special Ambassador to Japan in February 
1949 to rapidly rehabilitate the Japanese economy and to make the country a strong 
geopolitical partner in the region. Dodge, a fundamental free-market advocate, ordered 
harsh austerity measures to terminate inflation in Japan. His austerity policy package was 
called “Dodge Line”. Although there are various versions of his instructions to the 
Japanese government in the literature (Kagami, 1995; Metzler, 2013), the four principal 
demands commonly found are below: 
▪ Balanced and consolidated budget: a zero balance on all accounts should be 
maintained, and all special accounts should be brought into the general account. 
▪ Elimination of hidden subsidies, including price controls. 
▪ No further extension of the borrowing power of the Reconstruction Finance Bank, a 
predecessor of Japan Development Bank. 
▪ Unification of multiple currency exchange rates at JP￥360 to USD 1. 
As a result of this macroeconomic reform package, the inflation rate immediately 
decreased by 30% in 1949. Although the subsequent economic shock was quite severe and 
immediate recession was expected in Japan, the surprising breakout of the Korean War in 
1950 and the subsequent ‘wartime economic boom’ eliminated concerns of economic 
recession. More importantly, it sustained and backed up Matsunaga’s institutional reform 
of Japanese ESI, including the world’s highest electricity price. 
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World Bank’s Loan to Japanese Electric Industry 
The Japanese government designated the coal, electric power, steel and chemical 
fertiliser industries as key energy and materials industries, so-called “priority industries”, 
in its effort to reconstruct the Japanese economy during the post-war period. In 1946, it 
also established the Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB), a predecessor of the Japan 
Development Bank (JDB), in order to lend funds to the designated industries. Even when 
the RFB’s fund was not available, the Bank of Japan, in cooperation with the Economic 
Stabilisation Board, financed those designated industries. 
In 1951, once SCAP withdrew from Japan along with the direct US financial aid 
(i.e. the Counterpart Fund), Japan joined the international financial community, including 
the World Bank and IMF, in 1952. During this transition, the source of Japan’s major 
foreign financial aid shifted from the US Counterpart Fund to the World Bank Loan and 
US Export-Import Bank, which initiated a provision of aid loan to Japan from 1953 and 
1956. The first three provisions of loans from the World Bank to Japan through JDB, 
totalling USD 40 million, aided Japanese electric utilities which suffered a shortage of 
financial resources in reconstructing and expanding their electricity supply systems 
during the post-war period. 
In the fiscal years of 1951-1955, when the shift occurred from the US Counterpart 
Fund to the World Bank Loan, financing the electric power industry was JDB’s highest 
priority, for a total of JPY 117.4 billion (about USD 1.86 billion in 2016 price), or 46% of 
JDB‘s total financing during this period.90 Amongst this financing to the ESI, JPY 104.5 
billion was sent to nine utilities while the remaining JPY 12.9 billion was sent to industrial 
firms (mostly steelmakers) which operated their own auto-power generators (JDB/JERI 
 
90 Although the funding size seems rather small compared to the overall size of Japanese 
economy in the post-war period, its ‘signalling effect’ was large enough to induce additional 
funding from private banks. See Stiglitz and Uy (1996) for details regarding the ‘signalling 
effect’ of the Japanese public banks.  
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1994: 151). This snapshot of financial and economic reconstruction during the post-war 
era in Japan reveals the seriousness of the Japanese electric shortage. 
Additional financing for on-site, auto-power generation industries (primarily 
heavy industries) shows that electric power resource development by electric utilities 
could not meet the surging demand for electricity, even with major financial support. 
Therefore, it is understandable why Matsunaga drove such large increases of the 
electricity rate during his two years as acting chairman of Japan’s short-lived Public Utility 
Commission. Due to those consecutive increases, the Japanese electric rate was already 
the highest in the world beginning in the early 1950s (Kitazawa, 1984). 
In conclusion, massive inflation rates in the late 1940s, a harsh austerity policy, the 
economic boom during the Korean War, the chronic shortage of electricity, and massive 
financial aid for electric power resources development during the post-war period explain 
how and why Matsunaga’s increase of electricity prices could be accepted and endured. 
Although there have been additional electric price increases during the global energy 
crisis of the 1970s and the ESI restructuring policies initiated in the late 1990s, the post-
war economic condition and institutional system as explained above fundamentally 
shaped the basic structure and practices of the Japanese ESI. Salient results of the 
institutional reform are analysed and discussed further. 
5.2.3. Demand Condition of ESI: Basic Metal Industries 
Aluminium Smelters 
In the early 1970s, the Japanese aluminium industry was the world’s second-
largest producer with an annual capacity of 1.64 million tonnes. However, the oil crisis, 
followed by electricity price increases and global economic recession, made the Japanese 
aluminium smelters reduce their domestic production capacity by 98% from the mid-
1970s to 1990. Eventually, only a single smelter with a capacity of only 64,000 tonnes 
remained in operation. The dramatic change was the result of the rapid and voluntary 
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shift of the industry overseas, where much cheaper electricity and alumina were offered 
(Uriu, 1996). 
Although the Japanese government established a basic stabilisation plan, so-called 
Tokuanho, to support the aluminium industry, it hardly worked and was nearly 
meaningless in guiding the industry in an effective adjustment process. Instead, the 
industry itself voluntarily adopted a near-total closure of domestic production. The 
government policy was a rather passive response to the industry’s request and even tried 
to slow down the restructuring process (Peck et al., 1987; Uriu, 1996). There are several 
background reasons for this exceptional industry exit process. 
First, although the Japanese aluminium industry already had adjusted to the most 
expensive electricity in the world beginning in the 1950s, the two oil crises made the 
country completely lose any possible price competitiveness. Although the Japanese 
smelters had the most energy-efficient smelting plants in the world, their production costs 
were nine times those of Canadian firms backed up by abundant hydroelectric power, 
and three times those of American firms in 1980 (Samuels, 1983:496). According to a 
Japanese survey, the Japanese smelters had to pay 15-17 yen/kWh for electricity while 
Canadian and US counterparts paid the equivalent of 1-1.5 and 3-5 Yen/kWh, respectively, 
in the early 1980s (Kimura, 1983; Sheard, 1991). 
Furthermore, Japanese ESI did not offer a special price scheme to the country’s 
most electric-intensive industry, namely the aluminium smelters, such as a long-term 
electricity supply contract which is widely practised in most aluminium-producing 
countries. The long-term special electricity price for aluminium smelters in those countries 
is typically less than half of the average price for the industry. Considering the share of 
electricity cost in total aluminium production costs ranged from 41 to 51%, the big gap of 
electricity prices between Japan and its North American counterparts was devastating to 
the Japanese smelters (Michal, 1984; Peck et al., 1987). 
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Second, domestic users of aluminium ingots and final consumers, such as 
aluminium sheet producers and automobile makers, also faced fierce price competition in 
the global and domestic markets. This situation made protection of the Japanese 
aluminium smelters through a high import tax or other subsidies almost impossible in 
domestic politics (Goto, 1988:116-117). Also, aluminium ingots became an international 
commodity, freely available at international market prices when the London Metals 
Exchange began to trade aluminium ingot in 1978 (Uriu, 1996:180). 
Third, it was relatively easier for the Japanese aluminium industry to move its 
production capacity abroad technically, politically and financially. Due to technical 
simplicity, the six aluminium smelters employed less than 14,000 workers, the smallest 
labour force amongst the Japanese industries at that time. Thus, the political burden that 
the industry had to bear for its swift move was much smaller than any other industries 
under pressure of adjustment in Japan. In addition, all the smelters were tied to major 
Keiretsu firms and the Keiretsu supported their subsidiary firms’ shift abroad by financing 
and absorbing a portion of laid-off labours from the smelters (Sheard, 1991). 
Therefore, the smelters could easily create international joint ventures abroad to 
produce much cheaper aluminium ingots. The smelters mostly invested in Canada, Brazil, 
the United States, Australia and New Zealand, where there is a massive capacity of cheap 
hydropower or raw materials. In 1977, even before the Japanese government set any 
reduction target for domestic production capacity, the smelters had already established 
overseas facilities with an annual capacity of 1.24 million tonnes, much larger than 
domestic capacity. 
Electric Arc Furnace (EAF) Steelmakers 
While the most electric-intensive industry quickly chose to exit the market in the 
1970s, the second most electric-intensive industry, namely EAF steelmakers, struggled to 
survive the restructuring during the decade of the energy crisis. As a result of 
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restructuring, 69 EAF firms in 1977 reduced to 37 in 2010. Those firms are generally 
categorised by their financial support mechanisms, including 16 Keiretsu member firms 
which have the major share of the Japanese EAF market, four trading firms’ affiliated with 
EAF firms, and 17 independent firms which do not have either relationship. All the 
Keiretsu member EAF firms have been under control of their fellow, much larger, BOF 
firms (Peck et al., 1987; Lee, 2011). 
The business of EAFs mostly depends on the domestic construction market on the 
demand side, while it depends on scrap steels and electricity as major inputs on the supply 
side. In this sense, the Japanese EAF industry has suffered cycles of boom and bust due to 
domestic construction market fluctuations. On the supply side, while it has always 
enjoyed cheap, relatively high-quality scrap steel from the excessive ‘home-grown’ scrap 
steels from large Keiretsu BOF steelmakers, it also has suffered from the world highest 
electric price since the 1950s. 
Since 1970, on the verge of a global energy crisis, the Japanese EAF industry had 
gone through several major cycles of boom and bust. Repetitive Japanese governments 
spending on public construction projects and the biggest market of EAF steels created 
intermittent booms. Nevertheless, the booms quickly became busts. In the late 1970s, the 
Japanese government established a re-adjustment policy for “troubled” energy-intensive 
industries. The “Law of Temporary Measure to Stabilise Specific Industries in Recession” 
(Tokuanho in Japanese) which sought to facilitate the restructuring of suffering industries 
was passed in 1978 and was in effect until 1987. Along with the aluminium industry, the 
EAF steel industry was also included by the law (Peck et al., 1987; Uriu, 1996).91 
 
91 The industry was also specified as a target of restructuring policy in the “Temporary Measure 
on Restructuring of Specific Industries” in May 1983. The measure includes rationalization of 
investment, inhibition of new production facility and early closure of redundant facilities (Kim 
1994). 
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In effect, Keiretsu EAF firms already voluntarily initiated the reduction of 
production and requested the government to enforce the ‘cartel policies’ in the late 
1970s.92 Although independent EAF groups, such as Tokyo Steel, were against the Keiretsu 
initiative and expanded their production during the 1980s, the saturation of Japanese 
construction market in the early 1990s eventually restructured the Japanese EAF industry. 
Indeed, total investment in the construction of household, public infrastructure and non-
household buildings peaked in 1993 and has never recovered. The total EAF production 
followed suit (Lee 2011, World Steel Association 1983-2013) (Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1 Trends of Construction Market and EAF Steel Production in Japan 
Source: Author’s elaboration from World Steel Association 2014, and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism 2014  
With the decline of the construction market, it was inevitable that the ratio of 
Japanese EAF production to total steel production in Japan diminished from its peak of 
 
92 Contrary to Anti-Cartel Regulation concept in the Western economies, the Japanese Keiretsu 
collectively controlled production of steels to maintain price of steels under government 
protection during the 1970s’ global recession. See Uriu (1996) for details. 
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33% in 1996 to 22% in 2010. Both in absolute and relative production terms, Japanese EAF 
production performance is worse than it was during the second global energy crisis of 
1978 while the world average EAF production ratio has remained around 30% for the past 
two decades. Although Japanese EAF pioneered the structural beam market in the world, 
the share of the Japanese EAF production fell far below that of global EAF production 
levels with the world highest electric price and the end of the domestic construction boom 
(Figure 5.2). 
It is interesting that EAF steelmakers consumed more electricity than BOF 
counterparts by 56% even when their crude steel production was less than half of BOF 
steel production in 2000 (Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2). While BOF steelmakers showed stable 
electricity consumption from 1994 to 2010, EAF steelmakers reduced their consumption 
by one-third during the same period. The reduction seems to reflect the EAF industry’s 
restructuring effect. 
Table 5.2 Electricity Consumption of BOF and EAF Steels in Japan (GWh) 
 Purchased from Utilities & IPPs Self-Power 
Generation93 
 BOF (including Blast Furnace) EAF  
1994 8,023  14,866  18,766  
2000 7,015 10,977 5,891  
2010 8,028 9,814 5,284 
Source: Author’s elaboration from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan 2001 & 2011 
 
93 Although the original data do not show each self-power generation of BOF and EAF, year 
2000’s data show that BOF and EAF generated 2,297GWh and 3,594GWh, respectively. 
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Figure 5.2 Rise and Fall of Japanese EAF Steelmakers in 1980-2010 
Source: Author’s elaboration from the World Steel Association (WSA)’s <Steel Statistical Yearbook > 1983, 
1993, 2003 & 2013 
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fierce resistance from steel industries and MITI during the post-war period, made the 
Japanese electric price the world’s highest beginning in the 1950s. The price was 
drastically increased again during the global energy crisis of the 1970s. Naturally, it 
should have been difficult for electric-intensive BMIs to survive with such price in the 
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The electricity prices of the nine private utilities are regulated by METI (successor 
of MITI) based on the Electricity Utilities Industry Law. In particular, “Total Cost of 
Service Method” is stipulated in Article 19 of the law, and it defines that electric utilities’ 
tariff should be authorised by METI and the price and relevant supply contract should 
reflect “proper costs, based on efficient business management, plus fair return”. The 
“proper costs” consist of environmental treatment costs for wastewater, exhaust gas and 
other pollutants as well as expenses for labour, fuel, maintenance, and depreciation. The 
“fair return” is calculated according to the rate base method by multiplying business 
assets invested, including power generators and transmission lines by a certain rate of 
return, for example, 4.4% on average in 1998 (Cruz et al., 2002). 
However, METI’s regulation on electric prices is limited only in relative difference 
amongst the nine regional monopoly utilities based on a “Yardstick Assessment” which 
induces “performance competition” amongst utilities. When each of the utilities files its 
prices with METI, the ministry compares the utility to its own past performance and to 
the performance of the other utilities. The costs for each utility are assessed based on 
whether the utility is in the bottom third, middle third, or upper third of the range. 
Amongst the three groups, the bottom third group, which is most efficient or most 
improved, is allowed to receive revenues equal to the value of their costs while the middle 
group is allowed to receive revenues up to 99% of the value, and the upper third group 
are allowed to receive only 98% of the value (IEA, 1999; OECD, 1998). 
Other than the regulation based on performance competition, the Japanese 
government has not been able to directly control electric prices even when drastic price 
surges occurred, for instance, during the two oil crises. Electricity prices in Japan had 
increased by about 50% in 1973, after 20 years of price stability. The increases have been 
much greater for industrial users than domestic consumers, in particular (Surrey, 1974: 
229). 
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Since the 1970s, a few additional factors contributed to the already high electric 
prices. First, the world strictest emission regulations and the Air Pollution Control Law, 
which allows local government to set even stricter limits than the national government’s 
standards, resulted in increased expenditure on emission control technologies and 
measures (IEA, 2003; OECD, 1999). 
Second, the world’s strictest nuclear safety regulations forced the Japanese utilities 
to go through exceptionally tight safety inspections on the scope, depth, intervals, and 
judgement of defects. The utilities are required to have an overhaul, such as repair and 
maintenance, every 12 months in principle, with a one month grace period, although 
longer intervals for efficient fuel exchange cycles, typically 18 months, have been practised 
in most countries (OECD, 1999). As a result of the institutional and physical conditions, 
Japanese customers take the burden as explained below: 
▪ High generation and transmission capital costs: Japan has the highest 
investment costs for nuclear, gas and coal power in OECD. Expensive land, 
compensation payments made to local communities and high safety 
standards (including earthquake resistance) contribute to increased costs. 
Very high technical standards for equipment compared with other 
countries force prices up and limit the number of competitors. 
▪ High fuel costs: Japanese utilities pay 20% more for oil, 80% more for coal, 
and more than double for natural gas costs than the OECD average. 
▪ Low load factor: The load factor in Japan (the ratio of average electricity 
demand to the annual peak demand) is extremely low in comparison with 
other industrialised countries, principally because of air conditioning use. 
Each 1% decrease in the load factor increases the costs of service by 
approximately 1% (IEA, 2003). 
 
Voluntary Introduction of Natural Gas 
Amidst the severe environmental issues, the oil crisis of 1973 made the Japanese 
government urgently encourage electric utilities to diversify fuels from oil to alternatives, 
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mostly coal and nuclear power. The intended fuel-switching process, however, has been 
hindered by problems in finding acceptable sites for nuclear and coal power plants 
(Nemetz et al., 1984). In this sense, natural gas-based power plants played an important 
role by providing the electric utilities with a way to avoid public resistance and strict 
regulation on air pollution even a decade before the commercialisation of large and high-
efficiency CCGTs in the mid-1980s. Osamu Kimura from the Central Research Institute of 
Electric Power confirms the difference between natural gas from other alternatives in the 
fuel diversification efforts in Japan: 
Since the Oil Shocks in the 1970s, electric utilities have tried to diversify fuels 
from oil to nuclear and coal. But both options suffered from siting problems 
for different reasons. Utilities faced persistent public opposition against 
nuclear power while they found extreme difficulties to meet strict 
environmental regulation on SOx and NOx emission for coal power plants. In 
this sense, gas turbines were much favoured in Japan. 
Although major utilities still favour coal power and the government repeats 
ambitious nuclear construction planning, lengthy and tight environmental 
assessment procedure retarded their preference. Also, technical handicaps of 
nuclear and coal, such as relatively slow response to load change, limited such 
options.94 
Thus, it was electric utilities who obtained major LNG purchase contracts from 
various Asian and Middle East countries from the early 1970s.95 As a result of the utilities’ 
initiative, LNG’s share in terms of power capacity and generation in the Japanese 
electricity market soared from a mere 2% and 1.6% in 1970 to 16.2% and 16.4% respectively 
in 1983, even before Tohoku Power started operation of Japan’s first CCGT in 1985 (Figure 
 
94 Interview with Osamu Kimura, op. cit. 
95 In effect, Tokyo Power pioneered introduction of LNG including transportation, re-gasification, 
and distribution networks in Japan from 1969, and other utilities followed the suit. 
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5.3 and 5.4). Considering that the total capacity of gas turbines domestically delivered in 
Japan until 1983 was only 3.5 GW when total gas power capacity was 23.4GW, most LNG 
power plants in operation in 1983 were conventional gas boiler power plants rather than 
gas turbines (Gas Turbine Society of Japan, 1984).96 Thus, it can be said that LNG fuel was 
used predominantly for steam turbines, which are less energy-efficient, by electric utilities 
under strict emission regulation until the early 1980s, paving the way for the commercial 
success of CCGTs in Japan. 
Furthermore, utilities’ voluntary introduction of gas for power generation invited 
the American gas turbine OEM, namely Westinghouse, with its technological and 
manufacturing capacity from the US market, which was under an embargo on natural gas 
use for new power plants between 1975 and 1985 (Watson, 1997). The problematic decade 
pushed Westinghouse to leave its home market, and it transferred most of its gas turbine 
business to its Japanese partner, MHI in 1987 (Unger & Herzog, 1998). 
 
 
96 Total capacity of gas turbines manufactured by Japanese firms from 1948 to 1983 was 13.8GW 
including 10.2GW for export according to GTSJ 1984 report.  
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Figure 5.3 Average Natural Gas Prices by Sector in Japan 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from IEA’s Energy Prices & Taxes 1999, 2008 and 2013 
Note: The price information for the power generation group in Japan has not been reported since 1998. 
Also, all price information of 2008 was not reported. 
 
Figure 5.4 Fuel Mix in Japanese Electricity Market (% of supply) 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Japan Nuclear Safety Organization 2004 & 2013, Operational Status of 
Nuclear Facilities in Japan 2004 & 2013 
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5.2.5. World’s Strictest Environmental Regulations 
Regulatory Change in Emission Control After Yokkaichi Verdict 
Numerous Japanese HCI firms established the ‘Kombinato’ type of industrial 
complex, which integrated material processes and power plants at one site for maximising 
energy and resource efficiency in the late 1950s. This approach caused serious 
environmental issues, however, such as “Yokkaichi Asthma”, an outbreak of asthma cases 
around the ‘Showa Yokkaichi’ petrochemical-power plant complex in the 1960s along with 
“Itai-Itai Disease (Cadmium poisoning)”, “Niigata Minamata disease (Methyl-mercury 
poisoning)” and “Kumamoto Minamata Disease”, resulting in the “Four Major Pollution 
Episodes” in Japan (Schreurs, 2002). 
Although MITI and relevant ministries initially submitted the “Smoke and Soot 
Control Law” to the Diet in 1962, based on studies of emission control laws in the US, 
Germany and the UK, the law was limited in that it provided solutions only to smoke and 
heavy deposits (Schreurs, 2002). It did not significantly reduce sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
emissions and applied only to designated areas without a penalty clause for violations 
and was based on a standard that could be met by merely building more stacks or diluting 
concentrations with fresh air. Naturally, the law and subsequent implementations hardly 
appeased public anger. Adjacent residential areas already regularly experienced SO2 
concentrations of over 0.5 ppm and subsequently witnessed around 1,200 residents 
identified as “Yokkaichi Asthma” patients. While the main concerns of the ministries had 
been the protection of relevant industries from environmental disputes until the 1960s, 
civil actions by affected inhabitants and following rules of courts in the early 1970s 
significantly changed the direction of government regulations (Hashimoto, 1989; Wallace, 
1995). 
The ruling on the “Yokkaichi Asthma” case in July 1972 recognised defendant’s 
responsibility for the disease and pointed out negligence in failing to use the best available 
technology to control emissions as well as the misconduct in siting of the ‘refinery-
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petrochemical-power plant complex’. The verdict directly affected regulatory policy on 
power stations in Japan. It immediately induced the ratification of the Pollution-Related 
Health Damage Compensation Law and the government’s stricter administration of the 
air pollution laws (Cruz et al., 2002; Hashimoto, 1989). 
Facing the legal change in addition to nationwide public discontent, the Japanese 
government heightened environmental regulations on coal and high sulphur oil power 
plants in the early 1970s. 97  As a result, Japanese government’s emission standards 
changed from mere imitation of that of foreign countries in the 1960s to the most stringent 
emission standards in the world in the mid-1970s (Nishimura & Sadakata, 1989; Schreurs, 
2002). 
Furthermore, the Air Quality Control Law established in 1967 allowed local 
governments to set their own emission standards and to exert authority in power plant 
site permission. Indeed, local authorities imposed much stricter measures on electric 
utilities to reduce emissions even lower than the national standards. When electric utilities 
dismissed such local requirements, they had to face local residential referendums and 
often withdrew their construction projects. To meet such additional local requirements, 
utilities had to i) switch high sulphur and/or nitrogen fuels to cleaner fuels, ii) introduce 
combustion modification technologies and iii) develop both de-sulphur and de-nitrogen 
technologies, such as selective catalytic reduction (SCR) from the 1970s (Ando, 1983; 
Nishimura & Sadakata, 1989). 
Table 5.3 shows the tightening of national NOx emission standards on steam 
turbine plants in the 1970s. Although gas turbines were exempted from the national 
standards in the period, they still needed to meet strict local standards equivalent to 
standards on gas boilers (Table 5.4). In order to meet the local standards, the utilities 
 
97 Outbreak of massive photochemical smog and subsequent health effects on thousands of junior 
high school students in Tokyo area in 1970 also spurred the regulatory change. 
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required HEI firms to apply combustion modification as well as the SCR technologies. 
Table 5.5 shows performances of the emission control technologies. As a result of the strict 
local requirements, Japanese utilities’ overall environmental performances advanced 
much further than their European and American counterparts in the 1990s (Figure 5.5). 
Table 5.3 Changing National Nox Standards on Power Plants (ppm, % of O2) 
 1973 1975 1977 1979 1987 
Gas (5%) 
Boilers 
130 130 100 60 60 
Oil (4%) 180 150 130 130 130 
Coal (6%) 400 300 300 300 200 
Gas Turbine (15%) 
Exempted from national standards 70 
(Local standards set at 10~15 ppm in selected areas) 
Source: Aoyama & Mandai 1984, Ministry of Environment 1990. 
Table 5.4 Examples of Local Nox Standards on Power Plants in 1979 (ppm) 
 
Central 
Government 
Local 
Government 
Actual 
Emission 
Abatement Method 
Gas Boiler 60 10 8 CM + SCR 
Oil Boiler 130 25 20 CM + SCR 
Coal Boiler 400 170 160 CM + partial SCR 
Source: Ando 1983, “Nox Regulation on Stationary Sources in Japan”: 2 
Note: CM = Combustion Modification, SCR = Selective Catalytic Reduction 
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Table 5.5 Nox Abatement Technology Performances in the late 1970s (ppm) 
 
Outlet NOx Concentration, ppm Percent of Control 
Effects 
Boiler fuels 
(% of O2) 
Before 
Abatement 
After 
CM 
After 
CM+SCR 
CM SCR Total 
Gas (5%) 200 50 10 75% 20% 95% 
Oil (6%) 300 100 20 67% 27% 93% 
Coal (4%) 600 250 50 58% 33% 91% 
Source: Ando 1983, “NOx Regulation on Stationary Sources in Japan”: 2 
Note: CM = Combustion Modification, SCR=Selective Catalytic Reduction 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Environmental Performance of Fossil Power Plants by Country 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Federation of Electric Power Corporations 2008 
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Public Concerns, Leaks and Change of Nuclear Regulation in the 1970s 
Public concern regarding pollution issues and subsequent regulatory changes 
were not only limited to fossil power plants but also affected nuclear power’s siting and 
safety regulations beginning in the 1970s. For instance, local protests against the 
construction of the Hokkaido Power’s Kyowa-Tomari nuclear power plant delayed 
construction by sixteen years. The protests were mainly organised by local fishermen who 
feared the impact that coolant water used for cooling of the plant would have on their 
catch. As a result, the utility was forced to modify its siting plans (Schreurs, 2002). 
Although the average lead time to gain public acceptance of nuclear power plants in Japan 
was only two to three years in the 1960s, it reached fourteen to fifteen years in the 1980s 
(Lesbirel, 1998). 
Regarding safety regulations, when Japanese HEI firms almost completed 
indigenisation of the first-generation reactor technologies in the early 1970s, electric 
utilities faced serious corrosion issues of nuclear power equipment. The problems were 
generic—for example, primary water stress corrosion cracking (SCC) which caused steam 
generator tube deterioration of PWRs and inter-granular stress corrosion crack problems 
of BWRs. The deterioration of pipes and tubes of both reactor designs caused frequently 
unplanned shutdowns of reactors sometimes for several months or even years. Thereby, 
they exacerbated the poor economic performance of reactors, namely their capacity 
factor.98 
Until the early 1970s, Japanese nuclear safety regulators had used US regulatory 
guidelines as benchmarks for their safety regulations. For example, the sampling 
inspection method was the norm in the utility inspection of steam generator tubes as usual 
in other industrialised countries. The steam generator tube leakage incident at Mihama 
unit 1 in 1972, however, raised public concerns regarding nuclear safety issues and 
 
98 Interview with Takuya Hattori, President, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., Tokyo, and 
Former Vice President of Tokyo Electric Power, on 5 February 2011. 
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changed the norm. Mihama unit 1 (340MW) of Kansai Electric Power Co. (Kansai Power 
hereafter) had suffered from repeated leakages of primary coolant water in the steam 
generator tubes since its commercial operation in 1970. In June 1972, the utility 
experienced steam generator tube leaks of Mihama 1. After temporary shutdown and 
repair of the degraded tubes, it reopened the reactor soon after (Ono, 1973; Stevens-Guille 
1975). Tube leakages and degradation, however, recurred in July 1974. The leakage caused 
the suspension of the commercial operation of Mihama 1 for five years and nine months. 
It could then begin test operations on April 19, 1980. 
In responding to the event, MITI’s regulatory body stipulated strengthened 
regulatory criteria for the steam generator tubing inspection in 1980 (MITI, 1980). 99 
According to the amended Technical Standard of the Electric Utility Industry Law (MITI 
Notification No. 501), a ‘degraded tube’ could not be used, and the scope of inspection 
was expanded from sampling to all the tubes with full-lengths from end to end (Yashima, 
1991:6.2-4/11). The definition of the ‘degraded tube’, as well as 100% inspection, indicate 
the strength of the regulations. Most OECD countries had been using the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s standard as a benchmark, such as ‘40% loss of steam generator 
tube wall thickness’, in defining the ‘degraded tubes’ (IAEA, 1997). 
Japan has been the only country that applies that “No Flaw” principle since the 
1970s. The term “flaw” is interpreted to mean any indication (crack, pit or general wall 
thinning) greater than the background noise level in high-frequency electric detectors.100 
Furthermore, the definition of “flaw” addresses signals even lower than background noise 
level when indications are attributable to stress corrosion cracks (SCCs) or inter-granular 
attacks (IGAs). In such cases, utilities should inspect the tubes more thoroughly with 
 
99 Former Nuclear & Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) of the Ministry of Economy Trade & 
Industry (METI, the successor of MITI) had been responsible for nuclear power safety 
regulation until the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. 
100 The electric detector, namely Eddy Current Test (ECT), cannot distinguish flaw signals up to 
20% of wall thickness from the background noise of the tubes. Thus, an actual criterion is 20%. 
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advanced inspection methods. (Clark & Kurtz, 1988; IAEA, 1997, 2011; Shizuma, 1992; 
Yashima, 1991). 
Thus, the “no flaw” principle is not at all ‘lip service’ given that the principle 
applies to the limit of flaw detection technologies. It indicates the strictest level of 
regulation on inspection of steam generator tubes amongst nuclear power countries. For 
instance, German nuclear safety regulators allow up to 50% of wall thinning while the 
French do not have explicit criteria for steam generator tube inspection (IAEA, 1997). 
Further details of inspection and repair criteria of the tubes under Technical Standard of 
the Electric Utility Industry Law (MITI, 1980) are presented below: 
▪ Inspection Interval: Prescriptive regulation of inspection frequency 
enforces Japanese utilities to overhaul reactors every year, at least every 13 
months.101 
▪ Inspection Boundary: 100% tubes and full-length inspection if a leak or 
any flaw was detected during the previous cycle. If there was no leak or 
flaw in the previous cycle and inspection, 30% of sampling inspection is 
allowed. 
▪ Flaw Acceptance Criteria: “No Flaw” principle on steam generator tube 
inspection and operation. 
▪ Leakage Monitoring and Limits: No leak is allowed during operation. If 
more than 120% radiation on average is detected, the reactor should be 
shut down. 
 
 
 
 
101 In effect, all types of power plants including coal, gas and nuclear power in Japan should 
follow this 13month overhaul interval regulation according to Electric Utility Industry Law.  
199 
 
Table 5.6 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Guidelines in Nuclear Countries 
Bases How Implemented (Repair Criteria) Country 
No detectable flaws or 
leakage 
No wall thinning (virtually no defects over 
background noise level, which is 20%) 
Japan 
Flaws limited to a size which 
is calculated not to burst 
during normal operation and 
accident conditions 
Often 40% of wall thickness  
USA, 
Canada 
50% of wall thickness Germany 
Use conservative analysis methods supplemented 
by 100% inspections of affected areas and tight 
leak rate limits 
Spain 
Flaws limited to a size so that 
there is a low probability of 
tubing burst during accident 
conditions 
Use conservative analysis methods for each 
degradation mechanism (degradation specific 
management)—no explicit safety factors but 
aggressive inspections 
France 
Set defect size based on 
allowable risk of rupture 
during steam line break 
Estimate the probability of rupture for each defect, 
and require sum for all defects to be < allowed limit 
(e.g.1%) 
Sweden 
Source: IAEA 1997 
  
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident in 1991 and Industry Response 
Japanese PWRs experienced more serious degradation issues later, namely the 
SGTR accident at Mihama unit 2 in 1991. In effect, despite previous efforts to improve the 
chemistry of secondary coolant water and maintenance techniques including sleeving and 
plugging of the Alloy 600 steam generator tubes, Kansai Power eventually decided to 
replace the whole steam generators with an alternative material, namely Alloy 690, after 
the rupture accident (Yashima, 1993). In addition, it caused Mihama unit 2 to be shut 
down for three and a half years for in-depth analysis of the accident and steam generator 
replacement (Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, 1993, 1994). 
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Table 5.7 Steam Generator Tube Leaks in Japanese PWRs in the 1970s and 80s 
Year  Reactor Leak Rate 
(ℓ/hour) 
Causes Location 
1972 Jun. 
Mihama 1 
70 
Wastage Support plate 1974 Jul. 1.6 
1975 
Jan. Mihama 2 4 
May Genkai 1 80 Fretting Above tube sheet 
1977 Jan. Takahama 1 1.6 
IGA/SCC Tube sheet crevice 
1979 Oct. Mihama 2 - 
1981 Sep. Ohi 1 0.5 SCC Tight U-bend 
1982 
Mar. 
Mihama 1 
0.1 
SCC Tube plug 
Jul. 0.08 
1983 Feb. Mihama 2 0.55 IGA/SCC Tube sheet crevice 
1991 
Feb. 
Mihama 2 
Rupture 
(2,600 ℓ/min.) 
Anti-vibration 
bar 
Top of tube support 
plate 
Source: Togo, 1984; MacDonald et al., 1996 
Note: IGA = Inter-Granular Attack, SCC = Stress Corrosion Cracking, T.S.= Tube Sheet 
 
Utilities’ Effort to Overcome the Strict Regulations 
In Japan, nuclear power plants are required to have an overhaul and refuelling 
every 13 months, unlike other countries which allow their operators longer fuel cycles 
(typically 18 months). Furthermore, the world’s strictest inspection and repair criteria for 
steam generator tubes forced Japanese utilities to have longer inspection periods, typically 
more than three months, while utilities in other countries, including Korea, are allowed 
to have a much shorter inspection period, typically around one month. It means that it is 
almost impossible to increase the capacity factor of Japanese nuclear power plants over 
80%, excluding test operation (OECD, 1999; Institute of Energy Economics Japan, 2011). 
Indeed, in the entire history of reactor operation, Japanese utilities have only operated 
their nuclear reactors above 80% of a capacity factor for a few years in the late 1990s 
(Figure 5.6). 
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Therefore, the low operational performances created immense concern for 
Japanese ESI and HEI because that low performance was directly deteriorating the 
economic performance of the utilities and the track record of Japanese reactors in the 
global market. In order to improve their capacity factor, Japanese utilities had to reduce 
either the length of periodic inspections or loosen the compulsory 13-month interval of 
periodic inspections. An industry leader’s keynote speech at the Japan Atomic Industrial 
Forum (JAIF)’s annual conference in 1984 shows how much Japanese ESI has been 
concerned about the issue (JAIF, 1984): 
The availability factor102 cannot possibly be above 75% in Japan, because we 
spend more than 90 days for periodical inspections, much longer than in 
European countries and the United States. This long inspection period is a big 
hurdle facing the availability factor. By improving the work environment and 
increased mechanisation and automation, the periodical inspection time 
should be reduced to less than two months.103 
On the other hand, utilities have urged the government to loosen the compulsory 
maintenance regulation, which has required nuclear reactors to shut down every 13 
months for inspection and maintenance since the late 1980s. The regulation is quite strict 
compared to other countries’ practices. The US regulator allows operating cycles of 18 to 
24 months, for instance. Increasing the length of operating cycles from about 13 months 
to 18 months would increase a few percentage points of capacity factor or availability 
factor. Thus, the industry association, JAIF, aimed to increase the average capacity factor 
of nuclear power to about 85% by 2020 and 90% by 2030 through regulatory changes 
 
102 Availability factor (AF) is a ratio of hours which a power plant is on line to total hours in a 
given period while capacity factor (CF) is the ratio of actual electricity generated to the energy 
that could have been generated at continuous maximum power operation during the given 
period. Nevertheless, the AF also indicates the overall operational performance of nuclear 
power as CF does. 
103 Hiromi Arisawa, Chairman of the JAIF, Keynote speech at the 17th JAIF Annual Conference, 
Atoms in Japan, March 1984: 4 
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allowing longer-cycle operations of 18 months or more (Japan Atomic Industry Forum, 
2010). 
However, Tokyo Power’s inspection data scandal in 2002 resulted in nationwide 
public discontent on the Japanese utilities’ nuclear safety management. The scandal 
revealed that Tokyo Power’s falsification of reactor safety inspection records during 1990 
and 1991 was sealed by the utility for a decade. Under the pressure of public anger and 
subsequent government investigation and preventive measures, Japanese utilities’ efforts 
to loosen the regulation did not materialise (METI, 2007). Instead, forced outage of 
numerous reactors for in-depth inspection dramatically decreased the overall capacity 
factor of Japanese reactor fleets in the mid-2000s (Figure 5.6). 
Figure 5.6 Performance of Japanese Reactors Limited by Strict Inspection 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization 2014 
Note 1. The figure shows the average annual periodic inspection duration of all PWR and BWR reactors 
excluding Tokai-1, the only Gas-Cooled Reactor in Japan. 
Note 2. The dramatic decrease of capacity factor in 2012 is a result of the shutdown of 53 reactors out of 54 
reactors for safety checks and maintenance after the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. 
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Regulatory Change After the Fukushima Nuclear Accident 
The Japanese government established a new independent nuclear regulatory 
agency, Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), substituting the former Nuclear and 
Industry Safety Agency in 2012 as a countermeasure of nuclear safety after the Fukushima 
nuclear accident in 2011. NRA developed new and more stringent regulations that were 
enacted in 2013. The new regulations require utilities new evaluations of earthquakes, 
tsunamis, tornadoes etc. and additional countermeasures against tsunami, fire, internal 
flooding, and the loss of a large area of the nuclear power plants due to natural hazards 
or terrorisms (NEA, 2017). 
Although the Japanese government publicly announced to continue to use nuclear 
power as an important baseload power source, it is a challenging issue in that the more 
stringent regulations, cost increase associated with retrofitting reactors to meet the 
regulations (METI, 2014). Among 54 nuclear reactors in Japan, five reactors were 
permanently shut-down due to the new regulations and following cost increase. All of the 
six Fukushima Daiichi units were permanently shut down too. This makes the total 
operable reactors 43 units in Japan. Utilities had applied to the NRA for a review of the 
safety systems of 28 units among the 43 units for conformance with the new regulatory 
requirements and only nine of them went to restart as of 2018 (World Nuclear Association, 
2018). 
Even looking at the performance of the nine reactors, the capacity factor has never 
been improved. The average capacity factor of four reactors which experienced planned 
inspection outages from 2016 to 2018 was 79%, compared to 92% of average US reactor 
fleet in 2017. The difference mainly comes from the long duration of periodic inspections. 
The Japanese reactors spent 101 days, while US counterparts spent only 35 days for 
inspection on average. (Yamaguchi, 2018) 
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 Heavy Electrical Industry 
5.3.1. Sectoral Institutions of the HEI 
Post-war Period FDI Regulation and Technology Transfer Guidance 
During the post-war period, the Japanese government encouraged technology 
transfer from advanced foreign firms to Japanese firms, while effectively blocking foreign 
firms’ equity investment through lengthy and stringent case-by-case screening 
procedures based on the Foreign Investment Law (FIL) of 1950. The MITI, as a gatekeeper, 
decoupled technology issues from capital investment, and only allowed technology 
transfer in the form of patents, licences and expertise. At the same time, the Ministry of 
Finance blocked equity investment and foreign efforts to control Japanese firms including 
merger and acquisitions, while it allowed only foreign loans (Cohen & Zysman, 1983; 
Maison, 1992). 
When foreign firms indicated their intention to submit their investment 
applications to the Japanese FDI, they were told by Japanese officials or industrial leaders 
to modify or cancel their applications. Instead, they were persuaded to offer technology 
licensing with minimal effort and guaranteed approval under the FIL even before they 
submitted a formal application. When prospective foreign investors ignored such 
informal suggestions and went through the formal application process, their applications 
mostly failed. First, they had to submit an application to the Bank of Japan, then it passed 
to the Foreign Investment Deliberation Council (FIDC), which decided whether or not to 
validate individual investment proposals under the FIL. After a final decision by the 
FIDC, the Bank of Japan would notify the applicant of the result (Cohen & Zysman, 1983; 
Maison, 1992). 
As a result of the de facto government-industry coalition backed by the de jure 
screening process, most of the applications were rejected. Rather than sell their own 
products in Japan, what foreign firms could do was simply sell their technologies and 
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settle for royalty payments for the use of their technology, mostly under the MITI’s 
guidance (Figure 5.7; de jure process on the left, de facto process on the right). In this way, 
neither capital investment nor technology allowed foreign firms to control their Japanese 
counterparts in the post-war Japanese market. The virtually closed market institution 
gave Japanese firms not only stable domestic markets but also advanced foreign 
technologies without foreign intervention (Cohen & Zysman, 1983; Maison, 1992). 
With this ‘seamless’ FDI blocking system and technology licence settlement, 
Japanese HEI firms enjoyed easier technology transfers from advanced licensors. The 
MITI imposed unique indigenisation guidance on foreign licensors and domestic 
licensees. According to this guide, once they imported the first unit of power technology, 
Japanese licensee HEI firms had to be able to localise all the components and subsystems 
from the second unit of the same power technology. Without meeting this condition, the 
MITI did not allow power generation technology license contracts between foreign and 
Japanese HEI firms. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries could obtain technology transfer of key 
components and subsystem technologies, such as gas turbine rotor technology, when it 
formalised a license contract (Sakuraka, 1997). 
Figure 5.7 Foreign Investment Screening Processes in Post-war Japan 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Cohen and Zysman 1983 and Maison 1992 
Mostly Rejected 
Approval Guaranteed with Royalty 
Arrangement under the MITI’s Supervision 
Bank of Japan, Ministry of Finance, 
Foreign Investment Deliberation Council, 
MITI & Relevant Japanese Firms 
Technology Licensing Application 
without Equity Investment 
Submission of FDI Application 
Japanese Officials and Firms Suggest 
Technology License Instead of FDI 
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The Liberalisation of FDI Regulation and its Impact 
After a temporary exemption treatment from the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) in the 1950s, Japan faced the Kennedy Round of GATT in 1959, which 
urged the removal of such discriminatory import restrictions. Following the Kennedy 
Round, the Japanese government formulated the General Plan for Trade and Exchange 
Liberalisation, which outlined overall trade liberalisation within three years. 
Subsequently, the MITI removed quantitative restrictions on trade in 1963 and 
implemented most of the GATT rules, including Article 11, in 1964 (JDB/JERI, 1994; US 
Congress OTA, 1991). In this way, the Japanese government’s withdrawal from the post-
war regulation of FDI and technology transfer guidance resulted in significant 
implications for Japanese HEI firms in establishing their nuclear and gas turbine 
technology development. 
Notably, there has been a clear difference in licensing strategies between the two 
major HEI licensors in Japan, namely Westinghouse and GE. While Westinghouse has 
been rather approachable in transferring its nuclear and gas turbine technologies to its 
licensors worldwide, GE has been always strict in technology transfer and ‘bossy’ with 
regard to its licensees. 104 , 105  The intersection between the MITI’s technology licence 
approval pattern and the two global HEI OEMs’ contrasting licence strategies heavily 
influenced the catch-up performance of Japanese HEI firms. 
 
104 Author borrows the term, ‘bossy’, from a discussion with Professor Jim Watson at University 
of Sussex about GE’s relationship with its Japanese gas turbine licensees, Toshiba and Hitachi. 
GE’s controlling tendency in relationship with its licensees can be observed in the nuclear 
power case as well. While Westinghouse allowed its gas turbine and PWR licensees, including 
Combustion Engineering, EDF, KEPCO, and MHI, independence and direct competition with 
itself in the global market once they completed technology indigenisation, GE hardly did so in 
relationship with its gas turbine and BWR licensees, including Toshiba and Hitachi.  
105 Interview with Chunrok Kang, op. cit.: p. 145 
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Impact on Nuclear Power Technology Catch-up 
Nuclear power plants in Japan are supplied by the big three HEI companies, 
namely MHI, Hitachi and Toshiba. Although the impact of technology guidance on 
nuclear power catch-up performance of Japanese HEI firms is not as salient as in the gas 
turbine case, differences in degrees of freedom amongst the three companies are 
somewhat similar to that seen in gas turbines. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries completed its 
indigenisation of pressurised water reactor technologies through a close tie with 
Westinghouse in the late 1970s and early 1980s, while the other two companies have been 
restricted by GE. These two firms developed BWR technology but had been constrained 
by GE’s strict licence control for many years. 
Impact on Gas Turbine Technology Catch-up 
The combination of the MITI’s ‘one firm per one technology transfer’ approval 
strategy and the two foreign licensors’ contrasting strategic preference was more 
pronounced in the gas turbine case. The timing of the MITI’s withdrawal from licence 
approval practices based on the FIL, as well as the technology licence contracts between 
Japanese HEI firms and the two American licensors, explains a great deal. While 
Westinghouse entered into a gas turbine licence contract with MHI in 1961, GE established 
a contract with Hitachi only in 1964 when the Japanese government lifted FDI technology 
licence package regulation. In effect, GE also entered into a computer technology licence 
with Toshiba in 1964 (Boulton et al., 1992).106 It appears that GE strategically waited until 
the Japanese government lifted the FDI technology licence package regulation to secure 
its control over its Japanese licensees across various sectors during the transitional period. 
Although Hitachi entered a co-production contract with GE in 1964, it could not 
insert such a demanding technology transfer option into the contract (Sakuraka, 1997). 
 
106 It should be noted that a computer industry was another strategic sector, together with HEI, 
targeted by MITI during the post-war period. 
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Tokyo Shibaura Electric and its sub-licensees, predecessors to Toshiba, signed a gas 
turbine licence contract with Brown Boveri in 1958, but the licence was limited to 
manufacturing and marketing without technology transfer options (ABB, 2005). Although 
Toshiba switched its licensor to GE in the 1980s, it would not have expected to have a 
technology transfer option from the ‘bossy’ licensor. 
Table 5.8 Major Japanese HEI Firms’ Turbine Licence Contracts107 
 Licensor Country Technology License 
Duration 
MHI  Westinghouse Int’l 
Technology Cor. 
US Steam Turbine 1952-1989 
Gas Turbine 1961-1996 
Hitachi GE US Steam Turbine Early 1950s 
Gas Turbine 1964- 
Toshiba Brown Boveri Swiss Steam Turbine - 
Gas Turbine 1958-1982 
GE US Gas Turbine 1982- 
Source: MHI, 1990 and Ikegami, 2009 
5.3.2. Japan’s Nuclear Technology Catch-up Performance 
Daunting Experiences of Early Nuclear Reactor Catch-up Policies 
Encouraged by the ‘Atom for Peace’ initiative of the Eisenhower administration in 
the US in 1953, Japanese government officials established the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) and the Science and Technology Agency (STA) based on the ‘Atomic Energy Basic 
Law’ passed in the mid-1950s. What Japanese government acted as a player from the 
beginning, however, was an unsuccessful choice of commercial reactor technology such 
as Gas Cooled Reactor (GCR) by the STA, and later Canada Deuterium Uranium 
(CANDU) reactor by the MITI. While the CANDU reactor idea was abandoned, a small, 
 
107 Ishikawajima Shibaura Turbine, together with Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, 
previously made a gas turbine license contract with Brown Boveri, but was merged into Tokyo 
Shibaura Electric, a predecessor of Toshiba, in 1961. 
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single GCR was constructed in 1966. Unfortunately, this resulted in high costs, due to 
early cracks and the difficulty of repairing and replacing defective equipment. Japanese 
private utilities were against the government’s choices given that commercially proven 
American reactors, namely PWRs and BWRs already existed in the 1960s (Samuels, 1987). 
In the meantime, private HEI firms including Mitsubishi, Hitachi and Toshiba 
made their own choice of commercial reactors with American OEMs, namely 
Westinghouse and GE. Mitsubishi group’s 25 member firms established Mitsubishi 
Atomic Power Inc. (MAPI) as a nuclear engineering firm in 1958. Subsequently, MAPI 
agreed to a PWR technology license contract with Westinghouse in July of 1959, and the 
contract was approved by the Japanese government in September 1961 (MHI, 1990). The 
two-year delay was a typical aspect of the technology transfer negotiation process 
between domestic firm-government alliances and foreign licensors based on the FIL, 
which was omnipresent in the post-war era Japanese market (see Section 5.3.1). 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Catch-up to ‘the 1st Generation PWRs’ in the 1970s 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ PWR technology catch-up process followed its fossil 
power technology indigenisation pattern in the 1950s, which means if a first unit was built 
by foreign firms, MHI reviewed all the technology and built the second unit itself. This 
began with the Mihama unit 1 (340MW) order from Kansai Power in 1966. The order was 
divided into Westinghouse as a main contractor of the NSSS and MAPI as the main 
contractor of the turbine island in 1967. In the meantime, MHI acted as a subcontractor of 
Westinghouse for production of containment vessels and balance of power-related pipes. 
In preparing the construction, MHI sent numerous engineers and staff members to 
Westinghouse headquarters in the US for their training in designing and operating PWR 
reactors with the intention of technological accumulation in the 1960s (MHI, 1990). 
Following the first unit order, Kansai Power ordered its second PWR (500MW) 
from MHI in May 1968. From the second unit, MHI localised almost all component 
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technologies, equipment and system technologies. Once there was a second unit of this 
kind, the main contractor of the project was changed from Westinghouse to MAPI, and 
MHI designed and produced most of the reactor equipment and components while 
Westinghouse only designed some primary system equipment such as steam generators. 
This pattern was repeated three times following each scaled-up PWR, including Mihama 
1 and 2 of the 340~500MW class, Takahama 1 and 2 of the 800MW class and finally Oi 1 
and 2 of the 1,100MW class (MHI, 1990) (Table 5.9). 
Facing rapid power demand growth, Kansai Power ordered Takahama 1 in May 
1970. Takahama 1 was 826MW and a ‘three-loop plant’, namely three steam generators 
and three coolant circulation loops. In other words, it is different from Mihama 1 and 2, 
which have a two-loop design. In this situation, Westinghouse acted as a main contractor 
again. This time, MHI learned the larger design as quickly as it could get an order of the 
second unit, Takahama 2, from Kansai Power in December of the same year. Moreover, it 
indigenised the reactor core structure and control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) through 
the construction of this unit, and its overall PWR technology indigenisation rate jumped 
from 76% to 95% in the case of Mihama unit 2. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries reported that 
it localised 95% of PWR technologies through Takahama 2 in 1975, and with Genkai 2 in 
1981 reached 99% in terms of its share of total economic value (MHI, 1990) (Table 5.9). 
As technology transfer gradually progressed, Westinghouse finished its direct 
involvement in the nuclear construction projects with the final order as a main contractor 
from Kansai Power for Oi 1 and 2 in 1972. After the order of Oi 1 and 2, MHI became a 
supplier of full scope PWR technologies from system design to equipment in all 
subsequent PWR orders in Japan. Nevertheless, MHI continued efforts to absorb new 
PWR technologies from Westinghouse. It opened MAPI’s resident office near 
Westinghouse’s headquarter in Pittsburgh and let MAPI arrange training of MHI 
employees for design, production and operation under Westinghouse’s supervision. 
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From this continued close relationship, MHI evinced the intention for an efficient licence 
relationship with Westinghouse for new technologies in future (MHI, 1990). 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries claims that it improved reliability and capacity 
factors through its first phase programme, which included seven reactors from Genkai 
unit 2 and Tsuruga unit 2. Also, MHI claims that it increased the technology 
indigenisation rate to 99% in 1981 through the application of its own RCP, expanded 
application of automatic systems, reduced employees’ radiation dose and improved 
designs for easier maintenance and repair (MHI, 1990) (Table 5.9).  
Nevertheless, MHI suffered from a lack of new orders from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1980s due to the decreased growth rate of electricity demand and local resistance. It 
focused on cost reduction through modification of its reactor design. From a series of 
reviews aimed at minimising cost, MHI constructed seven more PWRs, including Tomari 
1&2 of Hokkaido Power, and Genkai 3&4 of Kyushu Power in the 1990s. Despite the early 
and wide scope technology indigenisation of reactors, stress corrosion crackings (SCCs) 
of steam generator tubes remained as a serious concern (MHI, 1990; Mishima, 1990; 
Miyake & Mukai, 2003).  
 
 
 
212 
 
Table 5.9 Progress in Indigenisation of Pressurised Water Reactors by MHI 
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Source: MHI 1990; Miyake and Mukai 2003 
Note: W = Westinghouse, CE = Combustion Engineering, MAPI = Mitsubishi Atomic Power Inc., MHI = 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, RV= Reactor Vessel, RC= Reactor Core, SG = Steam Generator, ST = Steam 
Turbine. 
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Stress Corrosion Cracking of Steam Generator Tubes and Subsequent Upgrades 
Although the first-generation American PWRs and BWRs had better experiences 
than the British GCR, it was still too early to see the chronic material problems, namely 
SCC of tubes and pipes (see Section 2.2.1). Mitsubishi Heavy Industries had to face 
numerous coolant leak events due to SCC of steam generator tubes and long years’ worth 
of shutdowns of Mihama unit 1. The cracking and coolant leaking issue at Mihama unit 1 
amidst public anger regarding overall environmental pollution issues induced the 
strengthening of safety regulations regarding nuclear reactors as well. Thanks to the 
strengthened regulation, the average capacity factor of Japanese PWRs fell from 72% to 
43% between 1971 and 1973 and remained at around 50% until the end of the decade 
(Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, 2014; MacDonald et al., 1996; Togo, 1984).108 
In order to solve the SCC problems alongside other operational and maintenance 
problems, MITI launched public R&D programme, namely the Light Water Reactor 
(LWR) Improvement and Standardisation Programme, in 1975. The programme was 
aimed to standardise LWR designs in three phases by 1985. In its first and second phases, 
the existing BWR and PWR reactors were modified to improve operational and 
maintenance performances. MHI participated in the programme with assistance from 
Westinghouse. Solving the SCC problems of steam generator tubes was a priority issue of 
these public programmes. Out of US$190 million ($436 million in 2017 price) for total 
reliability test R&D budget, US$61 million ($194 million in 2017 price) was spent on the 
SCC issue of steam generator tubes between the mid-1970s and early 1980s (Taniguchi, 
1985). Technological improvements regarding the safety of the steam generator tubes are 
summarised below: 
▪ Coolant water quality from phosphate treatment to all volatile treatment; 
▪ Structural modification of the tube supports and anti-vibration bars; 
▪ Application of more corrosion-resistant materials, e.g. Alloy 690 instead of 600; 
 
108 In effect, BWRs in Japan also suffered from serious coolant pipe cracks and leaks during the 
same period, but the thesis does not cover BWR issues in detail. 
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▪ Improving manufacturing methods from rolling to hydraulic expansion to restrain 
residual stress of tubes (Miyake & Mukai, 2003). 
In the third phase, MHI planned to increase reactor design size up to 1,350MW in 
1980. It co-developed the reactor with Westinghouse in addition to cooperation with five 
electrical utilities, including Kansai Electric Power Company. As a result, its Advanced 
Pressurised Water Reactor (APWR) was certified by the Atomic Engineering Test Centre, 
the MITI’s nuclear power technology institute, in 1987 (MHI, 1990; Taniguchi, 1985). Later, 
the APWR design was scaled-up to 1,500MW class and was applied to Japan Atomic 
Power Co. (JAPCO)’s Tsuruga unit 3&4 construction plan in 2004. Furthermore, MHI 
developed 1,700MW class APWR design targeting the US and European nuclear reactor 
markets in the late 2000s (IAEA, 2004). 
In effect, the APWR was one of development target reactors in the US Advanced 
Light Water Reactor programme, launched in 1985 and completed in 1999. It shows the 
technological and leveraging capability of MHI given that even its licensor, namely 
Westinghouse, could not complete the APWR design development during and after the 
programme. It also shows its close relationship with Westinghouse based on long years’ 
technology cooperation (see Section A2 and A4.2 of Appendix A). 
However, APWR reactor was never constructed anywhere in the world. Kansai 
Power and Japan Atomic Power have tried to build the APWR in Japan since 1989 but 
failed to do so. Even worse, strengthened safety regulations on seismic protection issues 
in the mid-2000s forced the power companies to delay the APWR construction projects 
(Maeda, 2010; NRC, 1992). Considering the even stricter regulations on the seismic issue 
after the Fukushima accident in 2011, it is unlikely that APWR has any future for 
commercialisation in Japan. It also suspended its design certification process of APWR in 
the US in 2013 (Ogata, 2013). 
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Table 5.10 Japanese LWR Innovation: Standardisation Programmes and Targets 
Target Items 1st Phase 
(1975-77) 
2nd Phase 
(1978-80) 
3rd Phase 
(1982-87) 
Capacity Factor Around 70% Around 75% 90% 
Annual Inspection 
Outage Duration 
About 85 days About 70 days 45 days 
Reliability 
Improvement 
Corrosion-resistant 
materials in Steam 
Generator 
Improving CRDM, 
Nuclear Fuel 
Developing ABWR 
and APWR, 
Improving Turbine 
Systems 
Typical PWRs Sendai 1, Tsuruga 2 Genkai 3 & 4  Tsuruga 3 & 4 
(planning halted) 
Typical BWRs Fukushima Daini 2 Kashiwazaki-K 2&5 Kashiwazaki-K. 6 & 7 
Source: Mishima 1990: 86 
 
Unsatisfactory Export Performance Despite Rise in Sophistication 
Despite MHI’s early technological indigenisation and increased sophistication of 
PWRs in the 1970s and 1980s and eventual expiration of licence with Westinghouse in 
1991(Schuler et al., 2004), its export performance was limited in dozens of subsystems and 
equipment until the 2010s. The firm started its nuclear equipment export from a steam 
turbines contract with Mexico in 1972 and a reactor vessel contract with China in 1984. 
Export performance of replacement steam generators (RSGs) has been better than other 
equipment thanks to the omnipresent SCC of steam generator tubes and subsequent early 
degradations of steam generators in OECD countries. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
received orders for 31 RSGs from utilities in the US, France and Belgium from the 1980s 
to the late 2000s (World Nuclear News, 12 May 2010). 
Although MHI put efforts into the export of nuclear reactor systems rather than 
component equipment, both internal and external conditions did not allow its export. 
Recognising some equipment export contracts with China in the mid-1980s as a signal of 
export conditions, MHI established its nuclear export group in May 1986. However, the 
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Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 and the appreciation of Japanese Yen to US dollars in 
1985 discouraged export efforts (MHI, 1990). Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was concerned 
that both the domestic and major global market, such as the US, faced nuclear market 
saturation in the 1990s. It seems to have considered developing small reactors under 
600MW for developing countries (Sato, 1991). This niche market idea has not been 
materialised. 
Table 5.11 Nuclear Equipment Exports by MHI from 1984~2018 
 
RCP RV RVH ST SG 
China 8 3 
 6  
Korea 
  
3 
  
Taiwan 
   
2 
 
N. America 
  
15 
 
6 
Central & S. Americas 
  
1 2  
Europe 
 
1 3 2 25 
Total 8 4 22 12 31 
Source: MHI 2006, 2018 
Note: RCP=Reactor Coolant Pump, RV= Reactor Vessel, RVH=Reactor Vessel Head, ST = Steam Turbine, 
SG = Steam Generator 
The unsatisfactory nuclear export performance can be observed in the other major 
Japanese HEI firms’ cases too. Although Hitachi and Toshiba have been actively involved 
with GE’s BWR construction projects in Taiwan, their role was limited in the supply of 
components and equipment as a subcontractor to GE. For instance, Hitachi provided 
reactor containment vessels to the Chinshan project and spent nuclear fuel storage racks 
for the Kuosheng project in the 1970s, and reactor pressure vessel and internal reactor 
components for the Lungmen project in the early 2000s (Yoshimura et al., 2009; AEC, 
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2013).109 They tried to improve their nuclear export performance as the main contractor of 
a whole nuclear construction project rather than a subcontractor from the late 2000s 
through either acquisition of or forming of a joint venture with foreign nuclear OEMs. 
Toshiba was the first mover in shifting from a subcontractor to a prime contractor 
by severing the old ties with a foreign licensor and buying a new nuclear vendor. It 
acquired Westinghouse from British Nuclear Fuel Ltd. In 2006 and aimed at foreign 
nuclear export markets for Westinghouse’s AP1000 PWR. Promptly, Hitachi also formed 
a joint venture with GE in 2007, namely Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, Ltd. With 80/20 share 
arrangement of the joint venture, Hitachi became a prime contractor in the global nuclear 
market and aimed at exporting ABWR reactors (Hitachi, 2012). In a similar vein, MHI also 
formed a joint venture with AREVA, a French nuclear OEM, in 2007 and aimed at 
developing and exporting jointly developed 1,100 MW PWR reactors (MHI, 2007). 
As soon as Toshiba initiated a destabilisation of the Japanese nuclear HEI, it started 
two AP1000 construction projects in the US and formed its UK subsidiary, namely NuGen, 
in 2009 to build another AP1000 reactors at the Moorside site. In addition, Korea’s first 
nuclear export case to the UAE in 2009 stimulated the Japanese nuclear community to 
participate in the fierce nuclear export market competition. The Japanese HEI firms, 
including MHI, Toshiba, and Hitachi, and nine Japanese ESI firms organised a nuclear 
export consortium, namely International Nuclear Energy Development of Japan Co. 
(JINED), under government sponsorship in 2010. The unprecedented user-producer 
nuclear export consortium in Japan first aimed at the Vietnamese market. The consortium 
made an agreement with the Vietnamese government to construct nuclear plants even 
without a reactor choice, whether it is PWR or BWR, in 2010. It indicates a sense of urgency 
 
109 The Lungmen nuclear project, which could have been the first ABWR out of Japan, was 
scrapped by the Taiwanese government due to safety concern and public protest in 2015. 
Although there are some suggestions to restart the project, the project is officially and 
irreversibly cancelled (Nuclear Engineering International, 2019).  
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that the Japanese nuclear industry felt after it was defeated by the Korean consortium in 
the UAE nuclear tender. 110 
Although the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 halted Japanese government 
and nuclear vendors export efforts temporarily, MHI, Toshiba/Westinghouse and Hitachi-
GE Nuclear resumed the efforts. MHI, alongside its French ally, AREVA, signed a nuclear 
export contract with Turkey in 2013 at a heavily discounted price (about US$ 18 billion for 
four reactors), in winning the competition with the Korean KEPCO/Doosan consortium. 
Also, Hitachi entered the UK nuclear market through acquiring Horizon Nuclear Power 
Ltd from German electric utilities in 2012 to construct two Advanced BWR(ABWR) 
reactors at the Wylfa site (Johnston, 2017). 
However, all the nuclear export projects expected by the Japanese nuclear OEMs 
and the nuclear consortium eventually failed after their decade long export efforts. It is 
unlikely that they restart nuclear export efforts in foreseeable future considering the 
extent of the financial damage and cost increase of the nuclear projects they experienced. 
Firstly, the Vietnamese government cancelled the nuclear construction plan due to 
concerns with increasing construction cost in 2016 (Larson, 2016). Secondly, Toshiba’s 
Westinghouse went bankrupt in 2017 due to the soaring construction cost of the two 
nuclear projects, including Virgil Clifton Summer (Summer in short) in South Carolina 
and Vogtle in Georgia, in the US. The bankruptcy induced Toshiba exit the nuclear market 
with a substantial financial loss. It also completely abandoned its Moorside nuclear project 
in the UK and liquidated NuGen in November 2018 after it failed to sell the subsidiary to 
KEPCO (Adelman & Yamaguchi 2018). 
Thirdly, the construction cost of the Sinop project in Turkey has doubled due to 
enhanced safety standards after the Fukushima accident during a feasibility study, and 
 
110 Interview with Yuji Takahashi, Chief Operating Officer, International Nuclear Energy 
Development of Japan Co., LTD., Tokyo, and Yoshihiro Tomioka, General Manager of Nuclear 
Power Department, The Federation of Electric Power Corporations, Tokyo, on 1 February 2011 
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MHI cancelled the project in December 2018, eventually. The problem was not a fear of 
the host country about nuclear accident risks but the heightened safety regulation after 
the Fukushima accident and the cost rise (Tsuji, 2018). 
Finally, Hitachi also announced indefinite suspension of its Wylfa nuclear project 
in the UK in January 2019, leaving substantial financial expenditure for preparation 
works. It suffered from increased cost, a reduced subsidy from the UK government, and 
lack of private investors. It expected further support from the UK government and private 
investors, but neither side did Hitachi favour in the end. The UK government has already 
been criticised by the National Audit Office, the UK’s national auditor, due to its generous 
subsidy to EDF’s Hinkley Point C nuclear project and suggested much less subsidy to 
Hitachi’s Wylfa project. Also, Tokyo Power, one of the major prospective private investors 
of the Wylfa project, indicated its unwillingness to participate in the project due to the 
soaring cost and financial risk (Hotta & Ibusuki, 2018; Ibusuki, 2018; Johnston, 2017; The 
Economist, 2019). 
 
5.3.3. Japanese Gas Turbine Technology Catch-up History 
Japanese gas turbine manufacturers can be grouped by the size of major gas 
turbine products. The big three ‘heavies’ include Mitsubishi, Hitachi and Toshiba Heavy 
Industries, who mostly supply large CCGTs to utilities, while Kawasaki Heavy Industries 
(KHI), Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI)111, Niigata, Kobe Steel and Mitsui 
Shipbuilding mostly supply small and medium gas turbines for various applications. In 
particular, MHI’s technological leadership has been pronounced. It developed its own 
 
111 Among the gas turbine suppliers, IHI, KHI and MHI also manufacture jet engines for airplanes. 
IHI performs the most advanced jet engine blade manufacturing process technologies through 
its precision casting subsidiary, namely ICC, in Japan. 
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high temperature-resistant materials as well as a precision casting process for gas turbines 
through its Keiretsu members, including Mitsubishi Steel Manufacturing Co. and 
Mitsubishi Materials Co, who were predecessors of MHI Precision Casting.112 
There has been a certain division of labour between the three big ‘heavies’ and 
other small- and medium-sized gas-turbine makers in terms of market segments. The 
three big ‘heavies’ concentrate on large gas turbines mainly for base-load power plants of 
utilities, while smaller gas-turbine makers focus on emergency purpose gas turbines for 
building and factory owners. Although the production of large gas turbines had been 
divided into base-load and peak-load markets in the beginning, large machines have been 
produced solely for the base-load market since the end of the 1990s (Table 5.12).113 
Table 5.12 Land-based Gas Turbine Production by Japanese Makers in 1948-2003 
  Base Load Peak Load Emergency 
 
Delivered 
Year Units 
Output 
(MW) Units 
Output 
(MW) Units 
Output 
(MW) 
Small 
1948-03 
224 72 12 6 4,957 1,777 
Medium 1,019 4,597 135 1,297 2,620 4,349 
Large 564 52,282 136 7,598 1 24 
Total 1,810 56,956 284 8,912 7,578 6,148 
Large GTs 
by Periods 
1948-69 0 0 2 60 0 0 
1970-78 100 3,796 78 2,418 0 0 
1979-83 61 2,786 13 319 1 24 
1984-88 48 2,453 10 554 0 0 
1989-93 102 9,890 15 1,656 0 0 
1994-98 114 14,426 18 2,591 0 0 
1999-03 139 18,931 0 0 0 0 
Source: Gas Turbine Society of Japan 2004 
Note: Small = ~0.74MW, Medium = 0.74~22MW, Large = 22MW~. 
 
112 Email interview with Youngsoo Yu, Senior Researcher, High Temperature Material Department, 
Korea Institute of Material Science, Changwon, on 13 January 2015 
113 Interview with Osamu Kimura, Research Economist, Socioeconomic Research Center, Central 
Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, Tokyo, on 15 February 2011 
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 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Gas Turbine Licence Contract with Westinghouse 
In establishing a gas turbine licence with Western firms, MHI alone enjoyed an 
exceptional technology transfer option from the licence contract amongst Japanese HEI 
firms, thanks to the timing of the contract in advance of the liberalisation of FDI 
regulation. Once dismantled into three heavy industry firms by Supreme Command for 
Allied Powers (SCAP) and re-merged in 1965, MHI’s two post-war predecessors 
established different licensors in parallel. Shin-Mitsubishi (Central Japan MHI), after 
several years of its in-house R&D of gas turbines, re-established its licence relationship 
with Westinghouse for gas turbines in 1961 and delivered its first Westinghouse-type 
industrial gas turbine (12MW) for Asahi Glass’s Chiba factory in 1963 (MHI, 1990). 
In addition, Mitsubishi Zosen (West Japan MHI), predecessor of the current 
Nagasaki Shipyard of MHI, re-established a licence contract with a Swiss firm, Escher 
Wyss, in 1953 regarding steam and gas turbines for land-based and marine applications. 
Following the licence contract, it delivered its first industrial gas turbine for an air 
supplying locomotive of a blast furnace at Yawata Steel in 1958 (MHI, 1990). 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries initiated its technology accumulation of gas turbines 
under the Westinghouse licence relationship in two ways. Regarding design capability, it 
developed its capability through iterative feedback from Westinghouse, including 
imitation, trials of design and reviews by Westinghouse designers. At the same time, it 
developed manufacturing capability through producing industrial gas turbines for 
marine propulsion and machine locomotive purposes based on, for instance, the 
Westinghouse W-251 model (MHI, 1990). 
However, the other two manufacturers did not enjoy the technology transfer 
option from their licence contracts. Although Hitachi began its in-house gas turbine R&D 
in 1949, it re-established a gas turbine licence contract with GE in 1964 only after the 
Japanese government withdrew from the post-war FDI regulations. Then, it delivered its 
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first industrial gas turbine (6MW) based on GE technology in 1966. Toshiba experienced 
a slightly different pattern of licensing with foreign OEMs. Ishikawajima Shibabura Turbine, 
a predecessor of Toshiba’s gas turbine division, entered a licence contract with Brown 
Boveri, a Swiss predecessor of ABB in 1958. It delivered its first industrial gas turbine 
(5MW) in 1961. Having lagged behind its competitors in high thermal inlet temperature, 
however, Toshiba changed its licensor to GE for leading commercial gas turbines in 1982. 
Like the Hitachi-GE licence contract case, however, its contract also lacked the possibility 
of including a technology transfer option (Kimura & Kajiki, 2008; Ikegami, 2009). 
Thus, the difference in technology transfer options is ascribed to the change of the 
Japanese government’s trade regulations and subsequent change of technology licence 
regulations in the mid-1960s. The post-war era Japanese government’s regulatory logic 
was to let a leading Japanese firm enter technology licensing contracts with foreign firms 
for technology transfer, and let the firm share the transferred technology information with 
other competing domestic firms (see Section 5.3.1.). 
Different Strategic Interests with the Licensor Across Dual Electrical Systems 
Although MHI had a better position than its domestic competitors, it also had to 
face conflict with Westinghouse over different strategic markets, which led to MHI’s own 
development of MW-701B and MW-252 in the early 1970s. When Middle Eastern 
countries’ oil field development boomed around 1970, MHI considered the Middle East 
an emerging strategic market for gas turbines. Most of these countries, however, had 
different electrical frequency systems or oil field purpose locomotive demand for gas 
turbines, away from Westinghouse’s interest (MHI, 1990; Hoshi 2002). 
Middle Eastern utilities mostly use 50Hz, unlike MHI’s home market, namely the 
Kansai region (western part of Japan) or Westinghouse’s home market which use 60Hz. 
Also, industrial gas turbines used for oil field purposes need to operate in a wide range of 
variations in both revolutions and loads in driving pumps and compressors for pipelines, 
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compared to gas turbines used for utility purposes (Watanabe, 1977). Thus, MHI had 
strong incentives to develop 50Hz and locomotive gas turbines. Westinghouse, however, 
was not eager to lead the development of both 50Hz and locomotive machines and refused 
to offer respective gas turbine blueprints to MHI. Instead, it indicated that it would review 
MHI’s draft blueprint. Thus, MHI tried drawing its first 50Hz gas turbine blueprint based 
on Westinghouse’s 60Hz W-501B machine rather than a tailored blueprint for a 50Hz 
system. Westinghouse’s indifference to 50Hz gas turbines could be explained by the fact 
that its production line had been already set to produce 60Hz machines targeted to its 
home market, namely North America (Hoshi, 2002; Kimura & Kajiki, 2008). 
By comparison, MHI had a large domestic market for 50Hz gas turbines, namely 
the Kanto region (the eastern half of Japan). It had already accumulated modification 
capabilities of 50Hz steam turbines for coal and oil power plants in the early 1960s, 
including Tokyo Power’s Yokohama unit 2 in 1962 based on Westinghouse’s 60Hz steam 
turbines. Furthermore, MHI’s gas turbine production system had not yet been fixed to a 
60Hz market. At that time, MHI was about to rearrange its scattered heavy electrical 
machinery development resources across its various shipyards in Japan. As a result of the 
rearrangement, MHI established a gas turbine test facility at its Takasago Machinery 
Works in around 1970 (MHI, 1990). 
By the mid-1970s, MHI experienced half success and half failure in developing gas 
turbines for the 50Hz electrical networks. It succeeded in developing its first 50Hz gas 
turbine, namely 701B, based on Westinghouse’s W-501B machine in the mid-1970s. Its first 
order came from Qatar’s Water and Electric Power Department for 93MW gas turbine in 
1975. Its first domestic order for a 50Hz gas turbine came from Hokkaido Power for the 
Onbettsu plant (74MW × 2) in 1976. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries considers the 701B as a 
prototype of 701D, its first CCGT (MHI, 1990). By comparison, it failed at commercialising 
the MW-252 gas turbines for industrial purposes after it spent three years on the process 
and incurred high development costs (Hoshi, 2002; Ikegami, 2009). 
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Catching-up Through Modifications Across Dual Electrical Systems 
In effect, the conflicting interests over different electrical systems and subsequent 
independent efforts to modify Westinghouse designs induced momentum for MHI’s 
catch-up in commercial CCGTs. It began to escape from Westinghouse’s licence when it 
modified Westinghouse’s 60Hz gas turbines such as 501D into a 50Hz machine, namely 
701D, together with its own air-cooled blade and low-NOx combustor technology in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. 114  The 501 series heavy frame gas turbine had been 
Westinghouse’s representative machine from its initial development of 501A (45MW) in 
1968 to W501ATS in 2002 (Ihor et al., 2002). From the early version, it became a runway of 
MHI’s 501 and 701 series gas turbines. This was a critical juncture in MHI’s gas turbine 
catch-up path in that MHI developed, in turn, its own 60Hz gas turbine, namely 501F, 
based on 701D and its scaled-down version M701DA (MHI, 1990) (Table 5.13 and Table 
5.14). 
Table 5.13 Catching-up through Modifications across Dual Electrical Systems 
Source: Author’s elaboration from MHI, 1990, Hoshi 2002 and Kimura & Kajiki, 2008 
 
114 MHI started independent commercial gas turbine development efforts with MW-701B based 
on Westinghouse 501D from 1970. MHI evaluates 701B as a prototype of MW-701D, a later 
version which was integrated into the first CCGT, Higashi Niigata unit 3, in Japan. 
 Power Output (MW) 
TIT 
(℃) 
5- 10- 20- 40- 80- 120- 160- 320- 480- 
800- 101  191 301      
900-   251A 501A      
1000-  M151 251B 501B            701B    50Hz Utility 
Purpose 1100-     5 0 1 D    7 0 1 D   
 1200- MF61 MF111 MF221    M701DA   
1300-     M501F M701F   
1400-  Industry 
Purpose(50/60Hz) 
  M501F3 M701F3   
1500-   60Hz Utility 
Purpose 
M501G M701G  
1600-      M501J M701J 
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Table 5.14 Gas Turbine Sales by Electrical Frequency by MHI as of 2014 
 501Series (60 Hz) 701Series (50 Hz) Small and Medium GTs 
D Class 25 units 92 units 
189 units 
(Mostly 50/60Hz Dual 
Industry Purpose GTs) 
F-Class 73 units 125 units 
G Class 70 units 11 units 
J Class 26 units 2 units 
Sub-Total 194 units 230 units 
Major Exports by Region and Domestic Sales 
Americas Europe Mid. East & Africa Asia Oceania Japan 
99 39 97 188 7 183 
Source: Ando, 2014: 15 
When MHI developed its MW 501F series of gas turbines in the late 1980s, it 
invited a team of Westinghouse designers into its development group. This 150MW 
machine’s turbine inlet temperature (TIT) is 1,350℃, and its efficiency reaches 50% with 
combined cycle (MHI, 1990). With the development of its own 60Hz 501F gas turbine, 
MHI became independent from the Westinghouse licence in terms of its technology and 
licence contract in 1986. This changed MHI’s status from licensee to ‘equal partner’ with 
Westinghouse, and the relationship continued until 1997 when the two companies 
finished joint development of the first ‘G’ class gas turbine with the operation of a 
demonstration gas turbine at the MHI’s Takasago Machinery Works (Kimura & Kajiki, 
2008).115 
Takasago Machinery Works, with its on-site R&D centre and manufacturing 
facilities, has been leading the development of various MHI’s gas turbine series under the 
Westinghouse license since the early 1970s. For example, it developed the 25MW 2 Shaft 
Gas Turbine (MW-252) for industrial purposes in 1976 based on Westinghouse’s W-251 
design. Due to its central role in absorbing Westinghouse’s technological knowledge, it 
has been often called ‘Eastinghouse’ by its own engineers (Stoloff, 1984; Tien, 1985). 
 
115 It should be noted that non-nuclear heavy electrical business of Westinghouse, including gas 
turbine, was merged by Siemens in 1998. 
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Takasago Machinery Works also collaborated with MHI’s Nagasaki Institute in the 1970s 
in developing design technologies for compressor, turbine, air-cooled blades, combustor, 
shaft system and control systems. Around 1980, in supporting MHI’s production of 501D, 
development of 701D gas turbine and the Moonlight Project’s ‘High-Efficiency Gas 
Turbine Project’, it developed crucial component technologies including an air-cooled 
blade and researched new superalloy materials. All the results were integrated into 
Tohoku’s Higashi Niigata unit 3 CCGT in 1984 (Kimura & Kajiki, 2008; MHI, 1990). 
 
Re-combination of Low NOx Combustor Under Strict Emission Standards 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ first CCGT, namely the 701D, cannot be sufficiently 
explained by its modification of machine design across the dual electric frequencies alone. 
The 701D had a salient key ingredient that outperformed advanced American CCGTs, 
namely in environmental performance. As briefly explained above, MHI commercialised 
a dry low-NOx combustor (DLNC) technology for the first time in the world, and its 
performance surpassed that of the global leaders, including GE (Aoyama & Mandai, 
1984). The technology of NOx emission control is crucial in gas turbine developments in 
that the formation of NOx exponentially increases in response to the combustion 
temperature increase which is essential to improve thermal efficiency (Tanaka et al., 2013). 
It means that the NOx control technology is a crosscutting solution area between ever 
strengthening global emission standards and ever-increasing combustion temperature for 
energy efficiency of gas turbines in the worldwide competition. 
In effect, GE won the first CCGT plant contract in Japan from Tokyo Power in 1981. 
The 2,000MW CCGT contract for the first and second groups of power plants at Tokyo 
Power’s Futtsu site was a breakthrough to GE given that the US and European CCGT 
markets were frozen in the 1980s (Watson, 1997). GE, however, faced an unfamiliar 
challenge, namely the stringent Japanese local NOx emission regulations. Its ‘wet-type’ 
NOx emission control technology which injects steam or water into the flame in the 
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combustor could not meet the stringent regulation. Although GE’s 9001E gas turbine 
could lower NOx emission to 42 ppm by using the ‘wet-type’ control in the Futtsu project, 
for instance, it could not meet the Japanese local standard which was 10 ppm. The project 
was delayed two years due to the emission issue, and barely met the local standard with 
Tokyo Power’s own post-combustion technique, namely selective catalytic reduction 
(SCR), in 1986. The SCR was also a new technology to GE whereas it was already widely 
applied to the Japanese fossil power plants from the late 1970s (Angello & Lowe, 1989; 
Ando, 1983; US EPA, 1993) (see also Section 5.2.5). 
In the 1980s’ global market, conventional combustors of gas turbines input fuel 
and air directly into the combustion zone and created a wide variation in the air-to-fuel 
ratio. This irregularity induces combustion of ‘localised fuel-rich pockets’, which 
produces significant levels of NOx emissions. In order to reduce the NOx emission of the 
combustor, the global OEMs used ‘wet-type’ treatments which inject steam or water into 
the flame in the combustor. The injection of steam or water reduces the temperature of the 
flame and subsequently reduces NOx emission sacrificing thermal efficiency. As NOx 
emission standards were strengthened in the 1980s’ US, the global gas turbine OEMs 
initially responded with more extensive use of steam or water injections. This response, 
however, causes not only further loss of energy efficiency but also substantial equipment 
and maintenance costs (Angello & Lowe, 1989; US EPA, 1993). 
Even after the installation in 1986, GE’s 9001E gas turbines suffered serious 
technical problems with the wet-type NOx control. The steam injection caused various 
problems, such as ‘flame out’ or rundown of power plants, lower thermal efficiency and 
more frequent inspections and part replacement at additional costs (Angello & Lowe, 
1989; EPA, 1993). After the saga of Futtsu group 1, Tokyo Power requested GE to apply 
dry low-NOx combustors for Futtsu group 2 CCGT units and joined GE’s combustor 
development programme as a sponsor. The company’s dry combustor, however, was not 
developed until the group 2 gas turbines started operation in 1988 (Angello & Lowe, 1989; 
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Hara, 1992). Its first dry combustor in Japan was applied to Tokyo Power’s Yokohama 
group 7 only in 1996 (Aizawa & Carberg, 1992; Tomlinson & McCullough, 1996). While 
GE and Tokyo Power suffered project delays and failure in the development of DLNC, 
MHI delivered the actually first CCGT in Japan in addition to its world-first commercial 
DLNC (Angello & Lowe, 1989). 
How could the latecomer commercialise the world first DLNC surpassing the 
global OEMs? In effect, MHI already developed a pre-mix combustor for oil and gas 
boilers in the mid-1970s to adapt to the strengthened Japanese NOx emission standards. 
The technology is based on MHI’s “off-set premixed flame theory”, a modification of the 
existing “premix flame combustion theory” mostly used in rocket designs by the US in 
the 1970s (Kawamura & Frey, 1980). While conventional combustors widely used for oil 
and gas boilers at that time produced a vast amount of NOx due to their irregularity of 
air to fuel mixture, the premix technology contributed to substantial reduction of NOx 
emission in dozens of oil and gas boiler power plants in the late 1970s’ Japan, such as 
Tokyo Power’s Anegasaki power plant in 1977. 
Later, it was applied to coal power plants too and licensed to CE for application to 
coal power plants in the US (Angello & Lowe, 1989; MHI, 1990). Table 5.15 shows that 
MHI’s premix combustion technology for gas boilers was a result of adaptation to 
gradually strengthened emission standards in the 1970s’ Japan, even before CCGT 
technology was commercialised. Table 5.16 shows difference of NOx emission standards 
for gas turbines between countries. It should be noted that once the DLNC technology is 
recognised available, a couple of regional regulatory agencies in the US, such as South 
Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD), set more restrictive NOx limits as 
low as 9ppm, which became effective from 1995 (US EPA, 1993). 
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Table 5.15 Gas Boiler Technology Adaptation of MHI to NOx Standards in the 1970s 
 Pre-1973 1973 1975 1977 
Emission standard 
on gas boilers 
None 
(180~250ppm) 
130ppm 100ppm 60ppm 
MHI’s abatement 
technology 
Tangential 
burner 
Tangential + GM PM burner 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Ando 1983 and MHI 1990 
Note: GM and PM stand for Gas Recirculation Mixture and Pollution Minimum, respectively. 
 
Table 5.16 International Comparison of NOx Standards on Gas Turbine in 1984 
 Turbine Capacity (MW) National Standards (ppm) Local Standards (ppm) 
Germany 60 or larger  147 - 
less than 60  172 - 
US 10 or larger  75 9 (SCAQMD 1995) 
Japan 10 or larger  70 (1987) 15(Tohoku),10(Tokyo) 
Source: Angelo & Lowe 1989, US EPA 1993 
To overcome the issue, the global gas turbine OEMs developed ‘a lean premixed 
combustor’, which premixes the air and fuel in an air rich ratio before fuel injection into 
the combustion zone following the lead of MHI in the 1980s and 1990s. This results in a 
mixture with a very fuel-lean and uniform air/fuel ratio for delivery to the combustion 
zone and a minimal NOx formation. Although all global gas turbine OEMs had initiated 
programmes for lean premixed combustors in the 1980s, only GE, Siemens and ABB 
among them had succeeded in commercialising the technology. Even Westinghouse could 
not develop the new combustion system and still had to depend on the ‘wet-type’ 
combustor (Bender, 2006; US EPA, 1993). 
Table 5.17 shows NOx emission performances of the conventional ‘wet-type’ 
combustors, a widely applied technology at the time, and newly developed DLNCs of the 
global gas turbine OEMs in 1993 in the face of strengthened US emission standards. At 
this stage, their newly developed DLNCs caught up with the 1984 version DLNC of MHI 
(Angello & Lowe, 1989; US EPA, 1993). Although the three global OEMs appear to have 
caught-up to MHI’s 1984 version DLNC technology with the lower NOx emissions in 
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1993, their lower TITs indicate their thermal efficiency was compromised for the 
environmental performance.116 Given that NOx emission exponentially increases as TIT 
increases, it is doubtful if their 1993 version combustion technologies were superior to the 
1984 version DLNC of MHI. 
Table 5.17 NOx Emission Control Performance of the Global OEMs in 1993 
 Model Output 
(MW) 
Temperature 
(TIT, °C) 
Wet Control 
(Steam/SCR) 
Dry Control 
(DLNC/ SCR) 
GE a, b 
9001E 116.9 1,085 (1988) 42/9 not developed 
9001E 125 1,124 (1991) 42/9 25/9 
Siemens V 84.2 105 1,060 55/n.a. 25/9 
ABB GT11N 83.3 1,027 25/9 25/9 
Westinghouse 501D5 109 1,132 25/n.a. not developed 
MHI (1984) c 701D 137 1,150 - 75/15 
Source: Angello & Lowe 1989 a, Pavri & Moore 2001 b , Aoyama & Mandai 1984 c, US EPA 1993: 5-136, 6-254, 6-255 
Note: TIT = Turbine Inlet Temperature, DLNC = Dry Low NOx Combustor, SCR = Selective Catalytic Reduction 
 
Special Relationship Between MHI and Tohoku Power on NOx Control 
The special relationship between MHI and Tohoku Power must be analysed in two 
aspects. First, mutual trust between the two firms under uncertain conditions need to be 
addressed. Under the conservative culture of the Japanese utilities, it was difficult for 
domestic producers to supply their first commercial product to the utilities (MHI, 1990). 
Therefore, Tohoku’s acceptance of MHI’s first CCGT was unusual in the Japanese 
electricity market in the early 1980s. Below, Osamu Kimura from Central Research Institute 
of Electric Power Industry explains the background behind this: 
Although the government initiated national technology development 
programmes for gas turbines, the utilities` role is more important in terms of 
providing a stable gas turbine market. In the early period of gas turbine 
 
116 An increase of 56°C (100°F) in turbine inlet temperature, for instance, provide a corresponding 
1.5~2.3% improvement in thermal efficiency of gas turbines (Soares, 2007; Huda et al., 2014). 
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commercialisation, Japanese utilities did not trust domestic manufacturers. 
However, the utilities gradually came to prefer domestic manufacturers to 
foreign suppliers since it was more comfortable to discuss with the domestic 
makers when the issues are complex, such as maintenance. For instance, when 
MHI developed its first CCGT (701D), the president of MHI met the president 
of Tohoku Power to negotiate the contract from the beginning. That is how 
MHI and Tohoku made their gas turbine business relationship, like a 
gentlemen’s agreement between top decision-makers.117 
Second, MHI’s close relationship with Tohoku Power cannot be separated from 
the stringent Japanese local emission standards on electricity suppliers. Before 1980, 
Westinghouse’s ‘wet-type’ combustors did not meet the local standards. The latecomer, 
thereby, needed to develop the DLNC technology based on its lean premix burner 
technology for gas boilers. It led MHI and Tohoku Power to tight cooperation as a 
developer and a sponsor, respectively. It took two years for MHI to develop the DLNC 
upon Tohoku’s request. 
After installation of the combustor, it took four months to complete final 
adjustments (Aoyama & Mandai, 1984; Angello & Lowe, 1989; Jeffs, 2008). The co-
development process between the two firms for innovation of the DLNC was repeated 
several times in the face of ever-increasing turbine inlet temperature and strict 
environmental regulations (Matsuzaki et al., 1992). This relationship continued until the 
2000s and worked as a base of MHI’s further development of CCGTs. For instance, 
Tohoku Power’s Higashi Niigata played a role of verification plant for M701G (50Hz 
CCGT) while MHI’s Takasago workshop did so for M501G (60Hz CCGT) (Soares, 2007). 
 
 
117 Interview with Osamu Kimura, op. cit.: p. 175 
232 
 
Table 5.18 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Milestones in Gas Turbine Catch-Up 
Milestone Implication Year 
Dependence on licensed Westinghouse designs (1970s) 
Development of MW-701B (50Hz) based 
on W-501B design GT (60Hz) 
Accumulation of technological capability 
in 50Hz gas turbine market 
1970~76 
Development of 252B for industry 
purpose GTs based on W-251B 
Accumulation of technological capability 
in industry purpose GTs 
1974~76 
Catching-up under Westinghouse licence (1978-86) 
Development of MW-701D (TIT 1,150℃, 
efficiency 48.8%)  
World 1st DLNC, 
Japan’s 1st CCGT 1984 
Joined in Moonlight Project (Target: 
1,300℃ ‘Reheat’ gas turbine) 
Accelerated learning in precision casting 
resulted in 1,250℃ industry purpose GT  
1978~87 
Equal partnership with Westinghouse (1986~96) 
Development of MW-501F/701F 
(TIT 1,350℃, efficiency 57%) 
Developed Multi-nozzle Combustor, 
World 1st large F-class CCGT 1989 
Independence from Westinghouse (1996-) 
Development of M-501G/701G (TIT 
1,500℃, efficiency 59%) 
World 1st Steam Cooling Combustor, 
Developed MGA-1400 cast blades (DS) 
1997 
Development of M-501J/701J 
(TIT 1,600℃, efficiency 61.5%) 
Efficiency Improvement 
(Extension of G-class technologies) 2011/’14 
Source: Author’s elaboration from MHI (990, Akita 2001, Komori, Yamagami & Hara 2003, and Kimura & 
Kajiki 2008 
Note: TIT=Turbine Inlet Temperature, GT = Gas Turbine, DS = Directionally Solidified 
 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Performance in the Global Gas Turbine Market 
With initial catch-ups of D class and F-class gas turbine technologies in the 1980s 
based on Westinghouse’s designs, MHI became one of the three major suppliers in the 
global gas turbine market. While GE focuses on proven technologies such those in the F-
class, Siemens and MHI put more weight on larger scale gas turbines such as J class in the 
global market. According to recent market analysis, in the mid-2010s, MHI’s share of the 
global gas turbine market in terms of gas turbine capacity is about 15%, while GE and 
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Siemens have shares of about 37% each (Korea EXIM Bank, 2014; Meritz Research, 2017) 
(Figure 5.8). 
Figure 5.8 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Performance in the Global Gas Turbine Market 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Korea EXIM Bank, 2014 
Although there had been a substantial gap between MHI and the two leading 
producers in the limited data available, this still illustrates some technical strengths and 
weaknesses of each OEM. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries appears to focus on larger and 
more efficient gas turbines while GE is more competitive in proven middle size gas 
turbines, such as F-class. In effect, more recent progress exposes that the division of labour 
comes from GE’s failure in steam cooling CCGT technologies in the 2000s and the slow 
process of replacing the production lines with air cooling one put it behind Mitsubishi 
and Siemens in the latest and large CCGTs in the 2010s (see A4.2.2. in Appendix Chapter 
A for technical details of the steam cooling technology issue). 
 Despite the technology gap with the frontier OEMs, MHI’s remarkable adaptation 
with the limited capability brought it to a leading position in the global CCGT market in 
terms of ordered capacity in 2018. It is the first time that MHI has taken a leading position 
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in the global CCGT market. In particular, its 41 per cent share compared to GE’s 28 per 
cent and Siemens’ 25 per cent in CCGTs category larger than 100MW in 2018’s global 
market shows its competitiveness in the latest CCGTs, such as J-series and J Air-Cooled 
series. The direct reason for this change comes from the failure of GE’s blades which broke 
out among its H Air-Cooling(HA) system CCGTs in 2017. The failure of blades caused 
shutdowns of at least 18 of 55 HA-systems in Japan, Taiwan, France and the US in 2018 
and subsequent reduction of sales (Gülen, 2019; Scott, 2018, 2019). 
Although GE only indicated that the cause of the blade failure is related to 
protective coatings of the blades without detail explanation, the blade failure occurred 
during the hasty transition process from its failed steam cooling technology to air cooling 
one (Scott, 2018). Given that GE spent an entire decade of the 2000s to fix problems of the 
unqualified steam cooling technology, it had to rapidly catch-up Mitsubishi and Siemens 
who applied the steam cooling to a quite limited area and replaced the steam cooling with 
air cooling much earlier, respectively. Whether the blade failure of GE HA-system is a 
random incident or an inevitable result of the hasty transition process, MHI’s catching-up 
efforts with cautious technology application appear to have paid off. More details of the 
issue are analysed and discussed in Section A4.2.2 in Appendix Chapter A. 
 
5.3.4. Specialised Metal Industry 
Precision Casters for Gas Turbine Demand in Japan 
The history of Japanese superalloy precision casters is rather short, due to the 
relatively late catch-up with the precision casting technologies from Western firms in the 
1980s and 1990s. Most of the firms belong to Keiretsu families and maintain close 
relationships with their Keiretsu HEI firms, such as MHI or Jet-engine makers like IHI. 
Although precision casters have maintained a close relationship with HEI firms, more 
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than half of precision casting products in terms of turnover come from other sectors, such 
as automobile, machinery and aircraft weaponry. 
Key component technologies in increasing gas TITs have been a material science 
(superalloy), process technology (precision casting), cooling technology and thermal 
barrier coating. Most Japanese superalloy precision casters are members of large and well-
capitalised Keiretsu, such as the Ishikawajima-Harima Casting Company of IHI and MHI 
Precision Casting of MHI. Most of the precision casters were developed from the 
backward integration of jet-engine and gas turbine manufacturers. Ishikawajima-Harima 
Heavy Industries, a jet-engine and small gas turbine parts supplier, developed its blades 
and vanes under GE’s licence. MHI Precision Casting has VIM and refining superalloys 
capabilities, as well as precision casting. In effect, MHI  integrated superalloys in primary 
production of precision casting, jet-engine and gas turbine manufacturing capabilities 
from the 1980s (Tien, 1985). 
Also, numerous Japanese leading iron and steelmakers, including Nippon Kokan, 
Kobe and Daido, had VIM capabilities, a crucial method for high-grade superalloy 
production and were able to forge superalloys from the 1980s onwards. Hitachi Metals 
are also in the superalloy business. Other Japanese firms established joint ventures with 
American superalloy firms, such as The International Nickel Company, the Cabot 
Corporation and the Howmet Corporation (Tien, 1985). 
Nevertheless, the country’s small air force defence and self-regulation on arms 
exports restricted the jet engine market from the post-war period onwards. Also, the 
Japanese superalloy makers had to import almost all superalloy ingots for turbine blades 
and vanes from the US due to licensing agreements with American firms and refusals to 
license the production alloys or even components. By comparison, the utility power plant 
market offered the Japanese HEI firms opportunities to continue to build technological 
capabilities in the gas turbine segment under American OEMs’ licences (Stoloff, 1984; 
Tien, 1985). 
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MHI Precision Casting Co. 
The MHI Precision Casting Co. specialises in precision casting and is engaged in 
the development, design, manufacture and sales of precision castings for gas turbines, 
aircrafts, automobiles, general machines, etc. in an integrated system. Initially, it was 
established as a Joint Venture between Mitsubishi Steel Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and an 
American firm, namely TRW Automotive Inc. in 1971. Although the two firms finished 
Joint Venture in 1975, their technology alliance lasted until 1986 and provided the latter a 
chance to improve precision casting technology capacity.118 
It began to manufacture low pressure turbine (LPT) blades for jet engines under 
Pratt and Whitney(P&W)’s licence in 1985. Then, it expanded its technology scope to large 
precision cast blades for land-based gas turbines from the 1990s, such as production of 
prototype blades processed by directionally solidified (DS) and single-crystal (SC) 
technologies in 1991 and 1994, respectively. Although it could not commercialise SC 
blades, its active technology relationship with American specialist firms from TRW 
Automotive to P&W paved the way for MHI’s flourishing catching-up performance in the 
global CCGT market. The precision cast division was separated from Mitsubishi Steel 
Manufacturing and established a Dia Precision Casting Co. as a 100% subsidiary of MHI 
in 1999 and then merged into MHI Precision Casting Co. in 2012 (Mitsubishi Hitachi 
Precision Casting, 2015).119 
In addition, the network of various gas turbine and propulsion system 
manufacturing and research centres within MHI, including Takasago Machinery Works, 
Hiroshima Machinery Works, Nagasaki Shipyard, the Nagoya Aero Space System Works 
and Nagoya Guided Propulsion System, seems to offer the firm a unique advantage. The 
 
118 Email interview with Jungwoo Lee, Deputy Director, Gas & Hydro Turbine Engineering Team, 
Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction, Changwon, on 23 January 2015 
119 The firm changed to Mitsubishi Hitachi Precision Casting after the merger between MHI and 
Hitachi in the thermal power plant segment in 2014; Ibid. 
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firm also supplies its products to MHI’s competitors such as KHI, Hitachi, Toshiba and 
Niigata Turbine.  
Despite the rich technology networks, it seems that MHI’s precision specialist firm 
has not yet overcome some crucial hurdles in commercialising the frontier process 
technology, namely SC. In developing the MF111 gas turbine in parallel with the 
Moonlight Project, precision casting technology was tested as a method to shape a hollow 
gas turbine blade with an inner coolant path, a crucial component for modern gas turbine 
blades. However, it was not much successful due to lack of experience with the complex 
shape of the inner coolant path (Akita, 2001). The hurdle in commercialising SC blades 
continues until the 2010s.  
MHI Precision Casting’s Gas Turbine Blade Catch-Up 
As described in Section 5.3.3, MHI was able to shorten precision casting 
technology, ceramic moulds in particular, through the famous Moonlight Project in the 
late 1970s and 1980s (Kimura & Kajiki, 2008). In addition to the public R&D programme, 
MHI’s precision casting subsidiary, Mitsubishi Superalloy, predecessor of MHI Precision 
Casting, benefitted from the long-term, stable relationship between MHI and 
Westinghouse in that the gas turbine technology transfer process also involved superalloy 
material specification, precision casting process specification, quality certification process 
and evaluation technology of reliability. Based on the technology transfer process and the 
Moonlight Project, MHI was able to commercialise its first CCGT, the 701D, for Tohoku 
Power in 1984 (Table 5.19). 
Although catching-up with precision casting technology itself does not require its 
own materials and could employ imported superalloys, donor countries could constrain 
latecomers’ future use of the materials through export control laws. Thereby, it is crucial 
for latecomers to develop their own superalloys, including patents of unique chemical 
compositions and alloy production technologies when catching-up with gas turbine 
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technology.120 All of the superalloys that MHI used for the rotating blades of its gas 
turbines were imported from the US, such as U-520 and IN738LC, until the mid-1990.  
Advanced gas turbines require heat-resistant materials as well as advanced 
cooling technologies. For the rotating blade material, MGA 1400 was developed through 
collaborative research between MHI, Mitsubishi Steel Mfg. and Mitsubishi Material Corp. 
MGA1400 is a nickel-based superalloy and can be used for DS casting. Compared to 
conventionally cast blades, the creep strength of the MGA1400 DS blade is 50 °C higher 
(Yoshioka et al., 2004) (Table 5.19). 
Table 5.19 Gas Turbine Catch-up Trend of MHI in Precision Casting121 
 Year 
Developed 
Output 
(MW) 
TIT 
(℃) 
Efficiency of 
GT only (%) 
Base Alloy Process 
501D/701D 1981/1984 114/144 1,154 31.5 U-520 Wrought 
501F/701F 1989/1993 185/270 1,350 37.0/38.2 IN-738LC Casting(CC) 
501G/701G 1997 254/334 1,500 38.7/39.5 MGA-1400 Casting(DS) 
Source: Yoshioka et al. 2004 
 Note 1: TIT= Turbine Inlet Temperature, CC = Conventional Cast, DS=Directionally Solidified 
Note 2: Only 1st stage blades are considered in Base Alloy and Process columns. The bracket indicates first 
delivery of the product.  
However, MHI has always lagged behind other global OEMs in the material 
application and casting technology, even from its first proprietary gas turbine in the 1980s. 
For example, when MHI developed its F series gas turbine in 1989, it applied conventional 
cast (CC) alloys while other OEMs applied DS alloys. This was repeated when MHI 
developed G series gas turbines in 1997. The company applied DS alloys when other 
OEMs applied SC alloys (Table 5.20). Even in its latest J-series, commercialised in 2011, 
MHI still applied DS. This was an unexpected approach in the international gas turbine 
 
120 E-mail interview with Youngsoo Yu, op. cit.: p. 220 
121 Only 1st stage blades are considered in Base Alloy and Process columns. The bracket indicates 
first delivery of the product. 
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market. Youngsoo Yu, a senior researcher from Korea Institute of Material Science, suggests 
a technical-material mismatch issue as a reason: 
We expected MHI would apply SC blades when it announced the 
development of the 1,600 ℃ class J-series gas turbine. Later, we learned that it 
still stuck to DS blades. MHI seems to have kept SC from application 
considering the risk of mismatch with the existing blade cooling and thermal 
barrier coating technologies.122 
Table 5.20 Materials of Gas Turbine Blades in the early 2000s’ Japanese Market 
 MHI Siemens/Fuji Alstom/KHI GE/Toshiba 
Model 701G2 V94.3A GT26 9H System 
Output 
(MW) 
GT 
CC  
334 
489 
266 
392 
265 
401 
- 
480 
Combustion Gas 
Temperature (°C) 
1500 (TIT) 1400 Class 
1230(ISO) 
1400 Class 
1250(ISO) 
1427 
(1st Blade) 
Pressure Ratio 21 17 32 23.2 
Efficiency 
(%, LHV)  
GT 
CC 
39.5 
58.7 
38.6 
57.4 
38.5 
59.1 
- 
60 
Coolant Air(Steam) Air Air Steam/Air 
1st Stage Blades MGA1400(DS) PWA1483(SC) CMSX4mod(SC) ReneN5(SC) 
1st Stage Vanes MGA 2400 Mar-M 509 
Source: Yoshiba 2003: 894  
Note: CC = Combined-Cycle, DS = Directionally Solidified, SC = Single-Crystal 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ recent technology review of its demonstration stage 
gas turbine for 1,700 ℃  class implies another reason for its relatively slow catch-up 
performance in blade technology. It highlights the risk of casting defects during the 
casting process, which greatly lowers the strength of blades, as well as the high cost of 
rare metal, namely rhenium, as main problems of SC blades (Oguma et al., 2015). It is not 
clear, however, whether MHI had the capability in SC blades but avoided application, or 
 
122 E-mail interview with Youngsoo Yu, op. cit. 220 
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if it did not have the capability to solve the mismatch issue. Also, the cost of the rare metal 
for SC blades does not explain its lagging performance in the 1980s and 1990s, when 
rhenium and SC blades were not commercialised on the global gas turbine market. 
Instead, the review reports that MHI and the National Institute for Materials Science 
successfully co-developed alternative SC blades without using the expensive rare metal 
and accompanying casting process technology without the risk of casting defects in 2015, 
as a part of a national R&D programme (Oguma et al., 2015). It is still too early to see the 
eventual results of the latest technological progress.  
Ishikawajima Precision Casting Co. 
The Ishikawajima Precision Casting Co. (ICC) of IHI is the most advanced 
precision caster for jet engines in Japan. Its parent firm, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy 
Industries, has partnered with GE since 1951, from the beginning of the Japanese Air Force 
programme. The firm initially performed rapid delivery of prototype jet-engine blades, 
within six weeks, for instance, while GE’s conventional process took nearly a year. It 
should be a clear advantage in developing new designs given that the engine developers 
need to confirm whether their new designs are ‘castable’ before they go further with the 
designs (see Section 2.3.2 for the castability issue). This experience led GE to enhance the 
technology relationship with IHI in further developing and producing jet engines 
(National Research Council, 1994). 
Initially, IHI was allowed to cast only low-pressure turbine blades of equiaxed 
superalloy (multi-crystals) when it made the F100 Jet Engine licence agreement with GE 
in 1978. Although its licensed production of higher grade blades, namely DS, was refused 
at that time, it acquired the right in 1983. Together with this revised licence and the Japan 
Defence Agency’s funding through its Technology Research and Development Institute, 
IHI made progress in the development of SC blade casting with partial success in 
manufacturing later (NRC, 1994). 
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Nevertheless, IHI’s progress has clear limits in two aspects. Despite the technical 
potential of IHI, it has little experience in the high-pressure turbine(HPT) blades which 
require the highest heat-resistant technologies (Nakagawa, 2004). Its entrance into the 
HPT market is not allowed by the international division of labour, either (see Appendix 
Chapter B). Second, the domestic jet-engine market has been too small for the Japanese 
precision casters to build-up technological capabilities (Stoloff, 1984; Tien, 1985). 
Although precision casting for jet engine and other weaponry is a high-value-added area 
as much as gas turbines, the market size has been minuscule compared to gas turbines 
and automobiles for the precision casters in Japan (Figure 5.9 and 5.10). 
Figure 5.9 Turnover of Precision Casting Industry in Japan 
Source: Author’s elaboration from METI 2012, ‘Yearbook of Iron & Steel, Non-ferrous Metals, and 
Fabricated Metals Statistics 2011’  
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Figure 5.10 Prices of Precision Casting Products per Weight in Japan 
Source: Ibid. 
Specialty Steel Industry for Nuclear Power Demand 
Japanese specialty steel makers diversified as widely as global specialty steel 
markets, including electro galvanised steel sheets, high strength oil country tubular 
goods, automotive wire rods and bars and advanced stainless steels. Most specialty steel 
makers themselves have been part of member firms of large BOF steelmakers such as 
Nippon Steel, JFE Steel, Sumitomo Metal, Kobe Steel and Nisshin Steel (Tien, 1985).123 
Japanese specialty steel makers belong to traditional BOF steelmakers and constitute a 
special segment inside of this classification. 
Amongst various types of specialty steels, Sumitomo Metal is one of the major 
producers of pipes and tubing for special purposes such as oil and gas fields, power plants 
 
123 Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Metal were merged into Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal 
Co.(NSSMC) in 2012 
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and chemical plants in Japan. Sumitomo Metal specialised in steam generator tube 
technologies for nuclear power and became a monopoly firm in the market segment in 
Japan. Starting from ‘Sumitomo Copper Plant’ in 1897, Sumitomo Metal has a long history 
in pipes and tubing, as described below: 
▪ Sumitomo Metal’s Steel Tube Works at Amagasaki Factory established in 
1919; 
▪ Began producing hot seamless pipes and tubes in 1921; 
▪ Produced Japan’s first stainless tubular products for nuclear power plants 
in 1956; 
▪ Began exporting steam generator tubes for nuclear power plants in 1994; 
▪ Increased production capacity for steam generator tubes for nuclear power 
plants in 2008. 
Source: Sumitomo Metal Industries (2008) 
In the 2007 fiscal year, Sumitomo Metal’s Steel Tube Works performed JPY116 
billion in sales in oil and natural gas development and exploration (43%), fossil fired 
power and nuclear power (32%) and chemical industry (25%) markets. Its share of the 
global market was around one-third of 1.8 thousand total tonnes in 2008. The high quality 
and reliability of Sumitomo Metal’s Steel Tube Works are supported by its own patented 
original manufacturing process: ‘High pressure drawing bench’. Its technical strength is 
in the precise size and shape of its tubes maintained through a high-pressure cold drawing 
method, while its international competitors, namely Sandvik from Sweden and Valinox 
from France, use a ‘cold rolling’ process (Sumitomo Metal Industries, 2008; Kusaka, 2013). 
The main benefit of Sumitomo’s steam generator tubes is the ‘high detectability’ 
of potential flaws resulting from the minimised background noise of the tube surface. This 
is a technological adaptation to the strict safety regulation of ESI, demanding the “no 
flaw” principle (see Section 5.2.5). During a periodic inspection of nuclear reactors, 
inspectors use a high-frequency electric test method, namely the eddy-current test, to 
detect flaws in steam generator tubes, such as cracks. If the background noise of the tube 
surface is not minimised during the manufacturing process, the tubes will produce more 
background noise above signals of potential defects during their periodic inspection. This 
244 
 
results in lower reliability of the inspection and longer inspection processes (Nippon Steel 
& Sumitomo Metal, 2013). 
In this way, Sumitomo Metal’s innovation is well adapted to Japanese nuclear 
safety regulations which require “no flaw” and “100% inspection” of steam generator 
tubes during periodic inspections. It reduces inspection time while improving the 
reliability of the inspection, while its competitors’ tubes, which have more background 
noise, incur difficulties in effectively identifying potential defects in the tubes. Thanks to 
the innovative characteristics of the tubes, Sumitomo Metal’s share in the current domestic 
markets is 100%, and one-third in the global SG tube market as of 2008 (Sami, 1994; 
Sumitomo, 2008: 27) (Table 5.21 and 5.22). 
Table 5.21 Sumitomo Metal’s Steam Generator Tube Supply Record (1969-2012) 
Country Tube Quantity (Tonne) Steam Generator Units 
US 4,941 64 
Japan 2,879 54 
Korea 1,507 18 
China 888 13 
Belgium 367 7 
UAE 270 2 
Total 10,852 158 
Source: Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal 2013 
Table 5.22 Performance of Global Steam Generator Tube Suppliers 
 Production Capacity (km/year) 
2008 2013 
Valinox (France) 1,700 km 5,000km 
Sumitomo/NSSMC (Japan) 1,500km ≈ 4,500km 
Sandvik (Sweden) 1,200km 1,600km 
Source: Author’s elaboration from the interview with Sunkyo Jung, op.cit.: p.161 and Vallourec 2013 
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Stimulated by the rapid growth of global electricity demand and nuclear power 
construction projects, as well as growing concerns over climate change issues, Sumitomo 
Metals announced an ambitious plan in 2010 to nearly triple its steam generator tube 
production capacity in Amagasaki, Hyogo Prefecture, by 2013 (Sumitomo Metal 
Industries, 2010). Furthermore, it negotiated with Korean Nuclear Fuel Ltd. to establish a 
joint-venture firm for a new steam generator tube production based in Korea. The 
negotiation went to quite a detailed level, with Sumitomo gaining 30% share in the joint 
venture firm and production technology.124 
However, in the early 2010s, Sumitomo Metal had to contend with the Fukushima 
nuclear accident as well as an international dispute. The dispute was over the integrity 
issue of its tubes for MHI’s eight RSGs to San Onofre Nuclear Generating Stations 
(SONGs), located in California. The operator of the SONGs, namely Southern California 
Edison, suffered from massive cracks and leaks in the replaced steam generators and sued 
MHI for faulty steam generators. Even further, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
undertook a field investigation of Sumitomo Metal’s Amagasaki Steel Workshop for the 
steam generator tubes’ cracking issue. According to investigation reports, the cause of the 
massive cracking originated from tube-to-tube frictions (US NRC, 2012). 
Although the dispute was settled with minimum compensation by MHI in 2017, and 
Sumitomo Metal itself was not accused as a contributor to the cracking issue, it caused a 
serious reliability issue for Sumitomo Metal and MHI as the two SONG reactors had to be 
permanently shut down due to the cracking tubes. The dispute, together with sluggish 
global nuclear power demand in the late 2000s and the Fukushima nuclear accident in 
2011, forced Sumitomo Metal to abandon its earlier plan to establish the JV firm in Korea. 
In particular, managers of the newly merged firm (NSSMC) between Nippon Steel and 
Sumitomo Metals in 2012 did not expect a prosperous future for nuclear power and 
scrapped the plan immediately after the replacement of previous managers. Despite its 
 
124 Interview with Sunkyo Jeong, op. cit.: p. 161 
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innovative tube technologies and subsequently excellent performances, Sumitomo 
Metal’s steam generator tube segment seems to be overshadowed by the anti-nuclear 
atmosphere both in the domestic and global nuclear markets. 125 
5.3.5. Public Research and Development Programmes of Nuclear 
Power and CCGT 
Public Research and Development of Nuclear Power Technology Catch-Up 
While catch-up efforts in commercial reactors were mostly undertaken by private 
HEI firms, which accumulated the technological capability through repetitive orders and 
with foreign technology assistance and public support, government R&D efforts have 
been focused on back-end nuclear fuel cycle technologies such as reprocessing and 
breeder reactors.126 There has been a division of labour between the former Science and 
Technology Agency (STA) and the former MITI in spending on R&D expenditures across 
different energy technologies. While most of the nuclear R&D budget came from the STA, 
which contributed more than 90% of the total budget, the MITI focused on non-nuclear 
energy R&D, and its expenditures were much smaller than that of the STA in absolute 
terms (Table 5.23). 
In detail, the MITI’s nuclear R&D spending have focused on standardisation and 
safety improvement of commercial BWRs and PWRs from their 1st to 3rd phases (see page 
209-215). As can be seen in Figure 5.11, total expenditures on commercial reactors between 
1974 and 2011 were around US$5.7 billion in 2013 prices. Considering technical 
cooperation programmes with foreign licensors, such as Westinghouse and GE, in public 
R&D, the public programmes included the technology transfer process in each phase of 
standardisation and improvement. 
 
125 Interview with Sunkyo Jeong, op. cit.: p. 161 
126 Although the thesis does not cover back-end cycle nuclear technologies per se, it is inevitable to 
address them when it comes with public nuclear energy R&D. 
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Table 5.23 The Japanese Government’s Energy R&D Expenditures (¥ Billion in 1985 prices) 
 Government’s Total 
Energy R&D Spending 
Total The MITI’s Contribution to 
Total Energy R&D Spending 
Sub-
total 
Nuclear Non-nuclear Nuclear Non-nuclear 
1980 231.7 78.4 310.1 10.1 (4.4%) 71.2 (90.8%) 81.3 
1985 280.5 91.1 371.6 25.4 (9.1%) 89.7 (98.4%) 115.1 
1990 297.0 70.0 368.0 n/a 
1994 301.1 101.9 403.0 20.4 (6.8%) 92.2 (90.5%) 112.6 
2000 309.0 128.0 436.0 n/a 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Watanabe 2002 and IEA 2003 
Note: (%) indicates the MITI’s contribution to total government R&D expenditures in nuclear and non-
nuclear energy technologies, respectively. 
Figure 5.11 Japan’s Public R&D Expenditures for Nuclear Power in 1974-2011 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from IEA 2015 
 
By comparison, public expenditures on ‘new reactor’ related R&D under the STA’s 
supervision reached US$74.5 billion during the same period. Despite the enormous public 
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and other converter reactors, have failed to commercialise. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 
together with other Japanese HEI firms, was also involved in various government new 
reactor R&D programmes as a core member, including fast breeder reactors, advanced 
thermal reactors, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors and nuclear fusion reactors. 
On a global scale comparison, Japan’s public nuclear R&D spending accounts for 
more than one-third of the world’s public spending. Even when fusion reactor R&D is 
excluded, Japan’s nuclear R&D spending outpace that of the US, which is second, more 
than twice in the past four decades. It will take two more decades, however, to see whether 
the new reactors will be commercially viable.127 
 
Public Research and Development for Gas Turbine Catch-Up 
Although the ‘Sunshine’ and the ‘Moonlight’ projects covered various non-oil 
alternative energy technologies besides gas turbine, it is worthwhile to examine the 
overall shape of non-nuclear public energy R&D in Japan. The MITI focused its efforts on 
securing an energy supply in the face of increasing oil prices in the 1970s. It initiated a 
new policy based on the ‘Basic Principle of Industry Ecology’ to increase energy security 
by means of R&D in new and clean energy technology. This policy led to the establishment 
in July 1974 of a new programme called the Sunshine Project (Watanabe, 2002). 
The Sunshine Project initiated the approach of focusing on non-oil alternative 
energy technologies such as coal and solar energies. By comparison, the Moonlight Project 
was launched in 1978 to focus on energy conservation and efficiency technology. The 
Sunshine Project and the Moonlight Project represented 4.9% of the MITI’s total R&D 
budget in 1974, 13.8% in 1979 and 28.9% in 1982, respectively (Watanabe, 2002). 
 
127 Interview with Suzuki Tatsujiro, acting chair of Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission, Tokyo, on 
16 February 2011 
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In 1978 under the Moonlight Project, the famous High Efficient Gas Turbine 
Project invited not only gas turbine suppliers but also upstream suppliers, users, national 
material institutes and other aerospace institutes for development of gas turbines with an 
output power of 100MW and 55% efficiency. It invited four metal supply and fabricators 
and three ceramic suppliers. Although the original project target, ‘Re-heat’ gas turbine, 
was not commercialised at the end of the project, the participants gained tacit knowledge 
and experiences from the project, which was important resources in developing 
subsequent gas turbine products in the 1980s and 1990s (Kimura & Kajiki, 2008). 
For instance, the each of five HEI firms could develop its own capability of 
component technologies such as blade cooling, superalloy and low-NOx combustors 
based on generic technologies of the project, such as return-flow cooling technique, 
thermal barrier coating and directional solidification (Kimura & Kajiki, 2008). Gas turbines 
of MHI’s F-class for utilities, Hitachi’s ‘H-25’ for middle size class and KHI’s ‘M7A’ for 
small-scale were based on experience gained through the project. Participants from public 
research institutes including the National Research Institute of Metals (NRIM) also 
continued superalloy development programmes and successfully extended these to 
develop DS and SC superalloys for gas turbine blade applications in the 1980s (Kobayashi, 
1990). 
However, the Sunshine and Moonlight projects did not necessarily lead to fruitful 
results in numerous technology cases. Even though the government spent nearly 10 and 
7 times the high-efficiency gas turbine project budget for coal liquefaction and coal 
gasification, respectively, Japan could not commercialise the two coal-based technologies 
through the projects (Kimura et al., 2007). Although MHI is reported to have succeeded 
in its demonstration of the Integrated Coal Gasification Combined-Cycle plant using the 
coal gasification technology from 2007 to 2012, it is still too early to judge from its five 
years of demonstration experience whether it will be commercially successful (Isles, 2012) 
(Figure 5.12). 
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Figure 5.12 Public R&D Expenditure for Fossil Fuel Technologies 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Kimura et al. 2007 
Note: The figure includes ‘Sunshine’, ‘Moonlight’ and ‘New Sunshine’ projects 
  
Furthermore, even the successful high-efficiency gas turbine project has serious 
limitations in explaining its relative contribution to Japanese gas turbine development on 
several points. It is not clear whether MHI’s success in commercial CCGT technology was 
the result of the project or of its own in-house efforts based on modification of licensed 
technology. First, the world’s first DLNC, which symbolises MHI’s catching-up to 
Western gas turbines, was a result of re-combining MHI’s own technology based on its 
previous lean premix combustion technology for conventional fossil power plants in the 
early 1970s (Angello & Lowe, 1989; Matsuzaki et al., 1992). Second, even the biggest 
benefit of the project for MHI, namely the ceramic mould for precision casting of blades, 
was a ‘time-saver’ that reduced a couple of years for commercialisation rather than a 
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did not have the necessary infrastructure, such as a test-bed plant, for verification of the 
Coal-
Liquification 
$2.70 billion
Coal-
Gasfication
$1.93 billion
High Efficiency 
Gas Turbine
$0.29 billion
Ceramic Gas 
Turbine
$0.18 billion
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
U
S
$ 
B
il
li
o
n
 i
n
 2
01
3 
p
ri
ce
251 
 
developed gas turbine, and had to depend on MHI’s own facilities (Kimura & Kajiki, 
2008).128 
In this sense, the public R&D programme for catch-up in large gas turbine 
technologies played only a supplementary role for MHI, which was already on its gas 
turbine commercialisation trajectory. Rather, the programme gave less-developed 
participants, such as Toshiba, a chance to improve their own combustor technologies and 
to reduce the large gap between them and the forerunner, namely MHI. It matches with 
Porter(1990)’s critical argument about the role of public R&D programmes and actual 
motivation of the participants (see page 21 for further discussion on the public R&D issue). 
 
Limits of Public Research and Development on Superalloy Technologies 
Japanese HEI and supporting firms could not have direct access to foreign 
superalloy production and precision casting technologies until the 1980s mainly due to 
US government’s strict technology control policy (Tien, 1985). HEI firms had to import 
superalloys for precision casting of blades and vanes even when MHI developed its own 
CCGTs, namely the 501D/701D and the 501F/701F. Instead, public and private R&D 
activities, including the Moonlight Project and subsequent Jisedai129 Project, dominated 
technological efforts of the precision casting industry in the 1970s and 80s. The former 
MITI, through its Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, sponsored two-stage 
superalloy technology public R&D programmes with the intention of supporting gas 
turbine and jet-engine technology development in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The first 
was a sub-project of the Moonlight Project, the high-efficiency gas turbine project. This 
project was intended to develop CC and DS superalloy materials under the leadership of 
 
128 MHI developed gas turbine technologies further after the Moonlight Project such as M501J 
with support of public R&D in the 2000s. For details see Ito et al. 2010 
129 Jisedai means “the next generation” in English 
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the NRIM. As a result of the project, the NRIM proposed several candidate alloys for the 
gas turbine.130 
The second superalloy public R&D programme for gas turbine, “Advanced Alloys 
with Controlled Crystalline Structures”, Jisedai Project in short, in 1981-1989 supported 
new materials R&D, including fine ceramics, high-efficiency separation membranes, high 
grade alloys under crystal growth control and composite materials. In particular, 
development of SC superalloy for advanced gas turbine blades and thermal barrier 
coatings was the main target of the subproject (Yamazaki, 1986; Yamagata et al., 1987). 
The project was intended by MITI to shift its policy of industrial science and technology 
from ‘follower mode’ to ‘pioneer mode’ (Tanaka, 1989). However, the development of SC 
alloy was not fruitful at the end of the sub-project. 
The public development efforts for the SC superalloys for gas turbines were 
continued in the 2000s in the name of “High Temperature Materials 21” from 1999 to 2008 
(Harada, 2010). Although the joint development programme between MHI and National 
Institute for Materials Scinece, the successor of NRIM, developed SC superalloy for gas 
turbine blades, namely MGA1700, it still did not reach to a commercial stage. A recent 
technology report of MHI acknowledges the new SC material still needs a thermal fatigue 
evaluation to guarantee a long-term reliability before commercialisation (Ishizaka et al., 
2017). The initial target schedule of commercialisation was about 2015, but it implies it 
would be beyond 2020 (Harada, 2010; Ishizaka et al., 2017). Thus, the four decades’ public 
and private joint development efforts for commercial SC gas turbine blades still need more 
time for the result. 
 
130 Interview with Youngsoo Yu, op. cit.: p. 220 
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 Sectoral Institutions of ESI and Catching-up 
Performances 
5.4.1. Sectoral Institutions of ESI and Nuclear Power Catching-up 
Strong Business Autonomy of Japanese ESI and Effects on Nuclear Power 
Strong business autonomy of the Japanese ESI shaped unfavourable market 
conditions for the Japanese HEI’s nuclear power catching-up efforts. The autonomous fuel 
choice and pricing scheme by the ESI restricted demand growth of major electricity-
intensive industries. Despite Japanese government’s support for major BMIs, the ESI’s 
arm’s length relationship with the BMIs and the world highest electricity price effectively 
restricted base-load demand growth of the electricity market, which is crucial to the new 
nuclear power project. 
Also, the strong autonomy of the ESI disabled government’s effective control over 
financial and organisational mobilisation in the nuclear export drive for the past decade. 
Although Japan established an HEI/ESI nuclear export consortium, namely JINED, in 
response to the Korean nuclear export case, the consortium could not enforce the private 
ESI firms to invest in the risky nuclear export projects. The autonomy of the Japanese ESI 
has been a significant handicap to the Japanese HEI in the increasingly squeezed global 
nuclear market, where a substantial up-front capital and organisational investment is 
crucial for a successful nuclear export deal. 
Strict Safety Regulation of Japanese ESI and Effects on Nuclear Power 
As can be seen in Section 5.2.5, the “no flaw” safety regulations on steam generator 
tubes have restricted operating performance of the Japanese nuclear fleets since the 1970s. 
Despite early reactor indigenisation in the 1970s and subsequent safety upgrade 
programmes, the strict regulations effectively have lowered the operating performance of 
the Japanese and left negative track records of the Japanese in the global nuclear market. 
Although a few specialised metal industry, such as Sumitomo Metal Tube Works, 
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developed high-quality steam generator tube technologies in adapting to the strict safety 
regulations and has exhibited competitive performance in the global steam generator tube 
market, it did not improve overall domestic nuclear fleets’ operating performances except 
a few years in the 2000s. 
In sum, combined effects of the two core regulations on the Japanese ESI 
effectively restricted the overall performance of Japanese nuclear power, superseding 
advanced capability of the upstream supplier and government’s strong commitment to 
nuclear power. Thus, the government’s nuclear power support policy had to be readjusted 
to a much smaller capacity target than its previous targets in every long-term energy 
supply plan. The ambitious government plans to promote nuclear power and delay or 
cancellation of actual construction projects repeated until the 2010s (Table 5.24). The initial 
safety regulations were enhanced by the newly established Nuclear Regulation Authority, 
furthermore. They put the Japanese nuclear reactors in a more difficult position with less 
operating reactor units, only nine reactors in 2018 (see Section 5.2.5). The effects of 
stringent safety regulations have resulted in unsatisfactory nuclear catching-up 
performances of the Japanese HEI. 
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Table 5.24 Ambitious Nuclear Expansion Plans of Government and Reality 
Released Year Government Targets Actual Performance 
AEC 1972 32GW by 1980 15.5 GW in 1980 
MITI 1980 51~53 GW by 1990 31.5 GW in 1990 
MITI 1998 
66~70 GW by 2010 
(480TWh, 45%)131 48.9GW in 2010 
(288TWh, 26%) 
METI 2001 
58.4GW by 2010 
 (416TWh) 
METI 
(3rd Basic Energy Plan) 
2010 
 about 68GW by 2030 
(14 or more new units) 
9 out of 54 reactors are operating and 
virtually no new nuclear reactor under 
construction or planned as of 2018 
METI 
(4th Basic Energy Plan) 
2015 
20~22% of total power 
supply by 2030 METI 
(5th Basic Energy Plan) 
2018 
Source: MHI 1990, IEA 2000, Pickett 2002, METI, 2003, 2010, 2015, 2018 
 
5.4.2. Sectoral Institutions of ESI and Gas Turbine Catching-up 
Strong Business Autonomy of Japanese ESI and Effects on Gas Turbine 
Strong business autonomy of Japanese ESI, established in the post-war period, led 
the industry independent decision making of technology and fuel choices in response to 
socio-economic changes in the 1970s. Facing rising oil prices and the Yokkaichi verdict, the 
Japanese ESI voluntarily developed a natural gas field in Indonesia and introduced the 
world first liquified natural gas(LNG) fired power plants from the early 1970s. While the 
Japanese government encouraged fuel diversification from oil to nuclear and coal, the gas 
fuel was the ESI’s own choice (see Section 5.2.4). 
 
131 The bracketed indicates planned nuclear power generation and its share in utilities’ electric 
market. AEC stands for Atomic Energy Commission and MITI stands for Ministry of Trade & 
Industry. 
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The voluntary fuel choice of the Japanese ESI in the early 1970s was overlapped 
with gas fuel ban for power plants of the US and European countries between the 1970s 
and mid-80s. This institutional asymmetry between Japan and Western economies not 
only invited the troubled foreign OEM, namely Westinghouse, but also offered an early 
home market environment for the Japanese HEI. Although a large scale modern CCGT 
was not yet born in the 1970s’ global market, technology transfer from Westinghouse in 
small scale gas turbines and markets for gas boilers power plants offered a crucial eco-
system to the Japanese HEI. 
Strict Emission Controls and Co-development of Low-NOx Combustors 
Strict emission regulations of the ESI led the HEI to develop NOx emission control 
technologies for gas boilers power plants in the early 1970s and eventually contributed to 
MHI’s gas turbine catching-up performance in the 1980s. 132  Later, the premixed 
combustion technology was modified and applied to MHI’s first CCGT, namely MW-
701D, for Tohoku Power in 1984.133 The commercialisation of the world-first dry low-NOx 
combustor (DLNC) for CCGT was a new combination of a pilot diffusion flame and a lean 
premix flame concept with air staging which MHI already developed for gas boiler with 
a steam turbine from the 1970s (Angello & Lowe, 1989; Matsuzaki et al., 1992). 
The achievement in the combustion technology supported MHI’s gas turbine 
catching-up performances in two ways. First, the world-first dry combustor outperformed 
the global OEMs including MHI’s own licensor in the 1980s. It not only made MHI 
independent but also highlighted MHI’s entrance into the global gas turbine market. 
Second, the performance of the combustor technology has compensated MHI’s relative 
 
132 Although desulfurization technologies had been improved from the 1960s, it is not discussed in 
this research since it had been mostly relevant to high sulphur fuels such as coal and heavy oil 
rather than gas turbine. 
133 Also, it should be noted that several NOx emission abatement technologies such as selective 
catalytic reduction (SCR), developed and applied in Japan in the 1970s, were globally diffused in 
the 1980s. 
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weakness in gas turbine blade precision casting technologies. Given that the combustor 
technology has been crucial in meeting the strict NOx emission standards while increasing 
the turbine inlet temperature and subsequently larger and more efficient gas turbines in 
the global market, MHI’s lagged performance in the blade precision technologies has been 
compensated by the combustor technology. MHI’s performance in the large CCGTs in the 
global market, such as its world-first J-class CCGT (1,600°C) in 2012, would not be possible 
without the low-NOx combustor technology (Hada et al., 2012) (see Section 5.3.4 and 
5.3.5). 
 
5.4.3. Effects of Post-Fukushima Institutional Changes 
Given that the Fukushima accident is a significant event and its ramifications to 
the Japanese ESI and HEI have been substantial, the effects of institutional change need to 
be analysed in this Subsection. Responding to the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 
2011, the Japanese government changed the economic and safety regulations on the 
Japanese ESI. The immediate post-Fukushima government action was the suspension of 
54 operable reactors in Japan for safety concerns, and the newly established nuclear safety 
regulator ordered the Japanese utilities to do safety checks and enhance safety measure 
as a requirement of the restart. Although 15 out of the 25 applied reactors were permitted 
to restart after several years of the safety review process, only nine reactors restarted 
operation by 2018 (JAIF 2019). Other reactors do not appear to have the prospect of the 
restart soon. In conjunction with the new safety regulation and subsequent supply 
shortage, the accident induced a substantial change in the Japanese electricity market.134 
 
134 Under the power supply shortage, Japanese public went into a drastic electricity conservation 
programmes including limited usage of air-conditioners in the notoriously hot and humid 
Japanese summer season for several years. This ignited a full-scale liberalisation of the Japanese 
electricity market to boost power supply in a cost-effective way and to allow new entrants. 
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Previously, the Japanese ESI had enjoyed strong autonomy in the regional private 
monopoly systems and had been reluctant to the electricity market liberalisation 
programme. The previous market reform only opened a large industrial customer market 
in the 1990s and had been virtually stalled since. The accident, however, reignited the 
reform process to the full-scale including the huge retail electricity market of about 82 
million customers. The electricity market reform subsequently had regulatory effects on 
the power plant bidding process. In September 2011, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI) publicly instructed the Japanese electric power utilities to hold 
competitive bids including new entrants when the utilities build fossil power plants to 
boost electricity supply and to reduce the overall cost (Goto & Sueyoshi, 2016; Goto & 
Takahashi, 2017). 
Accordingly, the Japanese ESI’s strong autonomy and its tacit barriers to the 
foreign HEI firms in their power plant bidding processes were changed. The post-
Fukushima regulatory change forced the ESI to open the bidding process and allow more 
foreign HEI firms. Okinawa Power awarded Siemens the contract of its Yoshinoura CCGT 
project while Chubu Power awarded GE/Toshiba the contract of Nishinagoya CCGT 
project discarding MHI’s bid in 2012, for instance. The new regulatory environment 
induced the Japanese HEI to consolidate their business. The merger between MHI Power 
System and Hitachi Power System in 2014 was the biggest action taken by the Japanese 
HEI, and the new Mitsubishi-Hitachi Power System (MHPS) consolidated gas turbine, 
boiler and fuel cell businesses from the two firms (Japan Times, 2012). 
The two HEI firms’ merger was not only for defending the domestic CCGT market 
but also for consolidating of each one’s global market network against foreign competitors 
such as GE and Siemens. The merger also has implications of the strategic division of 
labour between the two firms in the changing global electricity market where renewables 
are rapidly growing. MHI acquired Pratt & Whitney(P&W)’s Power Systems, P&W’s jet 
engine-derivative small gas turbine division for a land-based gas turbine market 
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segement, in 2013. The acquisition offered MHI a new capability in small and rapid load-
following gas turbines, which are increasingly valued in electricity grids as intermittent 
renewables increase globally. 
On the other hand, Hitachi announced its acquisition of ABB Power Grid, which 
installed half of the global high voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission systems, at 
the end of 2018 right after it implied the suspension of the Wylfa nuclear project in the 
UK.135 Hitachi, in effect, has been consistently stating that it aims at “smart-grid” business 
as a strategic sector since the merger discussion with MHI in 2011. It considers smart-grid 
is the fastest growing sector in the global electricity market, and the acquisition of ABB’s 
transmission business makes sense in this regard (Proctor, 2018). 
However, the merger excluded nuclear business due to already established 
complex alliance networks in the global market. MHI had AREVA as a partner for the 
Sinop nuclear project in Turkey while Hitachi partnered with GE for the Wylfa nuclear 
project in the UK in 2012. Nevertheless, all the nuclear export projects that the Japanese 
HEI planned were cancelled or suspended indefinitely at the end of the 2010s (see page 
216-219). 
 Chapter Conclusion 
This Chapter presenting the Japanese case reveals that the deeply entrenched 
institutions of ESI, including autonomous business and strict environmental regulations, 
effectively constrained the performances of nuclear while it incentivised gas turbines in 
Japan. Despite the early nuclear reactor indigenisation, the safety regulations of the 
Japanese ESI continuously obstructed the HEI’s performances. Although the explicit R&D 
efforts to adapt to the strict safety regulations resulted in globally competitive high-
 
135 HVDC is considered as an alternative grid system to incumbent alternating current (AC) 
transmission systems in accommodating rapidly growing intermittent renewables.  
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quality component technologies, the catching-up performance of nuclear power could not 
overcome the overall institutional constraints of Japanese ESI. The strict and lengthy 
periodic safety inspection constrained operating performance of Japanese reactor fleets 
mostly below 80% of capacity factor for the past four decades except a few years in the 
2000s, while strong business autonomy of the Japanese ESI constrained growth of BMIs 
and base-load electricity demand, which is a crucial factor for new constructions of 
nuclear reactors. 
By comparison, even though MHI and its subsidiary precision caster have lagged 
behind the rest of the global gas turbine OEMs in precision casting technologies, MHI’s 
adaptation to the strict emission standards of the Japanese ESI from the early 1970s 
resulted in remarkable catching-up performances. MHI’s world-first commercial DLNC 
technology in 1984 symbolises the adaptation process and still plays an important role as 
a backbone of the firm’s competitiveness, compensating its relative weakness in the 
precision casting technology, in the global gas turbine market. 
Also, this Chapter reveals that neither technological capabilities of HEI firms nor 
sectoral perspective on HEI explain the contrasting catching-up performances of the 
Japanese HEI in nuclear power and gas turbine technologies. Various public R&D 
programmes also show opposite pictures in terms of expenditure and resulting 
performances. Without attention to the institutional context of ESI, firm capabilities, HEI’s 
own sectoral elements and public R&D programmes may lead to misinterpretation of the 
contrasting catching-up performances of Japanese nuclear power and gas turbine. 
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Table 5.25 Institutional Framework of Japanese ESI and Technological Effects 
 Economic Events & Impacts Environmental Events & Impacts 
Institutional 
Environment  
Privatisation of National ESI by Allied 
Power (1950) 
Verdict on ‘Yokkaichi Asthma’ & 
Mihama Reactor Coolant Leak (1972) 
Institutional 
Governance  
Secured Business Autonomy in Fuel 
Choice & Pricing 
Strengthened Emission & Safety 
Regulations 
Voluntary introduction of the world 
first LNG Power Plants 
Arm’s Length Relation with BMIs 
(World Highest Price) 
World strictest NOx Standards on 
Fossil Power Plants 
“No Flaw Principle” on Nuclear Safety 
Regulation 
Technological 
Impacts 
Prepared for Gas Turbine Technology 
Transfer from the American OEM, 
Arm’s Length Relationship with BMIs 
Constrained Nuclear 
Induced development of advanced 
Low-NOx combustion technologies, 
Constrained nuclear despite Massive 
R&Ds 
Source: Adapted from Williamson 2000 
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Chapter 6. Comparison of Cases and Discussion 
 Chapter Introduction 
This Chapter compares the two cases and elaborates generalisable findings based 
on pattern matching between the user sector institution approach and its rival approaches. 
Section 6.2 compares the two country cases based on the institutional set of ESI. The core 
regulations of the ESI sector in the two countries demonstrate sharp contrasts. From 
business regulations on electricity pricing practices and natural gas fuel transactions to 
environmental and safety regulations on fossil and nuclear power plants, the two 
countries’ institutional sets of ESI sector display a clear dichotomy. Then, the Section 
compares the effects of the ESI institutions on the catching-up performances. 
Section 6.3 compares the rival explanations with the ESI institution approach. It 
finds that the institutional set of ESI played a major role in each catching-up case – either 
supporting or constraining each technology case – regardless of specific technology public 
R&D programmes or relative technological capabilities of HEI and upstream supplier 
firms. Also, it analyses a compatibility issue between the domestic institutional set of ESI 
and a global window of opportunity for technology transfer from advanced foreign HEI 
OEMs. It finds that successful technology transfers were associated with the fitness of the 
institutional set of ESI to a global opportunity, whereas the mismatch frustrated catching-
up performance. 
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 Institutions of ESI and Overall Effects on Catching-Up 
6.2.1. Direct Effects of Business Regulations 
Concerning the business practices of the ESI, the high degree of business 
autonomy of the Japanese ESI allowed the utilities to charge the world’s highest electricity 
prices and drove commodity metal industries either to exit the domestic market or to 
restructure their production capacity. On the other hand, this business autonomy allowed 
the Japanese ESI to lead overseas development of the natural gas field and LNG import 
contracts, which ultimately made the price of gas fuel for power generation more 
affordable in Japan compared to its Korean counterpart.136 
By comparison, the opposite occurred in the case of Korea. Tight government 
control of ESI business set the lowest level of electricity price in the OECD countries and 
paved the way for commodity metal industries in Korea. Moreover, from the early 1980s, 
the government’s cross-subsidy arrangement from the ESI to the city gas sector – aimed 
at accelerating the gasification of the country’s household heating system – resulted in an 
additional cost burden of natural gas for power generation, which eventually made gas 
turbines economically infeasible, other than as a peak-load operation in the Korean 
electricity market. This condition discouraged user-producer cooperation on gas turbine 
catching-up. 
As we have seen in the Case Chapters, the two countries have contrasting 
electricity pricing institutions. In the post-war era, Japan’s short-lived Public Utility 
Commission set up the world’s highest electricity rates, and the pricing practices have 
lasted for half a century, despite the fact that the former MITI dissolved the Commission 
and tried to control electricity prices (see page 177 and 180). The Korean government, by 
 
136 Although it does not mean gas power price has been cheaper than coal or nuclear power in 
Japanese power market, it made gas power relatively affordable and competitive in terms of 
price.  
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contrast, has tightly controlled the prices since the 1980s ( see page 99-103 and Section 
4.2.4). 
These contrasting institutions resulted in the Japanese ESI having the highest 
electricity prices, and its Korean counterpart the lowest amongst OECD countries in terms 
of the average price. 137 For example, the average electricity price for industry customers 
was US$154.4/MWh in Japan, while in Korea it was US$66.3/MWh, which represent the 
highest and the lowest figures, respectively, in the 2010 statistics relating to the 33 OECD 
countries. In the 2000s, only a few countries had prices comparable to those of Korea – the 
US or Norway, for example, which have abundant coal and natural gas resources, and 
cheap hydropower, respectively (Figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.1 Average Electricity Prices for Industry in Japan and Korea 
Source: Author’s elaboration from IEA Electricity Information 2001, 2008 & 2014 
 
137 Price hikes of the Japanese case between 1980 and 2000 reflect appreciation of Japanese Yen to 
US Dollars in 1985 as result of a trade agreement, namely “Plaza Accord”, between Japan and 
the US, which was reversed in 1995. Even without the currency exchange rate issue, however, 
Japanese electricity price has been the highest in the world since the post-war period. 
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With regard to electricity prices for industry customers, in particular, the Korean 
ESI’s excessive practice of TOU pricing widened the gap between the two countries. For 
example, its off-peak price during night hours is even cheaper than the nuclear power 
generation price and has caused huge revenue losses for the utility of approximately US$2 
billion a year, while its peak price has been set up above that of gas turbine. Japanese 
utilities, by contrast, have not practised such an excessive TOU pricing scheme, and the 
liberalisation of the wholesale electricity market in 1998 made such a step more difficult 
to put into effect. Given the liberalised wholesale electricity market, industry customers 
who cannot or do not have to cherry-pick cheap off-peak electricity in aggressive TOU 
pricing schemes would switch their supplier for more reasonable pricing schemes. 138 
It is not surprising that EAF steels have been the largest beneficiary of the price 
scheme in Korea, while their Japanese counterparts have been handicapped by off-peak 
prices that are not much different from peak prices, as well as the average world highest 
electric prices. In turn, the contrasting BMI growth patterns provided contrasting 
preconditions for a large new capacity of base-load power plants – nuclear power in 
particular – in the electricity market in the two countries. The relationship between the 
electricity pricing scheme and demand for new nuclear power capacity was more 
pronounced in the Korean case (see Section 4.2.4) 
Table 6.1 presents the differences between peak and off-peak prices in terms of the 
TOU pricing scheme in the two countries. The Korean ESI displays a much greater price 
differential than its Japanese counterpart. Section 4.2.4 highlights that such a low off-peak 
price – which is even cheaper than the nuclear power generation price – originates from 
government intervention rather than reflecting the actual power generation cost during 
off-peak hours. Although price differentials decreased from 1999 to 2010 in both countries, 
the Korean ESI still applies excessive TOU pricing. 
 
138 Email interview with Osamu Kimura, Research Economist, Socioeconomic Research Center, 
Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, on 8 April 2015 
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It should be noted that monthly fixed capacity charges are added to the TOU 
prices. For instance, Tokyo Power charged JPY1,480/kW ($13/kW in nominal price) while 
KEPCO charged KRW4,560/kW ($3.8/kW in nominal price) for a capacity charge, 
respectively, to the customers in 1999 in Table 6.1. The minuscule capacity charge of 
KEPCO hardly affects overall TOU prices. If these charges are added, thereby, the off-
peak price differential between Tokyo Power and KEPCO becomes even larger than the 
figures in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Typical TOU Pricing for Industry in Japan and Korea (US$/MWh) 
 Japan (Tokyo Power) Korea (KEPCO)  
 Nuclear 
price 
Off-
Peak(a) 
Peak 
(b) 
Ratio 
(a/b) 
Nuclear 
price 
Off-
Peak(a) 
Peak 
(b) 
Ratio 
(a/b) 
1999 44.0 49.2  119.0  2.4  30.7  23.7  94.1  4.0  
2010 63.8 98.7  154.3  1.6  35.8  36.2  127.1  3.4  
Source: TEPCO 1999, 2010, KEPCO 2010, Korea Power Exchange’s Statistics System 
Note 1: Tokyo Power’s TOU prices are based on “Special High Voltage B (140kV) Customer Group” while 
that of KEPCO is based on “Industrial High Voltage B-Selection II Group(154kV)” during the 
summer season. 
Note 2: The KEPCO’s figures in 1999, including prices of nuclear power generation and TOU, are 
substituted by figures in 2001 due to unavailability of official nuclear generation price in 1999. 
At a glance, the aggressive TOU pricing practice in Korea seems to work for more 
CCGT power generation during the off-peak hours at nights. However, the large gap 
between the off-peak price – even cheaper than the nuclear power generation unit price – 
and the actual fuel mix cost, including the massive operation of ‘expensive’ CCGTs, paved 
the way for new nuclear power projects in the 2000s. The induced demand from 
electricity-intensive industries, such as EAF steel, and subsequent huge revenue losses 
during the off-peak hours justified the logic for new nuclear power projects, such as 
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“Baseload power generators are in absolute shortage” in government’s electric supply 
plans for the past two decades (Lee 2012; Lee et al. 2013).139 
Amongst the various industry customers, EAF steel has been the biggest 
beneficiary of the ‘wrong’ TOU price for the past three decades, in that it relies entirely on 
electricity for its production energy sources, and can easily control electric furnace load, 
including start and stop during a day. EAF steel is one of a few industries that could 
exploit the cheaper off-peak electricity late at night, and promptly reduce their load, or 
even shut down their facilities during peak hours when the electricity price more than 
triples, which most other industries cannot do. Even BOF or “integrated mill” steelmakers 
cannot control their production load once it starts its blast furnace. 140 
Impact of Contrasting Regulations on Natural Gas Fuel Contract 
Japanese ESI firms have led the development of overseas natural gas fields since 
the 1970s and enjoyed high degree of freedom in international trade of natural gas while 
Korean counterpart has been shackled by a compulsory supply contract with a state-
owned monopoly natural gas supplier, namely Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS), for 
cross-subsidy to the city gas sector. Moreover, public concerns on environmental issues 
have encouraged the Japanese ESI to actively develop and import LNG from abroad. By 
contrast, Korea’s compulsory LNG contract with KOGAS resulted from the cross-subsidy 
policy to reduce the cost burden of city gas customers (Table 6.2). 
Subsequently, Japanese ESI enjoyed a much cheaper LNG price than the other two 
domestic customers, including industry and household did, while Korean ESI had to pay 
an additional price for the cross-subsidy to the city gas sector. In turn, the relative price 
 
139 Government’s electricity supply plans such as “The Basic Plan on Electricity Demand & 
Supply” or its previous version “The Plan on Long-Term Electricity Demand & Supply”, are 
made every other year in Korea. 
140 Instead, it can use its own self-power generator, mostly gas turbine, using by-product gas 
from the blast furnace. 
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difference of LNG resulted in major differences in the economic performance of the 
CCGTs, in terms of new construction projects and power generation in the two countries 
from the 1980s. 
Table 6.2 Two Countries’ Initial Natural Gas Import Contract with Indonesia 
 First 
Contract 
Contractors Second 
Contract 
Contractors 
Japan 1977 
 
Kansai Power, Chubu Power, 
Tokyo Gas, Nippon Steel 
1981  Tohoku Power, Tokyo 
Power 
Korea 1983 
 
Korea Electric Power Company 
(transferred to KOGAS in 1984) 
1991 KOGAS 
Source: Mehden and Lewis 2006 and Seo 2001 
Note: All the contracts are made with a state-owned Indonesian gas supplier, Pertamina 
The contrasting business regulations on natural gas for power generation shaped 
the relative price of gas turbine power generation in a contrasting way in the two 
countries. In addition, the Korean government often exercises additional price 
interventions, such as increasing gas price for power generation above the city gas price, 
when there are gas price hikes. Figure 6.2 illustrates that gas prices for power generation 
were higher than city gas prices in Korea in 1990, 1996, 1997, and 2008. Even in other years, 
the average price gap between power generation and city gas are negligible, whereas in 
Japan the difference in price is always more than double – the high household city gas 
price notwithstanding. 
In effect, there has been a seven-fold price differential between household city gas 
and gas for power generation in Japan. In liberalised energy markets, such as the UK and 
the US, there is a two- or three-fold price differential between gas for power generation 
and household city gas. Considering the pressure differential of gas distribution pipelines 
and seasonal demand fluctuations between the two customer groups, such a price gap is 
inevitable in competitive energy markets. Consequently, the fact that gas prices for these 
two consumer groups in Korea are similar indicates that there is strong cross-
subsidisation from the power generation sector to the household sector (Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2 Gas Prices for Power Generation & City Gas in Japan and Korea 
Source: Author’s elaboration from KOGAS 2011, KEPCO 2012 and IEA 1999, 2013 
Note 1: Japan has not reported gas prices for power generation to IEA and has not publicly disclosed in 
Japan since 1998 when the country opened its wholesale electricity market. 
Note 2: GCV stands for Gross Calorific Value. It takes into account the latent heat of vaporisation of water in 
the combustion products. 
6.2.2. Direct Effects of Environmental Regulations 
ESI environmental regulations display the same pattern. Japan’s stringent 
emission standards and practices introduced in the 1970s – the strictest in the world at the 
time– induced the Japanese HEI to develop low-NOx combustor for gas boilers, initially. 
The technology for boilers became a foundation for MHI’s world-first commercial low-
NOx combustor for CCGT in the early 1980s. It was a crucial component technology in 
catching-up with global frontier gas turbine OEMs as the US and Europe increasingly 
strengthened NOx emission regulation. MHI’s low-NOx combustor technologies – 
developed on the basis of its gas boiler experience, in compliance with the strict 
regulations introduced in the early 1970s – enabled the latecomer to outperform GE. In 
addition, the regulations enabled gas power to compete against coal power from the mid-
1970s. 
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Again, the Korean case displays an opposite trend with regard to environmental 
regulations and their impact on the performance of the two technologies. Lax emission 
standards and practices allowed coal power to dominate the Korean fossil power plant 
market at the expense of gas turbines. Lax safety regulations and practices relating to 
nuclear power resulted in the world’s highest capacity factor, and a rapid construction 
lead time for the Korean nuclear fleet. The operational and construction performances 
paved the way for Korea’s first nuclear export (World Nuclear Association, 2011).141 
Impact of Safety Regulation on Nuclear Power Performance 
Japan and Koreas display contrasting regulatory guidelines and practices on 
nuclear safety issues. Japanese regulatory criteria and practices are the strictest in the 
world, while their Korean counterparts are relatively lax, as can be seen in the case 
chapters. The steam generator tube integrity issue, in particular, reveals the high degree 
of contrast that exists. 
The degree of strictness regarding the steam generator tube issue is measured by 
four regulatory requirements, including flaw acceptance criteria, coolant leakage limit, 
inspection scope, and intervals between inspections. While Japan’s guidelines can be 
summed up as the “no flaw, no leakage principle” – 100% tube inspection and inspection 
every year, in principle – their Korean counterparts allow flaws of up to 40%, varied rates 
of leakage, a 20% sample inspection, and inspection intervals dependent on the fuel 
replacement cycle. The contrasting figures are summarised in Table 6.3 and 6.4. 
 
141 KEPCO claimed that its best track record in terms of highest capacity factor, lowest 
construction cost and the shortest construction lead time among the bidders from France, Japan 
and the US was the main factor of the award in the inter international competition for the 
UAE’s nuclear project after the export contract in 2009. 
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Table 6.3 Regulatory Guidelines and Practices on Steam Generator Safety 
 Korea Japan  
Flaw Acceptance 
Criteria 
Flaws less than 40% of wall 
thickness are allowed 
No detectable flaws are allowed 
(Detectable flaws are above 20%)  
Coolant Leakage 
Limit  
Varied by reactor 
(1,635 to 2,275 ℓ/day)142 
Leak operation is not allowed. If a leak is 
detected, it must be shut down 
Interval bet. 
Inspections 
Depends on refuelling 
cycle, mostly 18 months 
Less than 13 months (If no leak & no 
defect previously detected, every other 
year) 
Scope of 
Inspection 
20% sampling of tubes All Tubes & Full-Length (If no leak & no 
flaw previously detected, 30% sampling) 
Response to Tube 
Rupture Events 
Re-operation was allowed 
in less than two months 
(from April to May 2002) 
Shutdown for 3.5 years for analysis, 
preventive measures & steam generator 
replacement (Feb. 1991 to Aug. 1994) 
Source: KEPCO Plant Service & Engineering (KPS) 2002 and Yashima 1995 
Table 6.4 Intervals between Periodic Inspections on Nuclear Reactors (months) 
 
2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 
US 17.9 18.9 18 18.6 18.4 
France - 14.6 14.7 14.6 15.4 
Japan 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 
Korea 17.5 17.3 17.6 17.6 17.6 
Source: Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, “World Nuclear Power Plants 2010” 
Moreover, actual practices in relation to steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) 
accidents in the two countries reveal a further contrast. In the case of Japan, when a steam 
generator tube ruptured at Mihama 2 nuclear reactor in 1991, the utility had to shut down 
the reactor for three and a half years. Until the restart, the utility was subjected to an in-
depth analysis of preventive measure on similar design reactors, including the 
replacement of the existing steam generators by new ones made of a more corrosion-
 
142 The limits are applied to Yonggwang 3&4 and Ulchin 3&4, respectively (KPS, 2002). 
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resistant alloy tube material, namely Alloy 690. After the accident, Japanese utilities 
started to replace the steam generators at 11 reactors (Figure 6.3). 
In the case of Korea, the safety regulator allowed the utility to restart operation of 
the reactor after a simple repair, including plugging of the ruptured tube, just seven weeks 
after the rupture event at Ulchin nuclear reactor 4 in 2002. This represented the quickest 
restart of a nuclear reactor after an SGTR accident in the world and surprised experts in 
other countries (see Section 4.2.5 on page 116). In addition, hardly any concern was raised 
about the steam generator alloy materials after the accident, and the steam generators 
made of corrosion-prone alloys were not replaced (Figure 6.3).143,144 
Figure 6.3 Cumulative Steam Generator Replacement Cases in the World 
Source: Author’s elaboration from IAEA 2011 
 
143 It was revealed by Korean regulator’s in-depth report in 2012 that the apparent manifestation 
of massive tube cracking was in effect the result of overlooked accumulation of stress corrosion 
cracking during the previous periodic inspections for the past decade. 
144 The utility had to pay for its hasty action a decade later with a sudden manifestation of 
massive tube cracking in 2011, replacement of steam generators and two years’ shutdown 
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Although such contrasting practices are not codified by regulations, they are 
consistent with the contrasting regulatory guidelines referred to above. The contrasting 
regulatory guidelines and practices effectively influenced the contrasting operational 
performance of nuclear power in the two countries. Between 1984 and 2010, Japanese 
utilities had to spend an average of 142.8 days annually on periodic inspections. In 
principle, spending such a long time on periodic inspections every year does not allow 
utilities to achieve an annual capacity factor higher than 80%. In terms of Japanese 
regulations, the only way to achieve the desired level is to obtain an exemption from a 
periodic inspection by demonstrating ”no flaw” and “no leakage” records during the 
previous operational cycle and inspection. In effect, the Japanese nuclear fleet achieved 
an average capacity factor higher than 80% in only seven years during the past four 
decades. 
By comparison, the Korean utility, which enjoyed relatively lax regulatory 
guidelines and practices, spent only 53.5 days annually on periodic inspections during the 
same period. For the past two decades, Korea has achieved the world’s highest 
operational performance regarding nuclear power. Once it achieved an 80% capacity 
factor in 1991, it did not fall below that level until 2012. In fact, it maintained the world’s 
highest recorded capacity factor of higher than 90% between 2000 and 2011, the year in 
which it was faced with the manifestation of massive steam generator tube cracking in its 
first standardised reactors alongside enhanced safety checks as a preventive measure of 
the Fukushima accident (Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.4 Average Annual Inspection Days in Japan and Korea 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Korea Electric Power Co. 1990-2014 and Japan Nuclear Energy Safety 
Organization 2000-2014 
Figure 6.5 compares contrasting operational performances of nuclear power 
between Japan and Korea with those of the US as a reference case. Capacity factor refers 
to the operational performance of the reactors in terms of the ratio of the net electricity 
generated, compared to the energy that could have been generated continuously at full 
capacity over the same period. The Japanese nuclear fleet struggled to exceed 50% after it 
experienced its first steam generator tube leak incident in the 1970s. It then improved 
gradually until the late 1980s but remained below 80% for most of the time. Although the 
performance of Japanese PWRs was slightly better than BWRs – with a capacity factor 
above 80% for nine years – their overall performance was not much different from that of 
BWRs in terms the average performance during the four decades under consideration. 
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Figure 6.5 Operational Performances of Korean and Japanese Nuclear Power 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Korea Electric Power Co. 2014, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety 
Organization 2014 and US Energy Information Agency 2013 
Note: Korean case includes PWR reactors and four small units of CANDU reactors, while Japanese and the 
US figures show an average capacity factor of BWR and PWR reactors. The dramatic drops after 
2010 are results of the shutdown of 53 reactors after Fukushima accident in 2011 in Japan 
As a result, the contrasting track records of operational performance influenced 
each country’s export performance. Although Japanese HEI localised both PWR and BWR 
as early as the mid-1970s, its low capacity factor of below 70% until the 1980s gave it a 
‘bad name’ in the global nuclear export market (Kitschelt, 1991). Even after that, it never 
achieved a 90% capacity factor. By contrast, Korea’s record capacity factor throughout the 
2000s, in addition to its rapid construction performance, impressed the global market and 
helped it win the international competitive bid for the UAE’s first nuclear power project 
in 2009. 
Impact of Emission Regulations on Gas Turbine Performance 
As we have seen from safety regulations on nuclear power plants, the Japanese 
government and local authorities established the world’s strictest emission level 
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standards on fossil power plants from the mid-1970s, whereas the Korean government set 
lax standards, even until the 2000s. In fact, Japanese local governments not only set much 
stricter emission limits than those of the central government – thus reflecting public 
discontents about the serious environmental incidents in the 1960s and 1970s – but had 
such authority at their disposal that they could cause utilities to withdraw from power 
plant construction processes if such utilities could not meet the local standards. The 
Korean government, by comparison, neither set such strict emission standards nor 
allowed local governments meaningful authority. As a result, the Japanese local standards 
for NOx emission of all fossil power plants in 1975, were much stricter than their Korean 
counterparts in the 2000s (Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5 NOx Emission Standards on New Fossil Power Plants (ppm) 
Fuels 
Korean National Standards Japanese Standards in 1975 
1978~’86 1987~’04 2005-’09 
Central 
Government 
Local 
Governments 
Gas - 400 50 60 10 
Oil 250 250 70 130 25 
Coal  500 350 150 400 170 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Korea’s Ministry of Environment 2005, 2014, “Permissible Air Pollutant 
Emission Standards” and Ando, 1983, “NOx Regulation on Stationary Sources in Japan” 
Note: The standards were applied to new power plants in both countries 
Such strict emission standards not only forced Japanese ESI to switch from ‘dirtier’ 
fuels, such as heavy fuel oil and coal, to environmentally benign fuel, such as natural gas, 
but also encouraged the ESI and their contractors, HEI firms, to develop low-NOx burner 
technologies from the early 1970s. This gave a clear advantage to Japanese HEI firms in 
the 1980s when it came to catching up, in economic terms, with American standardised 
gas turbines, which did not comply with such strict standards. The Japanese HEI firm, 
MHI, could surpass GE, which supplied CCGT to Tokyo Power, by delivering Tohoku 
Power CCGT with low-NOx burner technology, which complied with such strict 
standards, at a much lower cost than that of GE. It gave MHI a strong track record and 
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paved the way for its flourishing catch-up performance in the Japanese CCGT market, 
where even advanced foreign firms could not comply with the emission standards. 
By comparison, Korea’s much more lax emission standards gave a signal to Korean 
ESI, KEPCO, to continue using much ‘dirtier’ but cheaper fuels. In particular, coal power 
technology has been the sole beneficiary of the lax emission standards since the 1980s, 
when the Korean government removed oil power plants from its long-term electricity 
supply plan, as a countermeasure to the ‘second oil shock’. Under such lax emission 
standards and the additional cost burden of cross-subsidy to the city gas sector, CCGT 
had to give way to coal power and has had to play only a limited role, such as providing 
peak-load power in the Korean market, for the past three decades. 
Due to the contrasting regulatory combinations relating to gas import contracts 
and emission control issues – excluding the question of electricity price – the role of gas 
power has been quite different in the two countries. Autonomous gas field development 
and import contracts, as well as the world’s strictest emission control in the Japanese ESI, 
paved the way for gas power, including CCGTs. Tight government control of the gas 
import contract and lax emission control of the Korean ESI limited the role of CCGT in the 
Korean electricity market. The share of gas power in terms of total generation by Japanese 
utilities has been mostly above 25%, while that of the Korean ESI has been approximately 
15% since 1990 (Figure 6.6). Table 6.6 highlights the contrasting institutional 
characteristics of ESI between the two countries.   
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Figure 6.6 Share of Gas Power Generation in Each Electricity Supply Market 
Source: Author’s elaboration from IEA Electricity Information 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2013 
Note: Gas boilers dominated gas power generation until the early 1980s in both countries before CCGTs 
emerged as a dominant gas power technology in the global market. 
 
Table 6.6 Contrasting Institutions of ESI across the Two Countries 
 Japan Korea 
Business 
Regulations 
Autonomous Management by 
Private Regional Monopolies 
Tight and Micro Interventions on the 
State-owned Monopoly 
 
Electric Price 
World Highest Electricity Price 
(Arm’s Length Relation with BMIs) 
Lowest Electricity Price in OECD 
(Tightly Coupled with BMIs) 
Gas for 
Power 
Utilities-led Gas Field 
Development & Contract 
Enforced Cross-Subsidy from Gas 
Power to City Gas 
Environmental 
Regulations 
World Strictest Regulations from 
the 1970s 
Lax Regulatory Standards & Practices 
 
Fossil Power 
World Strictest National & Local 
Emission Standards 
Lax Emission Standard, often 
Exemptions on Coal Power Sites 
Nuclear 
Power 
World Strictest Safety Criteria and 
Practices 
Lax Regulatory Practices 
 
4%
16%
22% 22%
26% 26% 26% 27% 26%
24%
26%
28%29%
30%30%
40%
1%
12%
16%
11% 11%
13% 13%
16% 16%
18%
19% 18%
15%
20% 21%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
Japan
Korea
279 
 
Diversity of Electricity Frequency System 
Although electric frequency systems are rather physical and technological 
conditions given by the ESI, they constrain or incentivise, as other institutions do, HEI’s 
catching-up performance in terms of technological adaptation and global export market 
potential. In the post-war era, Japan’s dual electric frequency system – which consists of 
the 60Hz system of the western region and the 50Hz system of the eastern region – made 
it possible for Japanese HEI firms to modify their technological capability from 
conventional steam turbine technologies. This provided another aspect for MHI to exploit 
in its efficient catching-up with regard to the 50Hz gas turbine, based on its licensor’s 
60Hz gas turbine designs. Since the 50Hz system dominates most of the global electricity 
market, the dual system offered MHI a technology ‘ladder’ to the global gas turbine 
market. 
By comparison, Korean HEI did not have such a technological opportunity to 
modify designs under the 60Hz electrical system. For example, even the famously resilient 
Chaebol firm, HHI, did not have any incentive to enter the gas turbine business when the 
Korean government briefly lifted the entry regulation of the domestic HEI market in the 
1990s, due to the mismatch between the domestic 60Hz gas turbine market and the global 
market, in which the 50Hz system largely prevails.145 In other words, the firm strategically 
considered that the export market potential would not be large enough, even when it 
could have developed 60Hz gas turbine technologies for the domestic market. 
 
 
145 While most of regions in the World use 50Hz electrical systems, only North America, some 
parts of Latin America, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, South Korea and Kansai Region of Japan 
use 60Hz electrical systems. Thus, in the sense of export market potential, development of 60Hz 
gas turbine may have less incentive than that of 50Hz technologies has. 
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6.2.3. Sectoral Institutions of the ESI and Demand Conditions 
Although both Japanese and Korean governments have been supportive of the two 
electricity-intensive BMIs, namely aluminium smelters and EAF steelmakers, direct policy 
efforts to support the BMIs, it was business regulations of ESI that decided the opposite 
growth patterns of the BMIs between the two countries. Despite MITI’s policy efforts to 
delay restructuring of the commodity BMI, virtually all of the Japanese aluminium 
smelters moved abroad in the face of an electricity price increase at the end of the 1970s. 
MITI’s role was irrelevant again when another electricity-intensive BMI, namely EAF 
steelmakers, voluntarily reduced production capacity in the 1990s.146 It was the world’s 
highest electricity prices that caused the commodity BMI to voluntarily exit the domestic 
market, and reduce its production capacity. 
By comparison, the Korean BMIs performed consistent growth under the 
government’s electricity price control through the national ESI, namely KEPCO. Although 
the aluminium smelter eventually exited the Korean market in the late 1980s due to the 
absolute price gap between Korean and Canada, it persisted in the domestic market a 
decade longer than its Japanese counterpart. After the market exit of the aluminium 
smelter, EAF steel industry became the largest beneficiary of KEPCO’s pricing practice in 
Korea. KEPCO maintained the cheapest electricity for industry amongst the OECD 
countries, and this shaped the persistent growth of the EAF steelmakers. 
Regardless of other supportive policy efforts for the BMIs, it was the electricity 
price that decided the trajectory of the industry – either towards restructuring or 
expansion. Korean EAF steel firms maximised their exploitation of the persisting TOU 
electricity rate and expanded their share in domestic crude steel production to above 40%, 
which was close to the world’s highest level throughout the 2000s. The strong bond 
 
146 As a few independent EAF steel firms such as Tokyo Steel expanded production capacity 
against Keiretsu-led Japanese Steel Association’s consensus of production control in the 1980s, 
actual reduction of Japanese EAF steel production capacity was delayed to the early 1990s. 
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between EAF steel and cheap electricity prices has been crucial to the survival and 
expansion of the industry, despite the country’s poor self-sufficiency in scrap steel, which 
is the major input material of EAF steel, other than electricity. 
Table 6.7 Institutions and Policies on Commodity BMI: Aluminium and EAF 
 Japan Korea 
Industry 
Policies 
“Cartelization” and Delay in 
Restructuring facing Recessions 
Scrap Steel Market Price Stabilisation 
Effort 
Electricity 
Pricing 
Practices 
World’s Highest Electricity Prices 
without Special Arrangement 
Special Discount for Aluminium, 
Excessive TOU Pricing Practice 
Industries’ 
Response 
Keiretsu Firms’ Voluntary Exit from 
Aluminium in the early ’80s, 
Reduction of EAF from the ’90s 
despite Government Support 
EAF Firms’ Exploitation of Excessive 
TOU Pricing and Over-Investment in 
the 2000s 
 
Figure 6.7 illustrates contrasting trends of EAF steel share in national crude steel 
production in Korea and Japan for the past three decades. While Japanese EAF steel 
dropped to well below the world average from the mid-1990s, their Korean counterpart 
started to increase from the early 1990s and remained above 40% throughout the 2000s, 
which was much higher than the world average. It should be noted that the world average 
is biased by a single large steel-making country, namely the US, which maintained a share 
of nearly 80% for most of the period. The US EAF steelmakers enjoy abundant high-
quality scrap steel from scrap automobiles, as well as cheap electricity, while most of the 
BOF steelmakers collapsed thanks to imported cheap steel. If the US is excluded, the world 
average would be much lower, and the share of Korean EAF steel will be the highest in 
the world. 
In turn, the persistent growth of Korean EAF steel production since the 1990s has 
elevated base-load electricity demand and has ultimately paved the way for new nuclear 
power and coal power projects since then. Iron and steel are not only the largest electricity 
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consumer but also the most stable base-load electricity user amongst all the industry 
sectors in both Japan and Korea.147 
Figure 6.7 Share of EAF Steel in National Crude Steel Production 
Source: Author’s elaboration from World Steel Association 1982, 1990, 2000 & 2014 
 
Although coal power is also a base-load power source, it has a load-following 
function and can change its output somehow in response to fluctuating electricity load 
demand. As a result, growth of new base-load demand is much less of a prerequisite for 
new coal power plant projects than for nuclear power. Table 6.8 illustrates the overall 
status of nuclear power and BMI in electricity supply and demand in Japan and Korea. 
The Korean case clearly reveals a higher share of nuclear power and BMI in electricity 
supply and demand, respectively, than Japan does. 
 
147 Although ‘Machinery’ is the biggest sector in electricity consumption among the industry 
sectors, the category is in effect sum of various sectors including automobile, semi-conductor, 
mobile phones and LCD panels. 
Korea
38%
World Average
29%
Japan
23%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
283 
 
Table 6.8 Status of Nuclear Power & BMI in Electric Supply & Demand (TWh) 
Electricity Supply in 2010 Electricity Demand in 2010 
 Japan Korea  Japan Korea 
% of Nuclear 25.5% 29.5% % of BMI 6.6% 11.0% 
Total 
Production 
1,075 480 
Total Final 
Consumption 
999.7 449.3 
Source: Author’s elaboration from IEA Electricity Information 2013 
Note: In total electricity production, power transmission & distribution loss is deducted while the industry’s 
own self-power generation is added. 
On the contrary, the world’s highest average electricity price, and a hardly 
differentiated off-peak price, reduced base-load power demand in Japan. Consequently, 
most BMIs became the worst victims, and voluntarily exited the domestic market, or 
restructured their production capacity. Moreover, the remaining commodity BMIs 
invested in the large capacity of auto-power generators, often with gas turbines. In turn, 
the stagnated growth of base-load demand did not provide adequate conditions for new 
nuclear power projects. 
 
6.2.4. Compatibility with a Global Window of Opportunity 
The User-Institution framework can only partially explain successful technology catching-
up cases, including Japanese gas turbines and Korean nuclear power, without technology 
transfer from advanced foreign firms. The MHI reaped the benefits of Westinghouse gas 
turbine division’s move into Japan as a result of the asymmetric regulations on natural 
gas between Japan and Western economies, including the US and EC, in the mid-1970s. 
In a similar vein, resilient financial mobilisation of the Korean state-owned ESI was crucial 
to exploit the global nuclear market collapse in the early 1980s. Regarding matching-up 
between domestic institutional sets and a global window of opportunity in the form of 
advanced foreign firms’ crises, subsequent public R&D programmes played an only 
supplementary role (Table 6.9). 
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In the Korean nuclear case, matching-up was a result of the global market 
contingency in the 1980s and the domestic institutional set, rather than deliberate 
governmental R&D programmes. The ‘package transfer deal’ between the financially 
troubled American reactor vendor and the Korean latecomer included nearly full-scope 
of reactor technologies from the blueprints of a reactor, main equipment designs, know-
how, and training at the cost of less than one commercial reactor. It was possible mainly 
because of the exceptional opportunity provided by the collapse of the global market and 
subsequent ‘buyer’s market’ conditions, in which buyers could exert their asymmetric 
power on sellers. By comparison, Korean public R&D expenditure was minuscule both in 
its first and second reactor standardisation programmes. The relative importance of the 
two major R&D programmes is overshadowed by the effect of technology transfer from 
the foreign OEM. In this sense, learning by doing through repetitive construction of the 
reactors would be more important for indigenising the transferred technology. 
Table 6.9 Compatibility between Institutional Sets and Global Opportunities 
Windows of 
Opportunity 
Distinctive Domestic 
Institutions 
Results 
N
u
cl
ea
r 
Collapse of Global 
Nuclear Plant 
Market 
(1980s~90s) 
Ja
pa
n High Electric Price and 
Strict Safety Regulations 
Mismatch Constrained Domestic and 
Export Performances 
K
or
ea
 Low Electric Price and Lax 
Safety Regulations 
Fit Drove Efficient Tech. Transfer: 
Exploiting Foreign Firm’s Knowledge and 
Skipping Development Stages  
G
as
 T
u
rb
in
e 
Closure of US and 
European Gas 
Turbine Market 
due to Gas Fuel 
Regulation 
(1974~’87) 
Ja
pa
n 
Autonomous Gas Fuel 
Trade and Strict Emission 
Controls 
Fit Drove Efficient Tech. Transfer: 
Exploiting Foreign Firm’s Knowledge and 
Commercialising Low-NOx Combustor 
K
or
ea
 
Cross-subsidy to City Gas 
and Lax Emission 
Controls 
Mismatch Constrained Domestic Market 
and User-Producer Interactions 
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‘Earlier vs. Later Latecomers’ in Global Market Contexts 
It is important to consider the timing of catching-up efforts when discussing the 
compatibility between domestic institutional sets and global opportunities for technology 
catching-up. Essentially, the different timing of catching-up efforts per se, whether ‘earlier’ 
or ‘later’ latecomers, does not explain the two countries’ dichotomous catching-up 
performances in the two technologies. 
There have been contrasting effects of the catching-up timing regarding the two 
technologies. While the early indigenisation of commercial reactors was disadvantageous 
to the Japanese HEI in terms of its costly path-following safety upgrades from its 1st to 3rd 
generations, the late indigenisation of PWRs by the Korean HEI was a cost-saving and 
efficient catching-up exercise by skipping the early and smaller reactor commercialisation 
stages. By contrast, the earlier gas turbine catching-up efforts not only provided the 
Japanese HEI with an opportunity to exploit knowledge from a troubled foreign firm but 
also paved the way for its flourishing export performances following the lifting of gas fuel 
regulations in the US and European Commission in the 1980s. 
In the case of Japanese HEI, the earlier latecomer, even when the industry had 
almost completed PWR indigenisation in the 1980s, must have had strong technological 
inertia, because it promptly diversified to the emerging CCGT market in the 1980s. The 
Japanese HEI export performance of CCGT continuously improved, and it became the 
third-largest global supplier of CCGT in the 2000s. Although Japanese HEI also exported 
nuclear power equipment, such as steam turbines and steam generators, it never 
produced a complete nuclear reactor export project beyond its domestic reactor projects. 
In the case of Korean HEI, although the ‘later latecomer’ caught up with PWR 
technology two decades later than its Japanese counterpart, it skipped the upgrade stage 
from 1st to 2nd generation reactors by acquiring 2nd and 3rd generation reactor blueprints 
and training courses at a much cheaper price than a single nuclear reactor. In contrast, the 
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‘earlier latecomer’, Japanese HEI, took advantage of catching-up with gas turbine 
technology, while Korean HEI missed the window of opportunity for gas turbine 
catching-up, and so could not repeat its nuclear success. 
Table 6.10 Advantages and Disadvantages of ‘Earlier’ and ‘Later’ Latecomers 
 ‘Earlier’ Latecomer (Japan) ‘Later’ Latecomer (Korea) 
Nuclear 
Power 
Followed All the Costly Upgrade 
Stages of Reactors from the 1970s to 
’80s (Disadvantage) 
Efficient Technology Transfer of Modern 
Reactors Exploiting Global Market 
Collapse in the 1980s (Advantage) 
Gas 
Turbine 
The Discrepancy between Domestic 
and Global Natural Gas Regulations 
Offered Window of Opportunity for 
Technology Transfer (Advantage) 
Missed Window of Opportunity for Gas 
Turbine Catch-up in the late 1970s and 
early ’80s (Disadvantage) 
 
Overall, although the core sectoral institutions of ESI do not directly influence 
domestic HEI firms’ technological capabilities, they govern the method of transactions of 
the two sectors and subsequently enabled the HEI for respective technology transfers 
from advanced foreign firms in a favourable market. The favourable domestic market 
invites advanced foreign firms when there is adverse institutional or economic change in 
the global market. As a result of the asymmetric institutional contexts between the 
domestic and global markets, the advanced firms suffering from financial problems or 
demand shortage sought the latecomer countries as a ‘shelter’, such as the gas turbine 
division of Westinghouse in the 1970s and the nuclear division of CE in the 1980s. 
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 Comparisons with Rival Approaches 
6.3.1. Firm Capability Approach 
Inconsistency Between Capabilities and Catching-up Performances 
 
Although the Japanese HEI firm, MHI, exhibits superior technological capabilities 
in terms of technology scope and depth compared to its Korean counterpart, its relative 
catching-up performances have been inconsistent with its technological capabilities. Even 
though MHI, together with the other two HEI firms, indigenised commercial reactor 
technologies in the 1970s, it never succeeded in nuclear export. By comparison, even 
though Doosan, including its predecessor, could not develop architecture & engineering 
(A&E) capabilities, its tight alliance with KEPCO led successful catching-up, including the 
nuclear export case in 2009 (Table 6.11). 
It was the governance structure of the ESI that decided the export success and 
failure in the end. While the state-owned monopoly ESI supported the Korean nuclear 
export to the UAE in every aspect, the Japanese ESI as private investors, such as Tokyo 
Power, autonomously decided to withdraw from the Wylfa project in the UK, 
independent of the Japanese government’s intent. The inconsistency between the firm 
capability and catching-up performance is also pronounced in upstream supplier’s cases. 
Table 6.11 Inconsistency between Firm Capabilities and Catch-Up Performances 
 Nuclear Power Gas Turbine 
Japan MHI: Early indigenisation of overall reactor 
technologies (1975) 
MHI: Commercialisation of CCGT 
(1984) 
Korea Doosan: indigenisation of NSSS (1995), 
deficient in A&E capability, Doosan-KEPCO 
alliance’s nuclear export (2009) 
Doosan: Developed 5MW small gas 
turbine (2009) 
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Disproportionate Performances of Supporting Industries 
Relative technological capabilities of specialized metal industries for the 
development of components of the two technologies exhibit unexpected but similar 
stories. Although Sumitomo Metal Tube Works successfully commercialised uniquely 
sophisticated steam generator tubes with advanced alloy and performed well in the global 
market, it did not help MHI to improve overall post-catching-up performances in the 
global nuclear market. By contrast, MHI Precision Casting Co. and its predecessor has 
been lagging behind the rest of the global OEMs in blades precision casting technologies 
despite MHI’s successful catching-up performance in the global gas turbine market. The 
precision caster has always applied lower grade superalloy and casting technology for gas 
turbine blades than the global OEMs since its first CCGT in 1984 (see Section 5.3.4). 
By comparison, Korea’s specialised metal industries show dichotomous stories 
compared to their Japanese counterparts. Although Korean specialty metal firms from 
Sami to its successor, POSCO Specialty Steel, never could indigenise even outmoded 
Alloy 600 steam generator tubes for nuclear power, the inferior capabilities hardly 
hindered Korean nuclear catching-up success. The Korean precision caster, namely KLW, 
exhibited relatively better catching-up performance in the gas turbine blade and vanes 
segments among the specialty metal firms, on the contrary. It not only localised outmoded 
blade technologies such as CC blades but also developed DS blades through public and 
in-house R&Ds and exports its own DS blades to a couple of customers in the Middle East. 
Nevertheless, its relatively advanced capabilities compared to its HEI partner hardly 
improved Korea’s gas turbine catching-up performances. Without involvement in 
commercial gas turbine projects in the Korean electricity market, the precision caster’s 
capabilities have remained as only unproven potential (see Section 4.3.5). 
Although the cross-nation and cross-technology dichotomy of the specialised 
metal industries are not clear as much as that of their HEI counterparts, the pattern offers 
unique insights from the ‘producer – upstream supplier relationship’ perspective, 
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recommended by the firm capability approach in the empirical literature. The inversely 
proportionate performances of the specialised metal industries compared to the 
performances of their HEI partners can be better explained by the effectiveness of the 
specific institutional set of ESI in this case study. Regardless of their relative strength and 
weakness compared to their HEI partners, the institutional sets of ESI effectively either 
constrained or incentivised HEI’s catching-up performances in both countries (Table 
6.12).148 
 
Table 6.12 Inversely Proportionate Performances of Specialised Suppliers 
 Specialty Metal Maker 
of Steam Generator Tubes 
Precision Caster 
of Gas Turbine Blades 
Japan Sumitomo Metal Tube Works: 
takes a large global market share 
with sophisticated tube technologies 
MHI Precision Casting Co.: 
Lagged behind the global trends 
(DS blades vs SC blades) 
Korea POSCO Specialty Steel: 
Failed at indigenisation of even 
outmoded tubes 
Korea Lost Wax: 
Produces own DS blades & exports 
to the Middle East market  
 
6.3.2. Sectoral System of Innovation Approach to the Results 
As discussed in the literature review (Section 2.4.2), the SSI framework’s ‘real boundary’ 
of sectors encompasses numerous heterogeneous elements, such as universities, public 
laboratories, financial organisations, governments, upstream suppliers, producers, users, 
and ‘sources of demand’. In addition, the SSI approach argues that sectoral systems could 
 
148 Regarding the relatively superior aircraft engine capabilities of the other precision casters in 
the Japanese case, Appendix Chapter B analyses the potential and the limits of the capabilities 
in the country’s CCGT catching-up performance.  
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be reduced to technological systems based on the technology’s interdependency and 
complementarity between upstream suppliers, producers, users, and ‘source of demand’ 
(Malerba 1999, 2006). Initially, categorising the four actors outlined above as a part of the 
nuclear- and gas turbine technology systems may appear convincing, given that most of 
the actors closely interact through the supply chain and user-supplier relationships. The 
framework is helpful in categorising the nuclear power and gas turbine ‘industries’ in 
terms of typological analysis. 
However, even with the perspective of the technological subsystem, the overall 
contrasting catching-up performances of each technology subsystem between Japanese 
and Korean cases cannot be accounted for without analysing ESI’s crucial role and 
institutions. As analysed in the firm-capability perspective above, the well-developed 
nuclear technology subsystem of the upstream supplier and the HEI firm in the Japanese 
case does not square with its unsuccessful performances in terms of operation, 
construction and export. Thereby, the technology subsystem view does not match with 
the case results. 
Furthermore, if the SSI equates a sectoral system with a technological system, it 
cannot capture the overall effects of the sectoral institutions of ESI across different 
technologies. Although units of regulatory criteria and methods are different by 
technology, the SSI approach could miss the homogeneous pattern of the salient 
institutions of ESI and its effects on nuclear power and gas turbines. It would be more 
problematic when nuclear power and gas turbines are considered in a competing 
relationship in electricity markets. 
6.3.3. Effects of HEI Research and Development Efforts 
Research and Development Efforts on Nuclear Power Catching-Up 
Although both governments have explicitly pursued catching-up policies through 
public R&D programmes in both technologies, these programmes cannot account for 
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success and failure of each technology catching-up in isolation. The Japanese government 
spent US$5.7 billion on public R&D programmes for the standardisation of commercial 
reactors, over and above the notorious ‘new reactor’ R&D programmes that exhausted 
US$74.5 billion without producing any commercial results over the past four decades. 
Although the Japanese commercial nuclear technology indigenisation was achieved much 
earlier than its Korean counterpart through its standardization and safety upgrade R&D 
programmes with gradual technology transfer from foreign licensors, the disappointing 
operating performance of the Japanese nuclear fleets was not significantly improved other 
than a few years in the 2000s. With weak performance in operation and new construction, 
the upgraded reactor, namely APWR, was never constructed in Japan despite a 
substantial R&D expenditure. 
The R&D programmes played only a supplementary role even in successful 
technology catching-up cases. Korea spent only US$820 million and US$274 million for 
the first (OPR1000) and second (APR1400) indigenisation programmes, respectively, – less 
than the cost of a single commercial reactor – on a package technology transfer of modern 
large reactors. Furthermore, the operating performance of Korean nuclear fleets has been 
the world record level in the 1990s and 2000s. Although some nuclear engineering 
literature argues that this was a Korean success in terms of R&D efficiency, or an effective 
catching-up strategy(Choi et al. 2009), the minuscule expenditure exhibits that the 
‘efficiency’ resulted from the exploitation of the global nuclear market recession rather 
than R&D per se. 
In terms of policy efforts view, there was no such ‘leapfrogging’ or ‘stage-skipping’ 
strategy in Korea prior to the unexpected global nuclear market collapse in the 1980s. The 
Korean HEI skipped unnecessary catching-up stages, such as early-generation small 
reactors, whereas its Japanese counterpart followed the path of American partners 
including all the upgrade stages from the first-generation to third-generation 
technologies. Rather than intentional policy efforts, the fitness of the institutional sets of 
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ESI to the global market contingency appeals in the successful catching-up of nuclear 
power. In particular, the role of the state-owned monopoly ESI in rapid mobilising of 
finance for the technology transfer and training in the global market change was 
pronounced. 
Research and Development Efforts and Gas Turbine Catching-Up 
Gas turbine catching-up cases demonstrate the same pattern. Catching-up policies 
include public R&D programmes and energy supply plans. Public R&D programmes 
played only a supplementary role, even in the successful Japanese gas turbine case. 
Although the famous Moonlight Project shorten processes for MHI to master its 
component technology for the precision casting of blades and vanes, MHI was already on 
its own catching-up trajectory of commercial CCGTs in the late 1970s and early 80s. The 
actual effect of the programme is pronounced in reducing the large gap between MHI and 
follower firms, instead. 
Considering the scale of the major public efforts, the Japanese government spent 
only US$490 million – in 2013 prices – on the ‘High-Efficiency Gas Turbine’ development 
of the Moonlight Project, which represents less than 1% of public expenditure on new 
reactor development programmes and less than 10% of that on the Light Water Reactor 
indigenisation and upgrades programmes in Japan. The catching-up success achieved in 
the Japanese gas turbine and Korean nuclear power cases can be better accounted for by 
such as local institutional contexts and the global market changes. 
By comparison, the Korean government repeated R&D programmes for small 
scale gas turbines at a similar level of public expenditure as Japan. Nevertheless, Korea’s 
public R&D programmes on small gas turbines did not generate meaningful technological 
improvements as well as commercial results. With the development of relatively obsolete 
component technologies, the development programmes without technological assistance 
from major foreign OEMs ended without reducing the big gap between such technology 
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and modern commercial gas turbine technologies. The Korean HEI firm is now involved 
in the country’s first large gas turbine public R&D programme without a major global 
OEM partner, but few expect this programme to fill the technology gap between the 
Korean HEI and the global OEMs (Table 6.13). 
Table 6.13 Major Public Expenditure for Indigenisation (US$ million in 2013 price) 
 Japan Korea 
Nuclear 
Power 
5,700 (1973-’10) for Reactor 
Upgrades from 1st to 3rd Stages 
1,407 in total 
o 820 (1985-’95) for Transfer of CE 
Reactor(System80) into OPR1000 
o 274 for development of APR1400 
o 313 for miscellaneous nuclear R&D 
programmes (1984-’99) 
Gas 
Turbine 
490 (1978-’88) for 120MW 
460 in total (1991-’20) 
o 120 (1991-’98) for 1.2 MW 
o 80 (2005-’11) for 5 MW 
o 260 (2013-’20) for 100 MW 
Source: IEA Energy R&D Statistics, Kimura & Kajiki, 2008, Science & Technology Agency of Republic of 
Korea 1997, Ahn 2014, and an interview with Sooyong Kim, op. cit.: p.144 
 
 Chapter Conclusion 
This Chapter explained dichotomous cross-nation and cross-technology variations of the 
catching-up performances in HEI through the salient institutional set of ESI. It also 
showed the relative technological capabilities of HEI and upstream supplier firms, the 
sectoral system approach and R&D programmes do not explain the dichotomy. Although 
one country case could be a random phenomenon, a comparison of the two countries 
reduces such randomness to be unlikely. 
The comparison between the country cases shows that the institutional set of ESI 
constrained the catching-up performances of nuclear power and gas turbine technologies, 
moving them toward opposite directions in the two countries’ cases. First, the unintended 
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institutional set of ESI systematically, rather than randomly, incentivised the catching-up 
performances of one technology, while constraining the other. Although it is possible that 
a specific country could have more policy efforts in developing or exporting a specific 
technology over the other, the analysis shows the environmental (or safety) and economic 
institutions have been often beyond the boundary of specific technology policies. The 
patterns of the institutions and the extent of influence on the catching-up performances 
were explicitly manifested in both countries. Second, the unique patterns of the 
institutional set of ESI across the two countries induced the user-supplier interactions 
towards incentivising either gas turbine or nuclear power catching-up performances. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 Research Findings and Policy Implications 
7.1.1. Major Findings 
Motivated by Korea’s first nuclear export in 2009, which defeated the Japanese 
counterpart in the international bidding competition, the case study investigated the 
cause of the nuclear export success and the overall ramifications to the catching-up 
performance of the two countries in the HEI sector. In order to evaluate the nuclear export 
success in a comparative fashion, the case study employed an axiomatic assumption that 
both nations are intent of developing and exporting every variety of technology in the 
HEI sector. The case study supported the assumption by demonstrating similar level 
efforts for catching-up and export of CCGTs as well as nuclear power in both countries. 
Based on the basic assumption, the case study demonstrated that a historically 
evolved set of core regulations on the ESI sector engendered the contrasting catching-up 
results of nuclear and CCGTs regardless of public R&D efforts and firm capabilities. The 
finding reveals the fallacy of existing empirical literature attributing the Korean nuclear 
catching-up performance to a linear evolution from R&D efforts to the technology 
localisation to the export. The finding is supported by the reference case. The Japanese 
case demonstrated that its contrasting catching-up performances across nuclear power 
and CCGTs, compared to the Korean counterpart, are attributable to a combined effect of 
autonomous economic regulations and tight environmental regulations, regardless of 
firm capabilities and public R&D efforts. 
The contrasting results of the replication across the two country cases, but for 
anticipated reasons, add up to important ramifications to catching-up studies as well as 
catching-up policies in the HEI sector. The finding revealed that both CCGT catching-up 
efforts in Korea and the efforts of nuclear expansion and export in Japan failed due to the 
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mismatch between the technology policies and the historically evolved regulatory 
structure of the ESI. Although neither the market nor government’s hierarchical control 
give panacea to the failures, the findings urge the two countries to change either the 
technology policies or the regulatory structures in order to address the mismatch. 
Further theoretical and empirical contributions to knowledge, rival propositions, 
and limitations of the study are addressed in the following sections. In order to address 
potential causes of the catching-up performances out of the rival propositions, Appendix 
Chapters are added. Appendix A analyses the relative technological capability of the two 
latecomers compared to the forerunners in the global nuclear and CCGTs markets. 
Appendix B analyses the Japanese aircraft engine capability in order to address the 
potential spill-over effects from the aircraft engine to the Japanese CCGT catching-up 
performance. 
7.1.2. Theoretical Implications and Contribution 
Contribution to the National Innovation System Framework 
The case study built on and contributed to the broad version of the National 
Innovation System (NIS) literature (Lundvall et al., 2002) by employing and deepening its 
main analytical concepts. To researchers, it may be cost-effective to leave the intractable 
and complex institutional structure and focus on micro-level policy choices which are 
allowed within the structure, particularly in advanced economies where institutional 
structures are relatively well established. However, often idiosyncratic institutional 
arrangements with a rationale of resource allocation are deeply entrenched and seriously 
affect the overall catching-up performances in catching-up economy contexts, such as the 
cross-subsidy between the power generation and city gas sectors in Korea. Following the 
recipe of firm capability or NIS theories without addressing the institutional structure 
would not work in the catching-up contexts. In this sense, the case study built on the broad 
version of NIS. 
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Although the broad version NIS provides abstract concepts encompassing 
economic, social and political institutions influencing innovation activities beyond 
narrow science and technology development activities, more concise theoretical 
perspectives are rarely articulated. The case study supplemented the main concepts by 
integrating more specific perspectives, including institutional analysis, firm capability in 
the catching-up context and Porter’s Hypothesis as specific analytical tools of the broad 
NIS framework as elaborated in Section 2.4.4. and Section 2.5. 
Through the theoretical arrangement, the case study captured the effects of core 
economic and social regulations influencing the catching-up directions and rates of the 
two technologies in the two latecomer countries. In particular, it demonstrated a mutually 
exclusive pattern between the combination of catching-up performances and the 
combination of core regulations on the ESI(see page 181-186 and page 271-275), as 
compared to firm capabilities (page 305-307) and government’s efforts through 
development programmes (page 309-311). Although the additional analytic perspectives 
do not explain the overarching story individually, they play a crucial role as parts of the 
integrated framework of the broad version NIS. In this way, it contributes to the 
generalisability of the broad version NIS beyond idiosyncratic catching-up cases. Through 
the integrated framework, the study provides additional contributions to the individual 
analytic perspectives. 
 
Contribution to the Literature of Environmental Regulation and Innovation 
This study exposed the gap in Porter’s Hypothesis (Porter & van der Linde, 1995) 
of environmental regulation and innovation and the following literature. As 
environmental regulations do not exist in isolation, ignoring other regulations which 
influence the ESI could lead to false causality or ambivalent results at best. For instance, 
Porter’s Hypothesis, per se, cannot explain Korea’s remarkable nuclear catching-up 
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performance despite its lax safety regulations and Japan’s weak nuclear catching-up 
performance despite the stringent safety regulations unless combined effects of 
environmental and economic regulations are considered. Although Porter’s Hypothesis 
plays a role in explaining micro-level innovations, such as Japan’s stringent safety 
regulation and Sumitomo Metal’s ‘low-noise’ steam generator tubes and Korea’s lax 
safety regulation and repeated failures of steam generator tube localisation efforts (see 
page 306-307), it cannot explain the overall catching-up performance. 
Alternatively, the study showed the strong economic regulations on the Korean 
ESI not only secured continuous nuclear construction projects but also provided efficient 
mobilisation of resources and leveraging capability during the technology transfer 
process and the nuclear export deal. The efficient mobilisation of resources based on the 
strong economic regulation more than offset the potential micro-level innovation effect of 
the lax safety regulations. This pattern is replicated in both technologies across the two 
countries in opposite directions as anticipated. Autonomous economic regulations of the 
Japanese ESI did not secure the rapid growth of baseload demand for new nuclear 
construction projects despite the micro-level innovations, such as the low-noise steam 
generator tubes. 
The tranquilising effect of economic regulations on Poter’s Hypothesis appears to 
originate from a difference between the regulatory purposes as reviewed in Section 2.4.4 
(see page 66). Economic regulations, in general, are motivated by resource allocation 
purposes, such as support of specific industries and economic welfare through energy 
subsidies, while environmental regulations require compliance and induce firms’ 
innovations for compliance. The case study urges the following researches of Poter’s 
Hypothesis to pay attention to the intrinsic tension between economic regulations and 
environmental regulations and its combined effects on the overall innovation (or catching-
up) performances. 
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Contribution to Firm Capability Literature in the Catching-up Context 
The case study demonstrated leveraging capability and combinative capability 
through catching-up firms’ technology transfer process and modification processes. In 
particular, swift mobilisation of resources by the state-owned ESI during the technology 
transfer process of the American reactors played a crucial role in leveraging the whole 
package of reactor technologies from the blueprints to On-The-Job training in the Korean 
case. The leveraging capability enabled the Korean nuclear consortium to rapidly acquire 
modern reactor technologies within one and a half-decade skipping the intermediate 
stages that the Japanese counterparts followed through from the first generation small 
reactors to the modern reactors. 
In this way, the finding suggests the possibility of conceptual expansion of 
“institutional resources” of the firm capability literature in the catching-up context. While 
the concept is used as a rather narrow term, such as public institutes for technology 
transfer facilitation, the case study shows the regulatory framework of the ESI, per se, 
could be the “institutional resources” in inducing attractive demand for foreign firms to 
the domestic market and leveraging technology transfer options. 
 
Contributions to Institutional Analysis 
The study findings contribute to the institutional analysis literature (Williamson, 
2000) by analysing the evolution of governance structures from the historic events as the 
cause of focal regulations of the ESI in both country cases. In particular, the cases showed 
that SCAP’s Occupation of Japan during the post-war period and the military Coup by 
Park Chung-hee in the 1960s’ Korea shaped the contrasting governance structures of the 
Japanese and Korean electricity markets. Within the contrasting governance structures, 
energy ministries’ degree of freedom in regulating the ESI has been polarised between the 
two countries. The study demonstrated that the contrasting governance structures 
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affected the ESI operation, including energy pricing, electricity supply planning, 
execution of reactor construction projects, and resource mobilisation for technology 
transfer and nuclear export projects, toward opposite ways across the two countries. 
In addition to the economic issue, it also demonstrated the process from historic 
environmental events, such as Yokkaichi Asthma in Japan and mass carbon monoxide 
poisonings in Korea, to the establishment of stringent environmental regulations and 
gasification of the electricity supply market in Japan and cross-subsidy for rapid 
gasification of households in Korea, respectively. Ironically, the two historic 
environmental events shaped contrasting market conditions of CCGTs between the two 
countries. While Williamson(2000)’s institutional analysis and governance structure are 
focused on the variation of regulatory instruments between market incentive and 
administrative control, the case study demonstrated a necessity to pay attention to the 
combined effect of economic and social regulations within a specific sector, such as the 
ESI. 
Given that a specific regulation does not play in isolation, the assumption of the 
combined effects of heterogeneous regulations is more realistic and intuitive. 
Nevertheless, the combined effect of multiple regulations is not yet well established in the 
literature. In this context, the case study captured a detailed process from a few historic 
events to the establishment of corresponding regulations to the combined effects on the 
catching-up performances in the two countries. In particular, the contrasting regulatory 
combination and following combined effects in the cases suggest that it is possible to 
capture generalisable patterns of evolutions in the governance structure of the ESI for 
international comparison. 
This case study supplements such a perspective depending on a single regulatory factor 
and its effect by demonstrating a combined effect of the two core regulations, including 
environmental and economic regulations of the user sector. The framework in Chapter 3 
anticipates that there are contrasting sets of institutions of ESI between Japan and Korea, 
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in accounting for the dichotomy of cross-technology and cross-nation catching-up 
performances. The case study results confirm the contrast of institutions between the two 
countries as anticipated by the proposition. Accordingly, research questions are 
addressed below. 
Research Question 1: Why did Japanese and Korean HEIs show dichotomously 
contrasting catching-up performances between nuclear power and gas turbines in the past 
three decades? 
The case study shows that the contrasting institutional set of ESI between the two 
countries effectively incentivises one technology while effectively constrain the other 
technology. It also shows the specific institutional sets are not randomly emerged but 
historically ingrained elements of the ESIs in both countries. By comparison, other 
potential factors, including public R&D efforts, and technological capabilities of HEI firms 
and upstream suppliers in both countries, do not match with the performance results in 
the case study. 
Research Question 2: What are the specific weaknesses of user-supplier linkages 
of the Korean HEI that might explain contrasting catching-up performance between 
nuclear and gas turbines, compared to their Japanese counterpart? 
The case study shows ambivalent results. ‘The lack of user-supplier relationship’ 
or ‘the lack of producer-specialized supplier relationship’ are commonly raised as a major 
obstacle for other Korean manufacturing industries to shift from their past technology 
catching-up success to emerging technology areas in the empirical literature. Regarding 
the ‘user-supplier’ relationship, the interviewees in the Korean case consistently point out 
the lack of demand for CCGTs in the Korean electricity market as the main obstacle for 
catching-up. The uncertain future demand for CCGTs also discourages private and public 
actors’ investment in human resources and in-house R&Ds. 
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Regarding the ‘producer-specialized supplier’ relationship, Korean a precision 
caster has exhibited relatively advanced performances than its HEI partner regarding gas 
turbine technology catching-up. Nevertheless, deficient demand for gas turbines has 
effectively constrained the precision caster from further user-producer interactions. The 
repeated public R&Ds without involvement in commercial gas turbine projects have not 
given a chance for the precision caster to get access to advanced technologies. Even a niche 
market such as the gas turbine repair service is blocked by foreign OEMs’ new strategy. 
It does not square with contexts and capabilities of other Korean specialised suppliers in 
other manufacturing sectors such as machine tool sector. Instead, the case study results 
point to the current Korean electricity market, which is locking-out gas turbines as 
discussed above. 
Research Question 3: To what extent, can a specific set of user sector’s institutions 
explain the contrasting catching-up performances of the Korean HEI, as compared to the 
experiences of the Japanese? 
Although the case study results show constraining effects of ESI’s institutions on 
gas turbine catching-up performances of Korean HEI, there is still uncertainty in 
addressing the degree of constraining effect. The large technology gap between the 
Korean latecomer and the global gas turbine OEMs leave such uncertainties. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that the current institutional set of Korean ESI blocks the chance of technology 
transfer from advanced foreign firms. Considering both of the successful Japanese CCGTs 
and Korean nuclear cases have benefitted from a match between domestic institutions of 
ESI and global market change, the current institutional set of Korean ESI is not prepared 
for a future window of opportunity. 
7.1.3. Policy Implications 
The case study demonstrated the unsatisfactory catching-up performances 
compared to the governments’ efforts, mostly focused on public R&D programmes. The 
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study results imply that the unsatisfactory catching-up performance of the Korean CCGT 
case would repeat unless the existing economic and environmental regulations of the ESI 
are reformed. It pointed out that the economic regulations continue despite the rationales 
of resource allocation already exhausted by showing the cross-subsidy between power 
generation and household city gas sectors despite the world record level of gasification 
rate of Korean households and continued electricity price subsidy scheme for specific steel 
industries despite the saturated demand for those steel products. 
The sectoral-level level juxtaposition of institutions and policies shows what 
governments should consider before they plan a specific energy technology catching-up 
policy. Although NSI literature addresses the mismatch issue between national 
institutions and technology development policies (Freeman 1997), the thesis reveals that 
some specific technology catching-up policies, such as CCGT, may need a thorough and 
comprehensive evaluation of the policies in terms of fitness with the existing institutions 
across relevant sectors, user sector’s institutions. In other words, policymakers who 
pursue energy technology catching-up policies may need cohesive evaluations and 
subsequent reforms of the existing institutional set of ESI before the start of a specific 
policy programme. 
In particular, the set of cross-subsidies that once functioned well for rapid socio-
economic development in the 1980s and 90s, are is now hampering Korean NSI for 
‘catching-up shift’ of the HEI while continuing to support already strong NSI for nuclear 
technology development. The Korean case shows how the cross-subsidies for the city gas 
sector weakened not only the price competitiveness of CCGTs but also the demand and 
incentives of stakeholders for investment on human resources and technology of CCGTs 
in Korea. In this context, repetition of undifferentiated technology catching-up policies, 
such as public R&D programmes, may result in unsatisfactory catching-up performances. 
On the other hand, this case study raises a necessity of overall reform of the major 
institutions surrounding the Korean HEI and ESI to recover resilience of the catching-up 
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policy in question. Although unorthodox institutional arrangements for rapid catching-
up, often addressed as “getting relative price wrong”, in the 1970s and 80s’ Korea worked 
well, the Korean case demonstrated that socio-economic factors have dramatically 
changed for the past three decades. It raises a question about the efficacy of such cross-
subsidies in energy pricing practices in terms of social welfare as well as catching-up 
policies. The city gas penetration rate already reached to the world highest level while the 
price of city gas is even cheaper than that of some natural gas exporting countries due to 
the continued cross-subsidy. In a similar vein, the saturation of demand for specific steel 
industry questions about the efficacy of the intense TOU electricity pricing, which cross-
subsidise EAF steel, at the expense of other manufacturing industries. 
The Korean cross-subsidy issue is comparable to the US and European restriction on 
natural gas use for power generation in the 1970s. Although the restriction was legislated 
based on misinformation about natural gas reserves and political concern on city gas 
consumers, once the misinformation was corrected the governments abolished the 
restriction in the next decade. The withdrawal was resilient enough, though not much 
prompt, for the American CCGT OEMs to rapidly recover their innovative activities. 
In addition, the Korean case highlights that the loose environmental and safety 
regulations and practices in the ESI need to be strengthened and sophisticated. It is not 
only for more efficient catching-up but also to address public discontent regarding safety 
and environmental concerns in the country. The Japanese case shows that stringent but 
gradual environmental regulations offered the Japanese CCGT firms a runaway into the 
global CCGT market. Sophisticated environmental and economic regulations could let the 
Korean HEI prepare future shocks, whether internal or external and exploit the window 
of opportunity. 
The case study also has some implications for the Japanese nuclear policy that 
enthusiastically sought export cases even after the Fukushima accident. The export 
success of the Korean nuclear power seems hardly replicable in the Japanese case. The 
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Korean export case mainly comes from the efficient mobilisation of financing, vertically 
integrated supply chain from A&E to construction sub-contractors, and the subsequent 
cost performance based on the state-owned monopoly ESI, namely KEPCO. 
However, the Japanese HEI has an entirely different catching-up path and 
institutional background from its Korean counterpart. The strong autonomy of private 
ESI firms in the decision-making of new investments, extensive and stringent safety 
inspection, as well as exhaustive reactor retrofitting works in Japan after the Fukushima 
accident make an export case virtually impossible to achieve. The withdrawals of Hitachi, 
Toshiba and Mitsubishi from the nuclear export market in the late 2010s give the evidence. 
 Comparing the Findings with Rival Explanations 
As discussed in the Methods Chapter, there could be three rival explanations for the 
research results. These alternative explanations derive from the firm-level capability 
approach and the SSI approach are addressed, below. 
Rival Proposition 1: The cross-technology and cross-nation contrast in catching-
up performance is a result of different firm capabilities, including supporting industries’ 
capabilities. 
Rival Proposition 2: The cross-technology and cross-nation contrast in catching-
up performance is a mere coincidence, given that the two technologies are different, and 
each has its own independent sector. 
Rival Proposition 3: The cross-technology and cross-nation contrast in catching-
up performance is a result of different R&D efforts, including the size of public 
expenditure and frequency of R&D projects. 
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Rival Proposition 1 ( Firm Capability Approach) 
The firm-level capability approach can only partially explain the contrasting 
shapes and performances across the two countries, given that the major characteristics 
and performances of HEI firms are co-evolved with sectoral and inter-sectoral institutions. 
Considering the technological gap between Japanese and Korean HEI firms, in terms of 
scope and depth, the firm-level capability approach has a limit in explaining the less 
successful catch-up performance of the Japanese nuclear power, and the pronounced 
success of the Korean nuclear power. 
The limit of the firm capability approach is more evident if supporting industry 
firms’ capabilities are compared. The case study highlighted that the Japanese HEI has 
been unsuccessful in nuclear power catching-up despite specialty metal firm’s highly 
sophisticated component technology capability, such as steam generator tube, whereas its 
Korean counterpart has been successful in nuclear power catching-up despite specialty 
firm’s incompetence in the same component technology. 
Rival Proposition 2 (Sectoral System of Innovation Approach) 
The SSI approach assumes that different technologies within the same sector might 
have different subsystems. From this assumption, mutually irrelevant co-existence of the 
two technologies within the HEI sector could be deduced. 
However, the case study highlighted that catching-up performances of the two 
technologies are substantially influenced by the homogeneous set of institutions in the 
user sector in terms of operation, construction, indigenisation and export. In particular, 
the case study showed that the same set of the ESI’s institutions incentives one technology 
while effectively constrains the other. Thus, the two technologies are highly relevant 
elements of the same sector. 
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Rival Proposition 3 (Public Research Efforts Claim) 
The case study exhibits all the major public R&D programmes without 
consideration of cohesive institutional context have failed, while even in successful cases, 
such as the Japanese gas turbine and the Korean nuclear, the R&D programmes played an 
only supplementary role. Furthermore, the stark contrast between the large public 
expenditure for the R&D programmes in the failed cases such as the Japanese nuclear case, 
and the minuscule public expenditure in the successful cases reject this kind of claim. 
Duration and frequency of such R&D programmes do not square with the results, as well. 
In order to clarify possible causes of the contrasting catching-up performances out 
the research framework and the rival propositions, Appendix Chapter. Analyses the two 
latecomer countries’ performance during the advanced nuclear and CCGT development 
programmes in the US. Appendix Chapter B analyses the Japanese aircraft engine 
capabilities and the potential ramifications to the country’s CCGT performance. 
 Limitations and Suggestions 
The comparative case study of the cross-technology and cross-nation catching-up 
performances inevitably limits in-depth analysis of each technology and sector. By 
themselves, each sector and technology deserves in-depth single case studies in finding 
more detailed variables in explaining their catching-up performances from a different 
perspective. For instance, the analysis of the actors’ network and knowledge base is 
limited by only focusing on institutional factors amongst the sectoral components. 
Amongst the two sectors of the Japanese case, this study lacks direct information sources 
on HEI and its upstream specialist suppliers. Thereby, the comparative case study results 
have a limit in claiming a definite causality. The Japanese HEI and specialised metal 
industries, in particular, need a further in-depth case study. 
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Regarding methodology, the qualitative comparative case study approach of the 
thesis was effective in highlighting the dichotomy of cross-nation and cross-technology 
catching-up performances. Focusing on the pattern of institutional sets as an explaining 
variable of the contrasting catching performances generated further insights. Although it 
is difficult to witness institutional change, and the subsequent results in catching-up 
performance, this thesis analysed institutional variation, and its subsequent effects, 
through contrasting institutional sets across the two case countries. 
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Appendix A. Advanced Energy Programmes and 
Ramifications to the Latecomers’ Catching-up Performances 
 
A1. Chapter Introduction 
This Appendix Chapter describes a representing aspect of state-of-the-arts of 
commercial nuclear and CCGT technologies originated from two advanced energy 
technology programmes in the US and respective ramifications to the Japanese and 
Korean latecomers. The advanced nuclear and CCGT development programmes were 
public and private reactions to considerable changes in economic and environmental 
regulations in the 1980s and 90s (see Section 2.2.). In this perspective, the US Department 
of Energy (DOE) and the relevant industries launched two major public-private energy 
technology development programmes, namely Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) 
(1985-1999) and Advanced Turbine System (ATS) (1993-2001) programmes.149 
In order to cope with the conflicting requirements of the environment (safety in 
case of nuclear power) and economics, a respective consensus among the US DOE, the ESI 
and the HEI emerged in each of nuclear and CCGT cases. The shared idea was that each 
technology would need a new technological approach in addition to incremental 
innovations of existing commercial technologies to overcome the conflicting 
requirements. The nuclear OEMs focused on the application of nuclear submarine 
technologies, which was previously impractical to apply due to scale-up issues, to nuclear 
power plants, while the CCGT OEMs focused on the application of non-jet engine 
technology to CCGTs beyond the technical boundary of their jet engine predecessors. 
 
149 Although there have been miscellaneous energy programmes in the US, the two were the 
largest public-private programmes among them in the past three decades and played a decisive 
role in shaping state-of-the-art innovations of nuclear and CCGT technologies in the global 
market.  
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Although the Japanese and Korean latecomers did not play any meaningful role 
in the new approach of the US energy programmes abovementioned, they actively took 
advantage of the innovations from the programmes through cooperative relationships 
with their American licensors. The Chapter shows their relative catching-up performances 
in exploiting the results of the energy programmes as well as their relative positions in the 
global nuclear and CCGT markets. In comparing relative catching-up performances and 
capabilities of the Japanese and Korean latecomers in both technologies, the Chapter 
shows to what extent the latecomers’ capabilities are different in terms of their relative 
resilience in the relationship with their American technology licensors during and after 
the programmes. 
 
A2. Advanced Light Water Reactor Programme in 1985-1999 
Serious concerns about the future of the US nuclear industry brought by major 
nuclear accidents, including Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986), triggered 
Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Programme in the 1980s. The shared consensus 
that the industry could not afford another major accident weakened the nuclear industry’s 
resistance to stricter safety regulations and standards. Furthermore, the industry leaders 
themselves urged that new nuclear designs should reduce the accident probability by two 
orders of magnitude lower than existing reactors to gain future public acceptance of 
nuclear power (MacKerron, 1992). The nuclear industry’s accident probability is 
expressed as Core Damage Frequency (CDF) per reactor year, and the CDF of existing 
average PWRs is considered as 5 × 10-5 /RY, for instance (Gaio, 2010). 
In addition to the safety concern, the US ESI and its advisory body, Electric Power 
Research Institute (EPRI), articulated safer and modularised reactor design requirements 
which standardise subsystems and components for reduction of the construction lead-
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time and capital cost. Although EPRI’s voluntary programme for ‘the next generation 
light water reactor’ was launched in the mid-1980s, details of the programme were 
embodied by “Advanced Light Water Reactor Utilities Requirements Documents” in 1990 
which contain owner-operator guidelines to the US nuclear OEMs of the new reactors. 
The documents suggested mainly two versions of new reactor requirements, namely Mid-
Sized Light Water Reactors (LWRs) with Passive Safety Features and Large Evolutionary 
LWRs (NRC, 1992; Cummins & Matzie, 2018). The former required simplified and passive 
safety systems beyond existing reactors while the latter required modified and scaled-up 
designs of existing reactors. The OEMs developed AP600 (Westinghouse) and SBWR 
(General Electric) in responding to the former and ABWR (GE), APWR-1300 
(Westinghouse), and System 80+ (CE) in responding to the latter (Table A1). 
Table A1. Nuclear Reactor Designs of the ALWR Programme and the Results 
 Design 
(MW) 
OEM Results 
US Market Other Markets 
Mid-Sized 
Reactors 
(Passive) 
AP600 
(615) 
WE Certified (1999); Scaled-up AP1000 reactors were 
constructed in China (2018) & US (2022, expected) 
SBWR 
(600) 
GE Not Certified - 
Large 
Evolutionary 
Reactors 
ABWR 
(1,350) 
GE Certified (1997), 
Expired (2002) 
Four units constructed in Japan from 
1996  
APWR 
(1,350) 
WE Not Certified Certified in Japan (1987) but never 
constructed 
System80+ 
(1,300) 
CE Certified (1997), 
Expired (2002) 
Modified & Constructed as APR1400 
in Korea (2016) & UAE (2018) 
Source: Author’s elaboration from NRC 1992 and Cummins & Matzie 2018 
Note: SBWR and AP600 stand for Simplified BWR and Advanced Passive 600, respectively. 
The reason why the ‘Mid-Size’ was emphasised for the passive reactor was that 
much larger capacity than a reference size of 600 MW would be impractical or not cost-
effective for the purpose. More extensive safety-related equipment, such as reactor vessel 
and cooling water tanks, would be inadequate for passive operation without electricity 
supply during emergency conditions, or it would be too expensive to make them operable. 
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Also, smaller reactor sizes would enable shorter construction lead time, more extensive 
modularisation of equipment, and more efficient learning by replication (Taylor et al., 
1989). 
However, the initial consideration of the passive reactor development was shifted 
to the economy of scale from the early 1990s when abundant and low-cost natural gas 
became available to CCGT power generation developers due to the regulatory change of 
natural gas and electricity supply markets in the US (see Section 2.2.1). The lift of the 
previous ban on natural gas use for power generation enabled the emergence of low-cost 
CCGT power generation while the liberalisation of the electricity market enabled CCGT’s 
direct competition with nuclear power. The OEMs for the passive reactors, GE and 
Westinghouse, turned to larger reactor designs, such as Economic Simplified BWR 
(ESBWR) (1,500MW) and AP1000 (1,100MW), in order to lower capital costs in the middle 
of the ALWR programme (Ahearne et al., 2001; Davis et al., 2002). 
Neither OEM realised how much cost they would pay for the abrupt scale-up. 
Although Westinghouse received the certification of the AP600 in 1999 and the initial 
certification of AP1000 from the US NRC in 2006 with a subsequent subsidy programme, 
namely “Nuclear Power 2010”, it had to change the designs repeatedly for another decade. 
By comparison, GE not only withdrew from the development process of SBWR but also 
failed at completing the ESBWR design due to safety concerns on its components, such as 
steam dryer, and the eventual withdrawal of the designated user, Entergy, from the 
ESBWR construction project in 2015 (US DOE, 2012; Nuclear Engineering International, 
2015). 
Unlike the complicated scale-up and design change processes of the passive 
reactor group, the Large Evolutionary LWRs group made a straightforward completion 
of designs. ABWR and System 80+ received design certifications from the US NRC in 1997, 
respectively, but never commercialised in the US market. The American electric utilities 
were rather indifferent to the reactors and focused on the passive reactors, particularly 
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AP1000 (Cummins & Matzie, 2018). Instead, the certified Large Evolutionary LWRs’s 
designs were transferred to the Japanese and Korean latecomers. The technology transfer 
process and results will be dealt with in Section A4. 
 
A2.1. Canned Motor Pump: Flagship Technology of the ALWR 
Significant differences in AP600 design and its scale-up version, AP1000, from 
previous and existing reactors are simplified and passive safety systems. It reduced 
miscellaneous valves, pipes, pumps and control cables extensively in order to reduce the 
overall construction cost as well as operational complexity. In terms of the passive safety 
system, it applies gravity, convection, and stored energy for natural circulation rather than 
active systems using pumps which need electricity supply during severe events, such as 
station blackout and Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). 
Among various innovations of AP600/AP1000, replacement of existing ‘sealed 
shaft’ reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) with ‘canned motor’ RCPs represents the simplified 
and passive characteristics of the design. The sealed shaft RCPs are widely used in most 
of existing commercial PWRs in the world. Attached to the coolant pipes between the 
reactor and the steam generator, the sealed shaft RCPs drive circulation of reactor coolant 
from the steam generator to the reactor (Figure A1). The impeller section of the RCP is 
exposed to the high-pressure and high-temperature reactor coolant system, for instance, 
at about 15.5Mpa (155 bar) and 290℃ in existing Westinghouse rectors, while its motor 
section is exposed to much lower pressure within the containment building. The 
enormous pressure differential between the impeller and the motor sections induces 
leaking up of the hot and contaminated reactor coolant into the motor section through the 
penetrating shaft. In order to minimise the leakage, the labyrinth seal package is located 
between the motor and impeller sections. Filtered seal injection water passes both down 
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to the reactor coolant system and upward to the seal cartridge to enhance the sealing 
function (US NRC Technical Training Center: 4-15, 4-21) (Figure A2). 
Despite the complex sealing package, it is inevitable for the RCP to leak the reactor 
coolant water due to the massive pressure differential. Thus, the nuclear safety regulation 
allows leaks of the reactor coolant to a certain amount, for instance, 20 gallons per minute 
in the Westinghouse models. Any coolant water that does leak up the shaft is collected 
and routed to the seal leak-off system for collection in various systems (US NRC Technical 
Training Center: 4-15, 4-21). The sealed shaft RCPs not only incur radiation exposure of 
workers during the maintenance but also can induce so-called small break LOCA which 
eventually could lead to uncovering of the reactor core (IAEA, 2004; Gaio, 2010) (Figure 
A1 and A2). 
In order to eliminate the coolant water leaks and probability of the small break 
LOCA, Westinghouse applied the canned motor RCPs into the AP600/AP1000 designs. 
The term ‘canned motor’ originates from the configuration that each rotor and stator of 
the motor section is ‘canned’ with a thin non-magnet stainless sheet for protection from 
the reactor coolant. The pump eliminates pressure differential between the impeller and 
the motor sections and leakage of the contaminated coolant water into the atmosphere by 
locating the pumps within the so-called ‘pressure boundary’ of the reactor coolant system. 
Also, it uses cooled reactor coolant water through a heat exchanger, rather than electric 
fans and oils, for cooling and lubricating bearings (Figure A1 and A3). 
In this context, the canned motor RCP has been the flagship technology of 
AP600/AP1000 since the start of the ALWR programme. The OEM summarises the 
advantages of the canned motor design over the conventional sealed shaft RCPs as below: 
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• Elimination of the shaft seal and the system needed to maintain seal 
injection 
• By eliminating this seal and seal injection, a potential leakage path of 
primary coolant and a source of small break LOCA are also eliminated 
• Canned motor pumps require very little or no maintenance and thereby 
also help lower worker dose (Gaio, 2010: 7) 
 
 
Figure A1. Reactor Coolant Systems of Conventional PWRs and AP1000 
Source: Adapted from USNRC Technical Training Center and Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. 2011 
Note 1: System 80 reactor coolant system on the left is a typical two-loop PWR design among existing PWRs. 
Note 2: The copyright in this image is owned by Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. Reprinted with 
permission. 
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Figure A2. A Conceptual Diagram of the Sealed Shaft Type Reactor Coolant Pump 
Source: Author’s elaboration from US NRC Technical Training Center 
Figure A3. A Conceptual Diagram of the Canned Motor Reactor Coolant Pump (AP1000) 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. 2011 
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Concerning the overall safety system, the canned motor RCPs would facilitate the 
natural circulation of AP1000 during severe events, such as station blackout, by attaching 
the pumps onto the bottom head of steam generators in an inverse position and removing 
interconnected coolant pipes (Figure A1). Although they have been widely used in the US 
Navy ships, such as submarines and aircraft carriers, since the Nautilus in 1955, it was 
unavailable to commercial reactors due to technical limits in scaling-up. Only a few small 
prototype reactors in the late 1950s, such as Shippingport, applied the canned motor 
RCPs. During the ALWR programme, however, Westinghouse considered the technology 
for Navy applications became mature enough to scale-up for commercial nuclear reactors, 
such as AP600 and even larger AP1000, and it would be minor modifications as below: 
All major components of both AP600 and AP1000 have been proven 
in operating reactors under similar flow, temperature, and pressure 
conditions, except for the AP1000 reactor coolant pump. It is a modest 
extension of proven pump designs (Cummins et al., 2003: 3). 
 
A2.2. The Reality of the Canned Motor Pump and Its Impact on AP1000 
Contrary to the hopeful appraisals during the programme, the scale-up process of 
the canned motor RCPs for commercial reactors involved much more than a simple 
extension of dimensions of its predecessors for the naval propulsion. Thermal distortions 
of the enlarged components which could lead to failure of ‘bearing film’, protecting the 
bearings from the hot reactor coolant, brought re-design issues, for instance. Scaling up 
and subsequent optimisation of rotating parts, such as flywheels, bearings, and auxiliary 
impellers brought severe technical challenges too. They caused malfunctions due to 
defects in design and materials and repeatedly delayed the AP1000 projects, including 
Sanmen Unit 1&2 and Haiyang Unit 1&2 in China. Consequently, the issue delayed five 
years of project schedules and still causes problems, such as coolant leakage of the pumps 
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at Sanmen Unit 2 as of 2019. The coolant leakage is a serious issue given that all the 
components of motors are integrated into the “leak-proof” pumps and are designed to 
operate for the life cycle of reactors without maintenance in principle. The experiences 
make additional AP1000 projects unlikely in China (Freebairn, 2014, 2019; MacLachlan, 
2010). 
On the other hand, the earlier experience of the RCP problems in China does not 
seem much helpful for improvements in other AP1000 construction projects in the US, 
such as Vogtle in Georgia and Summer in South Carolina. Although the US Energy 
Information Administration admits that a technological optimism factor of a first-of-a-
kind reactor, such as AP1000, tends to underestimate actual costs of such a new design, it 
assumes the problems would be addressed as experience is gained after building first four 
units (US EIA, 2017). Similar problems of the pumps in addition to quality control issues 
of the subcontractors caused delays of the projects for five years in the US even after the 
experience of four units in China, however. Thermal distortion of the bearings was one of 
the main problems of the pumps in the projects. Faced with repeated repairs, redesigns 
and delays with substantial cost increases, Westinghouse filed for bankruptcy while the 
Summer project was cancelled in 2017 (Freebairn, 2015; Hals & Flitter, 2017). 
The repeated re-design, re-manufacturing and construction delays doubled the 
construction cost. Initially, the project was planned to be completed by 2017 with the total 
construction cost of about US$14 billion when the electricity utility consortium applied 
the US federal government’s loan guarantee in 2008. However, the consortium announced 
in 2017 that the estimated project cost doubled to about US$28 billion and the project 
schedule would be delayed to 2022. The US DOE subsidised the project about US$12 
billion in total to alleviate the cost overrun issue of the consortium as of 2019 (Patel, 2018; 
US DOE, 2019). 
The only reason why the Vogtle project continues is that the cancellation cost is 
higher than the forecasted loss from the project completion, given that the project secured 
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a conditional subsidy including tax credit and direct subsidy upon completion of the 
construction from the US DOE. With this experience, the global nuclear market analysts, 
such as Chris Gadomski from BloombergNEF, evaluate that “the AP1000 is dead in China, 
and it may very well be dead all over the world (South China Morning Post, 2019)”. A 
joint inspection group of Chinese and American safety regulators, namely National 
Nuclear Safety Administration of China and the US NRC, on the RCP issue of AP1000, 
criticised overall problems from the design to quality control to manufacturing as below: 
The observations from the RCP design and manufacturing 
inspection indicated that the previous quality incidents with the RCPs 
were caused by inadequacies in the design process, insufficient personnel 
qualification assessments, process control inadequacies, insufficient 
subcontractor oversight, inadequate control during manufacturing, and a 
poor operator’s awareness to quality (NEA, 2018: 8). 
 
Despite the blame on the overall issues of the canned motor RCPs, it should be 
reminded that Westinghouse has been successful in designing and manufacturing of the 
canned motor RCPs for the US Navy ships since the 1950s (Hewlett & Duncan, 1974; 
MacLachlan, 2009). Westinghouse’s Electro-Mechanical Division has been an original 
manufacturer of the canned motor RCPs for the US Navy ships. Although it was acquired 
by Curtis-Wright in 2002, it still supplied the RCPs to all AP1000 projects in China and the 
US (MacLachalan, 2009, 2010). 
The core problem of the RCPs for commercial reactors is the abrupt scale-up 
without addressing accompanied risks. In that the Seawolf-class nuclear submarines 
(220MWt) in 1997 and Shippingport prototype reactor (225MWt) in 1957 have been the 
largest reactors using the RCPs in the US nuclear history, AP1000 (3,400MWt) was an 
320 
 
abrupt scale-up.150 Even the largest US Navy aircraft carriers, such as Nimitz-class, use two 
reactors of about 220MWt instead of one larger reactor. Although AP1000 is based on 
AP600 design (1,933MWt), AP600 was never constructed and could not provide a reliable 
base for the scale-up process. Westinghouse’s huge leap of scale by a factor of nearly 15 
without similar operational experience for the past half a century brought irretrievable 
costs, including doubling construction costs, its bankruptcy, cancellation of remaining 
projects, and despairing future of the design (Table A2). 
 
Table A2. Abrupt Scale-Up Evolution of the Reactors Using ‘Canned Motor RCPs’ 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Cummins & Matzie 2018, Ragebh 2011, Hewlett and Duncan 1974 
 
Thereby, the design and manufacturing problems of the canned motor RCPs that 
the regulators pointed out were the effect of the scale-up rather than the cause of the 
problems. It is worthwhile to remind the lesson of early scale-up trials by the US Navy 
and Westinghouse in order to figure out the core problem of the AP1000 issues. The first 
nuclear power plant using the canned motor RCPs was Shippingport (1957). Although the 
prototype reactor was the scale-up of the Nautilus submarine reactor by a factor of only 
three, the scale-up process was accompanied by severe burdens of design and engineering 
(Table A2). Even after the construction of Shippingport, Westinghouse and the US ESI 
scrapped the canned motor RCPs and switched to current ‘sealed shaft’ RCPs for larger 
nuclear power plants from the 1960s. A historical review of the US Atomic Energy 
Commission, predecessor of the US DOE and the US NRC, indicates that there had been 
 
150 Megawatt thermal (MWt) refers to thermal power capacity of nuclear reactors before the 
power is converted to electrical power, the capacity of which is measured as MWe or MW.  
 
1955 1957 1997 2006 2018 
Purpose Submarine Power Plant Submarine Design Only Power Plant 
Name Nautilus Shippingport Seawolf AP600 AP1000 
Capacity 
(MWt) 
70 225 220 1,933 3,400 
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overwhelming burdens in designing and manufacturing during the scale-up process from 
the Nautilus to Shippingport as below: 
 
 Scale-up itself involved much more than just putting new dimensions on 
old blueprints. … Fabricating a vessel of this size would push existing 
technology to its limits and generate new engineering problems. The same 
could be said for the huge canned motor pumps, hydraulic valves, and 
steam generators needed to control 225 megawatts of thermal energy. … It 
shifted the heaviest load of responsibility from the already overburdened 
design forces to component fabricators (Hewlett & Duncan 1974: 243). 
 
A3. Advanced Turbine System Programme in 1993-2001 
As can be seen in the nuclear power case, the reforms of economic and 
environmental regulations in the late 1980s and early 90s in the US resulted in a dramatic 
change of the global CCGT market (See Section 2.2.1). Deregulation of the US electricity 
market and declining natural gas price made power plant developers wait and see until 
the market adjustment. The US DOE considered that the increased uncertainty might 
discourage the American OEMs’ innovation efforts and the tightening emission standards 
would threaten their competitiveness. In this policy background, DOE launched a public-
private gas turbine development programme, namely Advanced Turbine Systme (ATS), 
facilitating cooperative networks between the American CCGT OEMs, national research 
institutes, universities and precision casters in 1992 (Rycroft & Kash, 1999; Curtis, 2003). 
The networks of internal and external resources which the CCGT OEMs exploited 
during the programme demonstrate that the advanced NIS of the US cannot be replicated 
in any other nations. While GE exploited knowledge stock of its internal resources, 
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including GE Aircraft Engines (GEAE) and GE Corporate Research & Development 
(GECRD), for improving aerodynamics and combustion systems, Westinghouse mostly 
depended on the networks of external resources, including US national laboratories, the 
US Air Force, precision casters, and universities to overcome its limited knowledge in 
materials, aerodynamics and combustion fields. In particular, Westinghouse took 
advantage of the advanced capabilities within the national laboratories, including the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)’s Glenn Research Center and the 
US Air Force’s Institute of Technology. The network with the national research centres 
provided a rare chance to improve Westinghouse’s limited capabilities in aircraft engine 
technologies, which became a base of its steam cooling technologies (Rycroft & Kash, 1999; 
Curtis, 2003) (Table A3). 
Table A3. Networks of Internal & External Resources of CCGT OEMs in the ATS 
 
GEPS Westinghouse (Siemens) 
Closed-loop Steam Cooling GEAE, GECRD R-R, MHI, NASA, US Air Force 
Precision Casters (Howmet, PCC Airfoil) 
Single Crystal Alloy Casting 
 
ORNL 
Precision Casters (Howmet, PCC Airfoil) 
Thermal Barrier Coating GEAE, GECRD ORNL, R-R 
DLNC GECRD, US Air Force NETL, Universities (Clemson, 
Georgia Tech., Carnegie Mellon) 
Source: Adapted from Rycroft & Kash 1999 
Note: GEAE = GE Aircraft Engine, GECRD = GE Corporate Research & Development, R-R = Rolls-Royce, 
MHI = Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration, ORNL = Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, NETL = National Energy Technology Laboratory 
The development programme aimed at higher energy efficiency above 60 per cent 
and lower NOx emission less than ten parts per million (ppm) departing from those of 
existing F-class CCGTs, developed by GE and Westinghouse in the late 1980s and early 
90s. Alongside the external pressure of the conflicting requirements, the intractable 
characteristics of the CCGT technology are that higher efficiency of the gas turbine cycle 
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is accompanied by higher temperature of combustion leading to an exponential increase 
of NOx emission. In tackling the bottleneck, the ATS programme devised four main 
targets, including i) closed-loop steam cooling system against existing air-cooling system, 
ii) large SC blades and vanes against existing DS ones, iii) advanced DLNC, and iv) 
advanced thermal barrier coating for blades and vanes (Curtis, 2003; Jeff, 2008). 
 
A3.1. Closed-loop Steam Cooling: Flagship Technology of the ATS 
Major technology development of the CCGTs in the ATS programme was the 
closed-loop steam cooling. Previously, CCGTs entirely depended on extracted air from 
the compressor for cooling of the inner combustor wall as well as turbine blades and 
vanes.151 The air cooling, however, not only interrupts injections of air for combustion 
from the compressor to the combustor generating more NOx emission but also reduces 
energy efficiency. Also, the discharged cooling air through miscellaneous fine holes of the 
first stage vanes drops the hot gas path temperature which is the driving force of the 
blades in the first and second stages, and thereby lower energy efficiency (Diakuenchak 
et al., 2002) (Figure A4). 
In tackling the problem, the OEMs applied a non-jet engine technology concept, 
namely closed-loop steam cooling. This design utilises steam from the heat recovery steam 
generator (HRSG) of CCGTs for cooling vanes, and blades if possible, and returns the 
heated steam to the HRSG for driving steam turbines. It minimises parasitic air extraction 
from the compressor, thus provides stable and more air rich combustion reducing NOx 
emission. At the same time, it sustains a higher hot gas path temperature between the first 
stage vanes and following blades by eliminating air discharge into the hot gas path. The 
 
151 The OEMs call it ‘air bleed’ due to the parasitic nature of the air extraction from the 
compressor. 
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uninterrupted expansion of the hot gas transforms more thermal energy into kinetic 
energy of rotating blades and improves fuel efficiency (Figure A4 and A5). 
General Electric led the innovation by applying the steam cooling to the vanes and 
blades of the first two stages in the four-stage gas turbine while Westinghouse’s steam 
cooling concept was limited to the vanes of first two stages. The remaining third and 
fourth stages still use air cooling or are uncooled (Gülen, 2019; Matta et al., 2000; Siemens 
Westinghouse Power Corporation, 2004). The technology was transferred to MHI through 
a cooperative development between MHI and Westinghouse in the mid-1990s and to 
Siemens through its acquisition of Westinghouse in 1998 (Jeff, 2008; Soares, 2008). 
At the end of the programme, the OEMs appeared successful in developing their 
next-generation CCGTs reaching 60 per cent of thermal efficiency and achieving single-
digit NOx emission, namely GE’s H-system and Siemens/Westinghouse’s G & H classes, 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The early observations of the programme appraised the 
achievements, including steam cooling, as a ‘transitional’ innovation departing from 
traditional incremental innovations (Rycroft & Kash, 1999; Curtis, 2003). Serious problems 
of the flagship technology, namely steam cooling, would be unveiled in the following 
years of field operation, however. 
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Figure A4. Conceptual Diagram of the Closed-Loop Steam Cooling CCGTs 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Matta et al. 2000 and Diakuenchak et al. 2002 
Figure A5. Conceptual Diagrams of ‘Air Cooling’ and ‘Steam Cooling’ Vanes 
Source: Ibid. 
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 A3.2. The Reality of the ATS Programme 
Contrary to the initial observation, the flagship technology of the ATS programme 
turned out to be commercially impractical during the several years’ field operation after 
the programme. The closed-loop steam-cooling system not only increases the operational 
complexity but also weakens the flexibility, which is the core technological 
competitiveness of CCGTs. Miscellaneous redundant equipment, such as intermediate 
boilers, expensive alloy pipes and valves, should be added between the gas turbine, the 
HRSG and the steam turbine for harnessing the benefits of the system. The operational 
complexity due to the integration with the steam cycle weakens the flexibility of the 
CCGTs in responding to changing loads from start-up to full-load. For instance, start-up 
of the steam cooling CCGTs takes much longer than the air cooling ones given that the 
steam is unavailable from the HRSG when they start-up. It makes them use air cooling 
during the start-up phase and switch to steam cooling once the CCGT reaches a certain 
level of load, say above 15 per cent of the capacity, and steam from the HRSG is available. 
Otherwise, they need to install auxiliary boilers to provide cooling steams in order to start-
up faster, which also complicate the operational process (Gülen, 2019; Jeff, 2008). 
Having struggled with the operational complexity issue during up to a decade’s 
disappointing experiences in the field, both GE and Siemens/Westinghouse completely 
abandoned the steam cooling design and returned to the air-cooling one. For instance, 
Siemens/Westinghouse started development of air-cooling in 2005 and commercialised 
SGT5-8000H in 2011 while GE replaced its steam-cooling H-system with the air-cooling 
HA-system in 2015. It makes MHI, which never participated in the ATS programme, the 
only steam cooling CCGT OEM, technically limited though (Jeff, 2008; Gülen, 2019). 
Failure of the closed-loop steam cooling in the ATS programme reveals risks of 
energy technology development efforts without prior experience in reference sectors, such 
as aircraft jet engines. While the air cooling technologies have been proven with long 
years’ development and operating experience by jet engine OEMs during the Cold War 
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era and well appreciated by CCGT OEMs, the closed-loop steam cooling design was alien 
to both sectors. The CCGT OEMs would need substantially more development efforts and 
time to reach successful commercialisation of the steam-cooling unless they find sources 
from other sectors to exploit relevant knowledge and experience. 
Except for the steam cooling system, the OEMs were successful in relatively 
incremental innovations in other areas, such as improvement of DLNC, applications of 
SC alloy blades, and thermal barrier coating (TBC). Although the OEMs previously 
developed DLNC for the F-class CCGTs in the late 1980s and early 90s, the programme 
facilitated the OEMs’ upgrade of the still immature DLNC technologies, for instance. They 
drove a commercial success of CCGTs in the last decade despite the failure of the steam 
cooling. Some of the incremental innovations of CCGTs based on jet engine technologies 
need brief explanation here. 
Initially developed by jet engine OEMs, SC blades are made without grain 
boundaries by precision casting techniques. The traditional casting processes produce 
polycrystal alloys having grain boundaries which are vulnerable to oxidation, corrosion 
and cracking. Although the CCGT OEMs applied DS technology, also based on jet engine 
technologies, to mitigate the problems of polycrystal blades, it still contains grain 
boundaries. Only GE has been successful in the application of the SC blades to CCGTs 
mainly due to its advanced jet engine capabilities and advanced American precision 
casters. Although Siemens/Westinghouse also developed the large SC blades during the 
programme, it abandoned it due to increasing price of core material, namely rhenium, 
and returned to DS blades. GE maintained the technology by replacing the expensive rare 
metal with an alternative one. 
Another application of jet engine technology into CCGTs during the ATS was 
active clearance control (ACC). The ACC improves fuel efficiency and lifecycle of gas 
turbines by adjusting gaps between the turbine blade tips and the turbine casing to the 
desired level according to operational conditions. The metal volume of the blades and 
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casing parts could expand or contract asymmetrically according to changing thermal 
loads of gas turbines and alter gaps between the two parts. The alternating clearance 
beyond the desired level either generates wasteful leakage of hot gas from the combustor 
allowing the hot gas to bypass the blades or induces harmful frictions between the two 
parts. GE Aircraft Engine developed the ACC using electronic sensors and cooling air 
control valves in the early 1980s. Its ACC for aircraft engine utilises compressor air and 
fan air to expand or contract the blade shroud according to operational conditions 
(Lattime & Steinetz, 2002; Lennard & Fasching, 1982). 
Exploiting the prior innovation of its aircraft engine division, GE developed ACC 
for its CCGTs during the ATS programme. Unlike GE, Westinghouse and its successor, 
Siemens, with weak aircraft engine capabilities had to develop alternative ACC 
technologies for CCGTs. Westinghouse developed a conceptual design of the ACC using 
its limited steam cooling technology with the support from the national aircraft engine 
research centres at the end of the programme. Siemens abandoned the limited ACC design 
after the acquisition of Westinghouse, however. Instead, Siemens commercialised a 
simplified version of ACC, namely hydraulic clearance optimisation, in 2005. It moves the 
entire set of turbine blades toward the compressor side by pulling the rotor with a 
hydraulic piston to reduce the clearance between the blade tips and the conical shape of 
turbine casing when the gas turbine reaches a predetermined load, and the casing is 
thermally expanded to outward (Langston, 2013; Gülen, 2019).152 
 
 
 
 
152 Figure A4 provides tips about the concept using the conical shape of the turbine casing. 
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A4. Ramifications of the Advanced Programmes and the Results 
A4.1. Ramifications to the Global Nuclear and CCGT Markets 
First, the American CCGT and nuclear OEMs benefitted from the advanced 
American NIS which could not be replicated in other nations. The programmes 
demonstrated to what extent the OEMs could exploit the advanced infrastructure 
including the advanced national research centres, specialised suppliers and universities. 
It raises a question about the efficacy of a narrow version NIS literature, based on the 
specific context of the US, to other national cases. 
Second, the programme results demonstrated that even the advanced nuclear and 
CCGT OEMs in the most advanced NIS could not escape from the technical boundary 
shaped by the prior experience in their respective traditional reference sectors. It shows 
that radical energy technology development without enough experience in the reference 
sectors is accompanied by substantial risks as warned in the literature (Cook & Surrey, 
1989; Sahal, 1985). The empirical literature on the programmes either finds the OEMs’ 
sourcing of complementary knowledge from relevant sectors as a success factor (Bergek 
et al., 2008) or concentrates on immediate technological achievements of the programmes 
(Cummins & Matzie, 2018; Cummins et al., 2003; Curtis, 2003). However, the literature 
pays little attention to the eventual failure of the flagship technologies and its 
ramifications to the industries. The results of the two programmes deserve special 
attention regarding lessons to future energy technology innovations. 
Third, relative technological flexibility decided the winner and the loser in the 
current global electricity market despite the failure of flagship technologies in both 
programmes. The CCGT OEMs succeeded in compensating the failure of the steam 
cooling by incremental innovations in other technical areas, whereas the nuclear 
counterpart’s failure in the canned motor RCPs influenced entire projects irreversibly. It 
seems that the modularised characteristics of gas and steam turbine parts allowed the 
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flexible adaptation of the CCGT OEMs upon the failure of the flagship design while the 
nuclear counterpart got stuck in the ambitious scale-up of the pump, an inseparable 
subsystem of the passive reactor coolant system. A substantial difference in capital cost 
and construction lead time widened the difference of flexibility between the two 
technologies. The difference enabled the CCGT OEMs to discard their failed design 
through the experience of full-scale field operations before further investment while 
restricted the nuclear OEM’s verification process within quasi field-tests using other 
reactors, which were not sufficient to realise the extent of problems. 
Table A4 highlights the initial performance targets and eventual achievements 
against the conflicting requirements of environment and economics in each programme. 
It also juxtaposes the major initial innovations, field experiences and commercial results 
of the two programmes. Both programmes appear to succeed in achieving their initial 
targets in safety and environmental requirements unless the canned motor RCP issue of 
AP1000 recurs. However, their economic performances polarise. In terms of overnight 
construction cost, which includes direct & indirect construction costs and owner’s cost, 
AP1000 was estimated as much as about $1,000/kW in 2002 (Davis et al., 2002). The cost, 
however, escalated to $8,600/kW in 2017 when Georgia Power filed its construction cost 
estimate of the Vogtle project to the Public Utility Commission of Georgia State (MIT 
Energy Initiative, 2018). 
A first-of-a-kind (FOAK) reactor, such as AP1000, may incur an extra cost in the 
beginning, and the cost may decrease as following reactors are constructed. Learning 
effects between the first four AP1000 units in China and the other four American units 
seem negligible, however. Also, the official cost of the Vogtle project has doubled from 
the utility consortium’s initial cost estimation in 2008 which already covered the extra cost 
regarding the FOAK issue (Patel, 2018; MIT Energy Initiative, 2018). Compared to the 
nuclear counterpart, CCGT OEMs achieved the economic target in terms of overall 
efficiency despite the failure of the steam cooling technology (Table A4). 
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Table A4. Overall Results of the Advanced Energy Programmes in the US 
 
Concern of Economics Environmental & Safety Concern 
N
u
cl
ea
r 
(A
L
W
R
) 
 Overnight Construction Cost($/kW) Core Damage Frequency (CDF) 3 
Target: $1,363 1 Result: $8,600 2 Target: 5 × 10-7/RY Result: 5 × 10-7/RY 
Innovations Simplified Passive Safety System, Canned Motor Coolant Pump (AP1000) 
Field Experience Repeated Design Changes, Construction Delay, Cost Overrun  
Results OEM’s Bankruptcy, Several Projects Abandoned 
C
C
G
T
 (
A
T
S
) 
 Thermal Efficiency (%) 4 NOx Emission (ppm) 4 
Target > 60% Result > 60% Target < 10 ppm Result < 10 ppm 
Innovations Steam Cooling, SC Blades, DLNC Improvement, TBC, ACC 
Field Experience Operational Complexity of Steam Cooling 
Results Return to Air Cooling, Combustor Improvement  
Notes: 1. The figure is converted to 2017’s US Dollar from Westinghouse’s target (Davis et al., 2002) 
  2. The figure comes from Georgia Power’s data in 2017 (MIT Energy Initiative, 2018) 
  3. Cummins & Matzie 2018,  
  4. Curtis 2003; Gülen 2019 
 
A4.2 Performance of the Latecomers During and After The Two Programmes 
A4.2.1 Performance of the Latecomers during and after the ALWR Programme 
The Japanese and Korean latecomers’ catching-up performances based on close 
cooperation with their American partners during and after the two programmes show 
their relative capabilities and limits. During the ALWR programme, the latecomers of both 
countries resiliently absorbed the ‘Evolutionary Large Reactor’ technologies, including 
ABWR, APWR and System 80+. In terms of localisation of the reactor designs, the Japanese 
latecomers show faster and more resilient capabilities than their Korean counterpart. 
In particular, Hitachi, Toshiba and Mitsubishi were successful in cooperative 
development of ABWR and APWR designs with their respective licensors from the very 
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beginning phase of the programme. For instance, the three Japanese nuclear latecomers 
developed ABWR and APWR designs with the support from GE and Westinghouse, 
respectively, in the 1980s, when only early draft designs of the two reactors emerged in 
the US during the ALWR programme. It shows not only their remarkable absorptive 
capacity of the reactor technologies but also their resilient leveraging abilities in 
negotiating technology transfers from their licensors from such early stages. 
However, their following performance limited to the construction of only four 
units of ABWR in Japan without any reactor export record. The four units of ABWR were 
not sufficient to overcome the unfavourable track record of the entire BWR fleet in the 
global market, including the higher radiation dose of maintenance workers and the 
negligible presence of BWRs out of the US and Japan, compared to the PWR counterpart 
(see Section 3.3.1 on page 64 and Section 5.3.2. on page 217-218 for details). It is 
unfortunate for MHI that it could never build APWRs and a subsequent track record for 
the past three decades considering the PWR-dominant global nuclear market context. The 
Japanese nuclear latecomers’ unsatisfactory catching-up performance cannot be explained 
by a firm capability perspective, thereby. It is highly related to domestic institutions, such 
as strict safety regulations. 
By comparison, the Korean latecomer is the biggest beneficiary of the ALWR 
programme in terms of its track record. It has constructed four units of APR1400 and has 
six more units of APR1400 under construction, including two in Korea and four in the 
UAE, despite its slower technology transfer of System 80+ design from CE in the 1990s 
(see Section 4.3.2 and Section 5.3.2 for details). Given that construction projects in the 
respective domestic market could make a big difference in terms of the track records and 
the maturation of the newly developed reactors, a combination of safety and economic 
regulations of the domestic electricity market has been a decisive factor to the catching-
up performance in the two countries (see Section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2). 
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In particular, Korea’s success in APR1400 was supported by the tight economic 
regulation on the electricity market from the rapid mobilisation of financial and human 
resources in the technology transfer process to securing the reactor construction projects 
through the national electricity supply plan. The resource mobilisation, the electricity 
supply plans and rapid execution of the construction projects were realised by the state-
owned monopoly ESI, namely Korea Electric Power Co.(KEPCO), under the 
government’s tight control. The monopoly status of the ESI played a role in protecting the 
reactor construction projects from safety regulations. 
The absorptive capacity of the Korean nuclear consortium, including KHNP, 
KEPCO and Doosan, in learning CE design System 80+ was remarkable from the 
technology transfer of basic design features in 1992 to the design certification of APR1400 
by the Korean safety regulator in 2002. It was based on the accumulated capabilities 
during the previous System 80 design from CE for developing the Korean Standard 
Nuclear Power (KSNP) reactor in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the extent of design 
modifications involving the combinative capability from System 80+ to APR1400 was 
marginal. In effect, the APR1400 design is virtually same to the System 80+ design, having 
the same core size and fuel lattice type (16 × 16 CE fuel type) (KEPCO/KHNP, 2018) (Table 
A5). 
Table A5. Design Features of APR1400 and CE’s System 80+ 
Design Features APR1400 System 80+ KSNP(System80) 
Capacity (Mwe) 1,400 1,300 1,000 
Safety Goal (CDF/RY) ≤10-5 ≤10-5 ≤10-4 
Containment Cylindrical Spherical Cylindrical 
EC
C
S 
No. of Trains (nozzle) 4 4 2 
Safety Injection Direct Vessel Injection Direct Vessel Injection Cold Leg Injection 
RWST Location Inside Containment Inside Containment Outside Containment 
Seismic Design (g) 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Source: Lee et al. 2010; KEPCO/KHNP 2018 
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Among basic components of nuclear power plant cost, including capital cost, 
operating and maintenance cost, and fuel cost, the capital cost is the largest component. 
Capital cost is composed of two parts. The first part is the overnight cost. The ‘overnight 
cost’ refers to the cost of building the plant, including equipment, construction materials, 
and labour, regardless of how long it takes to complete the construction. The term 
‘overnight’ comes from the assumption that the reactor is constructed ‘overnight’. The 
second part is the cost of interest on financial arrangements to build the reactor, affected 
by the time required to construct the reactor and the composite interest rate of the funds 
used. The cost of interest on the funds makes it difficult to compare the economic 
performance of reactors in the global market due to the variety of financial arrangements 
according to nations, however. (MIT Energy Initiative, 2018). 
Thereby, the overnight cost gives relatively straightforward figures in comparing 
the economic competitiveness of reactors without concerning distortions due to the 
financial arrangements or subsidies. In addition, the construction lead time also gives a 
criterion to figure out the relative performance of reactors in the international comparison 
given that the additional months induce an exponential increase of the overall capital cost. 
Although the two indicators are not enough to figure out the relative competitiveness of 
nuclear power compared to other energy technologies, they provide a straightforward 
yardstick to compare relative competitiveness among reactors. 
Hitachi/Toshiba/GE alliance’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa unit 6, completed in 1996, in 
Japan is the first commercialised case among the ALWR programme results. The ABWR 
projects in Japan have been the shortest in terms of construction lead time and one of the 
cheapest in terms of overnight cost among the ALWR-derivative reactors in the past three 
decades. Despite the remarkable performance, the strict domestic safety regulation 
preventing further ABWRs after the first four units in Japan and the dismal track record 
of the BWR fleet beyond Japan and the US in the global market constrained the Japanese 
latecomers’ catching-up performance as abovementioned (Table A6). 
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Table A6. Economic Performance of the Latecomers in the Global Nuclear Market 
  
Construction 
Lead Time 
Overnight 
Cost 
Construction Status 
  
Months $/kW 
(2017’s price) 
Start Completion 
ABWR Kashiwazaki-6 (Japan) 48 I 4,298 D 1992 I 1996 I 
APR1400 Shin-Kori-3 (Korea) 98 I 2,090 N 2008 I 2016 I 
Barakah-1 (UAE) M 96 e 4,000 2012 2020 
AP1000 Vogtle-3 (US) M 104 8,600  2013 2021 
EPR Olkiluoto-3 (Finland) M 174 8,000 2005 2019 
Flamanville-3 (France) M 126 7,400  2007 2019 
Source: Du and Parsons 2009(D); MIT Energy Initiative 2018(M); NEA 2015(D); IAEA Power Reactor 
Information System(I); crude estimate based on the industry’s expectation (e) 
Note 1: ABWR=Advanced Boiling Water Reactor, APR1400=Advanced Power Reactor 1400, EPR=European 
Pressurised Reactor, AP1000=Advanced Passive 1000 
By comparison, Korea’s APR1400 reactor was constructed two decades after the 
first unit of Japan’s ABWR and took nearly double construction lead time compared to 
the ABWR counterpart. The forgery scandal of the qualification certificate of some 
components in 2012 delayed the construction schedule as long as three years and delayed 
its export project in the UAE for the same duration. Even if the scandal and following 
delays of the schedule are excluded from the calculation, the APR1400 projects lag behind 
its ABWR counterpart. Instead, the Shin-Kori units’ overnight cost has been the cheapest 
among the OECD countries. 
Although the overnight cost of Shin-Kori units is not well accepted by the 
literature other than Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD due to the transparency issue of 
detail components, that of the Barakah units in the UAE is considered still the cheapest 
among the recent nuclear construction projects in the literature (MIT Energy Initiative, 
2018)(Table A5). Together with the economic performance, the world highest operational 
performance of Korea’s domestic PWR fleet in terms of capacity factor contributed to its 
reactor export to the UAE in 2009 outpacing its competitors in the global market (Table 
A5). 
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A4.2.2 Performance of the Latecomers during and after the ATS Programme 
Regarding the ATS programme, the catching-up picture across the two latecomer 
countries is the opposite. While Japan’s MHI was remarkable in modifying the new 
technologies from Westinghouse and commercialising them into its own J-series CCGTs, 
the Korean latecomer never could exploit the benefits of the programme due to its limited 
capability and arm’s length relationship with GE, its licensor at that time. Heavy electrical 
divisions of MHI and Hitachi, except their nuclear divisions, merged to MHPS in 2014 
(See Section 5.4.3). This Chapter uses MHI instead of MHPS in order to avoid confusion, 
however. Korea’s Samsung Aerospace was struggling with a tiny emergency purpose gas 
turbine (1.2MW) without advanced foreign firms and designated users when MHI was 
busy with absorbing and modifying advanced technologies from Westinghouse with a 
close partnership with Tohoku Power during the ATS programme. 
In particular, MHI demonstrated its combinative capability during and after the 
programme. While the programme provided Westinghouse advanced external 
knowledge networks in reducing a technology gap with GE, MHI efficiently exploited the 
benefits through its close relationship with Westinghouse. The combinative capability of 
MHI was pronounced when the ATS participants abandoned the failed technologies after 
the programme. Whereas Siemens abandoned Westinghouse’s steam cooling and ACC 
designs, MHI kept the steam cooling application to reduced stationary parts, such as the 
combustor and the blade rings (inner parts of the turbine casing) like Westinghouse’s 
design. The purpose of the limited steam cooling was for enhancing its already 
competitive DLNC and compensating its weak ACC capability rather than the overall 
efficiency. MHI’s tweaking of the limited steam cooling technology for DLNC and ACC 
purposes has ramifications in three aspects. 
First, the limited steam cooling deepened MHI’s already competitive technology, 
namely DLNC, further. It already has been competitive in the combustor in the global 
CCGT market since its pioneering commercialisation of DLNC in 1984. The technical 
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bottleneck of the combustor innovation is that higher flame temperature for efficiency 
improvement induces an exponential increase of NOx emission. In overcoming the 
bottleneck, MHI’s steam cooled combustor transition piece, meaning the inner combustor 
wall for the hot gas path from the combustor to the turbine, eliminates extraction of ‘air 
bleed’ from the compressor for the cooling the inner wall and enables air-rich and fuel-
lean combustion minimising NOx emission. Besides, the elimination of the cooling air 
from the inner wall minimises thermal loss of the hot gas due to dilution with the cooling 
air. Thereby, the steam cooling enables MHI’s DLNC to preserve more thermal energy of 
the hot gas and increase electrical output at the same flame temperature and NOx 
emission of the previous combustors. 
Secondly, MHI’s limited steam cooling compensated its weak ACC capability. The 
steam secures clearance between the rings and blade tips by thermally expanding the 
rings outward while minimises the clearance by cooling the expanded rings at a 
predetermined load (Fukuizumi et al., 2004; Gülen, 2019). As explained in Section A3.1, 
the ACC technologies for CCGTs originated from the aircraft engine OEMs, such as GE 
Aircraft Engine. Westinghouse, MHI’s CCGT partner at that time, did not have the aircraft 
engine capabilities while MHI’s aircraft engine licensor, namely P&W, has been bounded 
by the US export control, however (see Section B1). It was the ATS programme that 
provided Westinghouse external networks with aircraft engine research centres reducing 
the gap of aerodynamics capability and enabled the OEM to develop conceptual ACC 
designs using the steam cooling. MHI exploited the benefits through its alliance with 
Westinghouse. It explains somehow why MHI strived to exploit even the failed steam 
cooling technology. Mitsubishi’s weakness in aircraft engine and its implication to 
catching-up performance in CCGTs, other than the ACC issue, will be analysed further in 
Appendix Chapter B. 
Thirdly, MHI’s gradual approach, which limited the steam cooling application to 
the combustor and the blade rings, minimised the expensive transition cost between the 
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air-cooling and the steam-cooling designs. It is comparable to GE’s expensive trial of the 
fully steam-cooling H-system which covers cooling of blades and vanes and the return to 
air-cooling HA-system after the complete abandonment of the steam-cooling design. It is 
also comparable to Westinghouse efforts to expand its steam cooling application to vanes 
of the first two stages through its W501ATS gas turbine design (Table A6). 
The gradual transition of MHI, deepening accompanied peripheral technologies, 
repeated during the return process from the limited steam cooling to air cooling in the 
early 2010s. Given that even the limited steam cooling incurred operational complexity 
and the additional cost, including auxiliary boilers, high-pressure steam pipes and 
materials, it was inevitable for MHI to shift to the advanced air cooling CCGT, such as the 
production of J Air-Cooled (JAC) from 2016. Its return process to air cooling was not the 
same as its competitors abandoned the steam cooling altogether with surrounding 
technologies, however. It incorporates the essential technical features of the limited steam 
cooling into its combustor cooling and ACC. It applies external air coolers for supplying 
the combustor transition piece compressed cooling air and the bypass air valve to control 
blade tip clearance assimilating its steam-cooling design (Gülen, 2019; Turbomachinery 
International, 2016) (Table A7). 
GE’s hasty return process from the full-scale steam cooling to air cooling in order 
catch-up MHI and Siemens who initially applied the steam cooling to a quite limited area 
and replaced the steam cooling with air cooling one much earlier, respectively, incurred 
another transition cost. As briefly introduced in Section 5.3.3., GE’s apparently hasty 
return process incurred the devastating blade failure of the HA-system CCGTs sold to 
four countries, including Japan, Taiwan, France and the US, from 2017. Although GE 
announced its plan to replace all blades of the HA CCGTs with alternatives in 2018, it had 
to hand over its leading position to MHI in the large CCGT market segment for the first 
time in its history (Scott, 2018, 2019; Gülen, 2019) (Figure A6). 
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Table A7. CCGT OEM’s Transition between Steam Cooling and Air Cooling 
 Steam Cooling Air Cooling 
GE H-System (1998~ the early 2010s): 
Full SC + ACC  
HA-System (2015~): 
Air Cooling + Passive Clearance Control  
S/W W501G & W501ATS (1998~’05): 
Limited SC + Pilot ACC 
SGT8000H (2011~): 
Air Cooling + Hydraulic Control 
MHI M501G & J-Series (1999~): 
More Limited SC + ACC 
JAC-Series (2016~): 
Air Cooling + Enhanced ACC  
Note: S/W = Siemens/Westinghouse, SC = Steam Cooling, ACC = Active Clearance Control 
 
Figure A6. Global Gas Turbine Market Share by Capacity Ordered 
Source: Author’s elaboration from Scott 2018 
 
A5. Chapter Conclusion 
The Chapter analysed the two advanced energy technology programmes in the US 
with particular attention to their flagship technologies and relatively marginal 
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technologies in each programme in order to understand the technological sources and 
limits of the Japanese and Korean latecomers in nuclear and CCGT technologies from the 
global market perspective. It finds that neither the technological capability nor the NIS 
brought the advanced OEMs failures of the flagship technologies after the two 
programmes. It was the ignorance of a rule of thumb of energy technology development 
that brought the OEMs the failures. Their radical approaches, including the abrupt scale-
up of military pumps for commercial nuclear reactors and the non-traditional integration 
of steam and gas turbine cycles, in the absence of sufficient experience of their traditional 
reference sectors, exposed them to the tremendous risks. Despite the failure of flagship 
technologies of both programmes, technological flexibility made a difference in the 
adaptation of the OEMs across nuclear power and CCGTs. 
It also finds that changes in economic and environmental regulation on the US 
energy markets in the 1980s not only induced the two energy technology programmes but 
also influenced their relationship during the programmes. The regulatory reforms of 
electricity and natural gas markets induced the abrupt scale-up of the AP600 design 
concerning the prospective competition with CCGTs having access to cheap natural gas. 
Thereby, the institutional changes not only linked the two irrelevantly co-existed 
technologies into a direct competition but also changed the direction of the advanced 
nuclear programme, which eventually exacerbated the development process. 
While the American OEMs paid substantial transition cost and time for their 
unqualified flagship technologies after the programmes, the Japanese and Korean 
latecomers caught-up with their American partners through either rapid deployment of 
the second-best reactor or limited applications of the unqualified design from the 
programmes. It could be considered as a typical benefit of latecomers that catch-up with 
forerunners from a distance assimilating only proven technologies while avoiding the 
development risks the forerunners should take. In this case, absorptive capacity and firm 
capability of latecomers are frequently emphasised as the source of catching-up 
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performance in the literature. Indeed, the Japanese CCGT latecomer’s combinative 
capability and its nuclear counterparts’ absorptive capacity have been remarkable in 
individual catching-up perspectives. 
However, neither firm capability nor absorptive capacity explains the mutually-
exclusive catching-up performances of the two latecomers across nuclear and CCGTs 
despite the Japanese latecomers’ superior capabilities in both technologies, compared to 
the Korean counterpart. The failure of the Japanese nuclear latecomers in accumulating 
enough track records of ABWR and APWR in the country despite their decades earlier 
technology localisation of the ALWR-derivative reactors compared to the Korean 
counterpart was the result of domestic regulations rather than firm capabilities. Korea’s 
nuclear export case in addition to continued construction projects in the country despite 
its much slower localisation of another ALWR-derivative reactor also urges to pay 
attention to institutional factors rather than firm capabilities. 
Table A7. Latecomers’ Catching-up Performance after the Two Programmes 
 
American OEMs’ Results Latecomers’ Catching-up 
A
L
W
R
 (
N
u
cl
ea
r)
 
AP1000 
(W) 
Failed with irretrievable cost 
due to abrupt scale-up of RCP 
- - 
System 80+ 
(CE) 
Transferred to Korea APR1400 
(KHNP/DHIC) 
Overcame the limited capability 
with rapid mobilisation of resources 
ABWR(GE) Transferred to Hitachi & Toshiba ABWR Constrained by safety regulations 
despite superior absorptive capacity 
APWR(W) Transferred to MHI APWR 
A
T
S
 (
C
C
G
T
) 
(C
C
G
T
) 
HA-System 
(GE) 
Return to Air Cooling with 
substantial transition cost, 
Incremental innovations in 
TBC & DLNC enabled the 
OEMs to thrive  
J/JAC (MHI) Limited Steam Cooling for 
enhancing already robust DLNC 
and compensating weak ACC, 
Return to Air Cooling minimising 
transition cost & took a leading position  
SGT5-
8000H (S/W) 
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Appendix B. Japan’s Jet Engine Capability and Limits 
 
B1. Spill-over Effect of Jet Engine Technology to CCGTs 
In order to clarify the possible spill-over effects of the Japanese jet engine 
capability to their CCGT catching-up performance, this Appendix Chapter analyses the 
potential and limits. As described in the case of Ishikawajima Precision Casting Co. (see 
Section 5.3.4), Japan’s more extensive coverage in jet engine programmes and stronger 
performances in commercial aircraft engines compared to its Korean counterpart raises a 
question whether its CCGT success originates from its jet engine capability. For instance, 
IHI’s licensed production share was about 60 per cent in both F-15J and F-2 (Japanese 
version of F-16) programmes in dollar value while Samsung Techwin’s share during 
Korea’s F-16 and F-15 fighter programmes were 41 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively 
(Chen, 2014; NRC, 1994). 
Before the analysis of the potential of the Japanese version spill-over, it is necessary 
to look at a typical case of spill-over between aircraft engine and CCGT technologies. 
General Electric has efficiently exploited its advanced jet engine technologies in 
developing high-pressure turbine(HPT) components, thermal barrier coatings and DLNC 
for CCGTs. In improving the temperature of CCGTs, the material, casting process, and 
cooling design of the HPT blades and vanes of the jet engine were the key technological 
factors. General Electric’s development of the F-class gas turbines in 1990 typifies the 
characteristics of the spill-over effect. It applied the same material (GTD111 superalloy), 
precision casting process (DS), and cooling air passage concept (serpentine) of its CF6 jet 
engine blades, developed in the late 1960s, to the F-class gas turbine blades (Peterson, 
1989; Soares, 2008; Watson, 1997). 
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Regarding the DLNC technology of the F-class, GE developed the capability based 
on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s jet fighter programme for reducing 
NOx emission which was a signature of radar detection during the Cold War era (Watson, 
1997). In parallel with the military development, NASA also conducted a low NOx 
combustor technology research programme from 1976 to prepare prospective 
requirements of the Clean Air Act (CAA) which would require all types of aircraft engines 
to reduce NOx emission. Under NASA’s support, GE and P&W participated the joint 
‘Experimental Clean Combustor Program’ and researched a few combustor concepts, 
including premixed lean burn (Anderson, 1976; Munt, 1981). Although the programme 
did not result in immediate commercial success, it should have offered a substantial 
knowledge base to the DLNC of F-class gas turbine too. 
However, the successful Japanese CCGT catching-up case did not depend on such 
a spill-over, at least in core parts. Among the three major Japanese jet engine makers, 
namely Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI), Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) 
and MHI, IHI has been the primary producer of military jet engine parts under GE and 
P&W licences in Japan while MHI has been more active in commercial jet engines under 
the P&W licence (NRC, 1994). Whether it is military or commercial, the Japanese engine 
makers have not had access to core parts of jet engines due to technology strategies of the 
global jet engine OEMs and the US government’s export control. 
In principle, the US government under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 does 
not allow the transfer of core technologies both in the military and commercial jet engines, 
such as the ‘hot section’ of engines, to foreign partners.153 More specifically, “exports of 
the most sensitive hot section technology have not been permitted, even to close allies” 
under the US Department of State’s authority (GAO, 1997a: 18). Although it does not 
define what “the most sensitive hot section” indicates, technologies of the HPT blades and 
 
153 The hot section of the jet engine includes a combustor and a turbine while a cold section 
includes a turbofan and low-pressure and high-pressure compressors. 
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vanes which should endure high temperature and high-pressure have not been 
transferred from the global OEMs to the Japanese aircraft engine latecomers. Although 
licensed productions of some hot section parts have been allowed under government-to-
government agreements, they were limited in technically non-core parts, such as a low-
pressure turbine (LPT), in the Japanese air fighter programmes (GAO, 1997a, 1997b; NRC, 
1994). 
B2. Division of Labour Between Jet Engine OEMs and Parts Suppliers 
There is a considerable difference between the HPT and the LPT in terms of 
severity which they should withstand and their contribution to the overall efficiency of 
engines. The compressed air stream, from a compressor, is mixed with fuel in a combustor 
and reaches a very high temperature. As the hot gas mass enters the HPT, its volume 
expands, and the energy is transformed into the kinetic energy of the HPT blades, the 
pressure and temperature of the hot gas shrink dramatically. In GE’s GE90 series engines 
for commercial aircraft, for instance, the temperature of the air reaches about 1,500°C in 
the entrance of the HPT and drops to around 1,000°C before it enters the LPT (EASA, 2017; 
Lukachko & Waitz 1997). 
Thereby, the aircraft engine OEMs’ innovations concentrate on the HPT blades 
and vanes applying high-grade superalloy, complex air-cooling designs, TBC and ACC 
while leaving the LPT blades with low-grade or outmoded superalloys and often 
uncooled designs. The logic is the same as the CCGT counterpart’s innovations 
concentrate on the first two stages of the modern four-stage gas turbines (see Section 
A3.1.). Instead, the global OEMs’ primary concern on the LPT is reducing the count of 
blades and vanes to reduce the overall weight of jet engines and maintenance cost 
(Donachie & Donachie, 2002; Gier, 2008). It leads to the outsourcing of the LPT parts to 
licensed producers for cost reduction rather than technological issues. 
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The specific concern of weights in the aircraft engine industry makes the jet engine 
LPT technology even less relevant to CCGT OEMs that do not concern about the weight 
of power plants. Unlike the aircraft engine OEMs, the CCGT counterparts focus on the 
overall thermal efficiency of the gas turbines with increasingly larger and heavier LPT 
blades and vanes. Although relatively smaller CCGTs in the early 1990s, such as GE’s 
7001F case, improved efficiency using jet engine technology spun off the US Department 
of Defense (DOD) programmes, there has been a diverging trend between modern CCGT 
and DOD spill-over technologies in that required energy efficiency and the extent of NOx 
control of CCGTs are far beyond those of the jet engines (NRC, 2001). 
Therefore, there has been a clear division of labour between the global OEMs and 
parts suppliers in the global jet engine market. While the three OEMs, notably GE, P&W 
and Rolls Royce (R-R), cover the main engine control, overall system integration and high-
pressure parts, including the HPT and high-pressure compressor, they outsource specific 
components for low-pressure parts, including the LPT & low-pressure compressor (LPC) 
and a low-pressure shaft, combustion chamber, and some accessory parts to respective 
licensed producers. For instance, they outsource LPT supply to Snecma (France), Avio 
(Italy), Motoren Turbinen Union (MTU) (Germany), Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds 
(GKN)/Volvo (UK), Industria de Turbo Propulsores (ITP) (Spain), IHI and KHI (Japan), 
while outsource combustor supply to another group including Avio, MHI (Japan), 
Samsung Techwin (Korea), GKN Volvo, Danville Metal Stamping and Turbo Combustor 
Technology (US).154 The OEMs often invite those licensed producers as Risk and Revenue 
Sharing Partners for joint international aircraft engine programmes, such as V2500, to 
reduce development cost burden, but the division of labour is similar (EC, 2013). 
Table B1. Shows the global LPT market share for large commercial aircraft 
(installed base) in 2013, dominated by numerous parts suppliers. Snecma’s large market 
 
154 Samsung Techwin was taken by a Korean conglomerate and became Hanwha Techwin in 2015.  
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share comes from its special arrangement of production and marketing with GE in the EU 
region rather than its technological capability. MTU also has been actively involved in the 
production of LPT modules through the long-term alliance with P&W since the 1980s. The 
jet engine OEMs’ own production of LPT is quite limited while they depend on 
outsourcing to the parts suppliers to reduce production cost. Often, the OEMs support the 
parts suppliers in manufacturing or even sponsor new entrants into the LPT market. R-
R’s support of a new entrant of ITP in 1992 shows the case (EC, 2013, 2017). 
Despite the active involvement of the parts suppliers in the LPT market, the high-
pressure parts are so critical that the deficiency of proprietary technological knowledge in 
the area acts as a substantial barrier for potential new entrants into the jet engine market. 
The parts suppliers do not have other choice but become subcontractors or joint venture 
partners of the jet engine OEMs (EC, 2001, 2013). It is not surprising that the LPT parts 
suppliers do not have an independent capability to develop CCGTs other than licensed 
manufacturing of parts of small aero-derivative gas turbines, such as IHI’s production of 
GE’s LM-series gas turbines. 
Table B1. World Low-Pressure Turbine Market Share for Commercial Aircraft (2013) 
 
Narrow-body 
(100-200 seats) 
Wide-body 
(200-400 seats)  
Total  
Snecma (France) 70-80% 5-10% 50-60% 
MTU (Germany) 10-20% 10-20% 10-20% 
GKN/Volvo (UK/Sweden) 0-5% 30-40% 10-20% 
P&W (US) 5-10% 0-5% 5-10% 
Avio (Italy) 5-10% 5-10% 5-10% 
GE (US) 0-5% 0-5% 0-5% 
KHI (Japan) 0-5% 0-5% 0-5% 
IHI (Japan) 0-5% 10-20% 0-5% 
ITP (Spain) 0-5% 10-20% 0-5% 
Source: European Commission 2013: 21 
Note: Avio and ITP were merged by GE and R-R in 2013 and 2017, respectively. 
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B3. Reversed Positions of the Japanese Jet Engine and CCGT Capabilities 
Together with the clear division of labour in the global market, the US export 
control regime has effectively constrained Japanese aircraft engine capabilities. Japanese 
air fighter programmes have been a major source for the manufacturers’ access to modern 
jet engine technologies. Ishikawajima-Harima has been the primary licensed-producer of 
jet engine parts among the Japanese engine makers during the Japanese air fighter 
programmes including P&W’s F100 engines for F-15J in the 1980s and GE’s F110 engines 
for F-2 in the 1990s and 2000s. In both programmes, IHI produced about 60 per cent of the 
engines in dollar value covering the LPT parts including LPT blades and vanes and low-
pressure shafts. Nevertheless, the US export control regime prohibited licensed 
production of core engine technologies, such as HPT parts (Drohan, 2015; GAO, 1997b; 
NRC, 1994). 
As such, the role of MHI’s aero-engine division in the commercial engine 
programmes also has been limited in combustors and the non-HPT parts. While MHI took 
a part of the development of fuselages and avionics systems rather than jet engines in both 
Japanese fighter programmes, it has been active in the production of commercial jet 
engine parts based on other international programmes. It started licensed production of 
LPT blades and LPC disks of jet engines under P&W licence from the 1970s. It, 
nevertheless, has not been involved in the production of HPT blades and vanes other than 
combustors in its joint international jet engine programmes, such as V2500, PW4000 and 
Trent 1000 (MHIAEL, 2014; NRC, 1994). 
Only recently, MHI began to produce HPT disks in addition to combustors of 
P&W’s PW1200G engines for its indigenous commercial aircraft, namely Mitsubishi 
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Regional Jet, in 2018 (MHIAEL, 2014; Waldron, 2018).155 It would be the first case that MHI 
has produced HPT parts in its history of commercial jet engines, but the disks do not 
contain such technological ramifications as the HPT blades and vanes in terms of design, 
material and casting process. Given that its technological implication is rather marginal, 
it seems a somewhat symbolic attempt of MHI gradually stepping over the threshold of 
the US export control on core engine parts. Also, it could be explained as the latecomer’s 
‘linking and leveraging strategy’ expanding its coverage of production gradually from 
relatively simple to more complex parts in the relationship with the foreign partner. 
Whether symbolic or strategic, the relevance of the HPT disk production to MHI’s 
CCGT catching-up performance is questionable considering that it already achieved 
major progress in its CCGT catching-up trajectory in the 1980s and 90s, such as the world-
first DLNC and its proprietary DS turbine blades. By comparison, Japanese aircraft engine 
industries never could manufacture their own original aircraft engines other than licensed 
production of the LPT parts.156 Occasional productions of marginal HPT parts, such as 
disks, would contribute an only fringe portion to its already flourishing CCGT capability 
at best. 
On the contrary, MHI’s consistent involvement in combustor production for 
collaborative jet engine programmes with foreign OEMs is more pronounced in a 
potential relationship between its jet engine and CCGT business. Contrasting to the GE’s 
spill-over case, its DLNC of CCGTs contributed to its specialisation of combustors for 
those collaborative jet engine programmes from V2500, commercialised in 1993. The 
speciality of MHI in combustors for jet engines repeatedly played a role in the following 
 
155 MHI stopped receiving orders for the MRJ aircraft after a few dozens of cancellation cases 
occurred. It reportedly shifted its main product line from the initial 90-seat MRJ to 70 plane-seat 
M100 in 2019.  
156 Although Japan produced indigenous 60 seat YS-11 aircraft from the 1960s to 70s, it had to 
depend on R-R’s propeller engine. Even the second indigenous aircraft, namely 70 seat M100, 
depends on P&W’s jet engine as of 2019.  
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jet engine co-development programmes, such as PW4000 and PW6000 with P&W, and 
Trent 1000 with R-R (MHIAEL, 2014). It should be noted that MHI already specialised its 
capability in the DLNC system from its M701D CCGT in 1984 (see Section 5.3.3). 
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Appendix C.  
 
List of Interviewees 
Interviewees in the Korean Case 
Interviewees Regarding Nuclear Power Issues 
Taejung Park, Principal Engineer, Steam Generator Design Team, Doosan Heavy Industries 
& Construction, Changwon, on 14 March 2011 
Chaeyoung Lim, Director of R&D Coordination Division, Korea Atomic Energy Research 
Institute (KAERI), Daejon, on 18 March 2011 
Manki Lee, Senior Researcher of Nuclear Economics, Korea Atomic Energy Research 
Institute (KAERI), Daejon, on 18 March 2011 
Byungoo Kim, a former senior researcher of Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, 
Professor of Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, Korea Advanced 
Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST), Daejon, on 23 March 2011 
Unghan Lee, former deputy director of Quality Control division at Yonggwang Nuclear 
Power unit 5 & 6, on 14 July 2012 (Email Interview) 
Taehyun Choi, Director General for Materials and Components Industries, Ministry of 
Trade, Industry & Energy, Sejong, on 16 January 2015 
Seonkyo Jung, former Director of Technology Development Department, KEPCO Nuclear 
Fuel, Daejon, on 23 January 2015 
Jongbae Park, Professor, Department of Electricity and Electronics Engineering, Konkuk 
University, Seoul, on 14 May 2015 
Anonymous, General Manager of Pricing Office, Korea Electric Power Co. (KEPCO), Naju, 
on 19 May 2015 
Younghwan Chun, Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering, Hongik University, 
Seoul, on 12 July 2017 
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Interviewees Regarding Gas Turbine Issues 
Hyunkyu Kim, former Senior Researcher of Korea Electricity Power Engineering Co. 
(KOPEC), Seoul, on 21 February 2011 
Byungmoon Chang, Executive Director, Korea Lost Wax Technology Research Center, Sihwa 
Industrial Complex, on 7-8 March 2011 and 8 September 2017 
Bumsoo Kim, a senior researcher of Korea Electric Power Research Institute, Daejon, on 10 
March 2011 
Chunrok Kang, Chief Engineer, Gas & Hydro Turbine Engineering Team, Doosan Heavy 
Industries & Construction, Changwon, on 14 March 2011 
Daeseok Jung, Assistant Manager, Gas & Hydro Turbine Engineering Team, Doosan Heavy 
Industries & Construction, Changwon, on 14 March 2011 
Haechan Kim, former senior engineer of Hyundai Heavy Industries, a deputy director of 
Hyundai Electric, Changwon, on 15 March 2011 
Sooyong Kim, Management Director of Gas Turbine Development, Doosan Heavy 
Industries & Construction, Daejon, on 16 March 2011 
Sungho Lee, Senior Researcher of Green Energy Laboratory, Korea Electric Power Research 
Institute, Daejon, on 16 January 2013 
Jungchel Chang, Senior Researcher of System Reliability Group, Korea Electric Power 
Research Institute, Daejon, on 16 January 2013 
Byungwook Kong, Senior Researcher of Central Research Center, Doosan Heavy Industries 
& Construction on 15 January 2015 (Email interview) 
Anonymous, Team Leader of Marketing, Independent Power Producer, Seoul, on 15 May 
2015 
Anonymous, Officer of Climate and Air Quality Policy Division, Ministry of Environment, 
Sejong, on 8 June 2015 
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Participatory Observations 
Heebong Chae, Director General for Energy Saving and Efficiency, Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Energy (MOTIE), Public comments during a conference meeting for 
the 2nd Energy Demand and Supply Basic Plan, Gwacheon, on 14 June 2013 
Suengjin Kang, Professor of Graduate School of Energy, Korea Polytechnic University, 
Public comments during a conference meeting for the 2nd Energy Demand and 
Supply Basic Plan, Seoul, on 21 June 2013 
Kyungsik Kim, Director of External Cooperation Department, Hyundai Steel, Public 
comments during a conference meeting for the 2nd Energy Demand and Supply 
Basic Plan hosted by the Federation of Korean Industries, Seoul, on 2 October 2013 
Yunki Ahn, Director of Management Research Centre, POSCO Research Institute, Public 
comments during a Public-Private Joint Workshop on Greenhouse Gas Forecasting 
hosted by Greenhouse Gas Inventory & Research Centre of Korea, Seoul, on 27-29 
March 2015 
 
Interviewees in the Japanese Case 
Interviewees Regarding Nuclear Power Issues 
Yuji Takahashi, Chief Operating Officer, International Nuclear Energy Development of 
Japan Co., LTD. (JINED), Tokyo, 1 February 2011 
Yoshihiro Tomioka, General Manager of Nuclear Power Department, The Federation of 
Electric Power Corporations, Tokyo, on 1 February 2011 
Takuya Hattori, President, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., and former CEO of Tokyo 
Electricity Power Company, Tokyo, on 5 February 2011 
Jiro Kida, Deputy Director of Nuclear Energy Policy Division, Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry, Tokyo, on 5 February 2011 
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Shin Horiguchi, Officer of Nuclear Energy Policy Division, Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry, Tokyo, on 5 February 2011 
Tatsujiro Suzuki, Vice Chair of Japan Atomic Energy Commission, Tokyo, on 16 February 
2011 
Tetsunari Iida, Former Senior Researcher, Socioeconomic Research Center, Central 
Research Institute of Electric Power Industry on 5 July 2012 (Email interview) 
Interviewees as Secondary Information Sources from Korea 
Sunkyo Jeong, former Executive Chief of KEPCO Nuclear Fuel on 23 January 2015 
Interviewees Regarding Gas Turbine Issues 
Osamu Kimura, Research Economist, Socioeconomic Research Center, Central Research 
Institute of Electric Power Industry, Tokyo, on 2 and 15 February 2011, and a 
separate Email interview on 8 April 2015 
Shinya Kajiki, Research Economist, Socioeconomic Research Center, Central Research 
Institute of Electric Power Industry, Tokyo, on 2 February 2012 
Interviewees as Secondary Information Sources from Korea 
Youngsoo Yu, Senior Researcher, High Temperature Material Department, Korea Institute 
of Material Science, on 13 January 2015 (Email interview) 
Byungwook Kong, Senior Researcher of Central Research Center, Doosan Heavy Industries 
& Construction, on 15 January 2015 (Email interview) 
Jungwoo Lee, Deputy Director, Gas & Hydro Turbine Engineering Team Doosan Heavy 
Industries & Construction on 23 January 2015 (Email interview) 
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